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Having	  never	  been	  formally	  colonised	  and	  more	  recently	  emerging	  from	  14	  years	  of	  
intermittent	   armed	   conflict,	   Liberia	   represents	   a	   stark	   case	   study	   in	   citizenship	  
construction	   because	   of	   its	   idiosyncratic	   history	   of	   black	   settler	   state	   formation.	  
Because	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  tool	  of	  exclusion—once	  barring	  
women,	   non-­‐settlers,	   non-­‐Christians,	   and	   non-­‐blacks—it	   remains	   a	   violently	  
contested	   space	   of	   inquiry	   with	   newer	   forms	   of	   citizenship	   now	   developing	   in	  
Liberia	  and	  within	  transnational	  spaces.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   argue	   that	   conflict,	  migration,	   globalisation	  and	  post-­‐war	   recovery	  
have	   configured	   and	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   across	   space	   and	   time,	  
thereby	   influencing	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   a	   dual	  
citizenship	   bill	   proposed	   in	   2008.1	  The	   bill	   is	   used	   as	   a	   point	   of	   entry	   to	   evaluate	  
Liberia’s	   long-­‐standing	   struggle	   to	   construct	   a	   unique	   brand	   of	   citizenship	   that	   is	  
totalising,	  tactical	  and	  timeless.	  	  
	  
My	   findings	   show	   that	   contemporary	   constructions	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  
transcend	   the	   legal	   definition	   enshrined	   in	   the	   country’s	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	  
Law—moving	   from	   passive,	   identity-­‐based	   citizenship	   to	   more	   active,	   practice-­‐
based	  citizenship.	  Thus,	   claims	   for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	   citizenship	  are	  
manifestations	   of	   the	   hybridity	   of	   citizenship	   (identity	   +	   practice).	   Using	   actor-­‐
oriented	   analysis	   as	  my	   theoretical	   framework,	   I	   examine	   the	   interfaces	   between	  
202	   Liberian	   interviewees—namely,	   homeland	   Liberians	   in	   Monrovia;	   Liberian	  
diasporas	   in	   London,	   Washington,	   Freetown,	   and	   Accra;	   permanent	   and	   circular	  
returnees;	   executive	   and	   legislative	   members	   of	   government,	   including	   the	   four	  
sponsors	   of	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill—showing	   that	   their	  
conceptualisations	   of	   'Liberian	   citizenship'	   differ	   according	   to	   their	   lived	  
experiences	   and	   social	   locations,	   and	   ultimately	   influence	   participation,	   or	   lack	  
thereof,	  in	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  	  
	  
Given	   the	   dynamic	   trends	   in	   citizenship	   configuration	   across	   the	   globe	   and	  
particularly	   in	   Africa,	   my	   findings	   fill	   gaps	   in	   the	   growing	   body	   of	   literature	   on	  
citizenship	   and	   participation	   in	   emigrant-­‐sending	   countries.	   The	   thesis	   further	  
contributes	  to	  debates	  about	  how	  to	  rebuild	  states	  whose	  wars	  were	  fuelled	  by	  the	  





                                                
1	  If	  enacted,	  the	  bill	  would	  enable	  Liberian	  citizen	  women	  to	  pass	  on	  citizenship	  to	  their	  children	  as	  
well	  as	  grant	  dual	  citizenship	  to	  Liberians	  by	  birth	  who	  naturalised	  elsewhere	  (or	  have	  aspirations	  to	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Chapter	  I	  	  
The	  Love	  of	  Liberty	  Divided	  Us	  Here?	  
	  
Liberia’s	   official	   seal	   and	   motto	   are	   symbols	   of	   its	   contested	   ontology	   and	   of	  
competing	   realities	   colliding	   and	   co-­‐mingling.	   The	   official	   seal,	   or	   coat	   of	   arms,	  
consists	  of	  a	  shield	  with	  an	  idyllic	  pictorial	  of	  a	  passenger	  ship	  seen	  from	  the	  shore,	  
approaching	   new	   territory.	   An	   invisible,	   straight	   line	   connects	   the	   ship	   with	   an	  
inviting	   palm	   tree	   jutting	   out	   of	   the	   earth.	   There	   is	   a	  white	   dove	   hovering	   on	   the	  
horizon,	   its	   beak	   carrying	   a	   scroll	   symbolising	   peace	   and	   freedom	   (Henries	   and	  
Henries,	  1950:	  35).	  Beaming	  rays	  from	  a	  half-­‐exposed	  sun	  appear	  in	  the	  background	  
to	   complete	   the	   symbolism	   of	   newness	   and	   discovery.	   In	   the	   foreground	   of	   the	  
shield,	  on	  lush,	  green	  grass,	  lie	  a	  shovel	  dug	  into	  the	  earth	  and	  a	  plough	  representing	  
the	   dignity	   of	   hard	   labour,	   primarily	   from	   subsistence	   agriculture	   (Henries	   and	  
Henries,	   1950:	   35).	  Above	   the	   shield	   is	   a	   scroll	  with	  Liberia’s	   national	  motto:	  The	  
Love	  of	  Liberty	  Brought	  Us	  Here,	  and	  below	  it	  another	  scroll	  with	  the	  words	  Republic	  
of	  Liberia.	  	  
	  




This	  pictorial	  signifies	  America	  meeting	  Africa,	  yet	  it	  depicts	  the	  experiences	  of	  only	  




and	  now,	  almost	  200	  years	   later	   in	   the	  21st	   century.	   In	   fact,	  Liberia’s	  Constitution,	  
national	  motto,	  seal,	   flag	  and	  Declaration	  of	   Independence—which	  states:	   “We,	  the	  
people	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   of	   Liberia	   were	   originally	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   United	  
States	  of	  America”—all	  exemplify	  settler	  hegemony	  in	  the	  body	  politic	  (Dunn,	  1979).	  
Yet,	   some	   scholars	   argue	   that	   Liberia	   was	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   polarised	  
hegemonic	   narrative	   espoused	   by	   historians.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	  
independence	  Liberia	  expanded	  horizontally	  and	  vertically,	  while	  “many	  indigenous	  
groups	  that	  were	  shown	  on	  maps	  as	  included	  in	  the	  territory	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  
control—and	  oppression—by	  the	  Liberian	  state	  until	  decades	  after	   independence”	  
(Burrowes,	  2004:	  2).	  Furthermore,	  there	  were	  wars	  of	  resistance	  pitting	  indigenes	  
against	   settlers	  during	   the	   first	  half-­‐century	  of	   the	  country’s	  establishment	   (Dunn,	  
1979:	   31;	   TRC,	   2009b:	   114;	   Waugh,	   2011).	   However	   appealing	   these	   counter-­‐
narratives	  appear,	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  negate	  the	  pervasive	  nature	  of	  settler	  
domination	   before	   1980.	   	   In	   19th	   century	   Liberia,	   the	   ‘love	   of	   liberty’	   signified	  
erasure	   and	   silencing	   of	   indigenous	   agency	   because	   it	   evoked	   the	   experiences	   of	  
repatriated	  blacks	   from	  the	  US.	   It	   further	  represented	  a	  euphemistic	  proclamation	  
that	  divided	  rather	  than	  united	  settler	  Liberians	  and	  their	  indigenous	  counterparts.	  
In	   the	   21st	   century,	   the	   ‘love	   of	   liberty’	   represents	   a	   contemporary	   resurgence	   of	  
contestations	  about	  citizenship.	  	  
	  
This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   junctures	   at	   which	   multiple	   histories	   intersect	   to	  
interrogate	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  in	  contemporary	  development	  and	  
political	  practice.	   I	  use	   inverted	  commas	   to	  encase	   the	   term	  throughout	   the	   thesis	  
because	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   constantly	   shifting	   conceptualisations	   and	   practices	   of	  
citizenship	  over	  space	  and	  time.	  My	  title,	  “The	  Love	  of	  Liberty	  Divided	  Us	  Here?”,	  is	  a	  
satirical	  revision	  of	  Liberia’s	  motto,	  where	  the	   ‘here’	  signifies	  a	  dualism	  of	  time,	   in	  
this	   case,	   the	   21st	   century,	   and	   a	   matter	   of	   utmost	   importance	   to	   national	  
development,	  the	  question	  of	  citizenship.	  I	  argue	  that	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  has	  been	  
configured	   and	   reconfigured	   across	   space	   and	   time	  because	   of	   four	   historical	   and	  
contemporary	   factors,	   namely,	   conflict,	   migration,	   globalisation	   and	   post-­‐war	  
recovery.	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  Liberia’s	  state	  formation,	  citizenship	  was	  conceived	  




were	   characterised	   by	   exclusion	   rather	   than	   inclusion.	   Citizenship,	   therefore,	  
remains	  a	  violently	  contested	  space	  of	  inquiry.	  
	  
From	  Black	  Settler	  Migration	  to	  Post-­‐War	  Recovery	  
Liberia’s	   historical	   trajectory	   has	   been	   characterised	   by	   migration,	   mobility,	  
contestation,	   conflict,	   exile	   and	   return,	   thereby	   facilitating	   new	   configurations	   of	  
citizenship	   across	   space	   and	   time.	   The	   country	   was	   established	   in	   1822	   as	   an	  
“American	   outpost”	   for	   free	   blacks	   and	   repatriated	   slaves	   by	   the	   American	  
Colonisation	  Society	  (ACS),	  an	  association	  of	  influential	  abolitionists,	  yet	  its	  history	  
predates	  black	  settlement	  (Burrowes,	  2004:	  1;	  Moran,	  2006:	  2;	  Kieh,	  2012a:	  168).	  In	  
1847,	  Liberia	  declared	  itself	  independent	  seeking	  increased	  autonomy	  from	  the	  ACS,	  
fearing	  British	  and	  French	   territorial	  encroachment	  (Guannu,	  1989:	  49;	  Burrowes,	  
2004:	   61).	   During	   this	   time,	   the	   country	   became	   a	   prime	   location	   for	   the	  
convergence	   of	   a	   multitude	   of	   disparate	   actors,	   including	   the	   16	   ethno-­‐linguistic	  
indigenous	   groups	   already	   occupying	   the	   territory,	   black	   repatriates	   from	   the	  
United	   States,	   recaptives	   from	   the	   Congo	   River	   Basin	   in	   central	   Africa,	   and	  
emigrants	   from	   the	  West	   Indies	   (Liebenow,	   1987:	   19;	   Guannu,	   1989).	   Despite	   its	  
amalgam	  of	  identities,	  Liberia	  adopted	  a	  uniquely	  defined	  frame	  of	  citizenship	  that	  
soon	   turned	   hegemonic	   (Burrowes,	   2004:	   69).	   Modelled	   after	   the	   United	   States’	  
initial	  conferring	  of	  citizenship	  on	  white	  male	  landed	  gentry,	  Liberia’s	  construction	  
of	  citizenship	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  reflected	  a	  settler	  male	  ethos,	  ruling	  out	  indigenes,	  
non-­‐Christians,	  women	  of	   both	   indigenous	   and	   settler	   orientation,	   and	  non-­‐blacks	  
(Burrowes,	   2004:	   69).	   Not	   until	   100	   years	   after	   state	   formation	   would	   most	  
Liberians	   of	   ‘Negro	   descent’	   experience	   citizenship	   fully	   (Wreh,	   1976:	   42;	   Dunn,	  
1979),	   further	   illustrating	   that	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  has	  historically	  been	  a	   tool	  of	  
exclusion	  and	  privilege	  rather	  than	  an	  automatic	  entitlement	  at	  birth.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  nature	  of	  Liberia’s	  black	  settler	  state	   formation	  precluded	  nationalism	  and	  did	  
not	   lend	   itself	   to	   national	   identity	   consolidation.	   Unlike	   African	   polities	   that	  
underwent	  fierce	  nationalist	  struggles	  against	  colonial	  rule,	  Liberia	  was	  declared	  the	  
first	  black	  African	  republic	  nearly	  a	  century	  before	  independence	  movements	  began	  





Liberia	  was	  ruled	  from	  1847	  to	  1980	  by	  the	  True	  Whig	  Party	  (TWP),	  an	  oligarchy	  of	  
descendants	   of	   black	   settlers	   (Guannu,	   1989).	   Before	   President	   William	   Tubman	  
introduced	  an	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  in	  1947	  to	  court	  foreign	  investors,	  there	  were	  calls	  
to	  incorporate	  indigenous	  populations	  into	  the	  mainstream	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  3;	  
Kieh,	  1992:	  39;	  42).	  Tubman	  introduced	  the	  Unification	  Policy	  in	  1946	  subsequently	  
recognising	  women	  and	  indigenous	  men	  as	  citizens	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  a	  decidedly	  
failed	  attempt	  to	  construct	  a	  nation	  within	  a	  state	  (Dunn,	  Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	  2001:	  
341).	   Elite	   Liberians	   travelled	   to	   the	   United	   States	   and	   elsewhere	   for	   vacation,	  
business	  ventures	  and	  higher	  education,	  but	   rarely	  did	   they	  remain	  outside	  of	   the	  
country	   for	   long	   periods	   of	   time	   until	   Tubman’s	   successor,	   William	   Tolbert,	   was	  
assassinated	   in	  a	  1980	  coup	  (US	  Department	  of	  State,	  2001;	  Advocates	   for	  Human	  
Rights,	   2009:	   12).	   Rumoured	   to	   be	   an	   orchestrated	   plot	   by	   the	   US	   Central	  
Intelligence	   Agency	   (CIA)	   (Dunn,	   2009),	   the	   coup	   was	   led	   by	   a	   25-­‐year-­‐old	  
indigenous	  master	   sergeant	   in	   the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Liberia	   (AFL),	   Samuel	  Kanyon	  
Doe;	  it	  effectively	  toppled	  the	  TWP	  hegemony	  (Dick,	  2002:	  64).	  	  
	  
Doe’s	  military	  regime	   lasted	  until	  elections	   in	  1985,	  which	  were	   largely	  viewed	  as	  
fraudulent,	   entrenching	   his	   power	   in	   an	   arbitrary	   institutional	   arrangement	  
(Lawyers	  Committee	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  1986:	  118).	  For	  many,	  Doe’s	  reign	  signified	  
the	  beginning	  of	  an	  indigenous	  political	  renaissance	  because,	  among	  other	  reforms,	  
he	  abrogated	  a	   ‘hut	   tax’	   that	   tied	   citizenship	   to	  property	  ownership	   (Dunn,	  Beyan	  
and	   Burrowes,	   2001:	   170).	   Yet,	   his	   grip	   on	   power	   declined	   over	   time.	   When	   an	  
attempted	  coup	  in	  November	  1985	  led	  by	  Thomas	  Quiwonkpa,	  one	  of	  Doe’s	  trusted	  
allies,	  was	   rumoured	   to	  have	  been	   supported	  by	  Liberians	   abroad,	   a	  wave	  of	   out-­‐
migration	   ensued	   with	   large	   numbers	   of	   Liberians	   leaving	   the	   country	   fearing	  
reprisals	   from	   the	   Doe	   regime	   (Dunn,	   Beyan	   and	   Burrowes,	   2001:	   275).	   This	  
effectively	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship,’	  making	   it	   transnational	   for	   the	   first	  
time	  in	  the	  country’s	  history.	  	  
	  
Liberian	  exiles	   in	  the	  United	  States,	   led	  by	  former	  Interim	  Government	  of	  National	  
Unity	  (IGNU)	  President	  Amos	  Sawyer	  and	  current	  Liberian	  President	  Ellen	  Johnson	  
Sirleaf,	   lobbied	   against	   Doe’s	   authoritarian	   rule	   through	   the	   Association	   of	  




deaf	  ears	   (Huband,	  1998:	  47).	  These	  political	  elites	   in	   large	  part	  would	  eventually	  
support2	  Charles	  Ghankay	  Taylor,	   a	   counter-­‐revolutionary	  with	  political	   ambitions	  
(Sirleaf,	   2009:	   Waugh,	   2011).	   Taylor	   trained	   in	   Libya	   and	   launched	   an	   armed	  
rebellion	  in	  1989	  from	  neighbouring	  Ivory	  Coast,	  thereby	  prompting	  another	  wave	  
of	   out-­‐migration.	   From	   1989-­‐1997,	   approximately	   200,000	   Liberians	   were	   killed	  
(Saul,	  2007)	  and	  between	  500,000	  and	  750,000	  internally	  displaced;	  in	  the	  first	  year	  
alone	  as	  many	  as	  700,000	  fled	  the	  country,	  primarily	   to	  Ghana,	   Ivory	  Coast,	  Sierra	  
Leone,	   Guinea	   and	   Nigeria	   (Gberie,	   2005).	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   many	   Liberians	  
returned	  to	  the	  country	  after	  elections	  in	  1997	  brought	  Taylor	  to	  power.	  From	  1997	  
to	  2003,	  he	  ruled	  with	  an	  iron	  fist,	  involving	  Liberia	  in	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  armed	  conflict,	  
thereby	   prompting	   two	   militia	   groups,	   the	   Movement	   for	   Democracy	   in	   Liberia	  
(MODEL)	   and	   the	   Liberians	   United	   for	   Reconciliation	   and	   Democracy	   (LURD),	   to	  
agitate	  between	  1999	  and	  2003	  for	  his	  ouster	  (Waugh,	  2011:	  264-­‐268;	  Hazen,	  2013:	  
105-­‐110;	  121;	  131-­‐133).	  Liberians	  once	  again	   fled	  the	  country	   for	  safety,	   followed	  
by	  a	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  (CPA)	  in	  August	  2003	  in	  Accra,	  Ghana,	  with	  
Taylor	  exiled	  at	  the	  invitation	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  (Waugh,	  2011).	  On	  April	  
26,	  2012,	  Taylor	  was	  eventually	  convicted	  on	  11	  counts	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	  crimes	  
against	  humanity	  for	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  rebels	  during	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  war3	  (Bowcott	  
and	  Mark,	  2012).	  	  
	  
From	   2003	   to	   2005,	   an	   interim	   government	  was	   established	   to	   pave	   the	  way	   for	  
elections	   in	   2005	   in	   which	   Africa’s	   first	   female	   president,	   Sirleaf,	   was	   elected	  
(Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2005).	  From	  2003	  onwards,	  waves	  of	  return	  migration	   to	  
Liberia	   grew	   in	   magnitude	   and	   scale,	   with	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   efforts	   in	   security,	  
economic	   revitalisation,	   governance	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   and	   infrastructure	   and	  
basic	   services	   eliciting	   renewed	   hope	   in	   a	   country	   once	   considered	   the	   “heart	   of	  
darkness”	  (Williams,	  2006;	  Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2008a).	  Despite	  its	  multi-­‐layered	  
post-­‐war	   challenges,	   Liberia	   has	   undergone	   transformation	   in	   Sirleaf’s	   two	  
successive	   terms,	   creating	   what	   some	   have	   argued	   has	   been	   an	   enabling	  
environment	   for	   diasporic	   return	   and	   re-­‐engagement.	   Nevertheless,	   post-­‐war	  
                                                
2	  In	   2009,	   Liberian	   President	   Ellen	   Johnson	   Sirleaf	   testified	   before	   the	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	  
Commission	  (TRC)	  that	  the	  ACDL	  donated	  US$10,000	  to	  support	  Taylor’s	  insurgency	  against	  Doe.	  
3	  Taylor	   was	   given	   a	   50-­‐year	   jail	   sentence	   on	   May	   30,	   2012,	   and	   after	   losing	   an	   appeal	   was	  




recovery	   and	   return	   migration	   have	   complicated	   relations	   between	   Liberians	   of	  
divergent	  lived	  experiences	  and	  world-­‐views,	  thereby	  reviving	  unresolved	  historical	  
fissures.	   In	  21st	   century	  Liberia,	   the	  amalgam	  of	  different	   identities	  has	   somewhat	  
metamorphosed,	  with	  homeland	  Liberians,	   returnees	  and	  diasporas	  all	  vying	   for	  a	  
stake	   in	   post-­‐war	   development.	   At	   the	   centre	   of	   this	   convergence	   are	   questions	  
about	   citizenship,	   essentially,	   who	   belongs	   to	   the	   nation-­‐state	   and	   who	   can	  
legitimately	   participate	   in	   its	   reconstruction.	   In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   argue	   that	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   has	   been	   constructed	   and	   reconstructed	   since	   the	   founding	   of	   the	  
nation-­‐state	   in	   1847,	   with	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   serving	   as	   a	  
contemporary	  manifestation	  of	  that	  reconfiguration	  over	  space	  and	  time.	  
	  
Proposed	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Legislation	  Reconstructs	  ‘Liberian	  Citizenship’	  	  
Having	  never	  been	  formally	  colonised	  and	  more	  recently	  emerging	  from	  14	  years	  of	  
intermittent	   armed	   conflict,	   Liberia	   represents	   a	   stark	   case	   study	   in	   citizenship	  
construction	   because	   of	   its	   idiosyncratic	   history	   of	   black	   settler	   state	   formation.	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  has	  always	  been	  and	  remains	  a	  space	  of	  contestation.	  As	  a	  case	  
in	  point,	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  contradiction	  between	  Article	  27	  of	  Liberia’s	  1986	  
Constitution,	   which	   states,	   “All	   persons,	   who,	   on	   the	   coming	   into	   force	   of	   this	  
Constitution,	  were	  lawfully	  citizens	  of	  Liberia	  shall	  continue	  to	  be	  Liberian	  citizens,”	  
and	  Section	  22.1	  of	  its	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law,	  which	  automatically	  revokes	  the	  
legal	  citizenship	  status	  of	  Liberia-­‐born	  nationals	  of	   ‘Negro	  descent’	  who	  naturalise	  
in,	  declare	  formal	  allegiance	  to,	  enter	  into	  the	  armed	  forces	  of,	  vote	  in	  the	  elections	  
of,	   or	   formally	   renounce	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   in	   a	   foreign	   state4	  (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	  1973;	  Government	  of	  Liberia,	  1986).	  Passed	  into	  law	  in	  1973,	  and	  modelled	  
after	  the	  1952	  US	  Immigration	  and	  Nationality	  Act,	  the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law	  of	  
Liberia	  has	  never	  been	  amended.	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  therefore	  fails	  to	  contend	  
with	   contemporary	   configurations	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   largely	   brokered	   by	  
conflict,	  migration,	  globalisation,	  and	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  	  
                                                
4	  Although	   Liberia’s	   Constitution	   was	   amended	   in	   1986	   as	   part	   of	   a	   post-­‐election	   constitutional	  
review	   process,	   the	   reviewers	   neglected	   to	   reconcile	   the	   apparent	   contradictions	   between	   the	  
Constitution	  and	  the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law	  on	  matters	  of	  citizenship.	  In	  2012,	  President	  Sirleaf	  
commissioned	   a	   Constitution	   Review	   Committee	   to	   review	   and	   make	   recommendations	   for	  
amending	   the	  1986	  Constitution,	  based	  on	  a	  series	  of	  national	  consultations	  with	  Liberian	  citizens.	  
Three	   years	   earlier,	   in	   2009,	   the	   president	   had	   established	   a	   Law	   Reform	   Commission	   through	  





For	  example,	  the	  current	  law	  states	  explicitly	  that	  only	  those	  of	  ‘Negro’5	  descent	  can	  
be	  citizens	  and	  only	  those	  whose	  fathers	  were	  citizens	  of	  Liberia	  during	  the	  time	  of	  
their	   birth	   and	   resided	   in	   Liberia	   before	   their	   birth	   can	   be	   granted	   citizenship	   at	  
birth	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  1973).	   It	  also	  states	   that	  children	  of	  Liberian	  citizen	  
parents	  must	  declare	  at	  the	  age	  of	  majority	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  claim	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  or	  the	  citizenship	  of	  the	  country	  in	  which	  they	  were	  born	  (Government	  
of	  Liberia,	  1973).	  Therefore,	  the	  law	  distorts	  the	  principles	  of	   jus	  soli	  citizenship—
citizenship	  by	  birth,	   regardless	  of	  race,	  ethnicity,	  or	  class—as	  well	  as	   jus	  sanguinis	  
citizenship—citizenship	   by	   ancestry,	   regardless	   of	   parentage.	   Although	   I	   do	   not	  
interrogate	   the	   ‘Negro	   clause’6	  in	   this	   thesis,	   I	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   controversial	  
reference	   to	   race	   as	   a	   defining	   marker	   of	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   remains	  
contested,	  as	  do	  other	  markers	  such	  as	  citizenship	   traced	  through	  patrilineal	   lines	  
alone.	   Many	   argue	   that	   Liberia’s	   current	   law	   is	   anachronistic	   and	   overtly	  
exclusionary	  because	  it	  defines	  citizenship	  along	  racial	  and	  gender	  lines	  (American	  
Bar	  Association,	  2009)7.	  Others	  argue	  that	  revoking	  the	  citizenship	  of	  a	  natural	  born	  
Liberian	  without	  due	  process	  is	  unconstitutional,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  lawsuit	  filed	  in	  
Liberia’s	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2011	  by	  US-­‐based	  Liberian	  legal	  expert,	  Counsellor	  Alvin	  
Teage	   Jalloh.8	  Responding	   to	   increased	  pressure	   from	  what	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  strong	  
transnational	  tide,	  Liberia	   introduced	  a	  dual	  citizenship	  bill	   in	  2008	  to	  reconstruct	  
markers	  of	  citizenship.	  
	  
In	   their	   proposed	   “Act	   to	   Establish	   Dual	   Citizenship	   for	   Liberians	   by	   Birth	   and	  
Background,”	  four	  senators	  in	  Liberia’s	  Legislature,	  namely	  Cletus	  Segbe	  Wotorson,	  
Sumo	  G.	  Kupee,	  Jewel	  Howard	  Taylor,	  and	  Abel	  Massalay,	  endorsed	  amendments	  to	  
                                                
5	  To	   date,	   Liberia	   and	   Sierra	   Leone	   are	   the	   only	   two	   countries	   in	   Africa	   that	   explicitly	   define	  
citizenship	   by	   ‘Negro’	   descent,	   although	   Sierra	   Leone’s	   2006	   Dual	   Citizenship	   Act	   enables	   ‘non-­‐
Negroes’	  to	  naturalise.	  	  
6	  Although	  there	  is	  considerable	  contestation	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  maintaining	  a	  race-­‐based	  clause	  in	  
Liberia’s	  Constitution,	   it	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   the	  preponderance	  of	  Lebanese,	   Indian,	  and	  Chinese	  
entrepreneurs	   in	   the	   country’s	   strategic	   commercial	   sectors	   strengthens	   the	   case	   for	   the	   ‘Negro	  
clause.’	  Essentially,	  21st	  century	  angst	  amongst	  Liberians	  about	  foreign	  domination	  of	  the	  country’s	  
economy	  re-­‐inscribes	   the	  settlers’	  19th	   century	  preoccupation	  with	  escaping	  economic	  servitude	   in	  
the	  United	  States.	  
7	  The	  American	  Bar	  Association	  has	  argued	  that	  citizenship	  based	  on	  race	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  Article	  
5	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Constitution,	  which	  prohibits	  ethnic	  discrimination,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Convention	  on	  All	  
Forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  (CERD),	  which	  Liberia	  ratified	  in	  1978.	  
8	  Jalloh’s	  case	  is	  not	  in	  pursuit	  of	  dual	  citizenship,	  per	  se,	  but	  rather	  a	  lawsuit	  interrogating	  sections	  
22.1	   and	   22.2	   of	   Liberia’s	   Aliens	   and	  Nationality	   Law,	  which,	   he	   argues,	   violates	   Article	   20	   of	   the	  




sections	  20.1	  and	  22.1	  of	  the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  current	  
Constitution	   by	   enabling	   Liberian	   citizen	   women	   to	   pass	   on	   citizenship	   to	   their	  
children	  and	  granting	  dual	  citizenship	  to	  Liberians	  by	  birth	  who	  naturalised	  abroad	  
(or	   have	   aspirations	   to	   naturalise)	   as	   well	   as	   those	   born	   outside	   of	   Liberia	   to	  
Liberian	   citizen	   parents,	   respectively	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2008c).	   Two	  
questions	   ultimately	   underpin	   the	   proposed	   legislation,	   and,	   by	   extension,	   this	  
thesis:	  why	  was	  the	  bill	  introduced	  in	  2008	  and	  why	  has	  its	  passage	  been	  postponed?	  	  
According	   to	   the	   bill’s	   chief	   sponsor,	   Wotorson,	   the	   premise	   of	   proposing	  
amendments	   to	   the	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law	   was	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   needs	   of	  
Liberians	  who	  emigrated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  intermittent	  armed	  conflict:	  	  
	  
…a	  lot	  of	  them	  [Liberians	  abroad]	  had	  to	  change	  their	  lifestyle,	  accept	  
the	  dictates	  from	  a	  strange	  country,	  for	  survival,	  in	  some	  countries	  it	  
meant	   you	   had	   to	   become	   [a]	   citizen	   of	   that	   country,	   to	   enjoy	   the	  
benefits…So,	   they	   had	   to	   do	   that.	   It’s	   a	   temporary	  means	   of	   getting	  
their	   aims	   accomplished.	   But	   in	   taking	   that	   involuntary	   stance,	   it	  
qualified	   them	   for	   disqualification	   of	   their	   citizenships	   in	   their	   own	  
country,	   which,	   I	   believe,	   is	   unfair.	   It’s	   unfair	   given	   the	   background	  
that	   the	   drafters	   of	   the	   Constitution	   did	   not	   foresee	   that	   such	   a	  
scenario	  would	  have	  happened.9	  
	  
Though	   the	  bill	   recommends	  broad	  sweeping	  changes	  with	  major	   implications	   for	  
reconfiguring	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship,’	  its	  first	  iteration	  is	  
rather	  low	  on	  substance	  and	  does	  not	  explicitly	  define	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  
of	  would-­‐be	  dual	  citizens,	  thereby	  opening	  it	  up	  to	  targeted	  attacks.	  	  
	  
Despite	  unequivocal	  support	  from	  Liberians	  abroad	  about	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  
dual	  citizenship—with	  a	  number	  of	  outliers	  here	  and	  there—those	  at	  home	  are,	  for	  
the	   most	   part,	   less	   convinced.	   Senator	   Taylor	   presented	   her	   analysis	   of	   why	   the	  
proposed	  bill	  has	  sustained	  opposition:	  	  
	  
...Liberians	   here	   [Liberia],	   a	   lot	   of	   them	   are	   not	   working,	   they’re	  
unemployed,	   and	   they	   feel	   as	   if	   Liberians	   coming	   from	   the	   diaspora	  
who	  have	  had	  all	  of	  these	  opportunities	  want	  to	  come	  and	  take	  their	  
space.	   So,	   the	   common	   sentiment	   you’ll	   find	   with	   those	   living	   in	  
Liberia,	   especially	   the	   young	   people	   is,	   like,	   “Yeah,	   hey!	   Those	   guys	  
                                                




can	   decide	   whether	   they	   want	   to	   be	   Liberians	   or	   Americans	   [or	  
another	  nationality].	  If	  they	  want	  to	  remain	  Americans,	   let	  them	  stay	  
where	   they	   are.	   But	   they	   can’t	   have	   it	   both	   ways	   because	   you’re	  
coming	   and	   the	  possibility	   of	   those	  of	   us	  who	  have	  not	  had	   such	   an	  
opportunity	  being	  upstaged	  is	  so	  high.	  So,	  either	  you	  come	  home	  and	  
be	  a	  Liberian	  or	  you	  remain	  where	  you	  are.”10	  
	  
	  
As	  acknowledged	  by	  Senator	  Taylor,	  there	  are	  concerns	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  would	  
represent	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  for	  those	  based	  in	  Liberia,	  further	  impinging	  upon	  their	  
already	   limited	   access	   to	   political,	   economic	   and	   social	   opportunities.	   Given	   the	  
backlash	   against	   the	   bill,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   barrage	   of	   assertions	   made	   about	   the	  
potential	  positive	  outcomes	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  if	  it	  is	  enacted,	  chief	  among	  which	  is	  
the	   claim	   that	   Liberians	  who	   naturalised	   in	   other	   countries	  will	   be	   able	   to	   retain	  
their	   legal	   status	   as	   Liberian	   citizens,	   thereby	   contributing	   more	  meaningfully	   to	  
post-­‐war	   recovery.	   The	   assumption	   herein	   is	   that	   dual	   citizenship	   will	   facilitate	  
political,	   economic	   and	   social	   renewal	   by	   transnationals.	   The	   converse	   argument	  
could	  be	  applied,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  correlation	  between	  the	  retention	  
of	  emigrant	  citizenship	  and	  involvement	  in	  post-­‐war	  development	  (Whitaker,	  2011;	  
Spiro,	   2012).	   Furthermore,	   the	   assumption	   that	   transnationals	   are	   the	   panacea	   to	  
reconstruction,	   as	   is	   apparent	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   diasporas	   and	   development,	  
negates	  and	  obscures	   the	   lived	  experiences	  of	  homeland	  development	  actors.	  This	  
thesis	   problematises	   core	   assertions	   about	   the	   diasporas-­‐development	   nexus	   by	  
evaluating	  the	  active	  citizenship	  practices	  of	  Monrovia-­‐based	  Liberians	  despite	  the	  
constraints	  on	  their	  citizenship	  rights	  and	  privileges.	  Therefore,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
Liberian	  state	   in	   reconciling	   transnational	  commands	  with	  homeland	  demands	   is	  a	  
central	  feature	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Given	   that	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	   is	   the	   first	   comprehensive	   policy	  
mechanism	   that	   the	   government	   of	   Liberia	   has	   ever	   introduced	   specifically	   to	  
respond	   to	   diasporic	   claims	   beyond	   the	   range	   of	   ad-­‐hoc	   emergency	   capacity	  
building	  programmes,	  this	  thesis	  deploys	  it	  as	  a	  point	  of	  entry	  to	  evaluate	  Liberia’s	  
long-­‐standing	  struggle	   to	  construct	  a	  unique	  brand	  of	  citizenship	   that	   is	   totalising,	  
                                                




tactical	   and	   timeless.	   This	   research	   challenge	   is	   not	   only	   unique	   to	   Liberia,	   but	   is	  
also	  relevant	  to	  other	  post-­‐war	  states	  whose	  wars	  were	  fuelled	  by	  the	  politicisation	  
of	   identity.	   In	   this	   vein,	   I	   fill	   gaps	   in	   the	   growing	   body	   of	   literature	   on	   emigrant	  
citizenship	   by	   focusing	   my	   analysis	   on	   how	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   factors	  
have	  configured	  and	  reconfigured	  citizenship	  in	  a	  post-­‐war	  sending	  country,	  Liberia;	  
how	   that	   reconfiguration	   impacts	   the	   sending	   country’s	   homeland	   citizens,	   those	  
who	  reside	  in	  Liberia,	  and	  its	  diasporas,	  those	  who	  reside	  outside;	  and	  last	  but	  not	  
least,	  how	  new	  meanings	  and	  practice	  of	  citizenship	  impact	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  	  
	  
While	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis	   is	  not	   to	  delve	   into	   the	   legal	  contours	  of	  Liberia’s	  
Constitution,	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law,	   and	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	  
beyond	  this	  brief	  introduction,	  it	  is	  worth	  scrutinising	  the	  conception	  and	  practice	  of	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  across	  space	  and	  time	  within	  this	  backdrop.	  	  
	  
‘Liberian	  Citizenship’	  as	  Both	  Identity	  and	  Practice	  	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   signifies	   simultaneously	   an	   identity	   (passive,	  
fixed)—including	   legal	   status	   and	   national	   identity—and	   an	   expression	   of	   that	  
identity	   through	   practice	   (active,	   constructed)	   (Barry,	   2006).	   Departing	   slightly	  
from	  Stuart	  Hall’s	  (1992)	  and	  Homi	  Bhabha’s	  (1994)	  post-­‐colonial	  conceptualisation	  
of	  hybridity,	   a	   theory	  associated	  with	   the	   effects	  of	   racial	   and	   cultural	  mixture	  on	  
identities,	  I	  argue	  that:	  
i) Increased	  claims	   for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	  citizenship	   for	  Liberia	  
are	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  hybridity	  of	  citizenship	  (identity	  +	  practice);	  
ii) Liberia’s	   diasporas	   do	   not	   represent	   a	   composite	   of	   homeland	   and	   host	  
country	   identities	   alone,	   but	   are	   rather	   a	   hybrid	   mix	   of	   both	   identity	  
expression	  and	  political	  practice,	  hence	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  pluralise	  ‘diaspora’	  
when	  referring	  to	  Liberians	  abroad,	  specifically,	  and	  collectivities	  of	  migrants	  
from	  other	  countries,	  generally;	  
iii) Public	  reactions	  to	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  by	  Liberians	  at	  home	  
and	   abroad	   serve	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   notions	   about	   how	   diasporas	   should	   and	  




Herein,	   I	   examine	   relations	   between	   Liberia’s	   diasporas	   and	   the	   Liberian	   state,	  
between	   homeland	   Liberians	   and	   the	   Liberian	   state,	   and	   between	   homeland	  
Liberians	  and	  Liberia’s	  diasporas—based	  on	  qualitative	  interviews	  conducted	  with	  
respondents	   in	  London,	  England;	  Washington,	  D.C.;	  Freetown,	  Sierra	  Leone;	  Accra,	  
Ghana;	  and	  Monrovia,	  Liberia’s	  capital.	  As	  such,	  the	  central	  research	  question	  I	  seek	  
to	  answer	  is:	  
	  
How	   have	   current	   and	   historical	   factors	   influenced	   the	   introduction	   and	  
postponement	  in	  passage	  of	  Liberia’s	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation?	  
	  
I	  consider	  six	  key	  subsidiary	  questions:	  
	  
i)	   How	   is	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   currently	   conceived	   of	   and	   practiced	   at	   home	   and	  
abroad?	  	  
	  
ii)	  How	  have	   the	  conception	  and	  practice	  of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  been	  configured	  
and	  reconfigured	  over	  time	  and	  space?	  
	  
iii)	  Is	  there	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  citizenship	  and	  development	  practice,	  
and	  if	  so,	  what	  are	  its	  qualities?	  
	  
iv)	   How	   has	   diasporic	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   involvement	   in	   post-­‐war	  
recovery	  affected	  dual	  citizenship	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims?	  	  
	  
v)	   How	   has	   homeland	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   involvement	   in	   post-­‐war	  
recovery	  affected	  dual	  citizenship	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims?	  	  
	  
vi)	   What	   can	   be	   gleaned	   from	   models	   implemented	   elsewhere	   (regionally	   and	  
globally)	  regarding	  the	  range	  of	  transnational	  citizenship	  options	  and	  their	  political	  






My	  central	  argument	  is	  that	  four	  current	  and	  historical	  factors—conflict,	  migration,	  
globalisation,	  and	  post-­‐war	  recovery—have	  reconfigured	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  
of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  thereby	  influencing	  both	  the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  
citizenship	  legislation	  and	  its	  subsequent	  postponement	  in	  passage.	   In	  the	  thesis,	   I	  
also	  put	   forward	  three	  overarching	  hypotheses	  that	  are	  tested	  and	  analysed.	  First,	  
the	  demand	   for	  dual	   citizenship	   is	  not	  only	  about	   the	  need	   for	   involvement	   in	   the	  
political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  milieu	  of	  post-­‐war	  Liberia,	  but	  also	  about	  the	  need	  for	  
identity	   recognition	   and	   expression.	   Second,	   current	   power	   relations	   between	  
Liberia’s	   diasporas	   and	   the	   Liberian	   post-­‐war	   state	   favour	   the	   former,	   thereby	  
enabling	  diasporas	  to	  influence	  domestic	  homeland	  policies	  such	  as	  proposed	  dual	  
citizenship	   legislation.	   And	   third,	   historical	   inequities	   between	   settlers	   and	  
indigenes	   have	   been	   replicated	   by	   contemporary	   tensions	   between	  diasporas	   and	  
homeland	  Liberians,	  thereby	  creating	  a	  negative	  backlash	  against	  the	  proposed	  bill.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   discuss	   how	  my	  positionality	   framed	  my	   research	   questions	  
and	  selection	  of	  sites	  and	  informants.	  	  	  
	  
Researcher	  Positionality:	  Navigating	  between	  ‘Insider’	  and	  ‘Outsider’	  Access	  
In	   2000	   when	   I	   was	   18,	   I	   watched	   my	   mother	   raise	   her	   right	   hand	   and	   pledge	  
allegiance	   to	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America.	   In	   the	   small	   room	   in	   downtown	  
Washington	  with	  official-­‐looking,	  mahogany	   furniture,	   I	   felt	  a	  sinking	  regret	   in	   the	  
pit	   of	  my	   stomach.	   Yet,	   all	   around	  me	   there	  was	   pomp	   and	   pageantry	   during	   the	  
naturalisation	  proceedings.	  A	  six-­‐foot	  United	  States	  flag	  billowed	  in	  the	  background.	  
As	   keynote	   speaker,	   the	   president	   of	   Howard	   University	   (where	   I	   was	   then	   a	  
freshman	  undergraduate)	  regaled	  the	  newly	  minted	  US	  citizens	  with	  clichés	  about	  
what	   a	   wonderful	   place	   America	   was.	   However,	   my	   mother	   naturalised	   on	   that	  
eventful	  day,	  not	  because	  of	  some	  deep,	  abiding	   love	   for	  America,	  but	  because	  she	  
needed	   US	   citizenship	   to	   regularise	   my	   status.	   Her	   revocation	   of	   legal	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  represented,	  for	  me,	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  parental	  sacrifice.	  	  
	  
Born	  in	  Monrovia,	  I	  emigrated	  to	  the	  US	  in	  1988	  through	  a	  very	  complicated	  process,	  
and	   lived	   in	   undocumented	   limbo	   from	   the	   time	   I	   was	   six	   until	   I	   was	   20,	   a	  




moulded	   my	   identity	   as	   a	   Liberian	   citizen.	   I	   have	   come	   to	   define	   citizenship,	  
generally,	   and	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship,’	   specifically,	   as	   a	   political	   construct,	   as	   much	  
about	  ‘doing’	  as	  it	  is	  about	  ‘being.’	  I	  grew	  up	  in	  Washington,	  studied	  in	  Ghana,	  South	  
Africa,	  Egypt	  and	  the	  UK;	  nevertheless,	   I	  remained	  so	  metaphysically	  connected	  to	  
Liberia	   that	   my	   American	   accent	   defied	   logic.	   I	   taught	   primary	   school	   English	  
grammar	  at	  a	  Liberian	  refugee	  camp	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Accra	  when	  I	  was	  a	  20-­‐year-­‐
old	   study	   abroad	   student.	   My	   honours	   undergraduate	   thesis	   and	   masters	  
dissertation	  both	  focused	  on	  Liberia,	  catapulting	  me	  back	  to	  the	  country	  in	  2002	  and	  
2006,	  respectively,	  for	  field	  research.	  I	  joined	  the	  Liberian	  Studies	  Association	  (LSA),	  
learned	  how	  to	  cook	  Liberian	  cuisine,	  and	  perfected	  the	  lilting	  Liberian	  English	  that	  
rolls	  off	   the	   tongue	   like	  an	  unstoppable	   locomotive.	   I	  developed	  a	  wanderlust	   that	  
facilitated	  my	  permanent	  return	  to	  Monrovia	  in	  2007,	  at	  the	  age	  of	  25,	  to	  work	  as	  an	  
aide	  to	  the	  president	  of	  Liberia.	  In	  my	  personal	  and	  professional	  endeavours,	  I	  have	  
come	  across	  Liberians	  of	  varying	  backgrounds,	  perspectives,	  and	  ideologies,	  which	  
enabled	   access	   to	  202	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   spanning	   three	   continents.	  As	   an	  
academic,	  activist,	  and	  author,	  I	  represent	  a	  composite	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  Liberians	  
I	   interviewed	   in	   the	   field—homelanders,	   returnees,	   diasporas,	   executive	   and	  
legislative	   members	   of	   government—making	   me	   an	   ‘insider’	   and	   ‘outsider’	   all	   at	  
once.	  	  
	  
For	  this	  study,	  I	  spoke	  to	  Liberians	  with	  divergent	  citizenship	  statuses,	  who,	  like	  me,	  
remained	   fiercely	   engaged	  with	   the	   country	   in	   both	   tangible	   and	   intangible	  ways.	  
Although	   I	   spent	   most	   of	   my	   life	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   I	   opted	   for	   permanent	  
residency	  rather	   than	  naturalisation	  because	   I	  did	  not	  want	   to	  relinquish	  my	   legal	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	   Nonetheless,	   I	   recognise	   that	   Liberians	   like	   my	   mother	  
naturalised	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  whether	  by	  compulsion	  or	  choice.	  This	  thesis	  is	  
primarily	  informed	  by	  my	  desire	  to	  interrogate	  why	  people	  make	  certain	  citizenship	  
status	   decisions	   and	   what	   policies	   and	   practices	   support	   or	   invalidate	   those	  
choices—from	  an	  empirical	  point	  of	  reference.	  At	  the	  moment,	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  
on	  citizenship	  is	  overly	  theoretical	  and	  Eurocentric,	  prompting	  Conover	  et	  al	  (1991:	  
801)	  to	  contend	  that	  theoretical	  discourses	  on	  citizenship	  are	  “conducted	  in	  what	  is	  
virtually	   an	   empirical	   void.”	   In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   examine	   constructions	   of	   ‘Liberian	  




literature.	   Although	   a	   self-­‐professed	   transnational,	   I	   have	  maintained	   a	   decidedly	  
critical	   stance	   on	   deterritorialised	   forms	   of	   citizenship,	   primarily	   because	   Liberia	  
has	  had	  a	  complicated	  relationship	  with	  its	  nationals	  abroad.	  Because	  of	  this,	  I	  knew	  
that	  I	  would	  have	  to	  temper	  my	  opinions	  during	  interviews	  in	  the	  field	  and	  remain	  
constantly	   aware	  of	  my	  political	   stances.	  Although	   I	   do	  not	   claim	   to	  be	  neutral	   or	  
objective	   in	   my	   positionality,	   I	   have	   mitigated	   biases	   in	   writing	   this	   thesis	   by	  
constantly	  seeking	  and	  validating	  positions	  that	  are	  different	  from	  mine.	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	   section	   that	   follows,	   I	   present	   in	   summary	   form	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   entire	  
thesis	  and	  its	  constituent	  chapters.	  	  
	  
Nine	  Chapters	  Examine	  Citizenship	  Spaces	  of	  Contestation	  and	  Convergence	  
This	   thesis	   is	   divided	   into	   nine	   chapters,	   beginning	   with	   an	   introduction	   that	  
contextualises	  the	  entire	  scope	  of	  the	  study.	  In	  Chapter	  II,	  I	  explain	  the	  reasons	  for	  
adopting	  as	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  actor-­‐oriented	  analysis,	  which	  catalogues	  how	  
the	   lived	   experiences	   and	   social	   positions	   of	   agents	   influence	   their	   responses	   to	  
development	   interventions.	   Chapter	   III	   justifies	  my	  methodological	   approaches	   in	  
the	   field.	   I	   provide	   a	   rationale	   for	   interviewing	  202	  Liberians	   in	   five	   field	   sites	   as	  
well	   as	   seven	   Sierra	   Leonean	   policy	   makers.	   I	   present	   a	   demographic	   profile	   of	  
interviewees	  and	  examine	  their	  multi-­‐layered	  identities.	  The	  chapter	  also	  describes	  
general	   trends	   observed	   in	   the	   field,	   thereby	   providing	   a	   premise	   for	   detailed	  
analysis	  in	  the	  five	  subsequent	  core	  chapters.	  In	  Chapter	  IV,	  I	  evaluate	  how	  ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   is	   currently	   conceived	   of	   and	   practiced	   in	   Liberia	   and	   across	  
transnational	   spaces,	   reflective	   of	   the	   social	   discontinuities	   within	   respondents’	  
lived	   experiences.	   I	   argue	   that	   contemporary	   citizenship	   construction	   sits	   on	   a	  
continuum	  between	   identity	  (passive	  citizenship)	  and	  practice	  (active	  citizenship).	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   also	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   fluidity	  of	   the	  conceptions	  of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   transcends	   the	   legal	   definition	   articulated	   in	   the	   country’s	   Aliens	   and	  
Nationality	  Law.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  V	  is	  the	  first	  of	  a	  series	  of	  chapters	  examining	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  
factors	   that	   have	   influenced	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	  




Liberia	   and	   across	   transnational	   spaces	   have	   fundamentally	   configured	   and	  
reconfigured	   citizenship	   construction	   and	   practice.	   The	   chapter	   shows	   that	  
conflict—manifested	   in	   direct	   and	   structural	   violence—simultaneously	   ruptured	  
and	  sealed	  state-­‐citizen	  and	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations,	  thereby	  casting	  citizenship	  as	  a	  
space	  of	  contestation.	  Here,	   I	  review	  some	  of	   the	  conflict	   literature,	  exploring	  how	  
the	  manipulation	  of	  citizenship	  was	  a	  driver	  of	  Liberia’s	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  how	  it	  
continues	   to	   be	   a	   driver	   of	   continued	   tensions	   amongst	   homeland,	   diaspora	   and	  
returnee	  Liberians	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  milieu.	  	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  VI,	   I	  argue	   that	  migration	   to	  and	   from	  Liberia	   in	   the	  19th,	  20th	  and	  21st	  
centuries	  fundamentally	  altered	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  citizenship	  by	  creating	  
categories	   of	   Liberians	   that	   defy	   the	   legal	   definition	   of	   citizenship.	   While	   the	  
proposed	  dual	   citizenship	  bill	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   reconcile	   the	   (forced)	  migration	  of	  
hundreds	  of	   thousands	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	   intermittent	  armed	  conflict,	   it	  has	  
been	  postponed	  because,	  for	  some,	  naturalisation	  abroad	  signifies	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  
fundamental	   tenets	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship.’	   Because	   of	   the	   dearth	   of	   quantitative	  
data	  on	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐war	  migration,	  I	  include	  in	  this	  chapter	  a	  qualitative	  mapping	  
of	   the	   migration	   patterns	   of	   respondents	   in	   the	   five	   field	   sites	   to	   illustrate	   how	  
experiences	   of	  migration	   impact	   citizenship	   status	   choices.	   Chapter	   VII	  maintains	  
that	   globalisation	   has	   fundamentally	   configured	   and	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   through	   Liberia’s	   adoption	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   and	   regional	  
protocols	  as	  well	  as	  its	  integration	  into	  the	  global	  capitalist	  system.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  
argue	   that	   although	   Liberia	   has	   attempted	   to	   join	   sub-­‐regional	   and	   continental	  
trends	   in	   deterritorialising	   citizenship,	   its	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	   has	   been	  
postponed	  because	  the	  country	  has	  yet	  to	  reconcile	  its	  capitalist	  aspirations	  with	  the	  
accompanying	  marginalisation	  of	  its	  citizens.	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  VIII,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	  assumption	  that	  Liberians	  abroad	  
and	   their	   returnee	   counterparts	   have	   contributed	   to	   Liberia’s	   development,	   and	  
could	  further	  advance	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  if	  granted	  dual	  citizenship.	  However,	  I	  also	  
show	  that	  there	  has	  been	  backlash	  against	  dual	  citizenship	  as	  a	  policy	  prescription	  
because	   a	   disproportionate	   number	   of	   returnee	   recruits	   have	   been	   implicated	   in	  




transnational	  citizenship	  pursuits.	  This	  chapter	   further	  reveals	   that	  although	  post-­‐
war	   recovery	   may	   require	   the	   active	   participation	   of	   all	   Liberians,	   what	   Liberia	  
needs	  is	  not	  ‘all	  hands	  on	  deck’	  but	  rather	  only	  those	  hands	  that	  are	  truly	  committed	  
to	  transformation.	  My	  concluding	  chapter	  summarises	  key	  arguments	  and	  findings	  
and	  lists	  a	  set	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  and	  projections	  for	  future	  research,	  chief	  
among	   which	   is	   the	   need	   to	   base	   Liberia’s	   legal	   citizenship	   reconfiguration	   on	  
empirical	  studies	  such	  as	  mine,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  whims	  of	  political	  entrepreneurs	  
such	   as	   the	   four	   sponsors	   of	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill.	   This	   chapter	   also	  
discusses	   the	   implications	   of	   my	   thesis	   for	   other	   post-­‐war	   countries	   currently	  
examining	  issues	  of	  citizenship	  construction	  and	  practice.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Although	   Liberia’s	   official	   seal	   and	   motto	   are	   currently	   undergoing	   scrutiny	   in	   a	  
national	   symbols	   review	   process,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   they	   reflect	   the	   exclusion	   that	  
permeated	  the	  first	  100	  years	  of	  the	  country’s	  existence	  as	  a	  nation-­‐state.	  A	  parallel	  
review	  of	   the	   tenets	  of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	   is	  also	  underway,	  brokered	  by	  a	  dual	  
citizenship	   bill	   introduced	   in	   2008	   that	   has	   languished	   in	   the	   Senate.	   This	  
introductory	  chapter	  presented	  broad-­‐based	  contextual	  analysis	  for	  an	  examination	  
of	   how	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   factors	   have	   influenced	   the	   introduction	   and	  
postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation.	   In	   the	   chapter,	   I	   briefly	  
highlighted	  how	  the	  bill	  serves	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  debates	  about	  how	  conflict,	  migration,	  
globalisation,	   and	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   have	   configured	   and	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  across	  space	  and	  time.	  I	  also	  analysed	  my	  subjectivity	  and	  positionality	  
as	  a	  Liberian	  researcher	  who	  has	  inhabited	  multiple	  spaces	  in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad.	  I	  
evaluated	  my	  own	  biases	  as	  a	  child	  of	  Liberian	  soil	  who	  made	  a	  conscious	  choice	  not	  
to	  naturalise	  in	  the	  US	  despite	  my	  upbringing	  in	  Washington,	  and	  how	  this	  decision	  
influences	  my	  analysis	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship.’	  This	  chapter	  concluded	  by	  outlining	  
the	  scope	  and	  organisation	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   review	   the	   literature	   on	   citizenship	   and	   frame	   my	  
conceptualisation	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship.’	   I	   also	   validate	  Norman	  Long’s	   brand	   of	  






University	  Deadlock	  Shows	  Competing	  Worldviews	  on	  Citizenship	  
	  
In	  May	  2013,	  the	  University	  of	  Liberia,	  once	  a	  bastion	  of	  political	  advocacy	  against	  
government	  repression,	  came	  to	  a	  standstill.	  A	  mob	  of	  students	  heckled	  and	  jeered	  
at	   a	   delegation	   from	   the	   Union	   of	   Liberian	   Associations	   in	   the	   Americas	   (ULAA)	  
attempting	   to	   host	   one	   of	  many	   town-­‐hall	  meetings	   discussing	   the	  merits	   of	   dual	  
citizenship.	  Although	  a	  few	  students	  supported	  the	  delegation,	  pushing	  back	  at	  their	  
naysaying	   counterparts,	   the	   forceful	   majority	   barred	   them	   from	   speaking.	   In	   the	  
same	  month	  as	  the	  students’	  stand-­‐off,	  one	  of	  Liberia’s	  most	  notorious	  senators,	  Dan	  
Morias,	   unleashed	   an	   anti-­‐dual	   citizenship	   radio	   campaign	   that	   left	   the	  delegation	  
scrambling	   to	   return	   to	   the	   United	   States	   to	   raise	   funds	   for	   lobbying	   more	  
conciliatory	  members	  of	  the	  Legislature.	  	  
	  
Interactions	  between	  disparate	  social	  actors—such	  as	  the	  incident	  at	  the	  University	  
of	  Liberia—is	  framed	  by	  actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	  as	  sites	  where	  competing	  realities	  
collide	  and	  comingle.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	   this	  chapter,	   citizenship	  represents	  a	  
space	   of	   contestation	   and	   convergence	   in	   theory	   and	   practice.	   The	   chapter	   is	  
organised	   into	  two	  parts.	  Part	   I	  consists	  of	  an	  analytical	  review	  of	  how	  citizenship	  
has	   evolved	   in	   the	  modern	  world	   over	   time,	  which	   serves	   as	   a	   basis	   for	  my	   own	  
conceptual	   framing	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   identity,	   practice,	   and	   a	   set	   of	  
relations.	  In	  Part	  II,	  I	  explore	  why	  and	  how	  a	  strand	  of	  social	  constructionism,	  actor-­‐
oriented	  analysis,	  serves	  as	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Part	  I:	  Evolution	  of	  Citizenship	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Dual	  Citizenship	  
Citizenship	   has	   been	   construed	   over	   time	   to	   inscribe	   an	   individual	   within	   a	  
particular	  polity,	  yet	  modern	  forms	  of	  citizenship	  transcend	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  What	  
has	  been	  termed	  ‘citizenship’	  in	  modern	  times	  has	  its	  antecedents	  in	  the	  Greek	  city-­‐
state,	  which	  defined	  a	  citizen	  as	  a	  Greek	  male	  resident,	  ruling	  out	  foreigners,	  women,	  
and	   slaves	   (Hoffman,	   2004:	   18).	   This	   definition	   further	   evolved	   from	   the	   era	   of	  
feudalism	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   dating	   back	   to	   the	   Treaty	   of	  




principal	  actors	  within	  the	  world	  system”	  	  (Kashyap,	  1997:	  4;	  Turner,	  2000:	  137).	  In	  
the	  nation-­‐state	  system,	  a	  social	  contract	  defined	  the	  nation-­‐citizen	  relationship,	  as	  
theorised	   by	   Rousseau,	   Hobbes,	   and	   Locke	   (Adejumobi,	   2005:	   21).	   As	   modern	  
nationality	   laws	   were	   formulated	   from	   the	   19th	   to	   20th	   centuries,	   states	   either	  
adopted	  a	  jus	  sanguinis	  (ancestral	  lineage)	  or	  jus	  soli	  (birthplace)	  principle,	  thereby	  
defining	   which	   inhabitants	   of	   a	   state	   were	   citizens	   and	   non-­‐citizens	   (Koslowski,	  
2001:	  	  206).	  
	  
Throughout	   the	  modern	   era,	   citizenship	   has	   come	   to	   be	   described	   as	   a	   system	   of	  
rights,	   a	   form	   of	   political	   activity	   and	   a	   form	   of	   identity	   and	   solidarity	   (Bosniak,	  
2000:	   451).	   As	   an	   officially	   authorised	   category,	   citizenship	   defines	   formal	   legal	  
status,	  and	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relations,	  it	  refers	  to	  “the	  shared	  understandings	  and	  practices	  
that	   constitute	   a	   political	   community”	   (Joppke,	   1999:	   632).	   Barry	   considers	  
citizenship	  as	  both	  a	  legal	  status	  (legal	  citizenship),	  and	  as	  an	  identification	  of	  group	  
and	   individual	   engagement	   (active	   citizenship)	   (Barry,	   2006:	   20-­‐21).	   Citizenship,	  
therefore,	   is	   the	  process	  by	  which	  identity	  becomes	  anchored	  in	   law	  (Barry,	  2006:	  
25),	   with	   certain	   trends	   emerging	   out	   of	   an	   increased	   tendency	   toward	   more	  
cosmopolitan	  forms	  of	  citizenship,	  such	  as	  dual	  citizenship.	  However,	  scholars	  often	  
disagree	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   dual	   citizenship	   should	   be	   an	   extension	   of	   the	  
modern	  form	  of	  legal,	  political,	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  economic	  engagement.	  	  
	  
European	   bilateral	   treaties	   regarding	   nationality	   during	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	   19th	  
century	   brought	   about	   norms	   against	   dual	   citizenship	   in	   customary	   law,	  
accumulated	   in	   the	   1930	   Hague	   Convention	   on	   Certain	   Questions	   Relating	   to	   the	  
Conflict	   of	  Nationality	   Laws	   (Koslowski,	   2001:	   206),	  which	   states	   that	   all	   persons	  
should	   only	   have	   one	   nationality.	   This,	   Koslowski	   says,	   birthed	   the	   ‘demographic	  
boundary	  maintenance	   regime,’	  which	   tied	   citizens	   to	   a	  unitary	  polity	   (Koslowski,	  
2001).	   In	  contemporary	  international	  relations,	  however,	  nation-­‐states	  are	  moving	  
away	  from	  the	  demographic	  boundary	  maintenance	  regime	  because	  of	  a	  constantly	  
shifting	  international	  order.	  Even	  though	  historical	  precedents	  have	  deterred	  most	  




governments	  have	  endorsed	  it	  not	  because	  of	  increased	  internationalisation,	  per	  se,	  
but	  because	  of	  domestic	  politics	  (Koslowski,	  2001).	  
	  
Citizenship	  and	  Nationality	  as	  ‘Bounded’	  or	  ‘Unbounded’	  
Rapid	   international	   migration	   and	   mobility,	   coupled	   with	   globalisation,	   have	  
ruptured	  state-­‐centric	  conceptions	  of	  citizenship,	  identity,	  and	  belonging	  (Jacobson,	  
1996;	  Sassen,	  2005),	  with	  legal	  scholars	  asserting	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  or	  multiple	  
citizenships	   are	   becoming	   the	   rule	   rather	   than	   the	   exception	   in	   the	   21st	   century	  
(Spiro,	  1997;	  Rubenstein	  and	  Adler,	  2000).	  Rather	  than	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  erosion	  
of	  state	  sovereignty,	  the	  efforts	  by	  emigration	  states,	  for	  instance,	  to	  institutionally	  
embrace	   their	   citizens	   abroad	   highlight	   a	   reassertion	   of	   nation-­‐state	   sovereignty	  
“based	   on	   the	   Westphalian	   principle	   of	   territorial	   sovereignty”	   in	   which	   a	  
renegotiating	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   enables	   “citizenship	   a	   la	   carte”	  
(FitzGerald,	   2012:	   285-­‐286).	   	   This	   involves	   “voluntaristic	   ties	   rather	   than	   being	  
coercively	   ‘ruled,’	   a	  menu	   of	   options	   for	   expressing	  membership,	   an	   emphasis	   on	  
rights	   over	   obligations,	   and	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   plural	   legal	   and	   affective	   national	  
affiliations”	   (FitzGerald,	   2012:	   285-­‐286).	   Using	  Mexico	   as	   a	   case	   study,	   FitzGerald	  
argues	   that	   emigrant	   citizenship	   is	   being	   transformed,	   but	   that	   this	   process	   is	   a	  
result	  of	  the	  strengthening,	  not	  the	  weakening	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  (FitzGerald,	  2012:	  
292).	   While	   some	   scholars	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   increasingly	   a	   weakening	   of	  
territorially	   bounded	   nation-­‐state	   sovereignty,	   International	   Relations	   theorists	  
assert	  that	  the	  conceptual	  triad	  of	  identity-­‐borders-­‐orders	  still	  carries	  relevance	  in	  
which	  borders	  are	  vital	  to	  identity	  formation	  and	  preservation	  and	  their	  existence	  is	  
not	  simply	  a	  feature	  of	  social	  life	  (Lapid,	  2001:	  2;	  Brown,	  2001:	  129).	  	  
	  
While	   a	   growing	   body	   of	   literature	   is	   evaluating	   how	   globalisation	   and	  
transnationalism	   restructure	   or	   challenge	   the	   nation-­‐state	   (Clifford,	   1994),	   some	  
scholars	  argue	   that	   this	  should	  be	   treated	  as	  an	  empirical	  question	  rather	   than	  an	  
exaggerated	  assumption.	  Sociologists	   like	  Brubaker	   (2005)	  remain	  sceptical	   that	  a	  
radical	  shift	  in	  perspective	  has	  occurred	  from	  seeing	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  a	  single	  unit	  




globalisation,	  deterritorialisation,	  and	  transnationalism	  subverting	  said	  relationship.	  
It	   is	   argued	   that	   in	   the	   21st	   century,	   in	   fact,	   states	   have	   strengthened	   rather	   than	  
weakened	   mechanisms	   to	   control	   movement	   of	   people	   within	   their	   borders	   “by	  
deploying	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   technologies	   of	   identification	   and	   control	  
including	   citizenship,	   passports,	   visas,	   surveillance,	   integrated	   databases	   and	  
biometric	  devices”	   (Brubaker,	  2005:	  9).	  This	   is	  certainly	   the	  case	   in	  Liberia	  where	  
the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law	  prohibits	  dual	  citizenship.	  
	  
Other	   authors	  wrestle	  with	   the	   tendency	   to	   dismiss	   the	   state	   as	   a	   site	   of	   national	  
identity	   and	   citizenship	   formation	   altogether.	   Although	   traditional	   notions	   of	  
national	  identity	  and	  citizenship	  are	  being	  challenged,	  some	  authors	  assert	  that	  the	  
underlying	   tenets	   and	   values	   of	   republican	   citizenship—described	   as	   a	   form	   of	  
citizenship	  in	  which	  someone	  is	  actively	  involved	  in	  shaping	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  society—should	  be	  reasserted	  as	  a	  form	  of	  politics	  and	  nationhood	  should	  
be	   reasserted	   as	   a	   form	   of	   political	   identity	   (Miller,	   2000).	   According	   to	   Miller,	  
republican	   citizenship	   requires	   citizens	   to	   share	   a	   common	   identity	   within	   a	  
national	   border—bounded	   citizenship—thereby	   critiquing	   cosmopolitan	   forms	   of	  
citizenship—transnational	   citizenship—	   as	   “either	   parasitic	   on	   national	   forms	   or	  
else	  not	  genuine	  forms	  of	  citizenship	  at	  all”	  (Miller,	  2000:	  4).	  In	  defending	  the	  tenets	  
of	  national	  identity	  as	  a	  hallmark	  of	  citizenship,	  Miller	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  several	  
distinguishing	   features	   of	   national	   identity:	   i)	   nationality	   exists	   because	   people	  
believe	  in	  it;	  ii)	  nationality	  involves	  historical	  continuity;	  iii.)	  national	  identity	  is	  an	  
active	   identity;	   iv)	   national	   identity	   connects	   a	   group	   of	   people	   to	   a	   particular	  
geographical	   place;	   and	   v)	   people	   who	   compose	   the	   nation	   share	   traits	   that	  
distinguish	  them	  from	  other	  groups	  of	  people	  (Miller,	  2000:	  28-­‐30).	  Miller’s	  premise	  
is	   that	   nationality	   is	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   identity	   for	   citizens	   in	   contemporary	  
democracies,	   yet	   some	  citizens	  may	  uphold	   their	   clan,	   ethnic,	   or	   religious	   identity	  
before	   claiming	   national	   solidarity	   with	   other	   members	   within	   a	   nation-­‐state.	  
Furthermore,	   Miller	   might	   be	   accused	   of	   methodological	   nationalism,	   which	  
conflates	  “a	  nation-­‐state	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  society”	  thereby	  assuming	  that	  “members	  
of	  those	  states	  share	  a	  common	  history	  and	  set	  of	  values,	  norms,	  social	  customs	  and	  





While	   Miller	   espouses	   the	   idea	   that	   citizenship	   should	   be	   confined	   to	   a	   unitary	  
nation-­‐state,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  given	  the	  challenges	  to	  state	  sovereignty,	  the	  
legal	   principles	   associated	   with	   nationality	   need	   to	   be	   reconfigured	   to	   reflect	  
contemporary	   realities	   of	   citizenship	   and	   nationality	   in	   a	   globalised	   world	  
(Rubenstein	   and	   Adler,	   2000:	   521).	  While	   some	   perceive	   territorially	   unbounded	  
citizenship	  as	  an	  appropriate	  and	  inevitable	  response	  to	  globalisation	  (Turner,	  et.	  al,	  
1993;	  Bauböck,	  1994),	  others	  frame	  it	  as	  a	  tactical	  enterprise,	  rather	  than	  a	  marker	  
of	   identity	   formation	   or	   consolidation	   of	   political,	   social,	   or	   cultural	   rights	   (Ong,	  
1999).	  For	   instance,	  Ong	  argues	   that	   individuals	  and	  governments	  adopt	  a	   flexible	  
notion	   of	   citizenship	   and	   sovereignty	   in	   order	   to	   accumulate	   capital	   and	   power:	  
“’Flexible	  citizenship’	  refers	  to	  the	  cultural	   logics	  of	  capitalist	  accumulation,	   travel,	  
and	   displacement	   that	   induce	   subjects	   to	   respond	   fluidly	   and	   opportunistically	   to	  
changing	   political-­‐economic	   conditions”	   (Ong,	   1999:	   6).	   Therefore,	   globalisation	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  weaken	  state	  power,	  but	  rather	  states	  have	  increasingly	  found	  
ways	   to	   respond	   to	   transnationalism	   (Ong,	   1999:	   7).	   Ong	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘flexible	  
citizenship’	   to	   refer	   “especially	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   [Chinese]	   mobile	   managers,	  
technocrats,	   and	   professionals	   seeking	   to	   both	   circumvent	   and	   benefit	   from	  
different	  nation-­‐state	  regimes	  by	  selecting	  different	  sites	  for	  investments,	  work,	  and	  
family	   relocation”	   (Ong,	   1999:	   7).	   Unlike	   much	   of	   the	   literature,	   Ong	   regards	  
citizenship,	   and	  by	   extension,	  dual	   citizenship,	   especially	  with	   respect	   to	  overseas	  
Chinese	   transnationals,	   as	   a	   strategic	   approach	   to	   wealth	   accumulation	   and	  
economic	  opportunism,	  and	  subversion	  of	  state	  control	  over	  that	  capital	  (Ong,	  1999:	  
112-­‐113;	  123).	  	  
	  
Diasporas	  Challenged	  by	  and	  Challenging	  to	  State-­‐Centric	  Citizenship	  
Conceptions	   of	   the	   traditional	   state	   as	   an	   “administrative	   unit”	   and	   “spatially	  
discreet	  homogenous	  political	  identity”	  are	  being	  called	  into	  question	  by	  social	  and	  
political	  theorising	  of	  diasporas	  (Adamson	  and	  Demetriou,	  2007:	  490).	  In	  this	  light,	  
Adamson	   and	  Demetriou	  make	   two	  major	   claims:	   i)	   the	   concept	   of	   diasporas	   is	   a	  
useful	   tool	   for	   International	   Relations	   (IR)	   scholars	   to	   adopt	   when	   analysing	  
changes	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   states	   and	   collective	   identities	   under	  
contemporary	   processes	   of	   globalisation;	   and	   ii)	   non-­‐state	   political	   entrepreneurs	  




diaspora	   mobilisation	   as	   a	   means	   of	   generating	   material	   resources	   and	   political	  
support	  in	  a	  global	  economy	  (Adamson	  and	  Demetriou,	  2007:	  491).	  	  
	  
The	  basic	  unit	  of	  analysis	  of	  IR	  is	  implicitly	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  yet	  diasporas	  unsettle	  
that	  assumption,	  calling	   into	  question	  how	  ‘state’	  and	   ‘nation’	  are	  related	  and	  how	  
that	  relationship	  may	  change	  over	  time	  (Adamson	  and	  Demetriou,	  2007:	  491-­‐492).	  
Brubaker	  (2005)	  and	  others	  debunk	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  literature	  on	  diasporas	  that	  
the	   nation-­‐state	   is	   a	   static,	   homogenous,	   timeless	   entity,	   while	   diasporas	   are	  
changing,	   shifting,	   heterogeneous.	   He	   maintains	   that	   diaspora	   scholars	   make	   the	  
mistake	   of	   pitting	   the	   perceived	   homogeneity	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   against	   the	  
heterogeneity	   of	   diasporas,	   when	   the	   nation-­‐state	   represents	   a	   figment	   of	   the	  
sociological	   imagination:	   “The	  conceptual	  anti-­‐thesis	  between	   the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  
the	   diaspora	   obscures	   more	   than	   it	   reveals,	   occluding	   the	   persistent	   significance	  
(and	  great	  empirical	  variety)	  of	  nation	  states”	  (Brubaker,	  2005:	  10).	  	  
	  
Diasporic	  Stances	  and	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Claims	  as	  Mutually	  Constitutive	  	  
Current	  debates	  on	  citizenship	  illustrate	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  diasporas	  affect	  the	  
citizenship	  regimes	  in	  their	  host	  nations,	  yet	  there	  are	  emerging	  parallel	  discourses	  
focused	  entirely	  on	  how	  diaspora	  communities	  influence	  citizenship	  regimes	  in	  their	  
country	  of	  origin	  (Baranbantseva	  and	  Sutherland,	  2011:	  1).	  This	  debate	  has	  situated	  
claims	  for	  dual	  citizenship	  at	  the	  centre,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Liberia.	  Baranbantseva	  and	  
Sutherland	   stress	   that	   both	   diasporas	   and	   sending	   nations	   actively	   engage	   in	   the	  
process	  of	  revising	  the	  meaning	  of	  citizenship	  (Baranbantseva	  and	  Sutherland,	  2011:	  
1).	   For	   them,	   citizenship	   is	   fundamentally	   linked	   to	   nation-­‐building	   and	   state-­‐
legitimacy	   and	   citizenship	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   state	   territoriality	   has	  
increasingly	  become	  problematised	  by	  international	  migration	  (Baranbantseva	  and	  
Sutherland,	   2011:	   6;	   8).	  Most	   legal	  means	   by	  which	   immigrants	   are	   incorporated	  
maximise	  individual	  liberty,	  but	  their	  extraterritorial	  political	  participation	  comes	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  allowing	  members	  to	  make	  policies	  to	  which	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  subject	  






Contrary	   to	   claims	   by	   proponents	   of	   dual	   citizenship,	   Spiro	   also	   cautions	   that	  
extraterritorial	   citizenship	   may	   not	   necessarily	   evidence	   a	   strong	   tie	   to	   the	  
homeland	  state,	  because	  in	  many	  cases	  little	  is	  required	  of	  external	  citizens:	  neither	  
paying	  taxes,	  nor	  military	  service;	  essentially,	  there	  is	  no	  cost	  to	  maintaining	  one’s	  
original	  citizenship	  (Spiro,	  2012:	  311;	  318).	  On	  average,	  external	  citizens	  have	  less	  
of	  an	  interest	  in	  homeland	  governance	  than	  resident	  citizens	  (Spiro,	  2012:	  321),	  an	  
argument	   often	   invoked	   by	   homeland	   Liberians	   who	   challenge	   the	   institution	   of	  
dual	   citizenship.	   There	   is	   no	   empirical	   basis,	   moreover,	   for	   claiming	   that	   dual	  
citizenship	   necessarily	   enforces	   homeland-­‐emigrant	   ties,	   rather	   dual	   citizenship	  
simply	  enables	  “external	  populations	  to	  secure	  citizenship	  in	  their	  places	  of	  external	  
residence	   without	   relinquishing	   the	   material	   and	   sentimental	   advantages	   of	  
retained	  original	  citizenship”	  (Spiro,	  2012:	  319).	  This	  is	  why	  some	  states	  have	  opted	  
for	   a	   compromise	   by	   granting	   quasi-­‐citizenship	   to	   their	   non-­‐resident	   nationals	  
through	   the	   issuance	   of	   identity	   cards	   (i.e.,	   India,	   Turkey,	   Ethiopia)	   that	   enable	  
certain	  rights	  but	  stop	  short	  of	  political	  rights,	  enabling	  some	  form	  of	  membership,	  
i.e.,	  ethnic	  citizenship	  (Joppke,	  2005;	  Spiro,	  2012:	  324).	  	  
	  
In	  Medias	  Res:	  Boundedness	  and	  Transnationalism	  Converge	  
Some	   authors	   position	   themselves	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   what	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   binary	  
between	  state-­‐centric	  citizenship	  and	  transnational	  citizenship,	  arguing	  that	  the	  two	  
are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  The	  central	  argument	  of	  my	  thesis	  is	  closely	  aligned	  with	  
this	   paradigm,	   which	   constructs	   contemporary	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   a	   hybrid	  
manifestation	  of	  both	  bounded	  and	  unbounded	  forms	  of	  identity	  and	  practice.	  This	  
will	  become	  clear	  in	  Chapter	  IV	  where	  I	  discuss	  the	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  Liberians	  
in	   my	   study—both	   home	   and	   abroad—conceive	   of	   and	   practice	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship,’	  regardless	  of	  their	  legal	  citizenship	  status.	  	  
	  
Bosniak	   argues	   convincingly	   that	   the	   struggle	   over	   the	   concept	   of	   citizenship	  
beyond	   the	   nation-­‐state	   has	   really	   been	   a	   struggle	   over	   the	   true	   meaning	   of	  
citizenship	   in	   the	   contemporary	   world	   (Bosniak,	   2000:	   451).	   She	   examines	   and	  
reassesses	  recent	   trends	   in	  political	  and	  social	   theory	   to	   locate	  citizenship	  beyond	  




reconfigured	  in	  post-­‐national	  terms	  (Bosniak,	  2000).	  According	  to	  Bosniak,	  there	  is	  
no	  single	  answer	  to	  this	  claim	  because	  there	  is	  no	  singularly	  accepted	  conception	  of	  
citizenship.	   Therefore,	   analysing	   citizenship	   from	   its	   varied	   meanings	   seems	   to	  
suggest	   that	   it	   is	   being	   reconfigured	   beyond	   the	   nation-­‐state	   to	   varying	   degrees.	  
Because	   the	   process	   of	   denationalisation	   has	   been	   experienced	   more	   extensively	  
and	  meaningfully	  in	  some	  domains	  than	  in	  others,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  citizenship	  is	  
denationalised	  will	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  context	  (Bosniak,	  2000:	  451).	  Following	  
this	  logic,	  then,	  it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  state	  is	  losing	  its	  analytical	  vigour.	  
	  
Beyond	  the	  Legal:	  Cultural	  and	  Social	  Citizenship	  	  
Legal	  definitions	  often	  underpin	  the	  discourse	  on	  citizenship—whether	  bounded	  or	  
unbounded—but	   emergent	   scholarship	   is	   beginning	   to	   define	   citizenship	   along	  
cultural	  and	  social	  lines.	  Glick	  Schiller	  introduces	  the	  term	  “transborder	  citizenship”	  
to	  define	  “people	  who	  live	  their	  lives	  across	  the	  borders	  of	  two	  or	  more	  nation	  states,	  
participating	   in	   the	  normative	  regimes,	   legal	  and	   institutional	  system	  and	  political	  
practices	  of	  these	  various	  states”	  (Glick	  Schiller,	  2005:	  27).	  In	  framing	  transborder	  
citizenship,	  she	  moves	  beyond	  legal	  constructions	  of	  citizenship	  to	  examine	  cultural	  
citizenship,	   defined	   by	   Latino	   scholars	   in	   the	   United	   States	   as	   “the	   right	   to	   be	  
different	   with	   respect	   to	   norms	   of	   the	   dominant	   national	   community,	   without	  
compromising	  one’s	  right	  to	  belong”	  (Rosaldo	  and	  Flores,	  1997:	  57),	  contrary	  to	  the	  
typologies	   of	   Safran	   (1991),	   Sheffer	   (1993)	   and	   Cohen	   (1997)	   who	   argue	   that	  
diasporas	  feel	  alienated	  in	  host	  nations	  because	  of	  their	  inability	  to	  assimilate.	  	  
	  
Some	   authors	   conceptualise	   citizenship	   as	   a	   social	   process	   whereby	   “norms,	  
practices,	   meanings	   and	   identities”	   are	   constantly	   negotiated	   by	   individuals	   and	  
social	  groups	  (Isin,	  2000:	  5).	  This	  framing	  aligns	  with	  the	  actor-­‐oriented	  theoretical	  
model	   of	   social	   interface,	   which	   I	   discuss	   later	   in	   this	   chapter.	   As	   a	   sociological	  
construct,	  citizenship	  is	  relational;	  therefore	  the	  interactions	  between	  a	  citizen	  and	  
his/her	   society	   are	   just	   as	   important	   as	   the	   interactions	   between	   a	   citizen	   and	  
his/her	   state	   (van	   Steenbergen,	   1994:	   2).	   Furthermore,	   a	   citizen	   is	   framed	   as	   “a	  
competent	  member	  of	  society”	  (Turner,	  1993:	  2)	  who	  “governs	  and	  is	  governed”	  by	  




Glick	  Schiller	  (2005)	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  citizenship,	  which	  is	  inclusive	  
of,	  but	  broader	  than,	  the	  definition	  of	  cultural	  citizenship.	  Social	  citizens,	  she	  argues,	  
“claim	  rights	  to	  citizenship	  through	  social	  practice	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  law”	  by	  
making	  contributions	  to	  the	  state	  or	  demonstrating	  against	  discrimination	  within	  a	  
state,	  for	  example	  (Glick	  Schiller,	  2005:	  31).	  	  
	  
In	  deconstructing	  citizenship,	  Sassen	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  narrow	  legal	  definition	  of	  
citizenship	   does	   not	   adequately	   explain	   how	   citizens	   within	   a	   particular	   polity	  
experience	   the	   institution	   differently,	   and	   how	   minority	   groups,	   though	   citizens,	  
may	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  social	  and	  political	  dividends	  of	  citizenship	  (Sassen,	  2005).	  
In	   this	   vein,	   Yuval-­‐Davis	   develops	   the	   notion	   of	   	   ‘multi-­‐layered	   citizenship’	   to	  
describe	  how	  “people’s	   rights	  and	  obligations	   to	  a	   specific	   state	  are	  mediated	  and	  
largely	   dependent	   on	   their	   membership	   of	   a	   specific	   ethnic,	   racial,	   religious	   or	  
regional	  collectivity”	  (Yuval-­‐Davis,	  2000:	  172).	  Although	  not	  entirely	  confined	  by	  it,	  
“people	  are	  not	  positioned	  equally	  within	  their	  collectivities”	  just	  as	  “states	  are	  not	  
positioned	   equally	   with	   other	   states”	   (Yuval-­‐Davis,	   2000:	   172).	   This	   will	   become	  
clear	  in	  subsequent	  chapters	  of	  the	  thesis	  when	  I	  show	  that	  Liberians	  experience	  the	  
institution	  of	  citizenship	  differently	  depending	  on	  their	  social	  locations.	  In	  essence,	  
equal	   membership	   rights	   are	   not	   guaranteed	   by	   citizenship,	   legally	   defined	   only,	  
prompting	  some	  excluded	  groups	   to	  subvert	   the	   institution	  of	   citizenship,	   thereby	  
claiming	  more	   rights	   and	   privileges	   (Sassen,	   2005).	   New	   forms	   of	   citizenship	   are	  
being	   created	   and	   the	   global	   city	   is	   the	   site	   where	   these	   interactions	   take	   place,	  
where	  the	  disadvantaged	  can	  engage	  with	  each	  other	  and	  assert	  their	  presence	  by	  
engaging	  globalised	  forms	  of	  corporate	  power	  (Sassen,	  2005:	  91).	  This	  assertion	  is	  
crucial	  to	  my	  study,	  as	  I	  evaluate	  the	  citizenship	  practices	  of	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  in	  
five	  urban	  centres.	  
	  
Moving	  from	  Europe	  and	  North	  America:	  Citizenship	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  	  
The	   literature	  on	  citizenship	  heavily	  emphasises	  analysis	   from	   immigration	  states,	  
yet	   some	   scholars	   argue	   that	   an	   examination	   of	   citizenship	   construction	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  emigration	  states,	  such	  as	  Liberia,	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  vital.	  The	  
nature	  and	  meaning	  of	  citizenship	  within	  emigration	  states	  vary	  greatly	  from	  that	  of	  




their	  citizens	  abroad	  (Barry,	  2006:	  19).	  Barry	  uses	  the	  case	  of	  Mexican	  emigrants	  in	  
the	   United	   States	   to	   illustrate	   how	   remittances,	   the	   boom	   in	   transport	   and	  
communication	  networks,	  and	  the	  activism	  of	  Mexicans	  abroad,	  have	  broadened	  the	  
scope	   for	   citizenship	   reconfiguration	   (Barry,	   2006).	   She	   argues	   that	   migration	  
“decouples	  citizenship	  and	  residence”	  (Barry,	  2006:	  17),	  deconstructing	  the	  notion	  
that	  citizenship	  is	  bounded	  within	  a	  particular	  nation-­‐state.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Barry,	   there	   are	   three	   ways	   in	   which	   emigrant	   citizens	   and	   their	  
homeland	  states	  are	  reconfiguring	  citizenship:	   i)	  emigration	  states	  have	  construed	  
emigrant	   citizens	   as	   heroes	   who	   contribute	   to	   the	   economic	   regeneration	   of	   the	  
state	  through	  remittances,	  taxes	  (i.e.,	  Eritrea	  and	  Korea),	  and	  investment	  incentives	  
(i.e.,	   India);	   ii)	   emigration	   states	   have	   embraced	   plural	   citizenship	   by	   amending	  
citizenship	   laws,	   thereby	   allowing	   their	   nationals	   to	   retain	   homeland	   citizenship	  
while	   simultaneously	   naturalising	   in	   a	   foreign	   country	   (i.e.,	   Philippines,	   Turkey,	  
Senegal);	   and	   iii)	   emigrants	   are	   demanding	   the	   right	   to	   participate	   fully	   in	   the	  
political	  processes	  of	  their	  homelands—and	  being	  granted	  that	  right	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  
Colombia,	  Peru,	  and	  Dominican	  Republic—although	  most	  emigration	  states	  do	  not	  
permit	  the	  holding	  of	  political	  office	  or	  voting	  in	  general	  and	  presidential	  elections	  
by	  nationals	  abroad	  (i.e.,	  Mexico)	  (Barry,	  2006:	  34).	  Nevertheless,	  Barry’s	  analysis	  is	  
biased	   in	   that	   it	  privileges	   the	  citizenship	  practices	  of	  emigrants.	   I	   respond	  to	   this	  
blind	   spot	   by	   examining	   and	   validating	   the	   citizenship	   practices	   of	   domestically	  
rooted	  Liberians	   resident	   in	  Monrovia,	   thereby	  presenting	   them	  as	   agential	   social	  
actors	  rather	  than	  mere	  recipients	  of	  donor	  aid	  and	  diaspora	  remittances.	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  the	  literature	  neglects	  perspectives	  from	  emigration	  states	  and	  their	  resident	  
citizens,	  which	  Barry	  and	  I	  attempt	  to	  fill,	  respectively,	  far	  fewer	  sources	  examine	  in	  
detail	  post-­‐independent	  African	  states	  and	  their	  articulations	  of	  citizenship.	   In	  her	  
book,	  Struggles	  for	  Citizenship	  in	  Africa,	  which	  advances	  the	  arguments	  in	  Mahmood	  
Mamdani’s	   1996	   seminal	   text,	   Citizen	   and	   Subject,	   Manby	   asserts	   that	   citizenship	  
laws	  in	  Africa	  are	  residual	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  colonial	  era	  that	  have	  fomented	  conflict	  
and	  instability	  in	  the	  contemporary	  era	  (Manby,	  2009:	  1-­‐2).	  As	  a	  result,	  citizenship	  




discriminatory	  manifestations	  fashioned	  by	  the	  history	  of	  colonialism	  (Manby,	  2009:	  
1-­‐2).	   Contemporary	   contestations	   around	   citizenship	   are	   particularly	   stark	   in	   the	  
Liberia	  case	  study,	  although	  the	  country	  admittedly	  only	  experienced	  a	  pseudo	  form	  
of	  colonial	  rule	  under	  the	  American	  Colonisation	  Society	  (ACS)	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  
19th	   century	   (Levitt,	   2005).	   In	   the	   colonial	   architecture	   of	   most	   African	   states,	  
citizenship	  was	  non-­‐existent	  for	  the	  subjects	  of	  colonial	  rule,	  and	  only	  a	  few	  native	  
administrators	   retained	   any	   form	   of	   citizenship	   within	   colonial	   territories	  
(Mamdani,	  1996:	  16-­‐17).	  During	  independence,	  citizenship	  laws	  were	  reconfigured	  
in	   the	   same	   vein	   as	   European	   law	   configured	   liberal	   citizenship,	   by	   birth	   or	  
ancestral	  lineage,	  whereby	  those	  not	  native	  to	  the	  soil	  were	  excluded,	  either	  because	  
they	   had	  migrated	   to	   the	   region	   during	   the	   colonial	   period,	   or	   because	   they	   had	  
migrated	   from	   another	   section	   of	   the	   territory	   (Manby,	   2009:	   6-­‐7;	   18-­‐21;	   37-­‐93).	  
Just	   as	   colonial	   boundaries	  were	   not	   reconfigured	   after	   independence,	   citizenship	  
norms	  were	  often	  adopted	   that	   reflected	  a	  European	  ethos	   that	   is	   still	  maintained	  
today	  (Manby,	  2009:	  3-­‐8).	  	  
	  
Recent	   trends	   in	   changing	   legal	   norms	   coupled	   with	   globalisation	   are	   pressuring	  
African	  countries	  to	  loosen	  their	  regulations	  on	  citizenship,	  with	  about	  half	  adopting	  
dual	  citizenship	  provisions.	  However,	  post-­‐independence	  states	  still	  hold	  very	  strict	  
definitions	   of	  who	   belongs	   to	   the	   nation-­‐state,	   often	   excluding	   ethnic	   groups	  who	  
were	  not	  physically	  present	  in	  the	  polity	  by	  a	  particular	  date	  (i.e.,	  Uganda	  and	  DRC),	  
non-­‐Negroes	  (i.e.,	  Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone),	  and	  immigrants	  (i.e.,	  Nigeria)	  (Manby,	  
2009:	  6-­‐9;	  12;	  14-­‐15;	  109-­‐112).	  This	  trend	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  fractured	  nature	  of	  
African	   identity	   formation	   (Mamdani,	   1996;	   Adejumobi,	   2005;	  Manby,	   2009).	   The	  
colonial	  definition	  of	  native	  Africans	  as	  subjects	  rather	  than	  citizens	  explains	  why	  so	  
many	  crises	  along	   issues	  of	   identity,	  citizenship,	  and	  rights	  have	  plagued	  the	  West	  
African	   sub-­‐region	   in	   the	  20th	   and	  21st	   century,	  with	  Liberia	   as	   an	  applicable	   case	  
study.	   Adejumobi	   argues	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   colonial	   administration	   practices	  
further	   made	   antagonists	   of	   citizens,	   who	   challenged	   authoritarianism,	   with	   this	  
dichotomy	  discussed	  extensively	  by	  Mamdani	  (1996).	  Taking	  his	  cue	  from	  Mamdani,	  
Adejumobi	  asserts	  that	  claims	  to	  the	  attendant	  rights	  and	  privileges	  of	  citizenship—




proliferation	  of	  conflicts	  in	  West	  Africa	  and	  elsewhere	  on	  the	  continent	  (Adejumobi:	  
2005:	  20).	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   Adejumobi’s	   explication	   of	   citizenship	   as	   a	   site	   of	   contestation	   in	  
Africa	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  liberal	  definition	  of	  citizenship	  in	  social	  theory	  defined	  by	  
T.H.	   Marshall,	   who	   believed	   that	   modern	   citizenship	   included	   civil,	   political	   and	  
social	  rights	  for	  all	  members	  of	  a	  given	  society,	  whereby	  all	  enjoy	  the	  right	  to	  equal	  
treatment	   under	   the	   law,	   such	   as	   equal	   voting	   rights,	   access	   to	   education,	   health	  
care,	   housing	   and	   the	   minimum	   levels	   of	   income	   (Marshall,	   1950).	   Marshall	   has	  
been	   critiqued	   implicitly	   and	   explicitly	   for	   his	   myopia	   and	   naïveté	   (Yuval	   Davis,	  
2000;	   O’Connell	   Davidson,	   2013),	   and	   I	   intend	   to	   further	   challenge	   his	   liberal	  
assumptions	  by	  evaluating	  the	  differentiated	  citizenship	  experiences	  of	  respondents	  
in	  the	  five	  field	  sites	  chosen	  for	  this	  thesis.	  In	  fact,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  citizenship	  
by	  definition	  is	  exclusionary	  because	  by	  delineating	  who	  belongs	  one	  inadvertently	  
defines	  who	  does	  not	  (Castles	  and	  Davidson,	  2000:	  10-­‐11).	  Similar	   to	  Yuval-­‐Davis’	  
framing	  of	  citizenship	  as	  ‘multi-­‐layered’,	  O’Connell	  Davidson	  (2013:	  15)	  argues	  that	  
citizenship	  in	  practice	  is	   	  “gendered,	  aged,	  classed,	  and	  raced,	  and	  those	  who	  enjoy	  
citizenship	  in	  the	  formal	  sense	  do	  not	  always	  enjoy	  equal	  access	  to	  its	  privileges	  and	  
protections.”	  Therefore,	   exclusionary	  citizenship	   laws	  are	  not	  unique	   to	  Liberia	  or	  
Africa.	   It	   is	   difficult,	   and	   sometimes	   virtually	   impossible	   for	   migrants	   to	   acquire	  
citizenship	   in	  most	  parts	  of	  East	  Asia,	   South	  Asia,	   or	   the	  Pacific	  with	   their	  overtly	  
racist	  nationality	  laws	  (Castles	  and	  Davidson,	  2000:	  194).	  Therefore,	  citizenship	  as	  a	  
site	  of	  contestation	  seems	  to	  be	  apparent	  not	  only	  in	  the	  Liberia	  case	  study,	  but	  also	  
manifests	  itself	  more	  generally	  in	  the	  legacies	  of	  many	  formerly	  colonised	  states.	  	  
	  
The	   literature	   suggests	   that	   conceptualisations	   of	   citizenship	   remain	   varied	   and	  
nuanced	   in	  Africa	   and	  elsewhere,	   thereby	   supporting	   the	   central	   argument	  of	   this	  
thesis—that	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	   in	   Liberia	   is	   a	   manifestation	   of	   the	   contested	   configurations	   and	  
reconfigurations	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   across	   space	   and	   time.	   The	   brief	   section	  
that	   follows	   clearly	   delineates	   how	   I	   conceptualise	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   an	  
amalgam	   of	   the	   legal,	   political,	   and	   sociological	   definitions	   of	   citizenship	   in	   the	  




‘Liberian	  Citizenship’	  as	  Identity,	  Practice,	  and	  a	  Set	  of	  Relations	  
Just	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  citizenship	  across	  the	  globe	  is	  constantly	  shifting,	  I	  argue	  that	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  has	  been	  constructed	  and	  reconstructed	  because	  of	  historical	  
and	  contemporary	  processes	  such	  as	  conflict,	  migration,	  globalisation	  and	  post-­‐war	  
recovery.	   In	   this	   thesis,	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   simultaneously	   theorised	   in	   legal,	  
political	   and	   sociological	   terms.	   First,	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   passive	   and	   fixed,	  
representing	   an	   identity	   anchored	   in	   legal	   status,	   cultural	   and	   national	   affiliation.	  
Second,	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  is	  active,	  representing	  a	  bundle	  of	  practices	  enacted	  by	  
a	  multitude	  of	   actors.	  And	   third,	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   a	   combination	  of	   identity	  
and	   practice	   represented	   by	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   between	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   its	  
citizens	  in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad	  (state-­‐citizen	  relations)	  and	  between	  Liberians	  across	  
spatial	  landscapes	  (citizen-­‐citizen	  relations)—similar	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Fierke	  
frames	   security	   as	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   between	   the	   protector	   and	   protected,	   the	  
threatener	  and	  threatened	  (Fierke,	  2007).	  Citizenship	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  active	  
or	   passive	   depending	   on	  whether	   or	   not	   it	   was	   configured	   ‘from	   below’	   or	   ‘from	  
above’	   (Kuisma,	   2008:	   616).	   For	   instance,	   whereas	   the	   French	   Revolution	  
engendered	   citizenship	   ‘from	   below’,	   making	   citizenship	   active	   in	   France,	   the	  
unification	   of	   Germany	   under	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Versailles	   produced	   citizenship	   ‘from	  
above’	   thereby	   making	   German	   citizenship	   more	   passive	   in	   orientation	   (Kuisma,	  
2000:	  616).	   In	   this	   thesis,	   I	  demonstrate	   that	  while	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  
century	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   was	   passive	   and	   constructed	   ‘from	   above’	   by	   a	  
hegemonic	  state,	  late	  20th	  and	  early	  21st	  century	  citizenship	  has	  been	  largely	  active	  
and	  reconstructed	  ‘from	  below’	  by	  citizens	  themselves,	  primarily	  through	  processes	  
of	  contestation.	  	  
	  
With	  this	  conceptual	  framework	  of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  I	  examine	  throughout	  the	  
thesis	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Liberian	  state	  has	  protected	  the	  rights	  and	  privileges	  of	  its	  
citizens,	  whether	  or	  not	  Liberian	  citizens	  have	  upheld	  their	  civic	  responsibilities	  to	  
the	  state	  and	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  how	  this	  has	  impacted	  claims	  for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  
against	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  I	  situate	  my	  
study	  and	  multi-­‐sited	  fieldwork	  within	  a	  particular	  strand	  of	  social	  constructionist	  
theory,	   actor-­‐oriented	   analysis,	   which	   frames	   development	   intervention,	   and,	   by	  




worldviews	  of	  a	  range	  of	  social	  actors	  converge.	  Actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	   facilitates	  
in-­‐depth	  framing	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relations.	  	  
	  
Part	  II:	  An	  Actor-­‐Oriented	  Analysis	  from	  Below	  
Actor-­‐oriented	  analysis—with	  its	  constituent	  elements	  of	  human	  agency,	  life-­‐worlds,	  
social	   interfaces,	   and	   development	   interventions—represents	   the	   theoretical	  
grounding	   for	   this	   thesis	   because	   I	   examine	   relations	   between	   a	   multitude	   of	  
actors—homeland	   Liberians,	   Liberian	   diasporas,	   permanent	   returnees,	   circular	  
returnees,	   executive	   and	   legislative	   members	   of	   government—and	   how	   their	  
conceptualisations	   of	   'Liberian	   citizenship'	   differ	   according	   to	   their	   life-­‐worlds,	  
social	   locations,	   and	   experiences	   of	   conflict,	  migration,	   globalisation	   and	  post-­‐war	  
recovery,	   thereby	   influencing	  claims	   for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  proposed	  dual	  
citizenship	  legislation.	  	  
	  
Actor-­‐oriented	  types	  of	  analysis	  were	  popular	  in	  anthropology	  and	  sociology	  in	  the	  
1960s	   and	   1970s,	   ranging	   from	   transactional	   and	   decision-­‐making	   models	   to	  
symbolic	  interventionist	  and	  phenomenological	  analysis	  (Long,	  2001).	  Some	  studies	  
fell	   short	   by	   reverting	   to	   a	   kind	   of	   methodological	   individualism	   “that	   sought	   to	  
explain	   social	   behaviour	   primarily	   in	   terms	   of	   individual	   motivations,	   intentions,	  
and	   interests”	   without	   considering	   larger	   structural	   forces	   (Long,	   2001:	   14).	  
Nevertheless,	   Long’s	   brand	   of	   actor-­‐oriented	   analysis,	   which	   this	   thesis	   adopts,	  
considers	   the	   interplay	   between	   agency	   and	   structure	   and	   is	   concerned	   with	  
“actors’	   lived	   experiences,	   desires,	   understandings	   and	   self-­‐defined	   problematic	  
situations”	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  planned	  development	  interventions	  (Long,	  2001:	  27-­‐28).	  
It	  begins	  with	   the	  notion	   that	  different	  social	   forms—in	   the	  case	  of	   this	  study,	   the	  
varying	  conceptualistions	  and	  practice	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’—“develop	  under	  the	  
same	  or	  similar	  structural	  circumstances.	  Such	  differences	  reflect	  variations	   in	   the	  
ways	   in	   which	   actors	   attempt	   to	   come	   to	   grips,	   cognitively	   and	   organisationally,	  
with	   the	   situations	   they	   face”	   (Long,	   1990:	   10).	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   post-­‐war	  
challenges	  invariably	   impact	  Liberians	  in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad,	  respectively,	   thereby	  
impacting	   their	  disparate	   responses	   to	  homeland	  government	  policy	  prescriptions	  





The	  different	  patterns	  of	  social	  organisation	  which	  emerge	  result	  from	  “interactions,	  
negotiations,	  and	  social	  struggles	  that	  take	  place	  between	  several	  kinds	  of	  actor	  [s],	  
not	   only	   those	   present	   in	   given	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   encounters	   but	   also	   those	   who	   are	  
[physically]	   absent	   yet	   nevertheless	   influence	   the	   situation,	   affecting	   actions	   and	  
outcomes”	  (Long,	  1990:	  7),	  such	  as	  diasporas	  in	  my	  study.	  This	  point	  is	  particularly	  
stark	   in	   the	   case	  of	   Liberians	   abroad	  whose	   experiences	  of	   conflict	   and	  migration	  
have	  influenced	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  manifested	  in	  proposed	  
dual	   citizenship	   legislation.	   Analysis	   of	   the	   actor-­‐oriented	   paradigm	   requires	  
distinguishing	  and	  codifying	  the	  strategies	  employed	  by	  actors	  and	  their	  rationales,	  
the	  conditions	  under	  which	  these	  strategies	  arise,	  “their	  viability	  or	  effectiveness	  for	  
solving	  specific	  problems,	  and	  their	  structural	  outcomes”	  (Long,	  1990:	  10).	  It	  places	  
a	  premium	  on	  the	  varied	  interactions	  amongst	  different	  sets	  of	  actors,	  and	  does	  not	  
assume	  imposition	  from	  the	  ‘top’	  to	  the	  ‘bottom’	  (Long,	  2001:	  27).	  In	  this	  vein,	  actor-­‐
oriented	  analysis	   enables	   the	   framing	  of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   a	   set	  of	   relations	  
between	   diasporas	   and	   the	   Liberian	   state,	   diasporas	   and	   homeland	   Liberians,	   as	  
well	   as	   homeland	   Liberians	   and	   the	   Liberian	   state,	   for	   example.	   Each	   category	   of	  
actors	  in	  this	  thesis	  possesses	  varying	  levels	  of	  power	  that	  mediate	  one	  another—as	  
is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  deadlock	  on	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation—without	  one	  
group	  dominating	  the	  other.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  nucleus	  of	  actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	  is	  human	  agency,	  which	  Long	  defines	  as	  the	  
individual	   actor’s	   “capacity	   to	   process	   social	   experience	   and	   to	   devise	   ways	   of	  
coping	  with	  life,	  even	  under	  the	  most	  extreme	  forms	  of	  coercion”	  (Long,	  2001:	  15).	  
Despite	  constraints,	  all	  social	  actors	  possess	  Gidden’s	  coupling	  of	  ‘knowledgeability’	  
and	  ‘capability’	   in	  his	  theory	  of	  human	  agency	  (Giddens,	  1984),	  whereby	  they	  “can	  
engage	   with,	   distance	   themselves	   from,	   or	   adopt	   an	   ambiguous	   stance	   towards	  
certain	   codified	   rules	   and	   interpretations”	   (Long,	   2001:17).	   Expanding	   the	  
‘knowledgeability’	   and	   ‘capability’	   frame	   adopted	   by	   Giddens,	   Long	   references	  
Turner,	   who	   argued	   that	   “a	   theoretical	   interpretation	   of	   social	   action	   must	   go	  
beyond	   a	   consideration	   of	   knowledgeability,	   consciousness,	   and	   intentions	   to	  
embrace	   also	   ‘feelings,	   emotions,	   perceptions,	   identities,	   and	   the	   continuity	   of	  
agents	   across	   space	   and	   time’	   (Turner	   1992:	   91)”	   (Long,	   2001:	   18).	   This	   point	   is	  




‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   across	   space	   and	   time	   are	   not	   manifestations	   of	   rationality	  
alone,	   but	   rather	   a	   combination	   of	   actors’	   lived	   experiences	   of	   and	   emotive	  
responses	  to	  conflict,	  migration,	  globalisation,	  and	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  Agency	  is	  not	  
universal	   because	   it	   is	   constructed	   differently	   based	   on	   cultural	   and	   worldview	  
interpretations	  (Long,	  2001:	  19),	  particularly	  by	  a	  range	  of	  social	  actors	  in	  this	  study	  
who	  live	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  territorial	  confines	  of	   the	  Liberian	  nation-­‐state.	   In	  
this	   thesis,	   agency	   represents	   the	   application	   and	   management	   of	   social	  
relationships	  and	  networks	  across	  varying	  spatial	  landscapes	  (Long,	  2001:	  17).	  	  
	  
Actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	  situates	  “individuals	  in	  the	  specific	  life-­‐worlds	  in	  which	  they	  
manage	   their	   everyday	   affairs”	   and	   acknowledges	   that	   these	   same	   individuals	  
devise	   strategies	   for	   solving	   problematic	   circumstances	  while	   actively	   engaged	   in	  
“constructing	  their	  own	  social	  worlds,	  even	  if	  this	  means	  being	  ‘active	  accomplices’	  
to	   their	   own	   subordination”	   (Long,	   1990:	   14).	   Long	   borrows	   the	   term	   ‘life-­‐world’	  
from	  Shutz	  and	  Luckmann	  (1973)	  who	  defined	  it	  as	  	  “a	  lived-­‐in	  and	  largely	  taken	  for	  
granted	   world”	   that,	   according	   to	   Long,	   “is	   actor	   rather	   than	   observer	   defined”	  
(Long,	   2001:	   189).	   In	   Long’s	   analysis,	   everyday	   life	   is	   experienced	   as	   an	   “ordered	  
reality”	  shared	  with	  others	  in	  which	  actors	  both	  “manage	  their	  social	  relationships”	  
and	   “problematise	   their	   situations”	   (Long,	   2001:	   189),	   particularly	   in	   the	   face	   of	  
planned	  development	   intervention	  such	  as	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	   legislation	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   Liberia.	   What	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   interpreting	   processes	   of	  
intervention	  is	  identifying	  the	  tactics	  employed	  by	  actors	  “for	  dealing	  with	  their	  new	  
intervenors	   so	   that	   they	   might	   appropriate,	   manipulate,	   subvert	   or	   dismember	  
particular	   interventions”	   (Long,	   2001:	   233).	   This	   point	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	  
my	  analysis	  of	  how	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  space	  of	  contestation,	  as	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  dissenting	  opinions	  about	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  as	  
a	  policy	  prescription.	  	  
	  
Although	   Long	   examines	   how	   individual	   actors—poor	   peasants,	   entrepreneurs,	  
government	   bureaucrats,	   or	   researchers—respond	   to	   development	   projects	   in	  
localised,	   rural	   settings	   in	   the	  developing	  world,	   thereby	   revealing	   their	  divergent	  
social	   locations	   and	   life-­‐worlds	   (Long,	   1992:	   5),	   this	   thesis	   assesses	   how	  Liberian	  




dual	  citizenship	  –	  with	  its	  presumed	  development	  outcomes,	  and	  what	  this	  reveals	  
about	   their	   disparate	   experiences	   of	   being	   Liberian	   and	   practicing	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’.	   Therefore,	  my	   study	   spanning	   three	   continents	   and	   Long’s	   studies	   in	  
localised,	   rural	   settings	   cohere	   in	   attempting	   to	   understand	   the	   “‘social	   life’	   of	  
development	   projects—from	   conception	   to	   realisation—as	   well	   as	   the	   responses	  
and	   lived	   experiences	   of	   the	   variously	   located	   and	   affected	   social	   actors”	   (Long,	  
2001:	  15).	  In	  this	  theoretical	  framing,	  development	  interventions,	  such	  as	  proposed	  
dual	  citizenship	  legislation,	  are	  not	  taken	  for	  granted	  processes	  of	  amelioration,	  but	  
rather	  objects	  of	  contestation	  and	  accommodation,	  simultaneously:	  	  	  
	  
Rather	  than	  viewing	  intervention	  as	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  plan	  for	  
action,	  it	  should	  be	  visualised	  as	  an	  ongoing	  transformational	  process	  
in	  which	  different	  actor	  interests	  and	  struggles	  are	  located.	  Integral	  to	  
this	  type	  of	  approach	  are	  two	  other	  crucial	  aspects:	  an	  understanding	  
of	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  knowledge	  is	  negotiated	  and	  jointly	  created	  
through	   various	   types	   of	   social	   encounter,	   and	   an	   understanding	   of	  
the	  power	  dynamics	  involved	  (Long,	  1992:	  9).	  	  
	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   examining	   individual	   actors,	   human	   agency,	   and	   development	  
interventions,	   actor-­‐oriented	   analysis	   also	   adopts	   ‘interface’	   as	   a	   central	   unit	   of	  
analysis.	  It	  is	  at	  the	  site	  of	  ‘interface’	  where	  the	  different	  life-­‐worlds	  of	  social	  actors	  
“interact	  and	  interpenetrate”	  that	  social	  change	  occurs	  (Long,	  1992:	  6):	  	  
	  
Interface	   analysis	   concentrates	   upon	   analysing	   critical	   junctures	  
entailing	  differences	  of	  normative	  value	  and	  social	  interest.	  It	  aims	  to	  
depict	  not	  only	  the	  struggles	  and	  power	  differentials	  that	  emerge	  but	  
also	  seeks	  to	  understand	  the	  cultural	  meanings,	  accommodations	  and	  
compromises	   that	   underpin	   the	   interactions	   and	   transactions	   that	  
evolve.	   Even	   those	   interfaces	   characterised	   by	   strong	   hegemonic	  
tendencies—and	   therefore	   symbolically	   and	   organisationally	   geared	  
to	  the	  enforcement	  and	  reaffirmation	  of	  authoritative	  knowledge	  and	  
forms	   of	   domination—show	   evidence	   of	   countertendencies	   and	  
‘counterwork’	   which	   exploit	   the	   inherent	   ambiguities	   and	   partial	  
connections	  of	  interface	  phenomena	  (Arce	  and	  Long,	  2000:	  3;	  8-­‐9;	  19-­‐
20).	  	  
	  
Through	   interface	   analysis,	   one	   is	   able	   to	   glean	   the	   “ongoing	   processes	   of	  




specific	   actors”	   (Long,	   2001:	   72)	  without	   assuming	   that	   one	   group	  dominates	   the	  
other:	  	  	  
	  
As	  the	  many	  examples	  reveal,	  there	  are	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  so-­‐called	  
‘subordinate’	  or	  ‘weaker’	  actors	  can	  create	  space	  for	  themselves,	  defend	  
their	  own	  worldviews	  and	  standpoints,	  and	  subvert	  the	  best-­‐laid	  plans	  
and	  discourses	  of	   ‘dominant’	  actors,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  continuing	  
to	   live	   in	  a	  world	   full	  of	   inequalities	  and	  vulnerabilities.	  The	  advent	  of	  
global	   communication	   technologies	   has	   clearly	   been	   of	   considerable	  
logistical	  benefit	  to	  many	  counter-­‐development	  actions	  and	  movements,	  
including	  those	  involving	  indigenous	  groups	  (Long,	  2001:	  238).	  	  
	  
	  
In	   my	   study,	   ‘interface’	   does	   not	   signify	   a	   physical	   encounter,	   rather	   it	   is	  
characterised	  by	  a	  transnational	  discourse	  on	  the	  tenets	  of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  in	  
which	   diasporas	   have	   influenced	   the	   introduction	   of	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	   as	   much	   as	   their	   homeland	   counterparts	   have	   affected	   the	   bill’s	  
postponement.	   Actor-­‐oriented	   analysis	   enables	   an	   examination	   of	   how	   different	  
social	   actors	   such	   as	   diasporas	   and	   homeland	   Liberians,	   for	   instance,	   represent	  
varying	   nodes	   of	   knowledge	   and	   power	   that	   “are	   just	   as	   likely	   to	   reflect	   and	  
contribute	   to	   the	   conflict	   between	   social	   groups	   as	   they	   are	   to	   lead	   to	   the	  
establishment	  of	   common	  perceptions,	   interests	  and	   intentionalities”	   (Long,	  2001:	  
19).	   Therefore,	   interface	   embodies	   not	   only	   spaces	   of	   conflict,	   divergence	   and	  
opposition,	   but	   also	   intervals	   of	   consent,	   convergence,	   and	   accommodation.	   For	  
example,	  while	  a	  small	  minority	  in	  this	  study	  expresses	  extreme	  opinions	  about	  the	  
merits	  or	  demerits	  of	  dual	  citizenship,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  social	  actor	  respondents	  
are	   moderate	   and	   accommodating.	   The	   ways	   in	   which	   Liberians	   diverge	   and	  
converge	  on	  the	  tenets	  of	  citizenship	  is	  analysed	  in	  Chapter	  IV	  where	  I	  examine	  how	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   currently	   conceived	   of	   and	   practiced	   domestically	   and	  
transnationally.	  	  
	  
Within	   interface	   analysis	   is	   also	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘boundaries’	   demarcated	  within	   the	  
social	   interfaces	   of	   various	   actors.	   According	   to	   Villarreal,	   boundaries	   “show	   the	  
delimitations	  people	  themselves	  put	  on	  their	  worlds,	  on	  their	  projects,	  on	  their	  own	  
roles	  and	  aspirations,	  on	  their	  allies	  and	  enemies”	  (Villarreal,	  1992:	  254).	  While	  the	  




actors	  set	  and	  examine	  what	  kinds	  of	  changes	  these	  boundaries	  undergo	  during	  the	  
processes	  of	  interface,	  argues	  Villarreal:	  
	  
And	   the	   most	   important	   task	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   negotiations	   and	  
interpenetrations	   that	   take	   place	   at	   the	   boundaries.	   In	   this	  way,	  we	  
can	   appreciate	   the	  boundaries	   actors	  draw	  between	   themselves	   and	  
institutions,	   between	   themselves	   and	   other	   actors,	   but	   also	   with	  
respect	   to	   projects,	   plans,	   and	   activities,	   and	   places.	   Adopting	   this	  
approach,	   boundaries	   do	   not	   set	   the	   limits	   of	   research	   inquiry	   but	  
provide	   useful	   information	   on	   crucial	   social	   processes	   concerning	  
struggles	  over	  identity	  and	  truth	  adjudication	  (Villarreal,	  1992:	  254).	  
	  
Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	   illustrate	  how	  visible	  and	  invisible	  boundaries	  have	  come	  
to	  separate	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  who	  devise	  caricatured	  stereotypes	  of	  one	  another	  
emphasising	  differences	  to	  justify	  discordant	  views	  about	  dual	  citizenship.	  	  
	  
Besides	   examining	   interfaces	   and	   boundaries	   between	   divergent	   social	   actors,	  
actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	  also	  acknowledges	   the	  researcher	  as	  an	  actor	  with	  his/her	  
own	  life-­‐world,	  social	   location,	  and	  agency.	  While	  some	  theoretical	  paradigms	  may	  
obscure	   the	   role	   of	   the	   researcher,	   relegating	   him/her	   to	   a	   mere	   observer,	  
chronicler,	   and	   interpreter	   of	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   phenomena,	   actor-­‐
oriented	  analysis	  views	  the	  researcher	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  these	  processes.	  Given	  
my	  embeddedness	  within	  this	  particular	  research	  study—a	  Liberian	  doing	  research	  
on	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  whose	  life-­‐worlds	  influence	  their	  conception	  and	  practice	  
of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’—I	  remain	  convinced	  that	  “the	  life-­‐worlds	  of	  researcher	  and	  
other	  social	  actors	  intersect	  in	  the	  production	  of	  specific	  ethnographies	  and	  types	  of	  
social	   interaction”	   and	   that	   intervention	   processes	   are	   “socially-­‐constructed	   and	  
continuously	   negotiated”	   (Long	   and	   Long,	   1992:	   xi).	   Although	  my	   study	   does	   not	  
employ	  ethnography,	  I	  argue	  that	  what	  Long	  and	  others	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘life-­‐worlds’	  and	  
‘social	   interfaces’	  can	  be	  observed	  through	  the	  verbal	  utterances	  and	  life	  stories	  of	  
individual	  actors,	  captured	  in	  one-­‐off	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  settings	  in	  the	  field,	  
and	  not	   necessarily	   observed	   over	   the	   long	   duree.	  During	   fieldwork	   in	   five	   urban	  
centres	   across	   Europe,	   North	   America,	   and	   West	   Africa,	   I	   relied	   on	   the	   verbal	  
expressions	   of	   respondents	   during	   one-­‐on-­‐one	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   to	  




of	   and	  practice	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   and	  how	   this	   colours	   their	   responses	   to	  dual	  
citizenship	  as	  a	  proposed	  policy	  intervention.	  	  
	  
In	  summary,	   the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  an	  actor-­‐oriented	  approach	  are	  “agency	  and	  social	  
actor,	   the	   notion	   of	  multiple	   realities	   and	   arenas	   of	   struggle	   where	   different	   life-­‐
worlds	  and	  discourses	  meet,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  interface	  in	  terms	  of	  discontinuities	  of	  
interests,	  values,	  knowledge	  and	  power”	  (Long,	  1992:	  271).	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  examine	  
how	   the	   agency	   of	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   across	   diverse	   spatial	   landscapes	   has	  
enabled	   them	  to	  conceptualise	  and	  practice	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	   in	  a	  multitude	  of	  
ways	  because	  of	  their	  different	  experiences	  of	  conflict,	  migration,	  globalisation,	  and	  
post-­‐war	  recovery.	  The	  bundle	  of	  divergent,	  visceral	  responses	  to	  dual	  citizenship	  as	  
a	   proposed	   policy	   intervention	   signifies	   an	   interface	   wherein	   these	   social	   actors	  
negotiate	   the	   discontinuities	   in	   their	   lived	   experiences	   of	   being	   Liberian.	   Such	  
interfaces	  have	  an	  ultimate	  bearing	  on	  post-­‐war	  development	  outcomes	  in	  Liberia,	  
as	  discussed	  in	  the	  core	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
Actor-­‐Oriented	  Analysis	  Embedded	  in	  Social	  Constructionism	  	  
Long’s	   actor-­‐oriented	   analysis	   builds	   on	   other	   theoretical	  models	   that	   attempt	   to	  
reconcile	  structure	  and	  actor	  paradigms,	  such	  as	  theories	  of	  practice.	  Similar	  to	  the	  
‘actor’	   in	   actor-­‐oriented	   analysis,	   practice	   theory,	   which	   preceded	   actor-­‐oriented	  
analysis,	   adopts	   the	   term	   ‘agent’	   to	   describe	   an	   individual	   actor,	  where	   individual	  
actors/agents	  are	   the	   carriers	  of	  practice	  and	  neither	   completely	  autonomous	  nor	  
completely	  controlled	  by	  externalities	  (Reckwitz,	  2002:	  256).	  According	  to	  Reckwitz,	  
practice	  as	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  is	  “a	  routinised	  type	  of	  behaviour	  which	  consists	  of	  
several	  elements”	  including	  “bodily	  activities,	  forms	  of	  mental	  activities,	  ‘things’	  and	  
their	  use,	  a	  background	  knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  understanding,	  know-­‐how,	  states	  
of	   emotion	   and	  motivational	   knowledge”	   (Reckwitz,	   2002:	   249-­‐250).	  While	   social	  
practices	   can	  be	   theoretically	  dichotomised	  between	   “bodily	   and	  mental	   routines”	  
(Reckwitz,	   2002:	   257),	   practice	   theorists	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	  
“interconnectedness	   of	   bodily	   routines	   of	   behaviour,	   mental	   routines	   of	  
understanding	  and	  knowing,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  objects”	  (Reckwitz,	  2002:	  258).	   In	  this	  




form	   of	   ‘being’—identity,	   or	  mental	   routines—and	   a	   form	   of	   ‘doing’—practice,	   or	  
bodily	  routines.	  	  
	  
Authors	   who	   have	   advanced	   theories	   of	   practice	   include	   Bourdieu	   (1977,	   1990),	  
Giddens	  (1979,	  1984),	  Foucault	  (1984),	  and	  Schatzki	  (1996,	  2001).	  They	  have	  been	  
primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	   ‘everyday’	   and	   ‘life-­‐worlds’	   of	   particular	   agents	   or	  
actors	   (Reckwitz,	   2002:	   244),	   although	   there	   is	   no	   grand,	   overarching	   theory	   of	  
practice	  (Reckwitz,	  2002:	  257).	  Bourdieu	  (1990)	  and	  Giddens	  (1984)	  were	  pioneers	  
of	  theories	  of	  practice,	  where	  the	  former	  devised	  concepts	  such	  as	  habitus,	  capital,	  
and	  field,	  while	  the	  latter	  devised	  concepts	  such	  as	  rules	  and	  resources	  (structures),	  
and	  practical	  consciousness	  (Everts,	  et.	  al,	  2011:	  324).	  Bourdieu’s	  conceptualisation	  
of	   habitus	   is	   the	   bedrock	   of	   practice	   theory,	   and	   by	   extension,	   actor-­‐oriented	  
analysis.	   According	   to	   Bourdieu,	   habitus	   represents	   the	   “systems	   of	   dispositions”	  
and	   “embodied	  history”	   (Bourdieu,	   1990:	   56)	   implanted	   “in	   each	   agent	   by	   his	   [or	  
her]	  earliest	  upbringing,	  which	  is	  the	  precondition	  not	  only	  for	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  
practices	  but	  also	  for	  practices	  of	  co-­‐ordination”	  (Bourdieu,	  1977:	  81).	  Furthermore,	  
the	   habitus	   is	   a	   product	   of	   history	   that	   “produces	   individual	   and	   collective	  
practices—more	  history—in	  accordance	  with	  the	  schemes	  generated	  by	  history.	   It	  
ensures	   the	   active	   presence	   of	   past	   experiences”	   (Bourdieu,	   1990:	   54).	   However,	  
this	  theoretical	  frame	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  social	  actors	  are	  mechanically	  controlled	  
by	   their	   embodied	   histories.	   Rather,	   it	   illustrates	   how	   agents	   develop	   and	   deploy	  
tactics	   that	   are	   adapted	   to	   their	   individual	   and	   collective	   life-­‐worlds.	   Borrowing	  
from	  theories	  of	  practice,	  actor-­‐oriented	  theory	  is	  steeped	  in	  social	  constructionist	  
modes	  of	  analysis	  that	  place	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  
actors.	   It	   is	   concerned	   with	   how	   “social	   actors	   (both	   ‘local’	   and	   ‘external’	   to	  
particular	   arenas)	   are	   locked	   into	   a	   series	   of	   inter-­‐twined	   battles	   over	   resources,	  
meanings	  and	  institutional	  legitimacy	  and	  control”	  (Long,	  2001:	  1).	  	  
	  
There	   is	   a	   fundamental	   difference	   between	   structuralist	   and	   phenomenological	  
theories,	  where	  the	  former	  looks	  at	  macro-­‐level	  aggregate	  structures	  and	  trends	  (i.e.,	  
Marxist/structuralist	   approaches),	   while	   the	   latter	   looks	   at	   micro-­‐level	   changes	  
affecting	  operating	  or	  acting	  units	  (i.e.,	  actor-­‐oriented	  approaches)	  (Long,	  1990:	  4).	  




are	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   “detailed	   accounts	   of	   differential	   responses	   to	  
structural	  conditions”	  and	  exploring	  “the	  strategies	  and	  cultural	  dispositions	  of	  the	  
social	   actors	   involved”	   (Long,	   1990:	   4).	   The	  macro	   theories	   of	  modernisation	   and	  
structural	  Marxism,	   for	   instance,	   frame	  political	   and	   economic	  processes	   as	   about	  
‘external	   forces’,	   reducing	   the	   autonomy	   of	   individual	   social	   actors,	   thereby	  
“undermining	  local	  or	  endogenous	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  and	  solidarity,	  resulting	  in	  
the	   increased	   socio-­‐economic	   differentiation	   and	   greater	   centralised	   control	   by	  
powerful	  economic	  and	  political	  groups,	   institutions	  and	  enterprises”	  (Long,	  2001:	  
11).	   Like	   Giddens’	   theory	   of	   structuration—in	   which	   structures	   are	   neither	  
completely	   constraining	   nor	   enabling	   (Giddens,	   1984:	   25),	   Long’s	   brand	   of	   actor-­‐
oriented	  analysis	  does	  not	  negate	  structural	   forces,	   rather	   it	  accounts	   for	   them	  by	  
emphasising	   “the	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   life-­‐worlds,	   struggles	   and	   exchanges	   within	  
and	   between	   specific	   social	   groups	   and	   networks	   of	   individuals”	   in	   the	   midst	   of	  
development	   interventions	   (Long,	   1990:	   18).	   Whereas	   structuralist	   analysis	   is	  
“tainted	  by	  determinist,	  linear,	  and	  externalist	  views	  of	  social	  change”	  (Long,	  2001:	  
11),	   ‘agent’	   or	   ‘actor’	   oriented	   analysis	   adopts	   a	  more	   fluid	   interpretation	   of	   how	  
social	  actors	  are	  influenced	  by	  and	  influence	  structural	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
An	   actor-­‐oriented	   paradigm	   serves	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   structuralist	   analysis,	  
whereby	   external	   forms	   of	   intervention	   “enter	   the	   existing	   life-­‐worlds	   of	   the	  
individuals	   and	   social	   groups	   affected,	   and	   in	   this	   way	   are	   mediated	   and	  
transformed	   by	   these	   same	   actors	   and	   structures”	   (Long,	   1990:	   6).	   According	   to	  
Long,	  more	  nuanced	  analyses	  of	  social	  change	  are	  needed	  which	  stress	  the	  dynamic	  
“interplay	   and	   mutual	   determination	   of	   ‘internal’	   and	   ‘external’	   factors	   and	  
relationships”	  thereby	  acknowledging	  “the	  central	  role	  played	  by	  human	  action	  and	  
consciousness”	   (Long,	   1990:	   6).	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   my	   study	   shows	   that	   both	  
external	   and	   internal	   forms	   of	   intervention—by	   donors,	   by	   the	   Liberian	   state,	   by	  
Liberian	   diasporas,	   and	   by	   resident	   homeland	   Liberians—have	   had	   a	   profound	  
impact	   on	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   construction	   and	   practice	   across	   space	   and	   time.	  
One	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  employing	  an	  actor-­‐oriented	  theory	  of	  analysis	  is	  that	  one	  
can	  begin	  to	  explicate	  the	  “differential	  responses	  to	  similar	  structural	  circumstances,	  
even	   if	   the	  conditions	  appear	   relatively	  homogenous”	   (Long,	  1990:	  6),	   such	  as	   the	  




Liberian	  social	  actors.	  Therefore,	  one	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  “differential	  patterns	  
that	   arise	   are	   in	   part	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   actors	   themselves”	   who	   are	   neither	  
“disembodied	   social	   actors	   or	   passive	   recipients	   of	   intervention,	   but	   active	  
participants	  who	  process	   information	  and	  strategise	   in	  their	  dealings	  with	  various	  
local	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  with	  outside	  institutions	  and	  personnel”	  (Long,	  1990:	  7).	  My	  
study	   frames	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   as	   possessing	   varying	   levels	   of	   agency	   in	   the	  
midst	  of	  structural	  change.	  	  
	  
Responding	   to	   critiques	   of	   social	   constructionism,	  which	   argue	   that	   this	   brand	   of	  
social	   theory	   implies	  a	   ‘ready-­‐made’	   set	  of	  plans	  and	  blueprints,	  Long	  counters	  by	  
arguing	  that:	  	  
[Constructionism]	   is	   principally	   concerned	   with	   understanding	   the	  
processes	  by	  which	  specific	  actors	  and	  networks	  of	  actors	  engage	  with	  
and	   thus	   co-­‐produce	   their	   own	   (inter)personal	   and	   collective	   social	  
worlds.	  This	  is	  not	  simply	  achieved	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reworking	  existing	  
cultural	   repertoires,	   or	   language	   and	   learned	   behaviour,	   but	   also	  
through	   the	  many	  ways	   in	  which	   people	   improvise	   and	   experiment	  
with	  ‘old’	  and	  ‘new’	  elements	  and	  experiences,	  and	  react	  situationally	  
and	   imaginatively,	   consciously	   or	   otherwise,	   to	   the	   circumstances	  
they	  encounter	  (Long,	  2001:	  3).	  	  
	  
Therefore,	   social	   construction,	   and	   actor-­‐oriented	   analysis	   by	   extension,	   does	   not	  
suggest	  that	  social	  actors	  have	  a	  clear	  understanding	  “of	  why	  they	  do	  things,	  in	  the	  
first	  place,	  or	  of	  how	  their	  doing	  of	  things	  affects	  outcomes”	  (Long,	  2001:	  3).	  Rather,	  
social	   construction	   acknowledges	   that	   actors	   possess	   the	   knowledgeability	   and	  
capability	  to	  act	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   section	   that	   follows,	   I	   explore	  how	  one	   group	  of	   respondents	   in	   this	   study,	  
diasporas,	  fit	  within	  an	  actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	  as	  both	  social	  actors	  and	  categories	  
of	  practice.	  	  
	  
Diasporas	  as	  Social	  Actors	  and	  Categories	  of	  Practice	  	  
There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  competing	  conceptual	  frameworks	  for	  diasporas.	  One	  school	  of	  




another	   defines	   diasporas	   as	   passive	   and	   fixed,	   representing	   a	   state	   of	   being,	   an	  
identity	  (Safran,	  1991;	  Sheffer,	  1993).	  This	  thesis	  situates	  Liberia’s	  diasporas	  in	  the	  
‘interstices’	  (Bhabha,	  1994)	  of	  the	  conceptual	  debate	  because	  for	  Liberians	  abroad,	  
being	  ‘of’	  and	  ‘within’	  the	  diaspora	  is	  not	  only	  an	  expression	  of	  identity,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  
a	  category	  of	  practice,	  just	  as	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  both	  identity	  
and	   practice.	   With	   the	   proliferation	   of	   the	   meanings	   of	   diasporas,	   three	   core	  
elements	   remain	   widely	   understood	   about	   the	   term:	   i)	   dispersion;	   ii)	   homeland	  
orientation;	   and	   iii)	   boundary-­‐maintenance	   (Armstrong,	   1976:	   394-­‐397;	   Safran,	  
1991:	  84).	  In	  other	  words,	  diasporas	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  dispersed	  collectivities	  
residing	   outside	   their	   country	   of	   origin	   who	   “maintain	   regular	   or	   occasional	  
contacts	  with	  what	  they	  regard	  as	  their	  homeland	  and	  with	  individuals	  and	  groups	  
of	  the	  same	  background	  residing	  in	  other	  host	  countries”	  thereby	  underscoring	  their	  
distinctness	   and	   unity	   abroad	   (Sheffer,	   2003:	   10-­‐11).	   Therefore,	   when	   I	   refer	   to	  
Liberia’s	   diasporas	   in	   this	   study,	   I	   am	   specifically	   referring	   to	   Liberians	   born	   in	  
Liberia	  (or	  born	  to	  Liberian	  parents)	  who	  live	  outside	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  
the	  Liberian	  nation-­‐state;	   claim	  Liberia	  as	   their	   ‘homeland’;	  and	  engage	  at	  varying	  
levels	   while	   maintaining	   a	   definitive	   Liberian	   identity	   in	   their	   host	   countries,	  












This	   thesis	   frames	   Liberia’s	   diasporas	   as	   social	   actors	   whose	   life-­‐worlds	   have	  
shaped	  how	  they	  conceive	  of	  and	  practice	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  transnationally,	  how	  
they	   engage	  with	   the	   homeland	   nation-­‐state,	   Liberia,	   and	   how	   they	   interact	   with	  
other	  Liberians,	  both	  home	  and	  abroad,	  in	  interface	  situations.	  It	  is	  concerned	  with	  
 




how	   particular	   diaspora	   agents	   employ	   their	   knowledgeability	   and	   capability	   to	  
influence	  policy	  outcomes	   in	  Liberia,	  such	  as	  dual	  citizenship,	  while	  others	  engage	  
transnationally	   in	   development	   interventions.	   Diasporas,	   in	   this	   sense,	   are	  
categories	   of	   practice,	   rather	   than	   only	   collective	   identities.	   They	   are	   not	  
homogeneous	   political	   actors,	   but	   rather	   heterogeneous	   in	   their	   motivations	   and	  
aims	  (Adamson,	  2002)	  and	  represent	  a	  multitude	  of	  distinct	  life-­‐worlds.	  
	  
The	   growing	   body	   of	   literature	   that	   conceptualises	   diasporas	   as	   categories	   of	  
practice	   seems	   to	  be	  diametrically	   opposed	   to	   essentialist	   notions	   of	   diasporas	   as	  
fixed	  identities.	  Brubaker	  (2005)	  challenges	  Tololyan	  (1991,	  1996),	  Sheffer	  (2003)	  
and	   others	   who	   perceive	   diasporas	   as	   being	   a	   singular	   ‘entity,’	   preceded	   by	   a	  
definite	   article	   ‘the,’	   who	   function	   as	   unitary	   actors,	   possessing	   countable,	  
quantifiable	  memberships	  without	  any	  consideration	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  individuals	  
within	  the	  groups	  being	  counted	  actually	  self-­‐identify	  as	  members	  of	  diasporas	  at	  all.	  
He	  says	  that	  rather	  than	  thinking	  of	  diasporas	  as	  bounded	  entities,	  it	  is	  more	  useful	  
to	  think	  of	  ‘diaspora’	  as	  a	  category	  of	  practice:	  	  
	  
As	   a	   category	   of	   practice,	   ‘diaspora’	   is	   used	   to	   make	   claims,	   to	  
articulate	  projects,	  to	  formulate	  expectations,	  to	  mobilise	  energies,	  to	  
appeal	  to	  loyalties…As	  idiom,	  stance,	  and	  claim,	  ‘diaspora’	  is	  a	  way	  of	  
formulating	   the	   identities	   and	   loyalties	   of	   a	   population	   (Brubaker,	  
2005:	  12).	  	  
	  
Those	  who	  formulate	  loyalties	  and	  identities	  can	  be	  from	  the	  population	  in	  question	  
or	   may	   be	   speaking	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   homeland	   state,	   but	   not	   all	   those	   who	   are	  
claimed	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  diaspora	  take	  on	  a	  diasporic	  stance	  (Brubaker,	  2005:	  12).	  
Indeed,	  it	   is	  sometimes	  only	  a	  minority	  of	  the	  population	  who	  consistently	  adopt	  a	  
diasporic	  stance,	  thereby	  constituting	  a	  diaspora	  themselves	  (Brubaker,	  2005:	  12).	  
This	   delineation	   of	   a	   ‘diasporic	   stance’	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   my	   study,	   as	  
specific	   groups	   of	   Liberians	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   for	   instance,	   emerge	   from	   the	  
woodwork	  yearly	  only	  to	  campaign	  for	  the	  extension	  of	  Temporary	  Protected	  Status	  




armed	   conflicts.11	  Similarly,	   Liberian	   diasporas	   in	   West	   Africa	   have	   been	   at	   the	  
forefront	   of	   lobbying	   on	   behalf	   of	   Liberian	   refugees	   in	   Nigeria,	   Sierra	   Leone,	   and	  
Ghana.	   My	   study	   compares	   the	   myriad	   forms	   of	   diasporic	   political	   activity	   in	  
disparate	  spheres	  of	  influence.	  
	  
With	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  2012	  book,	  Politics	   from	  Afar:	  Transnational	  Diasporas	  
and	  Networks,	   diasporas	   have	   been	   increasingly	   framed	   as	   categories	   of	   practice.	  
Just	   as	   civil	   society	   groups,	   interest	   groups	   and	   political	   parties	   participate	   in	  
political	  life	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  outcomes,	  so	  too	  do	  diasporas,	  although	  they	  bring	  
a	   different	   set	   of	   resources,	   claims,	   and	   agendas	   to	   political	   processes	   thereby	  
challenging	  how	  political	  life	  should	  be	  organised	  (Lyons	  and	  Mandaville,	  2012:	  7).	  
For	   instance,	  diaspora	  political	  and	  social	  mobilisation	   in	  host	   countries	   is	  often	  a	  
function	   of	   why/how	   they	   left	   their	   home	   countries	   in	   the	   first	   place	   (Adamson,	  
2002).	   Drawing	   on	   other	   studies,	   Østergaard-­‐Nielson	   illustrates	   that	   political	  
refugees	  who	   leave	   their	   nations	   of	   origin	   on	   a	   collective	   basis	   tend	   to	   take	   on	   a	  
more	  political	  stance	   towards	   their	  homelands	   than	  economic	  migrants	  who	   leave	  
through	   individualised	   means	   (Østergaard-­‐Nielson,	   2001:	   10).	   Diasporas	   from	  
conflict	  prone	  regions,	  such	  as	  Liberia,	  often	  become	  politically	  involved	  in	  order	  to	  
transform	   what	   they	   perceive	   to	   be	   suppressive	   social,	   political,	   and	   economic	  
practices	   in	   their	   countries	   of	   origin,	   and	   often	   attempt	   to	   transform	   home	   by	  
mobilising	  in	  the	  host	  nation,	  raising	  international	  intention	  about	  their	  countries	  of	  
origin,	   and	   in	   some	   instances,	   funding	   insurgent	   groups	   to	   topple	   unfavourable	  
regimes	   (Adamson,	   2002).	   This	   is	   certainly	   evidenced	   in	   the	   Liberia	   case,	   where	  
diaspora	  organisations	  have	   ranged	   from	  politically	   explosive,	   focused	   entirely	   on	  
agitating	  for	  regime	  change	  in	  Liberia,	  to	  apolitical	  and	  solely	  focused	  on	  homeland	  
humanitarian	  and	  development	  relief.	  	  
	  
Yet,	  the	  tendency	  to	  characterise	  diasporas	  as	  either	  positive	  or	  negative	  influences	  
on	  conflict	  generation	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  a	  relatively	  new	  body	  of	  literature	  (de	  
Montclos,	   2005).	   Triangulation	   of	   diasporic	   practices	   is	   crucial	   to	   understanding	  
                                                
11	  Since	   1991,	   thousands	   of	   Liberians	   have	   relied	   on	   short-­‐term	   provisions	   such	   as	   TPS	   and	   DED	  
granted	  by	  the	  White	  House	  to	  extend	  their	  legal	  right	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  US.	  These	  individuals,	  many	  of	  
whom	  have	  been	   in	   the	  United	  States	  since	   fleeing	  Liberia	   in	   the	   late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  have	  




their	  varied	  roles	   in	   the	  conflict	  cycle.	  The	  general	   literature	  on	  conflict	  generated	  
diasporas	   seems	   to	   focus	   entirely	   on	   diasporas	   as	   supporters	   of	   insurgencies	   or	  
political	   instability	   in	   their	   homelands,	   failing	   to	   account	   for	   constructive	  
contributions	   of	   diasporas	   during	   and	   after	   conflict,	   including	   international	  
advocacy	  and	  mobilisations	  for	  peace	  (Brinkerhoff,	  2008:	  19-­‐20;	  Hammond,	  2012);	  
remittances	  (Lucas	  and	  Stark,	  1985;	  Kapur,	  2003;	  de	  Haas,	  2005;	  World	  Bank,	  2006;	  
Pieke,	  Van	  Hear,	  and	  Lindley,	  2007;	   IFAD,	  2009);	  diaspora	  philanthropy	  (Geithner,	  
Johnson	   &	   Chen,	   2004;	   Minoian	   and	   Freinkman,	   2006;	   Sidel,	   2007);	   diaspora	  
knowledge	  transfer	  (Ndiaye,	  Melde,	  and	  Ndiaye-­‐Coic,	  2011);	  diaspora	  foreign	  direct	  
investment	  (Esman,	  2008;	  Riddle	  and	  Marano,	  2008;	  Ketkar	  and	  Ratha,	  2011);	  and	  
diaspora	  transnational	  entrepreneurship	  (Iskander,	  2008).	  	  
	  
The	   different	   modes	   of	   engagement	   and	   practices	   by	   diaspora	   social	   actors	   may	  
endow	  them	  with	  power	  ‘above’	  and	  beyond	  the	  homeland	  state,	  thereby	  privileging	  
their	  social	  locations	  at	  the	  interface.	  For	  instance,	  Shain	  and	  Barth	  argue	  that	  while	  
diasporas	  are	  geographically	   ‘outside	   the	  state,’	   they	  remain	   ‘inside	   the	  people’	  by	  
virtue	   of	   their	   identity	   claims	   to	   the	   homeland,	   and	  how	   they	   use	   that	   identity	   to	  
influence	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   (Shain	   and	  Barth,	   2003:	   451).	  Moreover,	  
diasporas	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  exert	  influence	  on	  the	  homeland	  because	  of	  their	  influence	  
in	   the	   hostland	   (Shain	   and	   Barth,	   2003:	   461).	   Shain	   and	   Barth	   posit	   that	   if	   the	  
strength	  of	  relations	  between	  diasporas	  and	  the	  homeland	  state	  favour	  the	  former,	  
then	   diasporas	   as	   social	   actors	   will	   be	   better	   able	   to	   influence	   the	   homeland’s	  
foreign	   policy	   (Shain	   and	   Barth,	   2003:	   466).	   I	   expand	   their	   theory	   to	   include	   a	  
discussion	  of	  how	  Liberian	  diasporas	  have	  actively	   influenced	  domestic,	  homeland	  
policy,	   bringing	   into	   focus	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   as	   one	   iteration	   of	   that	  
influence.	   However	   flawed	   Shain’s	   and	   Barth’s	   theory	   appears—in	   it	   they	   only	  
employ	   Armenia	   and	   Israel	   to	   show	   how	   diasporas	   do	   and	   do	   not	   influence	  
homeland	   foreign	   policy,	   respectively—their	   analysis	   is	   still	   relevant	   for	   a	  
discussion	  about	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  across	  space	  and	  time,	  
precisely	  because	  diaspora	  social	  actors	  have	  influenced	  that	  reconfiguration	  given	  





According	   to	   Shain	   and	   Barth,	   the	   factors	   affecting	   the	   efficacy	   of	   diasporic	  
influences	  on	  homeland	  foreign	  policies—or	  homeland	  domestic	  policy,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  
this	   thesis—include:	   i)	   the	   degree	   of	   diasporic	   motivation;	   ii)	   the	   socio-­‐political	  
nature	   of	   the	   homeland	   and	   hostland	   (i.e.,	   if	   the	   hostland’s	   foreign	   policy	   is	  
important	   to	   the	   homeland,	   and	   the	   hostland	   is	   receptive	   to	   the	   influences	   of	  
diasporas	  on	  its	  foreign	  policy,	  then	  the	  ability	  of	  diaspora	  social	  actors	  to	  influence	  
the	  homeland’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  enhanced	  or	  if	  the	  homeland	  is	  weak	  and	  receptive	  
to	   diasporic	   input	   then	   the	   ability	   of	   diasporas	   to	   influence	   homeland	   foreign	  
policies	   is	  enhanced);	  and	   iii)	   the	  strength	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  homeland	  and	  
its	   diasporas	   (i.e.,	   if	   the	   homeland	   is	   in	   need	   of	   diasporic	   support—financial	   and	  
otherwise—and	   diasporas	   are	   united	   about	   the	   direction	   the	   homeland’s	   foreign	  
policy	   should	   take,	   then	  diasporas’	   ability	   to	   influence	   that	  direction	   is	   enhanced)	  
(Shain	  and	  Barth,	  2003:	  462-­‐465).	  Given	  that	  Liberia	  is	  a	  relatively	  fragile	  post-­‐war	  
state	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   external	   financial	   and	   human	   capital,	   I	   argue	   in	   this	  
thesis	   that	   the	   strength	   of	   relations	   between	   Liberia’s	   diasporas	   and	   the	   Liberian	  
state	   in	  many	  ways	  favours	  the	  former.	   It	   is	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	   imbalance	  in	  
power	  at	  the	  interface	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  has	  been	  introduced.	  
	  
Notwithstanding	   power	   differentials	   between	   Liberian	   diaspora	   social	   actors	   and	  
the	  Liberian	  homeland	   state,	   it	  would	  be	  misleading	   to	  assume	   that	  diasporas	  are	  
the	   panacea	   to	   homeland	   development.	   Diaspora	   engagement	   with	   the	   homeland	  
can	  have	  overwhelmingly	  negative	  consequences,	  manifested	  in	  money	  laundering,	  
drug	  trafficking,	  arms	  smuggling,	  scams	  or	  terrorist	  activities	  (de	  Montclos,	  2005).	  
Kapur,	   in	  what	   he	   terms	   “the	   Janus-­‐face	   of	   diasporas,”	   cautions	   that	   ideologically	  
extreme	  expatriates	  can	  negatively	  impact	  democratic	  consolidation	  at	  home	  and	  in	  
host	   countries	   (Kapur,	   2007).	   In	   practicing	   long	   distance	   nationalism,	   some	  
diasporas	  can	  be	  more	  extreme	  politically	  than	  their	  homeland	  compatriots	  and	  at	  
odds	   with	   the	   political	   machinery	   at	   home	   (Anderson,	   1992;	   Kapur,	   2007:	   97),	  
which	  explains	  why	  some	  of	  them	  may	  be	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Because	  they	  do	  
not	   live	   in	   the	   homeland,	   some	   diasporas	   may	   take	   a	   hard-­‐line	   stance	   politically	  
since	   they	  do	  not	  have	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  consequences	  of	   their	   ideological	   leanings	  
(Kapur,	   2007).	   Furthermore,	   empirical	   evidence	   has	   shown	   that	   participation	   of	  




challenges,	  especially	  in	  post-­‐war	  settings.	  For	  example,	  a	  recent	  review	  of	  post-­‐war	  
state-­‐building	  confirms	  that	  the	  return	  of	  diasporas	  to	  their	  homelands	  can	  lead	  to	  
the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   political	   elite,	   thereby	   inflaming	   socio-­‐political	   tensions	  
between	   returnees	   and	   homeland	   residents	   (Chesterman,	   Ignatieff,	   and	   Thakur,	  
2004).	  This	  is	  particularly	  central	  to	  contestations	  about	  granting	  dual	  citizenship	  to	  
Liberian	  diasporas,	  who	  are	  perceived	  as	  representing	  an	  already	  privileged	  social	  
category.	  Throughout	  the	  chapters	  in	  this	  thesis,	  I	  provide	  an	  in	  depth	  examination	  
of	  how	   interface	  encounters	  between	   returnees	  and	  homeland	  Liberians,	   amongst	  
other	  social	  actors,	  has	  created	  a	  polarised	  discourse	  on	  the	  conception	  and	  practice	  
of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	   Moreover,	   I	   show	   that	   the	   relatively	   elevated	   social	  
locations	   of	   diasporas	   does	   not	   negate	   the	   agency	   of	   other	   social	   actors,	   such	   as	  
policy	  makers	   in	  Monrovia	  or	  homeland	  Liberians.	   Furthermore,	  not	   all	   diasporas	  
occupy	  positions	  of	  privilege,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  comparisons	  of	  ‘near’	  and	  ‘wider’	  
diasporas	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   at	   the	   interface	   where	   contestations	   and	  
negotiations	  take	  place	  between	  and	  amongst	  the	  multitude	  of	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  
in	  this	  study,	  homelanders	  and	  diasporas	  alike.	  	  
	  
Given	  Liberia’s	  migratory	  history	  and	   its	  struggles	   to	  reconcile	  political	  and	  socio-­‐
economic	   inequities	   that	   fomented	   armed	   conflicts,	   evaluating	   how	   historical	   and	  
contemporary	   factors	   have	   influenced	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	  
passage	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill	  requires	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  multiple	  roles	  of	  
diaspora	   actors	   in	   fuelling	   conflict,	   facilitating	   development,	   neither,	   or	   both	  
simultaneously.	  As	  one	  of	  many	  social	  actors	  in	  this	  thesis,	  diasporas	  reveal	  through	  
their	   distinct	   social	   locations	   and	   life-­‐worlds	   that	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	  
simultaneously	  identity,	  practice,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
As	   illustrated	   in	   the	   introduction	  of	   this	  chapter,	   the	  University	  of	  Liberia	   impasse	  
between	   diaspora	   lobbyists	   and	   homeland	   student	   activists	   indicates	   how	   social	  
actors	  may	  consciously	  and	  unconsciously	  display	  their	  divergent	  lived	  experiences	  
in	   interface	   situations.	   Given	   the	   multi-­‐layered	   meaning	   of	   citizenship	   as	   a	   legal,	  
political,	  sociological,	  and	  cultural	  construct,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  




on	  identity),	  active	  (based	  on	  practice),	  and	  interactive	  (based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  relations).	  
In	   addition	   to	   defining	   citizenship	   generally	   and	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   more	  
specifically,	  I	  provided	  a	  rationale	  for	  using	  this	  conceptual	  framework	  in	  my	  study.	  
While	  Long’s	  analysis	  examines	  the	  disparate	  ways	  in	  which	  social	  actors	  respond	  to	  
development	   interventions	  within	  rural	  settings	   in	   the	  developing	  world,	   the	   form	  
of	   intervention	   relevant	   for	   my	   analysis	   is	   a	   policy	   prescription,	   namely	   dual	  
citizenship,	  in	  Liberia.	  I	  maintained	  in	  this	  chapter	  that,	  as	  a	  theoretical	  framework,	  
actor-­‐oriented	   analysis	   enables	   an	   exploration	   of	   how	   the	   life-­‐worlds	   and	   social	  
locations	   of	   actors	   such	   as	   diasporas,	   returnees,	   and	   homeland	   Liberians	   have	  
influenced	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   proposed	   dual	  
citizenship	   legislation.	   This	   chapter	   also	   included	   theoretical	   approaches	   to	  
diasporas,	  highlighting	  Shain’s	  and	  Barth’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  diaspora	  influences	  
on	  homeland	  foreign	  policy	  (and	  by	  extension	  homeland	  domestic	  policy),	  with	  an	  
explanation	   of	   how	   Liberia’s	   diasporas	   in	   my	   multi-­‐sited	   study	   either	   refute	   or	  
substantiate	  the	  theory	  using	  homeland	  domestic	  policy	  (dual	  citizenship)	  as	  a	  point	  
of	  departure.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  chapter	  builds	  on	  actor-­‐oriented	  analysis	  with	  a	  detailed	  rationale	  for	  why	  
and	   how	   my	   14-­‐month	   fieldwork	   included	   interviews	   with	   six	   categories	   of	  























Chapter	  III	  	  
From	  One-­‐Room	  Boxed	  Houses	  to	  Flawless	  Rooftop	  Offices	  	  
in	  the	  Field	  
	  
In	   mid-­‐May	   2013	   at	   the	   Buduburam	   Refugee	   Camp	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   Accra,	  
Ghana’s	   capital,	   a	   petite	   seamstress	   hurtled	   out	   of	   a	   decrepit	   one-­‐room	   house	   to	  
fetch	   some	   rainwater	   that	   was	   pouring	   endlessly	   from	   her	   corrugated	   rooftop.	   I	  
paused	  my	   interview	  recorder	  nearly	   four	  times	  during	  an	   interview	  with	  this	  38-­‐
year-­‐old	  former	  refugee	  who	  had	  opted	  for	  local	  integration	  after	  living	  in	  Ghana	  for	  
23	   years.	   Torrential	   showers	   splashed	   through	   her	   punctured	   window	   screens,	  
exposing	   me	   to	   the	   elements.	   Dripping	   wet,	   the	   woman	   re-­‐entered	   the	   house	  
holding	  a	  bright	  blue	  bucket	  on	  the	  crown	  of	  her	  head—filled	  with	  what	  I	  assumed	  
was	  water	  for	  washing	  clothes	  and	  bathing—and	  placed	  it	  in	  a	  corner	  of	  the	  room.	  
She	   sat	   down	   on	   a	   wooden	   bench	   facing	   me	   and	   we	   continued	   the	   interview,	  
shouting	  to	  hear	  each	  other	  above	  the	  loud	  clamour	  of	  the	  rain.	  	  
	  
Just	  one	  month	  earlier,	   I	  had	  sat	  comfortably	   in	  the	  refurbished	  rooftop	  office	  of	  a	  
48-­‐year-­‐old	   Liberian	   businessman	   and	   consultant	   in	   downtown	   Freetown,	   Sierra	  
Leone’s	  capital.	  Exuding	  privilege,	  the	  man	  had	  lived	  and	  worked	  in	  similar	  settings	  
across	  five	  different	  countries	  within	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  for	  two	  decades.	  When	  he	  
offered	  me	  a	  chilled	  orange	  Fanta	  in	  a	  sleek	  bottle,	  I	  could	  not	  help	  noticing	  his	  form	  
fitting	  tailor-­‐made	  suit.	  As	  the	  man	  walked	  to	  the	  single	  leather	  recliner	  facing	  me,	  
his	  shiny	  shoes	  made	  a	  soft	  noise	  on	  the	  white	  porcelain	  tiles.	  I	  placed	  my	  recorder	  
on	  his	  mahogany	  table	  and	  pressed	  Play.	  	  	  	  
	  
As	  the	  two	  vignettes	  illustrate,	  the	  settings	  of	  interviews	  with	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  
in	  the	  field	  are	  emblematic	  of	  their	  disparate	  life-­‐worlds	  and	  social	  locations.	  During	  
14	   months	   of	   fieldwork	   across	   five	   urban	   centres	   in	   Liberia	   and	   abroad,	   I	  
deliberately	  sought	  out	  Liberian	  respondents	  of	  different	  ages,	  genders,	  educational	  
levels,	   incomes,	  places	  of	  birth,	  countries	  of	  citizenship,	  and	  migration	  histories	   to	  
examine	   how	   their	   experiences	   of	   conflict,	   migration,	   globalisation	   and	   post-­‐war	  




legislation.	   During	   fieldwork,	   I	   balanced	   my	   interviews	   with	   181	   diaspora,	  
homeland	   and	   returnee	   respondents	   speaking	   unofficially	   with	   21	   respondents	  
speaking	   in	   their	   official	   capacities	   as	   government	   of	   Liberia	   representatives	   or	  
regional	  diaspora	  heads	  of	  organisations.	  Divided	  into	  two	  parts,	  this	  chapter	  is	  an	  
expansive	  overview	  of	  fieldwork	  interfaces	  with	  these	  respondents.	  Part	  I	  explains	  
my	  qualitative	  research	  design,	  providing	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  selection	  of	   field	  sites	  
and	   respondents	   as	   well	   as	   a	   summary	   of	   data	   collection	   processes	   and	   general	  
trends	   observed	   in	   the	   field.	   In	   Part	   II,	   I	   present	   a	   comprehensive	   demographic	  
profile	   of	   the	   unofficial,	   anonymised	   interviewees,	   as	   this	   initial	   framing	   enables	  
further	  analysis	  of	  citizenship	  construction	  and	  practice	   in	  subsequent	  chapters	  of	  
the	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Part	  I:	  Research	  Design,	  Rationale,	  and	  Mitigating	  Biases	  
My	   fieldwork	  design	   and	  planning	  was	   systematic	   and	   thorough.	   First,	   I	   relied	   on	  
previous	  pilot	  surveys	  I	  had	  conducted	  in	  2010	  and	  2011	  on	  the	  perceptions	  of	  dual	  
citizenship	  of	  Liberians	  based	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  America	  and	  registered	  Liberian	  
voters	   in	  Monrovia,	   respectively,	   to	   inform	   the	   selection	  of	  my	   research	   tools	   and	  
questions.	   Second,	   I	   selected	   five	   field	   sites—Monrovia,	   Liberia;	   London,	   England;	  
Washington,	   D.C.;	   Freetown,	   Sierra	   Leone;	   and	   Accra,	   Ghana—to	   conduct	   semi-­‐
structured	  interviews	  with	  a	  range	  of	  Liberian	  social	  actors,	  namely	  policy	  makers,	  
diasporas,	   returnees,	   and	   homelanders.	   Third,	   I	   pursued	   in-­‐depth	   case	   study	  
analysis	   on	   Sierra	   Leone,	   supplemented	   by	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	  
relevant	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   Freetown	   to	   be	   able	   to	   compare	   how	   the	   question	   of	  
citizenship	  reconfiguration	  has	  been	  addressed	  in	  another	  country	  in	  the	  sub-­‐region.	  
Fourth,	  I	  collected	  documentary	  data	  such	  as	  official	  reports	  and	  publications	  from	  
the	  Liberian	  government	  and	  its	  donors	  to	  construct	  a	  broad-­‐based	  narrative	  about	  
Liberia’s	   development	   deliverables	   and	   challenges	   to	   date,	   enabling	   me	   to	  
subsequently	   gauge	   through	   in-­‐depth	   interviewing	   what	   difference	   diaspora	  
contributions	  have	  made	  to	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  and	  how	  this	  has	   influenced	  claims	  
for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	  citizenship.	  And	  fifth,	  I	  monitored	  commentary	  
and	  news	  reports	  about	  dual	  citizenship	  on	  media	  websites	  and	  Liberian	  diaspora	  
listservs	   to	   assess	   domestic	   and	   transnational	   sentiments	   about	   the	   proposed	   bill	  




Since	   the	   research	   methodologies	   employed	   in	   this	   study	   were	   meant	   to	   be	  
exploratory	  in	  nature	  rather	  than	  representative,	  I	  applied	  non-­‐probability	  sampling	  
for	  my	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  Interviewees	  were	  selected	  through	  a	  snowball	  
sampling	   method,	   in	   which	   I	   contacted	   individuals	   I	   knew	   personally	   or	  
professionally,	   and	  asked	   them	  to	   recommend	  others	  who	   fit	  within	  my	  analytical	  
categories,	  explained	  further	  in	  this	  chapter.	  All	   interviews	  were	  audio	  recorded—
with	   the	   exception	   of	   Liberian	   embassy	   officials	   in	   Accra	   who	   asked	   not	   to	   be	  
recorded—and	   respondents	  were	  asked	   to	   sign	  a	   form	   indicating	   their	   consent	   to	  
participate	   in	   the	   study.	   I	   used	   an	   interview	   protocol	   document	   finalised	   by	   my	  
supervisor	   and	   myself	   to	   jot	   down	   notes	   during	   all	   interviews	   as	   well	   as	   collect	  
demographic	   data	   on	   each	   ‘unofficial’	   interviewee,	   those	   not	   speaking	   in	   official	  
capacities	   representing	   regional	   heads	   of	   diaspora	   organisations,	   the	   Liberian	   or	  
Sierra	   Leonean	   governments.	   The	   interviews	  were	   held	   in	   public	   places,	   in	   work	  
places,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  homes:	  wherever	  appeared	  most	  convenient	   for	   interviewees.	  
All	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   in	   English,	   and	   where	   necessary,	   I	   used	   informal	  
Liberian	   English	   to	   clarify	   terms	   and	   concepts	   that	   appeared	   too	   complicated	   in	  
standard	  English	  for	  some	  interviewees.	  	  
	  
Although	  my	  positioning	  as	  a	  Liberian	  writer,	  scholar	  and	  activist	  enabled	  access	  to	  
Liberian	  social	  actors	   in	  the	  five	  field	  sites	  selected,	   I	  knew	  it	  would	  also	  influence	  
the	  ways	   in	  which	   informants	   responded	   to	  my	   questions	   in	   interview	   settings.	   I	  
mitigated	   these	   concerns	   by	   deliberately	   selecting	   a	   combination	   of	   Liberian	  
interviewees	   I	   knew	   and	   those	   I	   had	   never	  met	   in	   each	   of	   the	   field	   sites.	  Where	  
appropriate,	   I	   gently	   challenged	   the	   interviewees	   I	   knew	   personally	   to	   provide	  
justifications	  for	  their	  responses,	  rather	  than	  accepting	  their	  positions	  at	  face	  value.	  
For	   instance,	   during	   an	   interview	   with	   a	   59-­‐year-­‐old	   permanent	   returnee	  
entrepreneur	   who	   had	   worked	   in	   diaspora	   engagement	   and	   was	   very	   pro-­‐dual	  
citizenship,	   I	  provided	  him	  with	  case	  study	  examples	   from	  the	  academic	   literature	  
showing	   that	   dual	   citizenship	   does	   not	   necessarily	   evidence	   strong	   ties	   to	   the	  
homeland	  state	  (FitzGerald,	  2012:	  285-­‐286;	  Spiro,	  2012:	  311;	  318).	  Where	  possible,	  
I	  also	  tempered	  my	  interjections	  in	  interviews	  with	  Liberians	  whom	  I	  did	  not	  know	  
to	  carve	  out	  a	  safe	  space	   for	   them	  to	  air	  grievances	   that	  were	  obviously	   lodged	  at	  




transnationals.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  I	  refrained	  from	  rebutting	  a	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  homeland	  
female	   banker	  who	  praised	  Charles	  Taylor	   for	   curbing	   the	   capital	   flight	   that	   is	   so	  
endemic	   in	  Sirleaf’s	  administration	  dominated	  by	  diaspora	  returnees,	  even	  though	  
Taylor’s	   regime	  was	   notorious	   for	   public	   sector	   graft.	  While	   I	   did	   not	   succeed	   in	  
maintaining	   a	   neutral	   stance	   in	   all	   instances,	   I	   jotted	   down	   any	   body	   language	  
changes,	   facial	  contortions,	  and	  other	  nuances	   in	  non-­‐verbal	  communication	  of	  my	  
interviewees	  for	  further	  analysis.	  Given	  the	  increasingly	  contested	  space	  citizenship	  
occupies	  in	  both	  theory	  and	  practice,	  I	  knew	  that	  it	  would	  be	  crucial	  to	  triangulate	  
sources	  in	  order	  to	  reconcile	  my	  subjective	  biases.	  According	  to	  Ozerdem	  and	  Bowd	  
(2010),	   research	   biases	   can	   be	  mitigated	   through	   triangulation,	   and	   this	   is	  why	   I	  
pursued	   an	   expansive	   field	   plan,	   thereby	   selecting	   a	   relatively	   large	   pool	   of	  
interview	  subjects	  and	  field	  sites.	  	  
	  
During	  and	  after	  the	  course	  of	  fieldwork,	  I	  hired	  seven	  young	  professional	  Liberians	  
as	   research	   assistants	   who	   transcribed	   interviews	   conducted	   in	   Europe,	   North	  
America,	  and	  West	  Africa,	  and	  we	  used	  Dropbox	  for	  file	  sharing.	  Research	  assistants	  
were	   required	   to	   sign	   a	   confidentiality	   statement	   witnessed	   by	   a	   third	   party,	   in	  
which	   they	   explicitly	   agreed	   not	   to	   share	   my	   research	   files	   with	   anyone.	   After	  
transcribing	  interviews,	  research	  assistants	  attested	  in	  writing	  that	  they	  had	  deleted	  
all	  my	   research	   files	   from	   their	   computers	   and	   emptied	   their	   recycle	   bins	   of	   said	  
files.	   I	   also	   stored	  audio	   files	   and	   field	  notes	  on	   the	   SOAS	   server	   through	  my	  PhD	  
research	  Logbook.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  section	  that	  follows,	  I	  present	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  five	  urban	  field	  
sites.	  	  
	  
Rationale	  for	  the	  Selection	  of	  Five	  Urban	  Field	  Sites	  	  
Because	  I	  intended	  to	  interrogate	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  
across	  space	  and	  time,	  I	  knew	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  my	  fieldwork	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
multi-­‐sited.	  I	  narrowed	  the	  spatial	  landscape	  of	  field	  sites	  to	  capital	  cities	  given	  the	  
growing	  body	  of	   literature	  on	  how	  certain	  urban	  centres,	  particularly	  global	   cities	  
such	   as	   London,	   New	   York	   and	   Tokyo,	   for	   instance,	   reproduce,	   refashion,	   and	  




2000).	   According	   to	   Isin,	   global	   cities	   are	   the	   primary	   sites	   of	   citizenship	  
construction	  and	  reconstruction:	  	  
	  
Being	   at	   the	   interstices	   of	   global	   networks	   of	   flows	   of	   commodities,	  
services,	   capital,	   labour,	   images	   and	   ideas,	   the	   global	   city,	   both	   as	   a	  
milieu	  and	  object	  of	  struggles	  for	  recognition,	  engenders	  new	  political	  
groups	  that	  claim	  either	  new	  types	  of	  rights	  or	  seek	  to	  expand	  modern	  
civil,	  political	  and	  social	  rights…Cities,	  particularly	  global	  cities,	  have	  
therefore	   become	   political	   spaces	   where	   the	   concentration	   of	  
different	   groups	   and	   their	   identities	   are	   intertwined	   with	   the	  
articulation	  of	  various	  claims	  to	  citizenship	  rights	  (Isin,	  2000:	  6;	  13).	  
	  
I	   selected	   cities	   not	   only	   occupying	   different	   spheres	   of	   global	   influence,	   such	   as	  
London	   and	   Washington,	   but	   also	   those	   with	   relatively	   sizeable	   Liberian	  
populations,	   such	   as	   Monrovia,	   Freetown,	   and	   Accra.	   From	   the	   beginning,	   I	   was	  
aware	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  considerable	  urban	  bias	  in	  my	  field-­‐based	  methodology.	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  focus	  on	  cities	  was	  a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  hone	  in	  on	  how	  access	  
to	  urban	  spaces	  shapes	   identity	  constructions	  and	  citizenship	  practices	  amongst	  a	  
range	   of	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   in	   Liberia	   and	   abroad.	   Reserving	   eight	  months	   for	  
exploratory	  fieldwork	  in	  Monrovia,	  I	  spread	  the	  remaining	  six	  months	  available	  for	  
fieldwork	  across	  the	  four	  field	  sites	  abroad,	  representing	  countries	  that	  had	  adopted	  
dual	   citizenship	   in	   practice	   or	   in	   theory.	   I	   also	   selected	   particular	   cities	   outside	  
Liberia	  with	  Liberian	  embassies,	   signifying	   that	  Liberia,	  with	   its	  meagre	  resources	  
and	  inability	  to	  support	  foreign	  missions	  in	  every	  country,	  attaches	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
importance	  in	  implementing	  its	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  in	  these	  locales.	  	  
	  
Monrovia	   was	   the	   primary	   field	   site	   because	   it	   represents	   the	   locus	   of	   Liberian	  
identity	   construction	   and	   practice,	   where	   rural	   to	   urban	   migration	   during/after	  
armed	   conflicts	   and	   the	   limited	   opportunities	   available	   to	   Liberia’s	   rural	   dwellers	  
stretched	  the	  city’s	  population	  beyond	  its	  capacity.	  Monrovia	  is	  not	  a	  global	  city	  like	  
London	  or	  Washington,	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  West	  African	  hub	  like	  Accra.	  In	  many	  respects,	  it	  is	  
akin	   to	   Freetown,	   representing	   a	   post-­‐war	   capital	   struggling	   to	   reconstruct	   and	  
reinvent	  itself.	  According	  to	  2008	  census	  figures12	  generated	  by	  the	  Liberia	  Institute	  
for	  Statistics	  and	  Geo-­‐Information	  Services	  (LISGIS),	  about	  one	  third	  of	  Liberia’s	  3.4	  
                                                




million	   population	   resides	   in	   Monrovia,	   a	   city	   that	   was	   constructed	   to	   only	  
accommodate	  500,000	  people	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2009).	  Given	  that	  Monrovia	  
is	  Liberia’s	  most	  populous	  city,	  I	  decided	  to	  conduct	  all	  fieldwork	  interviews	  there	  to	  
showcase	   the	   diversity	   of	   perspectives	   about	   how	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	  
manifested	   in	   identity	   construction,	   development	   practice,	   and	   the	   nuanced	  
interactions	  between	  the	  Liberian	  state	  and	  its	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  amongst	  citizens.	  
Monrovia	   also	   enabled	   access	   to	   Liberian	   policy	   makers,	   foreign	   donors,	   multi-­‐
nationals,	  civil	  society	  actors,	  and	  a	  growing	  repository	  of	  documentary	  data	  about	  
Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  development	  milestones	  and	  challenges.	  
	  
Given	  that	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Liberians	  outside	  of	  Liberia	  reside	  within	  the	  West	  
African	  sub-­‐region,	  I	  selected	  two	  capitals,	  Freetown,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  Accra,	  Ghana,	  
for	   a	   comparative	   investigation.	   It	   was	   crucial	   for	   me	   to	   draw	   on	   a	   sub-­‐regional	  
analysis	  to	  fill	  a	  void	  in	  the	  academic	  literature	  that	  places	  a	  premium	  on	  migrants	  in	  
the	  Global	  North.	  Unlike	  London	  and	  Washington,	  Freetown	  is	  not	  a	  global	  city.	   In	  
fact,	  it	  does	  not	  top	  the	  rankings	  of	  West	  African	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  hubs.	  
Yet,	   I	   selected	   the	   city	   because	   I	   suspected	   that	   the	   identity	   constructions,	  
citizenship	  practices,	  and	  lived	  experiences	  of	  Liberian	  migrants	  settled	  in	  Freetown	  
and	  its	  environs	  would	  be	  starkly	  different	  from	  those	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  and	  
Accra,	   primarily	  because	  of	   their	   geographic	  proximity	   to	  Monrovia.	   Furthermore,	  
Freetown	   houses	   the	  Mano	  River	  Union	   (MRU)13,	   a	   sub-­‐regional	   body	   comprising	  
bordering	   countries	  Liberia,	   Sierra	  Leone,	  Guinea,	   and	   the	   Ivory	  Coast,	  which	  was	  
founded	  on	  principles	  of	  economic	  cooperation	  (Robson,	  1982).	  	  
	  
Conducting	   fieldwork	   in	   Accra	   enabled	   me	   to	   analyse	   the	   life-­‐worlds	   and	   social	  
locations	  of	   Liberian	  migrants	   in	   the	   larger	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  
States	   (ECOWAS)	   supra-­‐national	   entity,	   which	   has	   a	   ‘free	   movement	   of	   persons’	  
protocol	  (Ibeanu,	  2007).	  Unlike	  London	  and	  Washington,	  Accra	  is	  not	  a	  global	  city.	  
Yet,	   unlike	   Freetown,	   it	   has	   transformed	   into	   a	   West	   African	   regional	   hub,	   and	  
therefore	   boasts	   a	   cosmopolitan	   milieu.	   Moreover,	   I	   selected	   the	   city	   because	   I	  
suspected	   that	  Accra	  would	   represent	   a	   composite	   of	   the	  demographic	   profiles	   of	  
                                                
13	  Co-­‐founded	  by	  Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  in	  1973	  and	  later	  joined	  by	  Guinea	  in	  1980	  and	  Ivory	  Coast	  
in	  2008,	  respectively,	  the	  MRU	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  larger	  regional	  body,	  the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  




respondents	  in	  London,	  Washington	  and	  Freetown,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  Furthermore,	   there	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  growing	   repository	  of	  published	  case	  
study	   analysis	   about	   Liberians	   in	   Ghana,	   particularly	   because	   the	   Buduburam	  
Refugee	   Camp	   at	   one	   time	   hosted	   the	   largest	   number	   of	   Liberian	   refugees	   in	   the	  
West	  African	  sub-­‐region	  (UNHCR,	  2004;	  UNHCR,	  2007).	  Although	  most	  research	  has	  
so	   far	   focused	   primarily	   on	   refugees	   at	   Buduburam,	   my	   study	   encompasses	  
Liberians	   in	  Accra	   and	   its	   environs	  who	   identify	   as	   economic	  migrants	   as	  well	   as	  
those	  who	  identify	  as	  former	  refugees,	  now	  locally	  integrated	  residents.	  	  
	  
Given	   that	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   Liberians	   outside	   of	   the	   West	   African	   sub-­‐region	  
reside	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   because	   of	   Liberia’s	   historical	   relationship	   with	  
America,	   I	   selected	  Washington	   as	   a	   fourth	   field	   site.	   As	   the	   headquarters	   of	   the	  
World	  Bank,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	  US	  Treasury,	  Washington	  is	  not	  only	  
an	   important	  centre	  of	  global	  power	  today;	   it	   is	  also	  where	  the	  Liberian	  state	  was	  
first	   conceived	   of	   by	   the	   American	   Colonisation	   Society	   (ACS)	   in	   the	   early	   19th	  
century	   (Kieh,	   2012a:	   168).	   In	  Washington,	   political	   entrepreneurs	   such	   as	   Ellen	  
Johnson	   Sirleaf,	   now	   Liberia’s	   president,	   and	   Amos	   Sawyer,	   former	   head	   of	   the	  
Interim	   Government	   of	   National	   Unity	   (IGNU)	   and	   now	   chair	   of	   Liberia’s	  
Governance	   Commission,	   once	   formulated	   the	   Association	   for	   Constitutional	  
Democracy	   in	   Liberia	   (ACDL)	   to	   oust	   President	   Samuel	   Kanyon	   Doe	   in	   the	   early	  
1990s	   (Sirleaf,	   2009).	   It	   is	   the	   site	   of	   mass	   political	   rallies	   in	   front	   of	   the	  White	  
House	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  cessation	  to	  enduring	  armed	  conflict	  in	  Liberia14.	  When	  the	  
Liberian	   Embassy	   in	   Washington	   was	   burned	   down	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   many	  
Liberians	   suspected	   that	   a	   political	   statement	   was	   also	   being	   made	   although	   an	  
investigation	   revealed	   no	   suspects.	   Washington	   is	   also	   the	   site	   of	   lobbying	   on	  
Capitol	  Hill	   and	  strategy	  meetings	  with	  members	  of	   the	  US	  Congress	   to	   regularise	  
the	  status	  of	  Liberians	  on	  Temporary	  Protected	  Status	  (TPS)	  and	  Deferred	  Enforced	  
Departure	   (DED)15 .	   Although	   there	   are	   concentrated	   pockets	   of	   Liberians	   in	  
Providence,	   Rhode	   Island,	   Minneapolis/St.	   Paul,	   Minnesota,	   Philadelphia,	  
Pennsylvania,	   and	   Staten	   Island,	   New	   York,	   I	   selected	   Washington	   to	   conduct	  
                                                
14	  [DL34]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  October	  17,	  2012.	  	  




fieldwork	  because	   it	  represents	  a	  global	  city	  where	  the	  manifestations	  of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  and	  Liberian	  transnational	  activities	  have	  been	  expressly	  political.	  	  
	  
London	   too	  represents	  a	  global	   city	  where	   transnational	  practices	  are	  particularly	  
stark.	   It	   is	  where	  material	   resources	  and	   institutional	  networks	   can	  be	  galvanised	  
for	  “homeland-­‐oriented	  causes	  or	  political	  projects”	  (Adamson	  and	  Koinova,	  2013:	  
7-­‐9).	  As	  such,	   I	  selected	  the	  European	  hub	  as	  a	   fifth	   field	  site	   in	  order	  to	   fill	  major	  
gaps	   in	   the	   literature	  on	  the	  migratory	   flows	  of	  Liberians	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  
armed	  conflict.	  The	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (TRC)	  Diaspora	  Project16	  
enabled	   Liberians	   in	   the	   UK,	   US,	   and	   Ghana	   to	   participate	   in	   public	   hearings	   that	  
culminated	  in	  a	  report	  entitled	  “The	  House	  with	  Two	  Rooms”	  (Advocates	  for	  Human	  
Rights,	   2009).	   Besides	   this	   study,	   I	   have	   not	   come	   across	   published	   empirical	  
research	   generated	   about	   Liberians	   in	   Europe,	   generally,	   and	   the	   UK,	   specifically.	  
Instead,	   the	   growing	  body	  of	  published	  academic	   literature	  on	  Liberia’s	  diasporas	  
tends	  to	  focus	  on	  Liberians	  in	  the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region	  (Van	  Damme,	  1999;	  Dick,	  
2002;	  Kaiser,	  2004;	  Utas,	  2004;	  Boateng,	  2005;	  Gale,	  2008;	  Hampshire,	  et.	  al,	  2008;	  
Porter,	  et.	  al,	  2008;	  Hardgrove,	  2009)	  or	  within	  the	  United	  States	  (Chaudhry,	  2008;	  
Lubkemann,	  2008;	  Young	  and	  Park,	  2009).	  Through	  fieldwork	  conducted	  in	  London,	  
I	  inserted	  Europe	  as	  a	  third	  node	  in	  the	  migration	  trajectory	  of	  Liberian	  social	  actors,	  
beyond	  Africa	  and	  North	  America.	  	  
	  
The	   multi-­‐sited	   interviews	   were	   meant	   to	   gauge	   systematic	   differences	   and/or	  
similarities,	   if	   any,	   amongst	   social	   actors	   in	   Monrovia	   and	   the	   four	   diasporic	  
communities	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   engagement	   with	   the	   homeland	   (state-­‐citizen	  
relations)	   and	   with	   other	   Liberians	   home	   and	   abroad	   (citizen-­‐citizen	   relations);	  
their	   contributions	   to	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   (citizenship	   practices);	   and	   their	   views	  
about	  the	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  presents	   for	  post-­‐war	  
Liberia.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  respondents	  in	  
the	  field.	  	  
	  
	  
                                                
16	  Liberia’s	  TRC	  is	  unprecedented	  in	  that	  it	  included	  significant	  contributions	  from	  Liberian	  diasporas	  
in	  the	  UK,	  US,	  and	  Ghana,	  who	  participated	  in	  outreach,	  gave	  testimonies	  during	  public	  hearings,	  and	  




Rationale	  for	  the	  Selection	  of	  Six	  Categories	  of	  Liberian	  Respondents	  
From	   June	   2012	   to	   July	   2013,	   I	   conducted	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   six	  
categories	  of	  Liberians	  across	  five	  field	  sites—namely,	  diasporas;	  executive	  branch	  
policy	   makers;	   legislative	   branch	   policy	   makers;	   homeland	   Liberians;	   permanent	  
returnees;	   and	   circular	   returnees—to	   gauge	   how	   citizenship	   is	   manifested	   as	  
identity,	  practice	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations,	  and	  what	  impact	  this	  has	  had	  on	  claims	  for	  
and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	  citizenship.	  The	  202	  Liberian	  respondents	  included:	  	  
	  
a) three	  Liberian	  ambassadors	  in	  London,	  Freetown,	  and	  Accra,	  respectively;	  	  
b) three	  additional	  embassy	  officials	  in	  Washington	  and	  Accra;	  
c) three	   heads	   of	   Liberian	   diaspora	   regional	   organisations	   in	   London,	  
Washington,	  and	  Accra;	  	  
d) four	  sponsors	  of	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill;	  	  
e) eight	   Executive	   branch	   policy	   makers	   heading	   ministries/agencies	  
responsible	  for	  driving	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  deliverables	  in	  Liberia;	  	  
f) 10	  permanent	  returnees	  who	  relocated	  to	  Monrovia	  after	  2003,	  the	  last	  post-­‐
war	  moment;	  	  
g) 11	   circular	   returnees	   who	   had	   spent	   12	   consecutive	   calendar	   months	   in	  
Monrovia	  after	  2003,	  yet	  considered	  their	  time	  in	  Liberia	  conditional;	  
h) 50	  ‘homeland’	  Liberians	  based	  in	  Monrovia;	  	  
i) 110	  Liberians	  residing	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  Freetown,	  and	  Accra.	  
	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  do	  not	  make	  claims	  that	  the	  202	  respondents	  are	  representative	  of	  
Liberians	  worldwide,	  especially	  since	  statistics	  on	  the	  number	  of	  Liberians	  abroad	  
are	   difficult	   to	   ascertain.	   Instead,	   I	   sought	   to	   compare	   and	   contrast	   thereby	  
examining	   trends	   in	   the	   life-­‐worlds	   and	   social	   locations	   of	   respondents	   through	  
their	   myriad	   migration	   patterns	   and	   experiences;	   perspectives	   about	   post-­‐war	  
recovery	  milestones	  and	  challenges;	  assessments	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  diasporas	  have	  
helped	  or	  hindered	   recovery;	   and	   conceptions	  about	  Liberian	   identity/citizenship.	  
Interviewees	   not	   speaking	   in	   official	   capacities	   as	   government	   representatives	   or	  
heads	  of	  regional	  diaspora	  organisations	  were	  considered	  ‘unofficial,’	  and	  therefore	  
anonymised.	  The	  basic	  criterion	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  Liberian	  interviewees	  speaking	  




Beyond	   psychological	   attachments	   to	   Liberia,	   those	   interviewed	   were	   also	   either	  
born	   in	  Liberia	  or	   to	  at	   least	  one	  parent	  who	  was	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  at	   the	   time	  of	  
their	   birth—representing	   the	   legal	   definition	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	   The	  
respondent	  pool	  does	  not	  include	  Lebanese	  residing	  in	  Liberia	  or	  those	  who	  would	  
be	   considered	   non-­‐‘Negroes’	   because	   their	   ‘Liberianness’	   is	   contested	   both	  
constitutionally—based	   on	   the	   ‘Negro	   clause’—and	   sociologically	   by	   Liberians	   at	  
home	  and	  abroad,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  briefly	  in	  Chapter	  IV.	  	  
	  
The	   four	   field	   sites	   outside	   of	   Monrovia	   were	   chosen	   because	   ‘near’	   and	   ‘wider’	  
diasporas	  (Van	  Hear,	  2009:	  181)	  represent	  central	  nodes	  of	  my	  study.	  In	  my	  original	  
research	  proposal,	  I	  intended	  to	  interview	  Liberian	  diasporas	  or	  Liberians	  who	  had	  
explicit	   transnational	   ties	   to	   the	   country	   and	   were	   engaged	   in	   homeland	  
‘development,’	  broadly	  defined.	  I	  realised	  early	  on	  that	  this	  qualification	  would	  limit	  
my	   analysis,	   given	   that	   Liberians	   engage	   with	   the	   ‘homeland’	   in	   a	   multitude	   of	  
individual	   and	   collective	   ways,	   and	   may	   not	   necessarily	   identify	   with	   a	   putative	  
diasporic	   Liberian	   community.	   In	   the	   field,	   I	   sought	   to	   examine	   how	   the	   lived	  
experiences	  of	  Liberian	  refugee	  diasporas	  in	  West	  Africa,	  for	  instance,	  compare	  with	  
economic	  diasporas	  who	  left	  Liberia	   for	  the	  United	  States	  or	  Europe	  before	  armed	  
conflict,	   and	   how	   the	   Liberian	   government	   engages	   with	   these	   communities	   at	  
varying	   levels	   through	   embassies	   abroad.	   Accra	   and	   Freetown	   presented	   optimal	  
case	   studies	   for	   ‘near’	   diasporas	   because	   they	   host	   fairly	   large	   populations	   of	  
Liberians	  in	  the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region	  (UNHCR,	  2004;	  UNHCR,	  2007).	  Washington	  
and	   London	   were	   selected	   as	   sites	   comprising	   ‘wider’	   diasporas	   because	   they	  
represent	   centres	   of	   power	   in	   North	   America	   and	   Europe,	   respectively,	   and	   the	  
politically	   charged	  nature	  of	  Liberian	  diasporas	   in	   these	   centres.	   For	   instance,	   the	  
US	   and	   UK	   provided	   the	   lobbying	   machinery	   for	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Coalition	  of	  Concerned	  Liberians	  (CCL),	  whose	  
founder	   is	   based	   in	   Washington,	   and	   the	   European	   Federation	   of	   Liberian	  
Associations	  (EFLA),	  whose	  president	  is	  based	  outside	  of	  London.	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   interviewing	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   abroad	   speaking	   in	   unofficial	  
capacities,	  I	  also	  interviewed	  Liberian	  embassy	  officials	  in	  the	  four	  ‘near’	  and	  ‘wider’	  




locales	   might	   affect	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   transnationally.	   Liberian	  
ambassadors	   interviewed	   were	   then	   ambassador	   to	   the	   UK,	   Wesley	   Momo	  
Johnson17,	   the	   late	   ambassador	   to	   Sierra	   Leone,	   Thomas	   Brima18,	   and	   the	   former	  
ambassador	  to	  Ghana,	  Rudolph	  Von	  Ballmoos19,	  who	  now	  serves	  as	  ambassador	  to	  
the	  UK.	   Liberian	  Ambassador	   to	   the	  US	   Jeremiah	   Sulunteh	  was	  unavailable	   for	   an	  
interview,	  so	  he	  instructed	  his	  two	  deputies,	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  Jeff	  Dowana20	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  Minister	  Counsellor	  for	  Public	  Affairs,	  Gabriel	  I.	  A.	  Williams21,	  to	  speak	  
with	  me.	  At	  the	  embassy	  in	  Accra,	  2nd	  Secretary	  Angela	  Lavela	  Von	  Ballmoos22	  was	  
asked	   by	   the	   ambassador	   to	   explain	   the	   embassy’s	   processes	   of	   engagement	  with	  
Liberians	   in	  Ghana.	  Also	  speaking	  in	   ‘official’	  capacities	  were	  the	  heads	  of	  regional	  
diaspora	   organisations	   legitimated	   by	   respondents	   in	   three	   of	   the	   four	   diasporic	  
field	   sites.	   Through	   interviews	   with	   Prince	   Taylor23 	  of	   the	   Union	   of	   Liberian	  
Organisations	   in	   the	   UK	   (ULO-­‐UK),	   Nee	   Allison24 	  of	   the	   Liberian	   Community	  
Association	  in	  the	  Washington	  Metropolitan	  area,	  and	  Julia	  Richards25	  of	  the	  United	  
Liberian	  Association	  in	  Ghana	  (ULAG),	  I	  endeavoured	  to	  examine	  how	  citizenship	  is	  
manifested	  in	  the	  collective	  practices	  of	  Liberians	  resident	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  
and	  Accra,	  respectively.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  regional	  Liberian	  organisation	  in	  Freetown	  
is	   indicative	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   Liberian	   and	   Sierra	   Leonean	   identities	   are	   fluid,	   as	  
corroborated	  by	  Ambassador	  Brima:	  “The	  two	  countries	  [Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone]	  
are	  so	   interrelated	  that	   it’s	  very	  difficult	   to	  actually	  differentiate	  a	  Liberian	  from	  a	  
Sierra	  Leonean.”26	  
	  
Just	  as	  I	  selected	  a	  range	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  four	  diasporic	  urban	  centres,	  I	  was	  
deliberate	  in	  interviewing	  83	  Liberians	  of	  varying	  demographic	  profiles	  in	  Monrovia,	  
comparing	  and	  contrasting	  the	  lived	  experiences	  and	  social	  locations	  of	  ‘homeland’	  
                                                
17	  Semi-­‐structured	   interview	   in	   London	   on	   June	   14,	   2012.	   Johnson,	   a	   former	   opposition	   party	  
member	   of	   the	   Progressive	   People’s	   Party	   in	   the	   1980s,	   was	   replaced	   in	   2013	   by	   Rudolph	   Von	  
Ballmoos,	  a	  veteran	  Liberian	  diplomat	  who	  had	  most	  immediately	  served	  as	  Liberia’s	  ambassador	  to	  
Ghana.	  	  
18	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Freetown	  on	  April	  18,	  2013.	  
19	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Accra	  on	  May	  23,	  2013.	  	  
20	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  November	  2,	  2012.	  
21	  Ibid.	  	  
22	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Accra	  on	  May	  23,	  2013.	  
23	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  16,	  2012.	  
24	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  November	  2,	  2012.	  	  	  
25	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Accra	  on	  May	  18,	  2013.	  	  




Liberians,	  permanent	  and	  circular	  returnees,	  legislative	  and	  executive	  branch	  policy	  
makers.	   What	   follows	   is	   a	   detailed	   categorisation	   of	   these	   Monrovia-­‐based	  
respondents.	  	  
	  
Homeland	  Liberians	  (or	  Homelanders)	  
	  
In	  my	  initial	  research	  proposal,	  ‘homeland’	  Liberians	  were	  defined	  as	  Liberians	  who	  
had	  never	  left	  the	  country	  after	  1997,	  Liberia’s	  first	  post-­‐war	  moment.	  I	  developed	  
this	   airtight	   definition	   because	   I	   assumed	   that	   their	   perspectives	   about	   post-­‐war	  
recovery,	  identity/citizenship,	  and	  dual	  citizenship	  might	  vary	  from	  those	  who	  had	  
considerable	   exposure	   or	   interactions	   abroad.	   During	   fieldwork,	   however,	   I	  
discovered	  that	  migration	  had	  touched	  the	  lives	  of	  all	  Liberians,	  and	  even	  if	  they	  had	  
not	  migrated	  to	  other	  countries	  post-­‐1997,	  many	  had	  certainly	  migrated	  pre-­‐1997.	  
And	   if	   they	   had	   not	   migrated	   at	   all,	   they	   certainly	   had	   Liberian	   relatives	   living	  
abroad.	  Furthermore,	  most	  Liberians	  have	  tactile	  experiences	  of	  migration,	  serving	  
as	   the	   basis	   for	   Chapter	   VI	   on	   how	   migration	   has	   configured	   and	   reconfigured	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	   I	   also	   discovered	   that	   globalisation—the	   flow	   of	   migrant	  
transfers	   through	   remittances	  and	   the	  advancements	   in	  mobile	   telephony	  and	   the	  
internet—had	  also	  transported	  migration	  to	  those	  who	  may	  not	  have	  physically	  left	  
Liberia	  during	  their	  lifetime,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  VII.	  	  
	  
Early	   on	   in	   my	   fieldwork	   in	   Monrovia,	   I	   discovered	   that	   finding	   ‘homeland’	  
Liberians—as	   initially	   defined	   in	   my	   research	   proposal—would	   be	   very	   difficult	  
because	   most	   of	   the	   individuals	   I	   spoke	   to	   had	   spent	   some	   time	   abroad,	   either	  
through	  short-­‐term	  study,	  short-­‐term	  job	  assignments,	  short-­‐term	  displacement,	  or	  
short-­‐term	  cyber	  travel.	  Therefore,	  an	  ‘authentic	  homeland	  Liberian’	  only	  existed	  in	  
my	   analytical	   imagination.	   And	   so,	   I	   reconfigured	   my	   definition	   of	   ‘homeland’	  
Liberian	   to	  describe	  Liberians	  who	  had	  spent	  most,	   if	  not	  all,	   their	   lives	   in	  Liberia	  
before	  the	  first	  war	  started	  in	  1989,	  and	  most,	   if	  not	  all,	   their	   lives	   in	  Liberia	  after	  
the	   first	   post-­‐war	   moment	   in	   1997.	   Exceptions	   were	   made	   for	   individuals	   who	  
found	   short-­‐term	   work	   and/or	   short-­‐term	   study	   opportunities	   outside	   of	   Liberia	  
during	   these	   periods.	   Unlike	   permanent	   and	   circular	   returnees	   described	   later,	  




their	  own.	  This	  has,	  in	  turn,	  become	  the	  defining	  marker	  of	  a	  ‘homeland’	  Liberian.	  As	  
a	  case	  in	  point,	  out	  of	  50	  ‘homeland’	  Liberians	  interviewed,	  26	  had	  never	  physically	  
left	  Liberia,	  and	  one	  had	  never	  left	  Liberia	  after	  1989	  although	  he	  studied	  in	  Europe	  
prior	   to	   the	   first	  armed	  conflict.	  Eleven	  homelanders	  had	  travelled	   for	  short	  stints	  
because	  of	   the	  wars	  between	  1989-­‐1997	  and/or	  1999-­‐2003,	  and	  six	  had	   travelled	  
abroad	  for	  schooling	  post-­‐1989.	  Six	  homelanders	  had	  travelled	  for	  short	  stints	  post-­‐
1989	  for	  a	  combination	  of	  reasons—due	  to	  war,	  for	  studies,	  and/or	  for	  work.	  	  
	  
Permanent	  Returnees	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  my	  categorisation	  of	  homeland	  Liberians	  was	  reconfigured	  in	  the	  field,	  so	  too	  
was	   my	   classification	   of	   ‘permanent	   returnees.’	   In	   my	   initial	   research	   proposal,	  
permanent	   returnees	   were	   defined	   as	   Liberians	   who	   had	   returned	   to	   Liberia	  
between	  2003	  and	  2013	  and	  lived	  in	  the	  country	  consecutively	  for	  six	  years	  during	  
the	   10	   years	   of	   uninterrupted	   peace.	   The	   consecutive	   six	   years	   was,	   to	   me,	  
analytically	   relevant	   because	   it	   represented	   one	   full	   term	   of	   a	   head	   of	   state	   in	  
Liberia,	   and	   signified	   a	   commitment	   to	   remaining	   in	   Liberia	   for	   the	   long	   duree.	  
While	  in	  the	  field,	  however,	  I	  discovered	  that	  a	  number	  of	  respondents	  considered	  
their	  return	  to	  Liberia	  permanent	  between	  2003	  and	  2013,	  yet	  for	  various	  reasons,	  
they	  either	  had	  to	  leave	  Liberia	  for	  further	  studies	  or	  were	  appointed	  for	  diplomatic	  
assignments	   abroad,	   thereby	   interrupting	   the	   permanency	   of	   return.	   Individuals	  
who	  considered	   the	  current	  move	   to	  Liberia	  a	  permanent	  move	  were	  classified	  as	  
permanent	   returnees.	  What	   I	   gleaned	   from	   the	   permanent	   returnees	   interviewed	  
was	   their	   heightened	   level	   of	   engagement	   with	   Liberia	   while	   abroad,	   from	  
participating	   in	  rallies	   for	  TPS/DED	  extension,	   to	  serving	  Liberia	   in	   the	  diplomatic	  
corps,	  to	  representing	  Liberia	  in	  the	  arts	  and	  humanities,	  to	  maintaining	  businesses	  
and	   investments	   in	   Liberia.	   They	   differed	   in	   their	   orientation	   from	   circular	  
returnees	  in	  that	  they	  demonstrated	  an	  expressed	  commitment	  to	  remain	  in	  Liberia.	  
	  
Circular	  Returnees	  	  
	  
In	  my	   initial	   research	   proposal,	   circular	   returnees	  were	   defined	   as	   Liberians	  who	  




2013.	  While	  in	  the	  field,	  however,	  I	  came	  to	  understand	  that	  three	  months	  was	  not	  
indicative	  of	  a	  circular	  returnee,	  and	  the	  short	  timeframe	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  capture	  
transnational	  ties	  with	  the	  homeland.	  I	  therefore	  reconfigured	  this	  categorisation	  to	  
define	   circular	   returnees	   as	   those	   who	   returned	   to	   live	   in	   Liberia	   for	   at	   least	   12	  
consecutive	  calendar	  months—but	  less	  than	  six	  consecutive	  years—within	  the	  past	  
decade.	  I	  considered	  the	  one	  year	  an	  appropriate	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  re-­‐establish	  ties	  
with	   Liberia	   while	   also	   leaving	   room	   for	   periodic	   return.	   Moreover,	   what	  
differentiated	   circular	   returnees	   from	   other	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   was	   their	  
sustained	   and	   considerable	   transnational	   engagement	   with	   Liberia.	   These	  
individuals	   admitted	   that	   their	   return	   to	   Liberia	   was	   conditional,	   and,	   therefore,	  
temporary,	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   factors,	   including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to:	   whether	  
peace	  and	  stability	  prevailed	  in	  Liberia,	  their	  continued	  job	  security	  in	  the	  country,	  
and	  familial	  obligations	  abroad.	  Circular	  returnees	  differed	  in	  their	  orientation	  from	  
permanent	   returnees	   because	   most	   admitted	   that	   they	   were	   still	   weighing	   their	  
options	  and	  were	  unsure	  of	  whether	  they	  would	  return	  permanently	  to	  Liberia.	  
	  
Legislative	  and	  Executive	  Branch	  Policy	  Makers	  
	  
Through	   interviews	   with	   legislative	   members	   of	   government,	   namely	   the	   four	  
sponsors	   of	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   gauge	   the	   range	   of	  
individual	  and	  collective	  motivations	  for	  attempting	  to	  reconfigure	  the	  generic	  legal	  
definition	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  as	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law.	  I	  
completed	   interviews	  with	   the	   four	   sponsors	  of	   the	  proposed	  bill	  before	  pursuing	  
other	   respondents	   in	   Monrovia,	   as	   this	   provided	  me	  with	   appropriate	   contextual	  
framing	   to	   ask	   appropriate	   questions	   of	   other	   interviewees.	   In	   December	   2012,	   I	  
interviewed	   two	   sponsors	  of	   the	  proposed	  bill,	   namely,	   Senators	   Sumo	  Kupee27	  of	  
Lofa	   County	   and	   Abel	   Massalay 28 	  of	   Grand	   Cape	   Mount	   County.	   They	   both	  
corroborated	   that	   the	  proposed	  dual	   citizenship	   legislation	  was	  heavily	  advocated	  
for	   by	   three	   prominent	   Liberian	   diaspora	   organisations,	   the	   Union	   of	   Liberian	  
Associations	   in	   the	   Americas	   (ULAA),	   the	   Coalition	   of	   Concerned	   Liberians	   (CCL),	  
and	   the	   European	   Federation	   of	   Liberian	   Associations	   (EFLA).	   Both	   Kupee	   and	  
                                                
27	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  December	  4,	  2012.	  




Massalay	  asserted	  that,	  given	  the	  contributions	  to	  development	  in	  the	  homeland	  by	  
Liberians	   abroad	   before,	   during,	   and	   after	   armed	   conflict,	   it	   would	   be	   unfair	   to	  
penalise	   those	   who	   naturalised	   elsewhere,	   and	   their	   descendants,	   from	   being	  
granted	   full	   entitlements	   to	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   including	   the	   right	   to	   own	  
land,	  a	  contentious	  issue	  that	  will	  be	  further	  analysed	  in	  Chapter	  IV	  on	  how	  conflict	  
has	  configured	  and	  reconfigured	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’.	  	  
	  
In	   March	   2013,	   I	   interviewed	   the	   two	   remaining	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	  
sponsors,	   Senators	   Cletus	   Wotorson29	  of	   Grand	   Kru	   County	   and	   Jewel	   Howard	  
Taylor30 	  of	   Bong	   County.	   As	   chief	   sponsor,	   Wotorson	   provided	   the	   necessary	  
background	  context	  of	  the	  proposed	  bill,	  explaining	  that	  he	  had	  introduced	  the	  bill	  
after	   being	   petitioned	   by	   groups	   of	   Liberian	   diasporas	   in	   the	   US	   and	   Europe.	   He	  
listed	   off	   the	   merits	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   for	   Liberia—family	   cohesion,	   economic	  
revitalisation,	  etc.—but	  maintained	  that	  opposition	  within	  the	  country	  (and	  within	  
the	  Liberian	  Legislature)	  had	  side	  lined	  the	  bill’s	  passage.	  Wotorson	  said	  that	  he	  had	  
held	  town	  hall	  meetings	  with	  Liberians	  in	  the	  US,	  as	  well	  as	  within	  Liberia,	  but	  had	  
fallen	   short	  of	   conducting	  empirical	   research	  on	  experiences	  of	   other	   countries	   in	  
the	   sub-­‐region.	   I	  would	   later	   find	   out	   through	   two	   interviewees	   in	  Monrovia	   that	  
Wotorson’s	  purported	  reason	  for	  sponsoring	  the	  proposed	  bill	  was	  to	  enable	  his	  US	  
citizen	   children	   and	   American	   grandchildren	   to	   legally	   inherit	   his	   accumulated	  
wealth	   and	   property	   in	   Liberia.	   Taylor,	   former	   wife	   of	   warlord-­‐turned-­‐president	  
Charles	   Ghankay	   Taylor,	   admitted	   after	   much	   prodding	   that	   she	   had	   developed	  
misgivings	   about	   the	  proposed	  bill.	   She	   expressed	   concerns	   that	  Liberians	   abroad	  
lobbying	  for	  dual	  citizenship	  were	  not	  committed	  to	  developing	  Liberia,	  but	  rather	  
narrowly	  interested	  in	  participating	  in	  the	  political	  processes	  of	  the	  country.	  Taylor	  
revealed	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  her	  former	  husband’s	  administration	  and	  the	  
administration	   of	   President	   Ellen	   Johnson	   Sirleaf’s	   was	   that	   Taylor	   insisted	   his	  
returnee	  cabinet	  officials	  relocate	  to	  Liberia	  with	  their	  families,	  thereby	  facilitating	  
full	  integration.	  	  
	  
                                                
29	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  March	  6,	  2013.	  




In	  addition	  to	  interviewing	  the	  four	  sponsors	  of	  Liberia’s	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  
bill,	   I	  also	   interviewed	  eight	  executive	  branch	  policy	  makers	   in	  Monrovia	   to	  gauge	  
significant	   post-­‐war	   development	   milestones	   and	   challenges,	   comparing	   them	   to	  
documentary	  data	   from	  government	  and	  non-­‐government	   sources.	  The	   interviews	  
were	  intended	  to	  gauge	  to	  what	  extent	  Liberia’s	  diasporas,	  through	  return	  migration	  
and/or	   transnational	   activities,	   had	   impacted	   Liberia’s	   development	   trajectory	  
thereby	  influencing	  the	  introduction	  or	  postponement	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  
Those	   interviewed	   were	   the	   ministers	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs31 	  (who	   spoke	   in	   his	  
capacity	  as	   immediate	  past	  Minister	  of	  Finance),	  Defence32,	   and	  Lands,	  Mines,	  and	  
Energy33;	   the	   then	  Minister	  of	   Justice34;	   the	   then	  National	   Investment	  Commission	  
Chairman35;	   the	   Governance	   Commission	   Chairman36;	   the	   former	   (and	   immediate	  
past)	   Minister	   of	   Public	  Works37;	   and	   the	   former	   (and	   immediate	   past)	   Director-­‐
General	   of	   the	   Civil	   Service	   Agency38.	   I	   was	   able	   to	   access	   these	   policy	   makers	  
because	   I	   worked	  with	   them	   collaboratively	   for	   four	   years	   as	   a	  mid-­‐level	   aide	   to	  
President	  Sirleaf.	   Interviews	  with	   the	  eight	  specific	  policy	  makers	  were	  conducted	  
because	   their	  ministries/agencies	   represented	   pillars	   on	  which	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	  
recovery	  agenda	  from	  2006-­‐2011	  was	  based,	  namely,	  peace	  and	  security;	  economic	  
revitalisation,	  governance	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law;	  and	  infrastructure	  and	  basic	  services.	  
My	   attempts	   to	   secure	   interviews	   with	   the	   current	   Ministers	   of	   Agriculture	   and	  
Finance	  &	  Development	  Planning39—the	   latter	  who	  served	  as	  Minister	  of	  Planning	  
and	   Economic	   Affairs	   from	   2008-­‐2011	   oversaw	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Lift	  
Liberia	   Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy—proved	   futile	   because	   of	   their	   very	   hectic	  
schedules.	  	  
	  
                                                
31	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  Augustine	  Ngafuan	  on	  June	  11,	  2013.	  
32	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  Brownie	  Samukai	  on	  July	  12,	  2013.	  
33	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  Patrick	  Sendolo	  on	  June	  28,	  2013.	  
34	  Semi-­‐structured	   interview	   in	   Monrovia	   with	   Christiana	   Tah	   on	   June	   19,	   2013.	   Tah	   resigned	   in	  
October	  2014.	  	  
35	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  O.	  Natty	  B.	  Davis	  on	  June	  13,	  2013.	  Davis	  was	  shortly	  
replaced	   thereafter	   by	   Michael	   Wotorson,	   who	   resigned	   in	   August	   2014	   and	   returned	   to	   the	   US	  
amidst	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak.	  	  
36	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  Dr.	  Amos	  Sawyer	  on	  June	  25,	  2013.	  
37	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  Kofi	  Woods	  on	  June	  25,	  2013. 
38	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  with	  Dr.	  C.	  William	  Allen	  on	  June	  4,	  2013.	  
39	  The	  current	  minister	  of	  finance	  and	  development	  planning	  insisted	  that	  he	  see	  my	  questions	  before	  
the	   interview,	   but	   I	   declined	   to	   share	   my	   interview	   protocol	   because	   I	   was	   concerned	   that	   his	  




It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  of	  the	  eight	  executive	  branch	  policy	  makers	  interviewed,	  five	  
were	  actively	  recruited	  from	  the	  United	  States—Tah,	  Samukai,	  Sendolo,	  Sawyer,	  and	  
Allen—while	   three	   remained	   in	   Liberia	   for	   much	   of	   their	   professional	   lives—
Ngafuan,	  Davis,	  and	  Woods.	  It	  has	  been	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  if	  the	  above	  breakdown	  
is	  representative	  of	  the	  president’s	  cabinet	  composition	  because	  she	  has	  frequently	  
reshuffled	  her	  ministers.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  at	  least	  one	  third	  of	  the	  cabinet—
at	  any	  given	  time	  in	  Sirleaf’s	  current	  and	  past	  administrations—have	  returned	  from	  
abroad.	  One	  of	  the	  things	  I	  sought	  to	  find	  answers	  for	  in	  the	  field	  was	  to	  what	  extent	  
diaspora	   returnees	   aligned	   themselves	   with	   local	   aspirations	   or	   international	  
agenda-­‐setting,	   since	   they	   fall	   into	   what	   I	   call	   a	   ‘third	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	  
space.’	   Although	  most	   of	   the	   policy	  makers—returnees	   and	  non-­‐returnees	   alike—
eschewed	  critiques	   that	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	   recovery	  had	  been	  primarily	  driven	  by	  
the	   ‘one-­‐size-­‐fits	   all’	   agenda	   of	   donors,	   with	   minimal	   local	   ownership,	   former	  
Minister	   of	   Public	   Works	   Kofi	   Woods	   admitted	   boldly	   that	   Liberia	   too	   often	  
“panders	   to	   the	   international	   community”40	  and	   that	   local	   aspirations	   have	   been	  
side-­‐lined	   completely	   in	   the	   process	   of	   state-­‐building.	   In	   Chapter	   VIII,	   I	   offer	   a	  
deeper	   analysis	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   returnee	   and	   non-­‐returnee	   Liberians	   have	  
either	   ‘pandered’	   to	   the	   international	   community	  or	   reconciled	   the	   ‘local’	  with	   the	  
‘international’	   in	   post-­‐war	   recovery,	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   on	   dual	   citizenship	  
claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims.	  	  	  
	  
Although	   Sierra	   Leone’s	   process	   of	   enacting	   dual	   citizenship	   does	   not	   feature	  
prominently	  in	  this	  thesis,	  I	  interviewed	  two	  Sierra	  Leonean	  executive	  branch	  policy	  
makers	  and	   five	  parliamentarians	   to	  glean	   comparable	  policy	  experiences	  on	  dual	  
citizenship.	   The	   rationale	  was	   to	   gauge	   the	   factors	   that	   influenced	   Sierra	   Leone’s	  
dual	   citizenship	   passage	   in	   2006,	   its	   potential	   ramifications,	   and	   the	   nodes	   of	  
resistance	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   country’s	   citizenship	   law.	   I	   gained	   access	   to	   the	   two	  
executive	   branch	   policy	  makers	   through	   contacts	   I	   had	  met	   during	   a	   2010	   study	  
tour	  in	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  Diaspora	  Affairs	  Office	  incubated	  in	  the	  Statehouse,	  the	  office	  
of	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  president.	   I	   gained	  access	   to	   the	   five	  parliamentarians	   through	  a	  
Liberian	  respondent	  in	  Freetown	  who	  had	  contacts	  in	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  Sierra	  
Leone’s	   political	   hierarchy.	   Although	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   interviews	   with	  
                                                




parliamentarians	  was	  undesirable—I	  did	  them	  all	  in	  a	  span	  of	  three	  hours,	  back-­‐to-­‐
back—I	   knew	   that	   it	   was	   important	   to	   pursue	   these	   interviews	   because	   it	   would	  
enable	  an	  appropriate	  comparison	  with	  Liberia’s	  six-­‐year	  dual	  citizenship	  impasse.	  
During	  my	  time	  in	  Parliament,	  I	  also	  obtained	  from	  the	  archives	  an	  official	  copy	  of	  
the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill	  for	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  the	  actual	  Act	  signed	  into	  law	  
in	  2006.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  Sierra	  Leone	  took	  nearly	  10	  years	  to	  eventually	  
enact	  dual	  citizenship,	  an	  important	  lesson	  for	  the	  Liberia	  case	  study.	  	  
	  
The	   section	   that	   follows	   includes	   brief	   descriptions	   of	   fieldwork	   in	   the	   four	  
diasporic	  urban	  centres	  as	  well	  as	  general	  trends	  observed	  about	  data	  collection.	  	  
	  
Data	  Collection	  Processes	  and	  General	  Trends	  in	  Four	  Urban	  Centres	  Abroad	  
Fieldwork	   processes	   and	   trends	   observed	   in	   the	   four	   urban	   ‘near’	   and	   ‘wider’	  
diaspora	  centres	  were	  similar	   in	  some	  respects,	  but	  very	  different	   in	  others.	  What	  
follows	   is	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	   snowball	   sampling	   methods	   employed	   in	  




In	   London,	   I	   conducted	   fieldwork	   from	   mid	   to	   late	   June	   2012,	   interviewing	   30	  
anonymised	   diaspora	   respondents,	   one	   ambassador,	   and	   one	   head	   of	   a	   regional	  
diaspora	   organisation.	   I	   initially	   approached	   the	   president	   of	   the	   European	  
Federation	  of	  Liberian	  Associations	  (EFLA),	  John	  Brownell,	  who	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  
long	  roster	  of	  his	  personal	  contacts.	  The	  Union	  of	  Liberian	  Organisations	  in	  the	  UK	  
(ULO-­‐UK)	  also	  forwarded	  their	   listserv	  a	  generic	  fieldwork	  interview	  request	  form	  
that	   I	   had	   written	   for	   potential	   interviewees,	   and	   two	   Liberians	   opted	   to	   do	   the	  
interview	  because	  of	  this	  e-­‐mail	  correspondence.	  I	  also	  interviewed	  Liberians	  I	  had	  
met	  through	  social	  functions	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  academic	  year,	  some	  of	  whom	  
were	  not	  actively	  engaged	  in	  any	  Liberian	  organisation	  in	  the	  UK.	  I	  visited	  a	  Liberian	  
restaurant	   in	   Brixton,	   Keneja	   Bar	   and	   Grill,	   and	   was	   able	   to	   interview	   three	  
respondents	  patronising	  the	  establishment.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  for	  London,	  
the	   Liberian	   Government	   held	   a	   consultation	   for	   Liberians	   in	   London	   to	   solicit	  




Liberia	   into	   middle-­‐income	   status	   by	   the	   year	   2030.	   I	   interviewed	   a	   number	   of	  
Liberians	   during	   and	   after	   this	   consultation,	   bearing	   in	   mind	   that	   many	   of	   them	  
were	   embassy	   contacts,	   and	   did	   not	   represent	   the	   full	   range	   of	   opinions,	  




Fieldwork	   conducted	   in	  Washington	   covered	   the	   month	   of	   October	   2012,	   during	  
which	   I	   interviewed	   30	   anonymised	   diaspora	   respondents,	   two	   embassy	   officials,	  
and	  one	  head	  of	  a	  regional	  diaspora	  organisation.	  I	  initially	  emailed	  and/or	  called	  a	  
number	  of	  my	  personal	   contacts	   in	  Washington,	  who	   in	   turn	  referred	  me	   to	  other	  
Liberians	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  I	  had	  reservations	  about	  interviewing	  friends	  of	  
my	   parents	   or	   distant	   relatives,	   but	   they	   were	   surprisingly	   candid	   once	   they	  
received	   an	   assurance	   that	   they	   were	   being	   anonymised.	   Unlike	   in	   London,	   I	  
interviewed	  a	  number	  of	  young	  professional	  Liberians	  aged	  25	  to	  35	  in	  Washington,	  
the	   vast	   majority	   of	   whom	   were	   not	   born	   in	   Liberia.	   This	   added	   an	   interesting	  
dynamic	   to	   the	  analysis,	  as	   I	  discovered	   that	  some	  of	   these	   jus	  sanguinis	  Liberians	  
were	  as	  engaged	   in	   ‘development’	   in	  Liberia	  as	   those	   twice	   their	  age,	  and	   in	  some	  
instances	  more	   engaged	   than	   their	   parents’	   generations.	   This	  made	  me	   reflect	   on	  
how	  one’s	  notion	  of	  identity	  can	  be	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  socialisation	  and	  parental	  
nurturing.	  Jus	  sanguinis	  Liberians	  are	  emblematic	  of	  the	  assertion	  that	  diasporas	  are	  
both	   identity	   and	   practice.	   In	   order	   to	   own	   their	   ‘Liberianness,’	   they	   seemed	   to	  
compensate	   for	  not	  being	  born	   in	  Liberia	  by	   their	   relentless	  engagement	  with	   the	  
country,	   from	   establishing	   small-­‐scale	   businesses	   in	   Liberia	   to	   leading	   large-­‐scale	  




In	   Freetown,	   I	   conducted	   fieldwork	   for	   two	  weeks	   in	  April	   2013,	   interviewing	   20	  
anonymised	  diaspora	  respondents	  and	  one	  ambassador.	  I	  initially	  emailed	  or	  called	  
a	   number	   of	   my	   personal	   contacts	   throughout	   the	   West	   African	   sub-­‐region	   and	  
Europe	  who	   referred	  me	   to	   Liberians	   in	   Freetown.	   One	   respondent	  was	   gracious	  




Waterloo,	  where	  I	  interviewed	  a	  number	  of	  Liberians	  still	  awaiting	  ID	  cards	  for	  local	  
integration	   in	   Sierra	   Leone.	   The	   son	   of	   a	   Liberian	   citizen	   father/Sierra	   Leonean	  
citizen	  mother,	  my	  former	  partner	  also	   introduced	  me	  to	  Liberians	   in	  Freetown	  in	  
the	   community	   where	   he	   grew	   up	   as	   well	   as	   Liberians	   at	   his	   mother’s	   church,	  
attended	   by	   ethnic	   Krus	   whose	   descendants	   started	   migrating	   to	   and	   settling	   in	  
Sierra	  Leone	  after	  Great	  Britain	  reserved	  a	  segment	  of	  Freetown	  for	  Kru	  seafarers	  
who	  had	  assisted	  the	  British	  navy	  in	  staving	  off	  illegal	  slave	  trading	  on	  the	  Atlantic	  
coast	  (Brooks,	  1972).	   I	  also	   interviewed	  a	   few	  Liberians	  who	  had	  been	  referred	  to	  
me	  by	  the	  Liberian	  embassy	  in	  Freetown.	  	  
	  
Unlike	   in	   London	   and	  Washington,	   I	   found	   it	   particularly	   difficult	   identifying	   and	  
securing	   respondents	   in	   Freetown	   because	   I	   discovered	   that	   Liberian	   identity	   in	  
Sierra	   Leone	   is	   relatively	   fluid.	   Moreover,	   because	   of	   the	   shared	   border	   between	  
Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Liberians	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  have	  managed	  to	  integrate	  into	  
Sierra	   Leonean	   society	   in	   a	   way	   that	   almost	   obliterates	   sharp	   markers	   of	  
“Liberianness.”	  Sesay,	  et.	   al	  describe	  Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  as	   fraternal	   twins—
“twins	   but	   not	   identical”—to	   describe	   their	   similarities	   (Sesay,	   et.	   al,	   2009:	   11).	  
Moreover,	  Edward	  Wilmot	  Blyden,	  a	  native	  of	  the	  Virgin	  Islands	  who	  naturalised	  in	  
Liberia	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  once	  remarked	  that	  Sierra	  Leoneans	  and	  Liberians	  “are	  
one	   in	   origin	   and	   one	   in	   destiny;	   and,	   in	   spite	   of	   local	   prejudices,	   they	   must	   co-­‐
operate”	  (Blyden,	  1884:	  15).	  As	  a	  case	   in	  point,	  many	  respondents	   in	  the	   field	  had	  
one	   Sierra	   Leonean	  parent/one	   Liberian	   parent,	   had	   been	   born	   in	   one	   of	   the	   two	  
countries,	   had	   travelled	   extensively	   across	   borders,	   and	   therefore	   considered	  
themselves	   both	   Sierra	   Leonean	   and	   Liberian.	   Also,	   the	   Krus	   in	   Freetown	   often	  
identify	  as	  Kru	  first,	  and	  as	  Liberian,	  Sierra	  Leonean,	  or	  Ghanaian	  second,	  so	  ethnic	  
Kru	   identity	   superseded	   Liberian	   identity.	   This	   is	   primarily	   why	   my	   interviewee	  




Fieldwork	   in	   Accra	   covered	   the	   entire	   month	   of	   May	   2013,	   during	   which	   I	  
interviewed	   30	   anonymised	   diaspora	   respondents,	   one	   ambassador,	   an	   embassy	  




Liberians	  based	   in	  Accra	   through	  my	   contacts	   in	  Ghana	   and	   elsewhere,	   and	   those	  
contacts	   referred	   me	   to	   other	   Liberians	   based	   in	   Accra	   and	   its	   environs.	   The	  
president	  of	   the	  United	  Liberian	  Association	   in	  Ghana	   (ULAG),	   Julia	  Richards,	  was	  
particularly	  helpful	   in	   identifying	  Liberians	   in	  Accra,	   as	  well	   as	   Liberians	   living	   at	  
the	  Buduburam	  Refugee	  Camp	  near	  Kasoa	  and	  its	  environs.	  I	  spent	  two	  days	  at	  the	  
Buduburam	  Camp,	  and	  over	  half	  of	  my	  interviewees	  were	  Liberian	  refugees	  residing	  
at	  the	  Camp	  or	  in	  Accra	  proper	  who	  had	  opted	  for	  local	  integration	  in	  Ghana.	  Unlike	  
in	   Freetown,	   I	   had	   little	   difficulty	   finding	   Liberian	   interviewees	   in	   Accra	   because	  
Liberian	   national	   identity	   tends	   to	   be	   entrenched	   because	   of	   Ghana’s	   strong	  
nationalist	   fervour.	   Unlike	   Liberia’s	   fluid	   relationship	   with	   Sierra	   Leone	   due	   to	   a	  
shared	   border,	   ECOWAS	   regional	   integration	   has	   only	   fortified	   Ghanaian	   national	  
identity,	  thereby	  clearly	  delineating	  who	  belongs	  to	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  who	  stands	  
outside	  its	  ambit.	  
	  
I	   have	   shown	  herein	   that	   data	   collection	   in	   the	   four	   diasporic	   field	   sites	   required	  
slightly	  different	  channels	  for	  securing	  interviews,	  although	  I	  relied	  primarily	  on	  my	  
personal	   contacts	   in	   all	   cases.	   In	   the	  next	   section,	   I	   provide	  detailed	  demographic	  
profiles	   of	   diaspora,	   homeland	   and	   returnee	   respondents,	   which	   support	   my	  
argument	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   that	   their	   varied	   life-­‐worlds	   and	   social	   locations	  
impact	   claims	   for	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   against	   dual	   citizenship	   as	   a	   policy	  
prescription	  for	  Liberia.	  	  
	  
Part	  II:	  Demographic	  Composition	  of	  Homelanders,	  Returnees	  and	  Diasporas	  	  
Although	  the	  methods	  employed	  in	  this	  study	  were	  primarily	  qualitative,	  descriptive	  
statistical	   analysis	   has	   been	   drawn	   from	   my	   snowball	   sampling,	   such	   as	  
demographic	   data	   on	   Liberians	   resident	   in	   Monrovia	   and	   those	   who	  migrated	   to	  
London,	   Washington,	   Freetown,	   and	   Accra—including	   gender,	   age,	   educational	  
attainment,	   employment	   status,	   income	   levels,	   citizenship	   status,	   and	   migration	  
trajectories.	   Where	   possible,	   I	   purposively	   sampled	   for	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   ages	   in	  
order	  to	  gauge	  differences	  in	  perspectives	  amongst	  Liberians	  of	  varying	  generations.	  
I	   also	   deliberately	   sought	   to	   balance	   the	   number	   of	   men	   and	   women	   in	   my	  
respondent	   pool	   to	   assess	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   conceive	   of	   and	   practice	   ‘Liberian	  




ask	   respondents	   explicitly	   for	   their	   ethnic	   identities	   because	   ethnicity	   was	  
politicised	   during	   Liberia’s	   intermittent	   armed	   conflicts	   and	   remains	   a	   sensitive	  
topic	   to	  broach.	  Because	   the	   frame	  of	  my	   thesis	   is	   citizenship	  and	   therefore	  much	  
broader	   than	   ethnic	   identity,	   I	   remained	   convinced	   that	   ethnicity	   would	   emerge	  
organically	   in	  conversation	  with	  respondents	  who	  considered	   it	  an	   impediment	   to	  
experiencing	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  fully,	  and	  this	  is	  apparent	  in	  Chapter	  IV.	  
	  
Across	  the	  five	  field	  sites,	  some	  interesting	  trends	  emerged	  from	  the	  range	  of	  gender	  
and	  age	  distributions	  amongst	  the	  181	  ‘unofficial’	  anonymised	  respondents—those	  
not	  speaking	  in	  official	  capacities	  as	  government	  of	  Liberia	  representatives	  or	  heads	  
of	   regional	   diaspora	   organisations.	   Table	   1	   shows	   the	   range	   represented	   in	   my	  
interview	   sample	   and	   is	   not	   indicative	   of	   age	   or	   gender	   distributions	   amongst	  
Liberians	   in	   these	   field	   sites	   generally.	   Gender	   and	   age	   distributions	   were	  
particularly	   stark	   in	   diaspora	   urban	   centres.	   While	   age	   distribution	   was	   more	  
concentrated	  amongst	  41	  to	  50	  year	  olds	  in	  London,	  with	  no	  respondent	  above	  the	  
age	   of	   60,	   respondents	   in	   Washington,	   Freetown,	   and	   Accra	   were	   more	   widely	  
distributed	  in	  age.41	  	  
	  














London	  (30)	   15	   15	   1	   9	   15	   4	   N/A	   N/A	  
Washington	  (30)	  	   14	   16	   9	   4	   4	   6	   5	   2	  
Freetown	  (20)	   14	   6	   3	   7	   3	   4	   2	   1	  
Accra	  (30)	   17	   13	   4	   9	   6	   8	   1	   N/A	  
Monrovia	  (71)	   36	   35	   26	   20	   15	   5	   4	   N/A	  
Total	   Absolute	  
Number/	  



























As	   Table	   1	   illustrates,	   male	   and	   female	   respondents	   in	   London,	  Washington,	   and	  
Accra	  were	   equally	   or	   nearly	   equally	   distributed.	   Contrastingly,	   the	   proportion	   of	  
male	   interviewees	  was	  more	   than	  double	   that	  of	   female	  respondents	   in	  Freetown.	  
                                                





Many	   of	   the	  women	   I	   approached	   in	   Freetown	  were	   either	   too	   shy	   to	   consent	   to	  
being	   interviewed,	   or	   lacked	   enough	   confidence	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   engage	   with	  
interview	  questions,	  despite	  my	  attempts	  to	  reassure	  them	  that	  questions	  could	  be	  
answered	  easily.	  I	  realised	  early	  on,	  however,	  that	  the	  low	  levels	  of	  formal	  education	  
amongst	  the	  women	  I	  approached	  could	  be	  a	  primary	  reason	  for	  their	  reticence.	  As	  a	  
case	  in	  point,	   I	  started	  interviewing	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  woman	  who	  had	  had	  no	  formal	  
schooling	  beyond	  the	  6th	  grade,	  and	  had	  to	  stop	  and	  discard	  the	  interview	  because	  
she	  could	  not	  understand	  concepts	  germane	  to	  my	  study,	  such	  as	  ‘citizen’,	  or	  explain	  
how	   she	   identified	   herself—as	   a	   Liberian,	   a	   Sierra	   Leonean,	   neither,	   or	   both.	  
Another	   barrier	   I	   encountered	   was	   the	   low	   level	   of	   English	   proficiency	   amongst	  
those	  not	  formally	  educated,	  particularly	  women.	  Those	  with	  no	  formal	  schooling	  in	  
Freetown	  tend	  to	  speak	  only	  Krio,	  the	  de	  facto	  national	  language	  of	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  
a	  lingua	  franca	  developed	  by	  descendants	  of	  repatriated	  blacks	  from	  the	  West	  Indies,	  
the	  UK,	  and	  US	  (Cole,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Monrovia	   represented	   even	   distributions	   of	   gender	   and	   uneven	   age	   distributions	  
amongst	   homelander,	   permanent	   and	   circular	   returnee	   respondents,	   as	   Table	   2	  
illustrates.	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Gender/Age	  Breakdown	  of	  71	  Anonymised	  Monrovia-­‐Based	  Interviewees	  	  
Gender/Age	  
	  












25	   25	   23	   13	   10	   2	   2	   N/A	  
Permanent	  
Returnees	  (10)	  
5	   5	   1	   3	   2	   2	   2	   N/A	  
Circular	  
Returnees	  (11)	  
6	   5	   2	   4	   3	   1	   N/A	   N/A	  
Total	   Absolute	  
Number/	  

























Men	   and	  women	   in	   all	   three	  Monrovia	   respondent	   categories	  were	   equal	   or	   near	  
equal	  in	  representation.	  Age42	  distribution	  was	  more	  varied,	  however,	  for	  those	  who	  
disclosed	   this	   information.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   homelanders,	   age	   distribution	   was	  
                                                




concentrated	  amongst	  21	   to	  30	  year	  olds	  because	   I	  deliberately	   sought	  out	  young	  
university	   students.	   According	   to	   2008	   census	   figures,	   more	   than	   60	   percent	   of	  
Liberia’s	   population	   is	   below	   the	   age	   of	   35	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2009),	   so	   I	  
attempted	   to	   mirror	   these	   figures	   with	   respondent	   selections.	   Unlike	   homeland	  
interviewees,	   however,	   age	  was	  more	  widely	   distributed	   amongst	   permanent	   and	  
circular	   returnee	   respondents.	   It	   is	   worth	   mentioning	   here	   that	   the	   highest	  
percentage	  of	  permanent	  and	  circular	   returnee	   interviewees	  were	   in	   the	  31	   to	  40	  
age	   bracket.	   This	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   adults	   in	   this	   age	   range	   are	  
more	   established	   professionally	   than	   their	   younger	   counterparts,	   yet	   less	  
apprehensive	  about	   taking	   risks	   than	   their	  older	   counterparts.	  According	   to	  many	  
31	  to	  40	  year	  old	  permanent	  and	  circular	  returnee	  respondents,	  a	  return	  to	  Liberia	  
after	  protracted	  periods	  of	  time	  abroad	  was	  considered	  a	  strategic	  move	  to	  build	  up	  
an	   established	   career	   or	   ‘test	   the	   waters’	   by	   venturing	   into	   other	   areas	   of	  
professional	   life,	   such	   as	   entrepreneurship.	   For	   instance,	   two	   circular	   returnee	  
respondents,	  a	  35-­‐year-­‐old	  Liberia-­‐born	  female	  who	  naturalised	  in	  the	  US	  and	  a	  31-­‐
year-­‐old	  male	  born	  in	  the	  US	  to	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  father,	  respectively,	  had	  secured	  
jobs	   as	   consultants	   in	   Liberia	   while	   also	   exploring	   business	   opportunities	   in	   the	  
country.	  The	  woman	  had	  registered	  a	  retail	  business	  in	  Monrovia	  and	  accumulated	  
considerable	  amounts	  of	  property—both	  family	  owned	  and	  personally	  acquired—to	  
lease	  and	   rent.	  The	  man	  was	   saving	  up	   to	   invest	   in	   a	   fisheries	   start-­‐up	  enterprise	  
with	  a	  friend.	  	  
	  
Education,	  Employment	  and	  Income	  Show	  Wide-­‐Ranging	  Social	  Locations	  	  
Just	  as	  gender	  and	  age	  demographics	  unearth	  certain	  trends,	  the	  education	  levels	  of	  
respondents	   in	   this	   study	   expose	   their	   divergent	   social	   locations.	   As	   Table	   3	  
indicates,	   ‘wider’	   diaspora	   respondents	   in	   London	   and	   Washington	   obtained	   on	  
average	   higher	   levels	   of	   education	   than	   their	   ‘near’	   diaspora	   counterparts	   in	  
Freetown	   and	   Accra,	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   permanent	   and	   circular	   returnees	   in	  
Monrovia	   obtained	   on	   average	   higher	   levels	   of	   education	   than	   their	   homeland	  
counterparts.	   Although	   the	   education	   levels	   of	   permanent	   returnee	   respondents	  
were	   nearly	   evenly	   distributed—three	   high	   school	   graduates;	   three	   bachelors	  
degree	  holders;	   three	  masters	  degree	  holders;	  and	  one	  PhD	  holder,	   respectively—




board—two	  bachelors	  degree	  holders;	  eight	  masters	  degree	  holders;	  and	  one	  PhD	  
holder.	   With	   the	   return	   of	   expatriate	   nationals	   to	   post-­‐war	   Liberia,	   the	   labour	  
market	  has	  become	  increasingly	  competitive.	  As	  such,	  domestically	  rooted	  Liberians	  
have	  placed	  a	  premium	  on	  university	  degrees	  in	  the	  past	  10	  years.	  Eighteen	  of	  the	  
twenty-­‐one	  homeland	  high	  school	  graduates	  reported	  they	  were	  pursuing	  bachelors	  
degrees,	  while	  another	  18	  homelanders	  had	  already	  obtained	  bachelors	  degrees.	  Of	  
the	   remaining	   11	   homeland	   respondents,	   nine	  were	  masters	   degree	   holders,	   and	  
one	  each	  reported	  having	  a	  medical	  degree	  and	  a	  PhD,	  respectively.	  	  
	  





















London	  (30)	   N/A	   8	   11	   10	   1	  
Washington	  (30)	  	   N/A	   5	   14	   10	   1	  
Freetown	  (20)	   6	   10	   3	   1	   N/A	  
Accra	  (30)	   3	   14	   6	   6	   1	  
Monrovia	  (71)	   N/A	   24	   23	   20	   4	  
Total	   Absolute	  
Number/	  


















The	   educational	   attainment	   of	   respondents	   had	   a	   positive	   correlation	   with	   their	  
employment	   status	   and	   income	   levels,	  with	   some	  women	  more	  marginalised	   than	  
others.	   In	   cases	   where	   educational	   attainment	   was	   high,	   respondents	   reported	  
higher	   levels	   of	   income,	   for	   those	   who	   opted	   to	   disclose	   this	   information.	   While	  
twenty-­‐seven	  of	   the	  30	  London-­‐based	   respondents	  were	  employed	  with	  a	  median	  
income	  of	  £35,000	  per	  annum,	  twenty-­‐six	  of	  the	  30	  Washington-­‐based	  respondents	  
were	  employed	  with	  a	  median	   income	  of	  US$71,000	  per	  annum.	  Unlike	   in	  London	  
and	  Washington,	  however,	  only	   five	  Freetown-­‐based	   (male)	   respondents	   reported	  
being	   employed,	   with	   a	   wide	   variance	   in	   income	   levels.	   For	   instance,	   a	  
consultant/administrator	  reported	  an	  annual	  income	  of	  US$180,000	  on	  the	  highest	  
end	   of	   the	   spectrum	  while	   a	   pastor	   reported	   an	   annual	   income	   of	  US$300	   on	   the	  




than	  in	  Freetown.	  Similar	  to	  Freetown,	  however,	  Accra-­‐based	  respondents	  reported	  
a	  wide	   variance	   in	   income	   levels	   that	   exposed	   not	   only	   disparities	   in	   educational	  
attainment	   but	   also	   gender.	   For	   instance,	   a	   male	   banker/economist	   and	   Masters	  
degree	  holder	  reported	  an	  annual	  income	  of	  US$170,000	  on	  the	  highest	  end	  of	  the	  
spectrum	  while	   a	   female	   seamstress	   and	   high	   school	   drop-­‐out—one	   of	   only	   eight	  
female	  respondents	  employed	   in	  Accra—reported	  an	  annual	   income	  of	  US$600	  on	  
the	  lowest	  end.	  Although	  Chapters	  IV	  through	  VIII	  provide	  a	  more	  nuanced	  analysis	  
of	  the	  differentiated	  ‘homeland’	  engagement	  patterns	  of	  diasporas	  in	  this	  multi-­‐sited	  
study,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   state	   here	   that	   unlike	   respondents	   in	   London	   and	  
Washington,	   the	   limited	   employment	   prospects	   of	   interviewees	   in	   Freetown,	  
generally,	   and	   Accra	   to	   a	   certain	   degree,	   impedes	   their	   ability	   to	   formalise	   that	  
engagement	  by	  actively	  practicing	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  from	  afar.	  
	  
Wide	   income	   gaps	   within	   the	   Monrovia	   respondent	   pool	   also	   revealed	   their	  
differentiated	  social	  locations.	  Although	  30	  percent	  of	  homelanders	  reported	  being	  
unemployed,	   the	  70	  percent	  who	  were	   employed	  disclosed	   extensive	   variances	   in	  
their	  income	  levels.	  For	  instance,	  a	  male	  development	  economist	  reported	  an	  annual	  
income	   of	   US$91,000	   on	   the	   highest	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum	   while	   two	   females—a	  
programme	  assistant	  and	  an	  accountant,	  respectively—reported	  annual	  incomes	  of	  
US$2,400	   on	   the	   lowest	   end.	   Amongst	   permanent	   returnees,	   the	   highest	   income	  
reported	  was	  US$200,000,	  the	  middle	  US$34,000,	  and	  the	  lowest	  US$4,200.	  Within	  
the	   circular	   returnee	   respondent	   pool,	   five	   reported	   having	   an	   annual	   income	   of	  
US$50,000	  and	  above	  while	  the	  lowest	  reported	  income	  earner	  received	  US$27,000	  
per	   annum.	   These	   variances	   represent	   a	   microcosm	   of	   increasing	   income	  
inequalities	   within	   post-­‐war	   Liberia,	   as	   discussed	   in	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   V	   on	   how	  
conflict	  has	  configured	  and	  reconfigured	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship.’	  	  
	  
Divergent	  Life-­‐Worlds	  Manifested	  in	  Citizenship	  Status	  and	  Migration	  Patterns	  	  
Since	   the	   education	   levels,	   employment	   status	   and	   annual	   incomes	   of	   the	   social	  
actors	  within	  this	  study	  serve	  as	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  a	  demographic	  profile,	  their	  
citizenship	   status	   and	   migration	   patterns	   are	   equally	   important	   in	   developing	   a	  
schema	   of	   their	   life-­‐worlds	   and	   social	   locations.	   The	   citizenship	   status	   of	  




shift	  in	  the	  citizenship	  configurations	  of	  Liberians	  post-­‐1989,	  which	  I	  examine	  fully	  
in	  Chapter	  VI	  on	  how	  migration	  has	  influenced	  the	  introduction	  and	  postponement	  
in	   passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation.	   As	   Table	   4	   indicates,	   most	   ‘near’	   and	  
‘wider’	  diasporas	  were	  born	   in	  Liberia,	  yet	  London	  and	  Washington	  accounted	   for	  
the	  majority	  of	  respondents	  who	  naturalised	  abroad	  and/or	  were	  born	  abroad.	  
	  
Table	   4:	   Place	   of	   Birth/Country	   of	   Citizenship	   of	   181	   Anonymised	   Diaspora	   and	  
Monrovia-­‐based	  Interviewees	  
Place	  of	  Birth	  (PoB)/	  











London	  (30)	   28	   2	   6	   24	  
Washington	  (30)	  	   	  24	   6	   11	   19	  
Freetown	  (20)	   15	   5	   14	   6	  
Accra	  (30)	   30	   N/A	   29	   1	  
Monrovia	  (71)	   66	   5	   60	   11	  
Total	  Absolute	  Number/	  










Of	  the	  30	  respondents	  in	  London,	  two	  were	  born	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  at	  least	  one	  Liberian	  
citizen	  parent	   at	   the	   time	  of	   their	   birth,	   thereby	  being	   entitled	   to	  both	   jus	  soli	  UK	  
citizenship	  and	  jus	  sanguinis	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  until	  the	  age	  of	  majority.	  Of	  the	  28	  
Liberia-­‐born	  respondents,	  21	  had	  naturalised	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  one	  had	  naturalised	  in	  
New	  Zealand,	  all	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Of	  the	  six	  respondents	  who	  did	  not	  naturalise,	  
four	   had	   Indefinite	   Leave	   to	   Remain	   in	   the	   UK	   (the	   equivalent	   of	   permanent	  
residency	   status);	   one	   was	   on	   a	   Tier	   4	   student	   visa;	   and	   one	   respondent	   had	  
diplomatic	   status	   because	   of	   a	   spouse	   working	   in	   the	   Liberian	   foreign	   service.	  
Although	  I	  include	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  migration	  patterns	  and	  experiences	  of	  
respondents	  in	  Chapter	  VI,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  briefly	  that	  of	  the	  30	  London-­‐
based	  respondents,	  63	  percent	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  
1989	  yet	  migrated	  directly	  to	  the	  UK	  shortly	  thereafter	  or	  to	  a	  second	  party	  country	  
within	  the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region	  before	  relocating	  permanently	  to	  the	  UK.	  A	  small	  
group	  of	  men	  representing	  16	  percent	  of	  the	  UK	  respondent	  pool	  had	  won	  Liberian	  
government	   scholarships	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   to	   attend	   school	   in	   the	   former	   Soviet	  
Union,	  yet	  relocated	  to	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	  Cold	  War	  politics	  dismantled	  




form	  of	  scholarships	  to	  Liberian	  nationals	  beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  in	  exchange	  
for	  Samuel	  Kanyon	  Doe’s	  Cold	  War	  alliance	  with	   the	  USSR	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  101;	  155).	  
On	   average,	   the	   30	   London-­‐based	   respondents	   had	   spent	   approximately	   17	   years	  
residing	  in	  the	  UK.	  
	  
While	   the	   migration	   patterns	   and	   citizenship	   status	   of	   Washington-­‐based	  
respondents	  is	  similar	  in	  some	  ways	  to	  that	  of	  their	  London	  counterparts,	  they	  differ	  
in	   that	   fewer	   opted	   for	   naturalisation	   abroad.	   About	   a	   third	   of	   the	   Liberia-­‐born	  
respondents	   in	   Washington	   did	   not	   naturalise	   despite	   being	   eligible	   to	   do	   so	  
because	   they	   admitted	   to	   feeling	   a	   sense	   of	   abiding	   patriotism	   to	   Liberia	   despite	  
apparent	  inconveniences	  in	  the	  US.	  Those	  who	  kept	  their	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  
were	  fiercely	  nationalistic,	  and	  expressed	  strong	  intentions	  to	  return	  to	  Liberia,	  with	  
or	  without	  the	  passage	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  This	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  
politicisation	   of	   Liberian	   identity	   in	  Washington,	   in	  which	   naturalisation	   could	   be	  
perceived	  as	  a	  renunciation	  of	  any	  ties	  to	  the	  homeland.	  Conversely,	  however,	  some	  
respondents	   asserted	   that	   naturalisation	   enabled	   them	   to	   access	   the	   corridors	   of	  
political	   power	   in	  Washington	   as	   legitimate	   stakeholders,	   thereby	   aiding	   Liberia’s	  
development.	  	  
	  
Of	   the	   30	   respondents	   in	   Washington,	   six	   were	   born	   in	   the	   US	   to	   at	   least	   one	  
Liberian	  citizen	  parent	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  birth,	  thereby	  being	  entitled	  to	  both	   jus	  
soli	  US	  citizenship	  and	  jus	  sanguinis	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  until	  the	  age	  of	  majority.	  Of	  
the	  24	  Liberia-­‐born	  respondents,	  12	  had	  naturalised	  in	  the	  US	  at	  varying	  times,	  with	  
the	   earliest	   reported	   naturalisation	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   the	   latest	   in	   2012,	  
respectively;	  one	  was	  entitled	  to	  jus	  sanguinis	  US	  citizenship	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  birth	  
because	   of	   his	   US	   citizen	   father;	   and	   the	   remaining	   11	   retained	   their	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   despite	   the	   majority	   being	   entitled	   to	   US	   citizenship.	   Of	   the	   11	  
respondents	  who	  retained	  their	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  six	  reported	  being	  permanent	  
residents;	   one	   reported	   conditional	   residency;	   one	   was	   on	   an	   F1	   student	   visa	  
pursuing	  a	  PhD,	  one	  was	  on	  a	  G4	  visa	  as	  an	  international	  civil	  servant	  working	  for	  a	  






Of	   the	  30	  Washington-­‐based	  respondents,	  57	  percent	  resided	  outside	  of	  Liberia	  at	  
the	  advent	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  1989,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  were	  already	  settled	  in	  
the	  United	  States.	  This	  statistical	  variation	  differs	   from	  the	  demographic	  profile	  of	  
London-­‐based	   respondents	   because	   the	   concentration	   of	   US-­‐born	   Liberians	   is	  
higher	   in	   the	   Washington	   respondent	   pool	   than	   UK-­‐born	   Liberians	   in	   London.	  
Furthermore,	  those	  respondents	  not	  born	  in	  the	  US	  who	  found	  themselves	  residing	  
abroad	   at	   the	   advent	   of	   armed	   conflict	   left	   prior	   to	   1989	   either	   to	   pursue	   higher	  
education	  or	  because	  of	   the	  mounting	  political	   instability	   in	  Liberia	   in	   the	  early	   to	  
mid-­‐1980s.	   The	   migration	   patterns	   varied	   considerably	   amongst	   the	   43	   percent	  
Washington-­‐based	  respondents	  who	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war	  
in	  1989.	  Some	  migrated	  directly	  to	  the	  US	  shortly	  after	  the	  war	  started,	  while	  others	  
passed	   through	  a	  second	  party	  country	  within	   the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region	  before	  
relocating	   permanently	   to	   the	   US.	   On	   average,	   the	   30	   respondents	   had	   spent	  
approximately	   20	   years	   residing	   in	   the	   US,	   a	   slightly	   longer	   trajectory	   than	   the	  
respondents	  in	  London.	  
	  
The	   citizenship	   status	   and	   migration	   patterns	   of	   interviewees	   in	   Freetown	  
illustrates	  not	  only	  how	  fluid	  Liberian/Sierra	  Leonean	   identities	  have	  become,	  but	  
also	   how	   access	   to	   naturalisation	   proceedings	   for	   Liberians	   based	   in	   London	   and	  
Washington	   differed	   from	   those	   in	   Freetown.	   Of	   the	   20	   Freetown-­‐based	  
respondents,	  five	  were	  born	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  therefore	  entitled	  to	  jus	  soli	  Sierra	  
Leonean	   citizenship.	   Three	   of	   the	   five	   identified	   as	   Sierra	   Leonean	   citizens	   even	  
though	   they	   had	   also	   been	   entitled	   to	   jus	   sanguinis	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   until	   the	  
age	   of	   majority	   because	   of	   a	   male	   Liberian	   citizen	   parent.	   Of	   the	   remaining	   two	  
respondents	   born	   in	   Sierra	   Leone,	   one	  had	   spent	   considerable	   time	   living	   in	   both	  
Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  because	  of	  his	  Sierra	  Leonean	  citizen	   father	  and	  Liberian	  
citizen	   mother.	   Moreover,	   he	   had	   opted	   to	   retain	   his	   jus	   sanguinis	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’,	   thereby	   being	   entitled	   to	   refugee	   status	   (and	   thereafter	   refugee	   local	  
integration)	  when	  he	  moved	   to	  Sierra	  Leone	  during	  armed	  conflict	   in	  Liberia.	  The	  
other	  respondent	  born	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  had	  two	  Liberian	  citizen	  parents,	  lived	  all	  his	  
life	   in	   Liberia,	   and	   only	   returned	   to	   Sierra	   Leone	   in	   2007	   to	   take	   care	   of	   family	  
property.	   His	   immigration	   status	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   remained	   ambiguous.	   Of	   the	   15	  




both	  official	  and	  unofficial	  channels.	  One	  respondent	  admitted	  that	  he	  had	  obtained	  
a	  Sierra	  Leonean	  passport	  not	  through	  official	  naturalisation	  proceedings,	  but	  rather	  
through	   his	   personal	   connections	   and	   bribe	   payments43.	   Of	   the	   remaining	   12	  
Liberia-­‐born	  respondents,	  five	  had	  opted	  for	  local	  refugee	  integration	  but	  were	  still	  
awaiting	   residency	   cards	   from	   UNHCR	   and	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	   government;	   four	  
reported	  having	  legal	  residency	  status	  in	  Sierra	  Leone;	  and	  three	  reported	  having	  no	  
official	   immigration	   status	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   at	   all,	   primarily	   because	   of	   the	   free	  
movement	  of	  persons	  protocols	  within	  the	  MRU	  and	  ECOWAS	  sub-­‐regional	  bodies,	  
respectively	  (Ibeanu,	  2007).	  Unlike	  respondents	  in	  London	  and	  Washington,	  whose	  
demographic	   profiles	   signify	   relative	   privilege	   and	   access,	   90	   percent	   of	   the	  
Freetown-­‐based	  interviewees	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  war	  in	  1989,	  with	  
the	  majority	  of	  them	  migrating	  to	  Sierra	  Leone	  in	  the	  early	  to	  late	  1990s	  because	  of	  
the	   crisis.	   The	   10	   percent	   who	   resided	   in	   Freetown	   in	   1989	  were	   born	   in	   Sierra	  
Leone	   to	   Liberian	   citizen	   parents	   at	   the	   time	   of	   their	   birth.	   On	   average,	   the	   20	  
respondents	  had	  spent	  approximately	  17	  years	  residing	   in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  similar	  to	  
the	  average	  of	  their	  London-­‐based	  counterparts.	  	  
	  
The	  citizenship	  profiles	  and	  migration	  patterns	  of	  Accra-­‐based	  respondents	  contrast	  
in	  some	  considerable	  ways	  with	  those	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  and	  Freetown.	  Unlike	  
respondents	   in	  other	   cities,	   all	  Accra-­‐based	   interviewees	  were	  born	   in	  Liberia	   yet	  
only	   one	   had	   naturalised	   in	   the	   US.	   This	   respondent’s	   relative	   privilege	   and	   US	  
passport	  enabled	  him	  to	  reside	   in	  Ghana	  with	  only	  a	   tourist	  visa.	  Of	   the	  29	  Accra-­‐
based	  respondents	  who	  retained	  their	  legal	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  16	  had	  opted	  for	  
local	  refugee	   integration	  but	  were	  still	  awaiting	  residency	  permits	   from	  the	  Ghana	  
Immigration	  Board	  and	  passports	  from	  the	  Liberian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (53	  
percent	   of	   the	   respondent	   pool);	   nine	   reported	   having	   legal	   residency	   status	   in	  
Ghana	   (30	   percent	   of	   the	   respondent	   pool);	   two	   were	   still	   considered	   refugees	  
because	  one	  had	  been	  granted	  exemption	  from	  discontinuation	  of	  his	  refugee	  status,	  
while	  the	  other	  had	  applied	  for	  exemption	  (7	  percent	  of	  the	  respondent	  pool);	  and	  
two	   had	   no	   official	   immigration	   status	   in	   Ghana,	   primarily	   because	   of	   the	   free	  
movement	  of	  persons	  protocol	  within	  ECOWAS	  (7	  percent	  of	  the	  respondent	  pool)	  
(Ibeanu,	   2007).	   Admittedly,	   however,	   one	   of	   the	   two	   respondents	  without	   official	  
                                                




immigration	  status	  said	  he	  had	  applied	  for	  refugee	  status	  after	  migrating	  to	  Ghana	  in	  
200344,	  but	  never	  received	  a	  response	  from	  UNHCR.	  	  
	  
Granted,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  most	  interviewees	  in	  Ghana	  maintained	  their	  legal	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  because	  having	  refugee	  status	  prohibits	  naturalisation,	  and,	  if	  
given	   the	   choice,	   they	   would	   have	   naturalised	   in	   greater	   numbers	   like	   their	  
counterparts	  in	  London	  and	  Washington.	  Yet,	  most	  of	  these	  respondents	  argued	  that	  
naturalising	   in	   Ghana	   does	   not	   entitle	   one	   to	   major	   economic	   and/or	   political	  
opportunities.	  Also,	  naturalising	  in	  Ghana	  is	  tedious,	  costly,	  and	  difficult,	  particularly	  
for	   those	  without	  political	  and	  social	  connections.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  echo	  of	   the	  
sentiments	  shared	  by	  respondents	  in	  Freetown.	  Similar	  to	  Freetown,	  90	  percent	  of	  
Accra-­‐based	  respondents	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  1989,	  
with	  most	  of	  them	  migrating	  to	  Ghana	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  because	  of	  war.	  Of	  the	  10	  
percent	  who	  resided	  outside	  of	  Liberia,	   two	   took	  a	  circuitous	  route	   to	  Accra—one	  
via	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	   the	  UK,	   the	  other	  via	   the	  US	  and	  Liberia—while	   another	  
had	   lived	   in	   Ghana	   since	   migrating	   there	   in	   1981	   for	   school.	   On	   average,	   the	   30	  
respondents	   had	   spent	   approximately	   15	   years	   residing	   in	   Ghana,	   less	   than	   the	  
averages	  of	  the	  other	  three	  diasporic	  field	  sites.	  	  
	  
As	  Table	  5	   indicates,	   the	   citizenship	   status	  of	  Monrovia-­‐based	   respondents	   varied	  
across	  categories.	  
	  
Table	   5:	   Place	   of	   Birth/Country	   of	   Citizenship	   Breakdown	   of	   71	   Anonymised	  
Monrovia-­‐Based	  Interviewees	  
Place	  of	  Birth	  (PoB)/	  











Homelanders	  (50)	   50	   N/A	   50	   N/A	  
Permanent	  Returnees	  (10)	  	   	  8	   2	   8	   2	  
Circular	  Returnees	  (11)	   8	   3	   2	   9	  
Total	  Absolute	  Number/	  









                                                
44	  2003	  was	  the	  year	  of	  Liberia’s	  infamous	  World	  Wars	  I,	  II,	  and	  III,	  in	  which	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  forces	  
battled	  rebel	  groups	  Liberians	  United	  for	  Reconciliation	  and	  Democracy	  (LURD)	  and	  Movement	  for	  
Democracy	  in	  Liberia	  (MODEL)	  for	  control	  of	  Monrovia,	  eventually	  culminating	  in	  Taylor’s	  asylum	  in	  




Although	  48	  percent	  of	  homelanders	  reported	  migrating	   to	  other	  countries	  during	  
Liberia’s	   conflict	   cycles,	   all	   50	   had	   maintained	   their	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	  
Permanent	  and	  circular	  returnees,	  however,	  had	  more	  differentiated	  citizenship	  and	  
migration	  profiles.	  While	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  permanent	  returnees	  had	  the	  option	  of	  
naturalising	   abroad,	   the	   overwhelming	   majority	   did	   not.	   Of	   the	   10	   permanent	  
returnees,	  eight	  had	  retained	  their	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  while	  abroad;	  one	  was	  
born	   in	   the	   US	   (and	   therefore	   entitled	   to	   jus	   soli	   US	   citizenship);	   and	   one	   had	  
naturalised	  in	  the	  US	  in	  2007.	  Five	  had	  returned	  most	  immediately	  from	  the	  US;	  four	  
had	  returned	  most	   immediately	   from	  within	  the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region;	  and	  one	  
had	  returned	  most	  immediately	  from	  Europe.	  Most	  of	  the	  permanent	  returnees	  from	  
the	  US	  had	  secured	  immigration	  status	  abroad,	  as	  did	  the	  returnee	  from	  Europe.	  The	  
returnees	  from	  within	  Africa	  did	  not	  secure	  immigration	  status	  because	  they	  were	  
refugees	   and	   ineligible	   for	   permanent	   residency.	   Of	   the	   10	   permanent	   returnees,	  
seven	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  1989,	  and	  found	  their	  way	  
to	  West	  Africa,	  the	  US	  or	  Europe	  during	  different	  cycles	  of	  the	  war.	  Of	  the	  three	  who	  
lived	   outside	   of	   Liberia	   when	   armed	   conflict	   began,	   two	   left	   Liberia	   in	   the	   early	  
1980s	  because	  of	  political	   instability	  and	  one	  fled	  to	  Ghana	  slightly	  before	  the	  war	  
began.	  On	  average,	   the	  10	  respondents	  had	  spent	  approximately	  16	  years	  residing	  
abroad.	  
	  
Unlike	  most	   permanent	   returnees,	   circular	   returnee	   interviewees	   appeared	   to	   be	  
deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  countries	  from	  which	  they	  had	  come,	  through	  immediate	  family	  
ties	   and	   investments,	   and	   this	   is	   reflected	   in	   their	   citizenship	   status.	   Of	   the	   11	  
circular	  returnees,	   four	  had	  naturalised	   in	   the	  US;	   three	  were	  born	   in	   the	  US	   to	  at	  
least	  one	  Liberian	  citizen	  parent	   (and	   therefore	  entitled	   to	   jus	  soli	  US	  citizenship);	  
two	   had	   retained	   their	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   while	   abroad,	   yet	   held	   US	  
permanent	  residency;	  one	  had	  naturalised	  in	  the	  UK;	  and	  one	  was	  born	  in	  Liberia	  to	  
a	   Liberian	   citizen	   father/US	   citizen	   mother,	   but	   was	   considered	   a	   US	   citizen	   by	  
ancestry	  because	  she	  never	  denounced	  her	  jus	  sanguinis	  US	  citizenship	  at	  the	  age	  of	  
majority.	  Eight	  of	  11	  circular	  returnees	  had	  returned	  most	  immediately	  from	  the	  US;	  
two	   had	   returned	   most	   immediately	   from	   Europe;	   and	   one	   had	   returned	   most	  
immediately	  from	  within	  the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region.	  Of	  the	  11	  circular	  returnees,	  




parts	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  the	  US	  or	  Europe	  during	  different	  cycles	  of	  the	  conflict.	  
Of	  the	  five	  who	  lived	  outside	  Liberia	  when	  armed	  conflict	  began,	  three	  were	  born	  in	  
the	  US	  and	  had	  been	  living	  there	  when	  war	  erupted;	  and	  two	  had	  been	  living	  outside	  
of	   Liberia	   because	   of	   political	   instability	   in	   the	   early	   1980s.	   On	   average,	   the	   11	  
circular	  returnees	  had	  spent	  approximately	  22	  years	  residing	  abroad,	  much	  longer	  
than	  their	  permanent	  returnee	  counterparts.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   demographic	   composition	   of	   unofficial,	  
anonymised	   social	   actors	   within	   and	   across	   the	   selected	   five	   field	   sites	   is	   wide-­‐
ranging.	   This	   serves	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   arguing	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   that	   their	  
differentiated	  life-­‐worlds	  and	  social	  locations	  have	  influenced	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  
construction	   and	   practice	   across	   space	   and	   time,	   and	   ultimately	   impacted	   the	  
introduction	  and	  postponement	  in	  passage	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
The	   female	   seamstress	   and	   business	   executive	   described	   in	   the	   introductory	  
vignettes	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  divergent	  lived	  experiences	  and	  socio-­‐
economic	   positions	   of	   Liberian	   respondents	   in	   this	   study.	   Because	   my	   thesis	   is	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  how	  qualitative	   factors	  have	   influenced	  the	   introduction	  
and	  postponement	   in	  passage	  of	  dual	  citizenship	   legislation	   in	  Liberia,	   I	  employed	  
multi-­‐sited,	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  in	  the	  field	  with	  a	  range	  of	  social	  actors	  like	  
the	  seamstress	  and	  businessman	  to	  gauge	  perceptions,	  feelings,	  and	  opinions	  about	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   construction	   and	   practice	   across	   space	   and	   time.	   In	   this	  
chapter,	   I	  described,	  analysed,	  and	   justified	  my	  research	  plan	  and	  implementation,	  
thereby	  providing	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  five	  field	  sites	  and	  six	  categories	  of	  
Liberians	  including	  202	  respondents	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  Freetown,	  Accra,	  and	  
Monrovia.	  A	  detailed	  demographic	  profile	  of	  respondents	  was	  presented,	  and	  where	  
appropriate,	  I	  explained	  how	  data	  collected	  from	  the	  five	  field	  sites	  will	  be	  employed	  
throughout	  the	  thesis.	  In	  the	  chapter,	  I	  also	  described	  general	  trends	  observed	  in	  the	  






In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   provide	   empirical	   grounding	   for	   my	   conceptual	   framing	   of	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  as	   identity,	  practice,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  by	  examining	  how	  































Will	  the	  Real	  Liberian	  Citizen	  Please	  Stand	  Up?	  
	  
Liberia’s	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   trajectory	   makes	   for	   an	   interesting	  
sociological	  case	  study,	  especially	  where	  the	  study	  of	  citizenship	  is	  concerned.	  It	  is	  a	  
country	  where	  one’s	  citizenship	  can	  be	  called	  into	  question	  because	  of	  an	  Aliens	  and	  
Nationality	   Law	   that	   has	   yet	   to	   respond	   to	   constantly	   shifting	   social	   processes,	   as	  
illustrated	  in	  the	  vignettes	  below:	  	  
	  
35-­‐year-­‐old	   Beyan45	  was	   born	   in	   Nairobi,	   Kenya,	   to	   two	   Liberian	   citizen	   parents,	  
grew	  up	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Gambia	  and	  returned	  to	  Liberia	  to	  work	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  He	  
is	  eligible	  for	  jus	  soli	  Kenyan	  citizenship	  and	  US	  naturalisation,	  but	  holds	  fast	  to	  his	  
Liberian	   passport	   for	   fear	   that	   his	   jus	   sanguinis	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   might	   be	  
revoked.	  	  
	  
49-­‐year-­‐old	  Teta46	  was	  born	  in	  Rivercess,	  Liberia,	  to	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  mother	  and	  a	  
Lebanese	  citizen	  father.	  Having	  emigrated	  to	  the	  UK	  at	  the	  age	  of	  12	  and	  naturalised	  
in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  she	  was	  asked	  by	  the	  Liberian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  swear	  
an	  oath	  of	  allegiance	  to	  Liberia	  and	  formalise	  her	  legal	  status	  when	  she	  returned	  to	  
the	  country	  in	  2008	  to	  renew	  her	  passport.	  She	  says	  she	  often	  wonders	  whether	  her	  
UK-­‐born	  children	  will	  ever	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  after	  the	  age	  
of	  majority.	  	  
	  
55-­‐year-­‐old	  Precious47	  was	  born	  in	  Liberia	  to	  a	  Mandingo	  father	  and	  therefore	  has	  
cultural	   roots	   in	   Guinea.	   She	   married	   an	   Indian	   national	   and	   entrepreneur	   in	  
Monrovia	  who	  was	  ineligible	  for	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  because	  of	  his	  race,	  and	  
together	   they	   had	   children	   who,	   by	   law,	   are	   not	   considered	   Liberian	   citizens	  
although	  they	  were	  born	  in	  Liberia.	  
                                                
45	  This	  pseudonym	  is	  used	  to	  protect	  the	  identity	  of	  permanent	  returnee	  respondent	  PR7.	  	  
46	  This	  pseudonym	  is	  used	  to	  protect	  the	  identity	  of	  diaspora	  respondent	  DL6.	  




38-­‐year-­‐old	   James48	  was	   born	   in	   Freetown	   to	   a	   Sierra	   Leonean	   citizen	   father	   and	  
Liberian	  citizen	  mother	  but	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  life	  in	  Liberia.	  He	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  a	  
Liberian	  passport	  while	  growing	  up,	  although	  his	  mother	  could	  not	   legally	  pass	  on	  
citizenship	  to	  him.	  When	  James	  returned	  to	  Freetown	  in	  2006,	  he	  was	  asked	  by	  the	  
Sierra	   Leonean	   government	   to	   naturalise	   in	   the	   country	   of	   his	   birth	   because	   his	  
accent	  and	  way	  of	  life	  were	  considered	  ‘too	  Liberian.’	  
	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  snapshots	  of	  select	  respondents	  above,	  I	  use	  this	  chapter	  to	  interrogate	  
whether	  or	  not	  an	   ‘authentic’	  Liberian	  citizen	  actually	  exists.	  First,	   I	   examine	  how	  
Liberian	  social	  actors	  across	  the	  five	  field	  sites	  in	  this	  study	  conceive	  of	  citizenship.	  
Then,	   I	   assess	  how	   they	  practice	   citizenship	   in	   their	   every	  day	   lived	   realities.	  The	  
chapter	   provides	   empirical	   grounding	   for	   my	   conceptualisation	   of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  as	   identity,	  practice,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations,	  simultaneously.	  Citizenship,	  
in	   my	   analysis,	   is	   not	   only	   a	   bundle	   of	   rights	   and	   privileges	   embedded	   in	  
constructions	  of	  legal,	  national	  and	  cultural	  identity,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  
and	   interactions	  embodied	   in	   the	   life-­‐worlds	  of	   respondents	   in	  Liberia	  and	  across	  
transnational	  spaces.	  	  
	  
Birthplace,	   Bloodline,	   and	   Beyond:	   How	   ‘Liberian	   Citizenship’	   Is	   Currently	  
Conceived	  of	  in	  Liberia	  and	  Abroad	  	  
The	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	  in	  Liberia	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  is	  
constantly	   being	   negotiated	   and	   redefined.	   During	   an	   interview,	   then	   Minister	   of	  
Justice	  Christiana	  Tah	  shared	  her	  reflections	  with	  me	  about	   the	  reconfiguration	  of	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  across	  space	  and	  time:	  	  
	  
The	  definition	  [of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’]	  has	  taken	  on	  new	  meanings.	  
And	   because	  we	  went	   through	   this	   period	   of	   transformation	   during	  
the	  war,	  it	  took	  on	  another	  meaning,	  too.	  Besides,	  the	  major	  thing	  that	  
has	  identified	  Liberians	  is	  this	  accent…But	  I	  think	  now	  it	  goes	  beyond	  
that.	   It	   goes	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   incorporates	   experiences.	   Shared	  
experiences.	   And	   this	   is	   an	   informal	   definition,	   and	   it’s	   a	   definition	  
that	  just	  emerged	  from	  the	  war.49	  
                                                
48	  This	  pseudonym	  is	  used	  to	  protect	  the	  identity	  of	  diaspora	  respondent	  DL63.  





While	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  may	   have	   been	   construed	   as	   passive	   and	   constructed	  
before	  armed	  conflict,	  newer	  meanings	  of	  citizenship	  are	  emerging	  to	  include	  more	  
active	   forms	   of	   citizenship,	   bringing	   about	   the	   reconfiguration	   to	   which	   former	  
Minister	   Tah	   alluded.	   Therefore,	   the	   conception	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   amongst	  
202	  Liberian	  social	  actors	   in	  London,	  Washington,	  Freetown,	  Accra,	  and	  Monrovia	  
sits	  on	  a	  continuum	  between	  passivity	  and	  activity,	  identity	  and	  practice.	  I	  compiled	  
the	  list	  in	  Table	  6	  to	  illustrate	  recurring	  responses	  to	  an	  open-­‐ended	  question	  posed	  
to	  all	  respondents	  about	  how	  they	  defined	  a	  Liberian	  citizen,	  without	  prompts	  from	  
a	  prescribed	  list.	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Top	  10	  Conceptions	  of	  What	  Constitutes	  a	  Liberian	  Citizen	  Amongst	  202	  
Respondents	  	  
Markers	  of	  a	  Liberian	  Citizen	  	   Cities	   Where	   Responses	  
Most	  Frequent	  	  
Born	  in	  Liberia	  (jus	  soli)	   All	  
Has	  Liberian	  mother	  or	  father	  	  (jus	  sanguinis)	   All	  	  
Identifies	   as	   Liberian,	   feels	   and	   behaves	   Liberian	  
culturally	   (speaks	   Liberian	   language	   or	   Liberian	  
English;	  dresses	   in	  Liberian	  clothing;	  eats	  Liberian	  
food)	  
All	  	  
Considers	  Liberia	  ‘home’	   London,	   Washington,	  
Freetown,	  Monrovia	  
Raised	  in	  Liberia	  	   London,	  Freetown,	  Monrovia	  
Has	  lived	  in	  Liberia	  extensively	  and/or	  currently	  
resides	  fulltime	  in	  Liberia	  
All	  
Naturalises	  in	  Liberia	   All	  
Has	   ‘heart’,	   love	   or	   affinity	   for	   Liberia	   (and	  
Liberians)	  
London,	   Washington,	   Accra,	  
Monrovia	  
Shows	  allegiance,	  loyalty,	  and	  patriotism	  to	  Liberia	  
(and	  Liberians)	  
London,	  Freetown,	  Monrovia	  
Contributes	   to	  Liberia’s	  development	   	   (involved	   in	  
capacity	   building	   and	   nation-­‐building;	   abides	   by	  
the	  laws	  of	  Liberia	  and	  its	  Constitution;	  pays	  taxes;	  
invests	   in	   real	   estate	   and	   businesses;	   supports	  
democratic	   governance	   and	   peace;	   engages	   in	  
political	  processes)	  	  
All	  
	  
Although	   the	  markers	   of	   a	   Liberian	   citizen	   in	   the	   table	   are	   not	   ranked,	   the	  most	  
prevalent	  responses	  were:	  i)	  born	  in	  Liberia;	  ii)	  has	  a	  Liberian	  mother	  or	  father;	  iii)	  




Liberia’s	   development.	   The	   first	   five	   conceptions	   listed	   in	   the	   table	   of	   what	  
constitutes	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  are	  passive	  thereby	  constituting	  identity,	  whereas	  the	  
last	  five	  are	  active	  thereby	  constituting	  practice.	  The	  multiple	  meanings	  of	  ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   can	   thus	  be	  visualised	  as	  a	  continuum	  coupling	  passivity	  with	   identity	  
and	  activity	  with	  practice.	  Whereas	  some	  respondents	  listed	  a	  single	  identity-­‐based	  
or	   practice-­‐based	   criterion,	   such	   as	   ‘born	   in	   Liberia’	   or	   ‘contributes	   to	   Liberia’s	  
development’,	   respectively,	   others	   listed	   multiple	   criteria	   from	   each	   end	   of	   the	  
continuum.	  As	  illustrated	  in	  Table	  6,	  Monrovia-­‐based	  social	  actors	  in	  this	  study	  were	  
most	   emphatic,	   with	   a	   composite	   list	   of	   markers	   that	   mostly	   surpasses	   those	   of	  
respondents	  in	  the	  four	  diasporic	  field	  sites.	  	  
	  
On	   the	   ‘passive’	   side	   of	   the	   continuum,	   variants	   of	   the	   ‘by	   birth’	   (jus	   soli)	   or	   ‘by	  
blood’	  (jus	  sanguinis)	  principles	  were	  invoked	  most	  often	  by	  respondents	  in	  the	  field.	  
‘Birthplace’	   and	   ‘bloodline’	   occupy	   the	   passive	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum	   because	   they	  
generally	  require	  minimal	  to	  no	  effort.	  When	  queried	  about	  who	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  is,	  
the	  majority	  of	  respondents	  conceptualised	  citizenship	  as	  a	  form	  of	  legal	  identity	  as	  
enshrined	  in	  the	  Liberian	  Constitution	  and	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  clear	  
based	   on	   Liberia’s	   cultural	   and	   social	   milieu	   that	   all	   those	   born	   in	   the	   country,	  
regardless	  of	  their	  entitlements	  as	  ‘Negroes’,	  are	  not	  considered	  equal,	  just	  as	  Yuval-­‐
Davis	  (2000)	  argued	  that	  citizenship	  is	  ‘multi-­‐layered’	  and	  largely	  differentiated	  by	  
race,	   class,	   gender,	   and	   ethnicity.	   This	   is	   particularly	   stark	   for	   Liberians	   of	   the	  
Mandingo	  ethnic	  group	  whose	  ancestors	  migrated	  from	  the	  Mali	  empire	  in	  the	  14th	  
and	   15th	   centuries,	   establishing	   trade	   routes	   in	   slaves,	   gold,	   and	   kola	   nuts	  
connecting	  the	  hinterland	  to	  the	  Atlantic	  coast	  (Konneh,	  1996:	  9;	  56;	  63).	  Because	  of	  
their	   constantly	   shifting	   trade	   and	   migratory	   patterns,	   faith	   in	   Islam,	   as	   well	   as	  
cultural	  ties	  to	  several	  different	  West	  African	  countries,	  Mandingos	  have	  often	  been	  
characterised	  as	  ‘strangers’	  and	  therefore	  non-­‐Liberian	  citizens	  (Konneh,	  1996:	  15;	  
25).	  Their	  participation	   in	  economic	  and	  political	   life	   is	   further	   contested	  because	  
they	   tend	   to	   dominate	   the	   public	   transport	   and	   consumable	   goods	   sectors	   of	   the	  
economy	   (Konneh,	   1996:	   135).	   Resident	   in	   London	   for	   14	   years,	   this	   55-­‐year-­‐old	  
female	   respondent	   with	   paternal	   roots	   in	   Guinea	   talked	   about	   the	   importance	   of	  
maintaining	   the	   jus	   soli	   principle	   of	   citizenship,	   particularly	   for	   Liberia-­‐born	  





I	   think	   [a]	   Liberian	   citizen	   is,	   I	  would	   say,	   those	   of	   us	  who	   grew	  up	  
over	   there	   [Liberia].	   Because	   we	   have	   had	   that	   problem,	   we	   as	  
Mandingos	   in	   Liberia.	   People	   always	   say,	   “You	   Mandingo,	   you	  
foreigner.”	  But	  we	  say,	   “We	  were	  born	  here	   [Liberia].	  We	  got	   just	  as	  
much	  rights	  as,	  you	  know,	  as	  you	  people!”…Someone	  who	  was	  born	  in	  
Liberia,	  I	  will	  consider	  them	  a	  citizen…50	  
	  
‘Negroes’	   phenotypically,	   Mandingos	   pass	   the	   race-­‐based	   requirement	   for	   legal	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  yet	  they	  are	  a	  stark	  example	  of	  how	  the	  birthplace	  principle	  in	  
the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law	  remains	  contested.	  	  
	  
Roots,	  blood	  coursing	   through	  one’s	  veins,	  and	  psychological	  attachments	  embody	  
the	  existential	   entitlements	  of	   those	  who	   identify	   as	  Liberian	   citizens	  by	  ancestry,	  
but	   who	   were	   not	   born	   in	   the	   country.	   For	   instance,	   a	   59-­‐year-­‐old	   Washington-­‐
based	  respondent	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  US	  for	  31	  consecutive	  years	  quipped	  about	  
how	   her	   American-­‐born	   daughter,	   who	   has	   never	   touched	   Liberian	   soil,	  
understands	  the	  cultural	  logics	  of	  Liberian	  dress	  better	  than	  she	  does:	  
	  
[My	  second-­‐generation	  daughter]	  thinks	  she’s	  a	  Liberian.	  You	  see	  that	  
girl	  tie	  her	  lappa	  like	  one	  Kru	  woman	  and	  set	  that	  thing	  on	  her	  head.	  I	  
was	   sitting	   here	   one	   time,	   the	   girl,	   when	   she	   was	   going	   to	   do	   her	  
laundry,	  and	  she	  took	  the	  laundry	  basket	  and	  put	  it	  on	  her	  head…And	  I	  
sat	  down	  here,	   I	  sat	  down,	  and	  she	  didn’t	  even…she	   just	  sat	   it	  on	  her	  
head,	  it’s	  just	  like	  it	  was	  something	  that	  was	  just	  in	  her.	  And	  the	  way	  I,	  
who	  [am]	  a	  Liberian	  woman	  or	  an	  African	  woman,	  when	   I	   tie	   lappa	   I	  
have	   to	   tie	   it	   two/three	   times	  because	   it	   can	  be	   tight	  on	  my	   feet	   like	  
this.	   That	   girl	   tied	   that	   thing	   and	   she	   was	   just	   going.	   I’m	   like,	  
wow!...This	  girl,	  this	  thing	  is	  in	  her.51	  
	  
The	   idea	   that	   one’s	   Liberianness	   can	   be	   inherited	   through	   cultural	   transmission,	  
regardless	  of	  birthplace,	  was	  echoed	  vigorously	  by	  other	  respondents	  in	  this	  study.	  
For	   instance,	   a	   65-­‐year-­‐old	   permanent	   returnee	   in	  Monrovia	   insisted	   that	   no	   one	  
could	   negate	   the	   Liberianness	   of	   her	   American-­‐born	   son,	   who	   had	   spent	   his	  
childhood	  and	  adolescence	  in	  Liberia	  but	  returned	  to	  the	  US	  in	  adulthood	  to	  settle	  
out	  of	  ‘convenience’:	  
                                                
50	  [DL9]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  13,	  2012.	  	  





He	   grew	   up	   here	   [Liberia],	   he	   knows	   the	   streets,	   he	   knows	   all	   the	  
corners,	  he	  knows	  the	  culture.	  But	  even	  in	  America,	  he’s	  Liberian.	  He	  
doesn’t	  go	  eat	  hamburger	  or	  McDonald’s.	  He	  goes	  to	  the	  Puerto	  Rican,	  
and	   Indian	   and	   Chinese	   shops	   to	   look	   for	   palm	   butter…And	   his	  
children,	  he’s	  got	  two	  children	  by	  a	  white	  girl,	  they	  wake	  their	  father	  
up	   in	  the	  morning	  and	  they	  say	  they	  want	  rice	  and	  cassava	   leaf.	  Yes,	  
my	   grandchildren!	   My	   son	   never	   liked	   Corn	   Flakes	   and	   my	  
grandchildren	   don’t	   like	   Corn	   Flakes.	   So,	   what	   are	   we	   going	   to	   do?	  
They’ve	   never	   been	   here	   [Liberia].	   They’ve	   never	   visited…My	   grand	  
kids,	   they’ve	  never	  been	  here	  but	   they	  eat	   cassava	   leaf,	  palm	  butter,	  
potato	  greens.	  Everything.	  They	  know	  everything	  about,	  you	  know,	  as	  
much	  as	  they	  can	  about	  Liberia.	  So,	  that’s	  why	  I	  say	  if	  you	  are	  born	  of	  
Liberian	   parentage…I’m	   an	   African	   to	   the	   core,	   so,	   they	   are	   born	   of	  
Liberians,	  their	  blood	  comes	  from	  here.52	  
	  
Though	  the	  relevance	  of	  bloodline	  ties	  cannot	  be	  negated,	  some	  respondents	  argued	  
that	   cultural	   links	   alone	   should	   not	   signify	   an	   automatic	   entitlement	   to	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  as	  a	  legal	  status.	  For	  instance,	  a	  49-­‐year-­‐old	  female	  respondent	  resident	  
in	  the	  UK	  for	  37	  years	  argued	  that	  her	  UK-­‐born	  children	  must	  earn	  the	  right	  to	  be	  
considered	  Liberian	  citizens:	  	  
	  
I	  wouldn’t	  consider	  them	  [my	  children	  born	  in	  the	  UK]	  to	  be	  Liberian	  
citizens.	  However,	  if	  they	  do	  choose	  to	  come	  and	  live	  in	  Liberia,	  then	  I	  
would	   expect	   that	   if	   it	   is	   a	   decision	   that	   they	   want	   to	   make	   to	  
be…granted	   [legal]	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	   they	  should	  be	  offered	   that	  
right	  to	  do	  so.	  Because	  obviously,	  they	  are	  descendants	  of	  Liberia,	  so	  
they	   should	  be	  given	   that	   right.	  But,	   if	   they	  don’t	   live	   in	   the	   country	  
and	   they	   have	   never	   lived	   in	   the	   country	   I	   don’t	   think	   it	   should	   be	  
their	   automatic	   right	   because	   their	   parents	   are	   Liberians.	   I	   think	   if	  
they	  choose	  to	  do	  and	  come	  and	  live	  in	  Liberia,	  then,	  yes,	  they	  should	  
be	  given	   that	  opportunity	   to	  decide,	  well,	   I’ve	  been	   living	  here	   for	  X	  
amount	  of	  years,	  I	  want	  to	  be	  a	  citizen	  and	  be	  given	  equal	  rights	  like	  
people	  who	  are	  living	  in	  the	  country.	  I	  think	  it	  should	  be	  their	  right	  to	  
choose.53	  
	  
This	  respondent	  was	  echoing	  the	  sentiments	  of	  many	  interviewees	  in	  Monrovia	  who	  
ardently	   supported	   the	  provision	  within	   Liberia’s	  Aliens	   and	  Nationality	   Law	   that	  
someone	   of	   Liberian	   parentage	  must	   declare	   at	   the	   age	   of	  majority	  whether	   they	  
want	   to	   maintain	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   or	   the	   citizenship	   of	   the	   country	   in	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which	  they	  were	  born.	  Presumably,	   the	  drafters	  of	   the	  1973	  law	  believed	  that	  this	  
would	  minimise	  divided	  loyalties,	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
	  
Although	   there	   was	   contention	   about	   who	   should	   qualify	   for	   jus	   soli	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   statute	   of	   limitation	   should	   be	   placed	   on	   jus	  
sanguinis	  citizenship,	  most	  respondents	  debunked	  the	  notion	  that	  citizenship	  should	  
be	   traced	  only	  patrilineally.	  This	  position	  was	  particularly	   salient	   for	   respondents	  
who	  were	  born	  to	  Liberian	  citizen	  mothers/non-­‐Liberian	  citizen	  fathers.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  
point,	  one	  43-­‐year-­‐old	  female	  resident	  in	  London	  for	  22	  consecutive	  years	  was	  born	  
in	  the	  UK	  to	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  mother.	  Although	  this	  respondent	  had	  lived	  in	  Liberia	  
for	  half	  her	  life,	  having	  moved	  there	  before	  her	  first	  birthday,	  she	  complained	  about	  
constantly	  having	  to	  defend	  her	  right	  to	  be	  called	  Liberian:	  
	  
I	  say	  it’s	  difficult	  because	  sometimes	  when	  I	  say	  to	  people,	  “Well,	  my	  
father	  was	  a	  naturalised	  Liberian	  and	   I	  was	  born	   in	   the	  UK	  and,	  you	  
know,	  and	  my	  maternal	  grandmother	  was	  actually	  Jamaican”,	  they’re	  
like,	   “You’re	  not	  Liberian!”	  and	  I’m	   like,	   “What	  gives	  you	  the	  right	   to	  
say	   that,	   you	  know?	  Because	   I	   feel	   I	   am!”	  You	  know,	   I	   think	   I	  would	  
define	   a	   Liberian	   citizen	   as	   someone	   who	   has	   some	   sort	   of	   ties,	  
whether	   it’s	   mother	   or	   father,	   to	   that	   country…a	   true	   Liberian	   is	  
someone	   who	   identifies	   with	   that	   country	   and	   who	   accepts	   that	  
they’ve	  got	  roots	  there.54	  
	  
Since	  President	  Tubman’s	  Unification	  Policy,	  which	  legally	  incorporated	  indigenous	  
men	  and	  women	  and	  settler	  women	  who	  owned	  property	  as	  Liberian	  citizens,	   the	  
notion	   that	   Liberian	   women	   should	   be	   relegated	   to	   the	   private	   sphere	   alone,	  
without	  the	  attendant	  rights	  and	  privileges	  of	  citizenship,	  has	  been	  contested.	  As	  a	  
case	   in	  point,	   the	  majority	  of	  male	  and	   female	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	  critiqued	  
Liberia’s	  constitutional	  provision	  barring	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  woman	  from	  passing	  on	  
citizenship	  to	  her	  children	  as	  overtly	  sexist	  and	  discriminatory.	  
	  
While	   there	   was	   consensus	   amongst	   interviewees	   about	   the	   need	   to	   enfranchise	  
Liberian	  citizen	  women	  fully,	  those	  who	  voluntarily	  interrogated	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause’	  
were	   more	   ideologically	   divided.	   For	   instance,	   Monrovia-­‐based	   respondents,	  
particularly	   homelanders	   and	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	   sponsors	   alike,	   were	   more	  
                                                




emphatic	   about	   maintaining	   the	   race-­‐based	   proviso	   particularly	   because	   of	   the	  
perceived	  contemporary	  socio-­‐economic	   inequities	  between	  Lebanese,	   Indian,	  and	  
Chinese	  merchants	   and	   resident	   Liberians,	   while	   their	   counterparts	   abroad	   were	  
either	  ambivalent	  or	  more	  inclined	  to	  reject	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause.’	  Wide-­‐ranging	  dissent	  
about	   the	   ‘Negro	   clause’	   is	   a	   function	   of	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   Asian	   and	  
Middle	   Eastern	   immigration	   to	   Liberia.	   While	   Indian	   and	   Chinese	   migration	   to	  
Liberia	   is	   relatively	   recent—with	   no	   empirical	   studies	   documenting	   this	   trend—
Arab	   migration	   started	   in	   the	   early	   20th	   century	   and	   is	   therefore	   embedded	   in	  
modern	  Liberian	  economic	  history:	  
	  
The	   number	   of	   Arabs	   or	   “Syrians”	   in	   Liberia	   was	   12	   in	   1914	   and	  
increased	  to	  80	  in	  1925,	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  public	  call	  for	  a	  tightening	  of	  
immigration	  standards.	  The	  latter	  influx	  may	  have	  been	  in	  response	  to	  
encouragement	   from	   British	   and	   French	   colonialists	   in	   the	   West	  
African	  region	  who	  sought	   the	  creation	   in	   their	  colonies	  of	  a	   foreign	  
business	   class	   as	  middlemen	   between	   their	   administrations	   and	   the	  
African	   populations…The	   number	   and	   influence	   of	   these	   Arabs	  
steadily	  increased	  in	  Liberia	  so	  that	  by	  the	  1960s	  they	  constituted	  the	  
largest	  nationality	  group	  among	  large	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  commercial	  
establishments…The	  trend	  obviously	  continued	  for	  in	  1983,	  they	  were	  
estimated	   to	   be	   about	   6,000...In	   the	   1980s,	   they	   held	   a	   controlling	  
interest	   in,	   among	   others,	   CEMENCO	   (for	   many	   years	   a	   monopoly	  
cement	  factory),	  MIC	  furniture	  factory,	  LIPFOCO	  foam	  mattress	  plant,	  
many	  of	  Monrovia’s	  leading	  restaurants	  and	  the	  hotel	  industry	  (Dunn,	  
Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	  2001:	  203).	  	  
	  
The	  most	   prevalent	   Arab	   emigrants	   in	   Liberia	   today	   are	   Lebanese	   nationals	   who	  
cannot	  obtain	  citizenship	  because	  they	  are	  not	  considered	  ‘of	  Negro	  descent.’	  A	  30-­‐
year-­‐old	  male	  homelander	  argued	  that	  the	  Lebanese,	  who	  have	  collectively	  resided	  
in	   Liberia	   longer	   than	   Indian	   or	   Chinese	  migrants,	   are	   culturally	   differentiated	   by	  
their	  own	  choice	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  considered	  Liberian	  citizens:	  	  
	  
Lebanese	  can	  never	  be	  Liberian	  by	  heart…In	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  Lebanese,	  
they	  have	  customs	  and	  traditions…I	  don’t	  care,	  the	  Lebanese	  can	  live	  
here	   [Liberia],	   they	   can	   be	   born	   here,	   but	   their	   roots	   can	   never	   be	  
forgotten.	  They	  can	  never	  forget	  their	  root.55	  
	  
                                                




Taking	  an	  opposing	  view,	  a	  57-­‐year-­‐old	  man	  based	  in	  Accra	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  UK	  
previously	   argued	   that	   the	   Lebanese	   in	   Liberia	   had	   assimilated	   over	   multiple	  
generations,	  which	  should	  automatically	  qualify	  them	  for	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’:	  
	  
There	  are	  Lebanese	  who	  have	  been	  in	  Liberia	  for	  40	  years,	  30	  years,	  
these	  people	   know	  no	  other	  place	   other	   than	  Liberia,	   so	  people	   like	  
that,	  in	  as	  much	  as	  I	  will	  call	  them	  Lebanese,	  but	  I	  accept	  the	  fact	  that	  
they’ve	  already	  gotten	  acculturated	   into	   the	  society.	  So,	  you	  will	   say,	  
“Well,	  he’s	  a	  Liberian	  already,”	  and	  more	  than	  that	  even	  if	  you	  say	  he’s	  
not	  a	  Liberian,	  he’s	  doing	  things	  that	  Liberians	  should	  be	  doing…56	  
	  
The	   ‘things’	   alluded	   to	   in	   this	   respondent’s	   statement	   are	   economic	   in	   nature,	   as	  
Lebanese	   merchants	   dominate	   the	   retail	   industry	   in	   Liberia	   as	   owners	   of	  
consumable	   goods,	   building	   materials	   and	   cement	   commercial	   chains	   across	   the	  
country	   (Dunn,	   Beyan	   and	   Burrowes,	   2001:	   203).	   For	   this	   reason,	   arguments	   for	  
maintaining	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause’	  are	  often	  framed	  as	  an	  economic	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  with	  
Liberians	  inevitably	  losing,	  said	  this	  53-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  homeland	  entrepreneur:	  	  
	  
I	  believe	  Liberians	  are	  a	  very	   long	  way	   from	  gaining	  control	  of	   their	  
economy,	  which	   I	   believe	   is	   fundamental	   to	   our	   stability	   and	   peace.	  
And	   until	   deliberate	   efforts	   are	  made—by	   not	   just	   this	   government,	  
any	   government	   for	   that	   matter—to	   see	   Liberians	   take	   control,	  
meaningful	  control	  of	  the	  economy,	  I	   think	  it	  would	  be	  premature	  to	  
have	  foreigners	  become	  citizens	  of	  Liberia,	  foreigners	  meaning	  people	  
of	  non-­‐‘Negro’	  descent.57	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  a	  68-­‐year-­‐old	  Freetown-­‐based	  man	  argued	  that	  people	  of	  non-­‐‘Negro’	  
descent,	  such	  as	  the	  Lebanese,	  already	  control	  the	  economy	  and	  barring	  them	  from	  
citizenship	  will	  not	  fundamentally	  transform	  Liberia	  positively:	  	  
	  
If	   they	   [the	  Lebanese]	  have	  been	   there	  and	   they	  have	  assimilated	   in	  
the	   society	   and	   they	   are	   contributing,	   you	   know,	   to	   the	   economic	  
development,	   I	   think	   they	   should	   be	   given	   that	   right	   to	   become	  
Liberians.	   Because	  my	   belief	   is	   that	   way	   they	  will	   be	   able	   to	   invest	  
more	  and	  bring	  economic	  development.58	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Echoing	  these	  sentiments,	  a	  Monrovia-­‐based	  circular	  returnee	  man	  argued	  that	  non-­‐
‘Negro’	   residents	   in	  Liberia	   such	  as	  Lebanese	  nationals	   are	  politically	   and	   socially	  
embedded	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  economic	  clout:	  	  
	  
I’d	   consider	   them	   [Lebanese]	   to	   be	   Liberians,	   because	   I	   think	   they	  
fulfil	   the	   conditions	   –	   living	   here,	   being	   part	   of	   the	   culture.	   They’re	  
part	   of	   the	   political	   discourse	   because	   they	   influence	   the	   political	  
decisions	   that	   are	  made…Yeah,	   because	   of	   their	   economic	   power.	   In	  
my	   definition,	   they	   are	   Liberians	   because	   any	   businesses	   they	   own	  
pay	  taxes	  in	  Liberia.59	  
	  
However	   compelling	   the	   argument	   may	   be	   to	   fully	   incorporate	   non-­‐‘Negroes’	   as	  
citizens	   in	   Liberia,	   there	   are	   also	   visceral	   responses	   against	   this,	   such	   as	   the	   one	  
offered	  by	  this	  31-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  resident	  of	  London:	  
	  
If	   we	   move	   this	   [‘Negro’]	   clause,	   they	   [non-­‐‘Negroes’]	   will	   buy	   up	  
every	  lick	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  There’s	  a	  whole	  bunch	  of	  landowners	  
in	  Monrovia	  who	  will	  be	  eager	  to	  sell	  because	  they	  will	  see	  six	  zeros	  
and	   their	   eyeballs	   will	   start	   turning	   and	   Liberia	   won’t	   be	   Liberian	  
anymore.	   It	  won’t.	  That’s	  why	  I’m	  in	  favour	  of	   it	   [the	   ‘Negro	  clause’],	  
and	  if	  that	  makes	  me	  a	  bigot	  or	  a	  pseudo	  racist	  or	  prejudice	  then,	  yeah,	  
I	  am.	  This	  [Liberia]	  is	  my	  damn	  country	  and	  I	  got	  more	  right	  to	  it	  than	  
you!60	  
	  
Deeply	  embedded	  in	  Liberia’s	  historical	  DNA,	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause’	  was	  instituted	  at	  a	  
time	   when	   repatriated	   blacks	   had	   fled	   economic	   servitude	   in	   the	   United	   States	  
vowing	  to	  create	  a	  haven	  for	  black	  people	  where	  they	  would	  be	  the	  sole	  owners	  of	  
capital,	   land,	   and	   the	   means	   of	   production.	   The	   controversial	   clause	   also	   has	  
contemporary	  manifestations	  demonstrating	   its	  continued	  relevance	  today.	  During	  
my	   interview	   with	   Governance	   Commission	   chairman,	   Dr.	   Amos	   Sawyer,	   who	  
previously	  served	  as	  head	  of	  Liberia’s	  constitutional	  review	  committee	  in	  the	  early	  
to	  mid-­‐1980s,	  he	  admitted	  that	  his	  committee	  maintained	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause’	  because	  
of	  staunch	  opposition	  to	  removing	   it	   from	  Liberians	  of	  all	  persuasions.	  Dr.	  Sawyer	  
vividly	   recalled	  one	  of	  his	   interactions	   in	   rural	  Liberia	   in	  which	  a	   traditional	   chief	  
implored	   the	   constitutional	   review	   committee	   not	   to	   abandon	   the	   clause	   because	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“all	   the	  white	  people	  will	   take	  our	   land.”61	  Just	  as	  opposition	   to	  dual	   citizenship	   is	  
embedded	   in	   concerns	  about	   inequality,	   so	   too	   is	   support	  of	   the	   ‘Negro	  clause.’	   In	  
order	   to	   penetrate	   what	   appears	   to	   be	   an	   impasse	   in	   debates	   about	   race	   and	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   one	   respondent	   in	   this	   study,	   a	   43-­‐year-­‐old	   man	   based	   in	  
Accra,	  argued	  that	  gradual	  measures	  should	  be	  instituted	  to	  appease	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐
‘Negro	  clause’	  proponents	  alike:	  	  
	  
I	   think	   it	  would	  be	   very	  difficult	   to	  move	   from	  what	  we	  have	   in	   the	  
Constitution	   now	   to	   outright	   citizenship	   [for	   non-­‐‘Negroes’];	   I	   think	  
that	   would	   be	   quite	   difficult.	   But	   I	   also	   think	   that	   somebody	   who’s	  
there,	  who	  has	  business	   there	  and	  who	  resides	   there,	  who	  can	  show	  
that	  they	  pay	  taxes	  there	  should	  not	  have	  to	  renew	  their	  immigration	  
status	  every	  year…So,	  something	  similar	  to	  a	  permanent	  residency	  or	  
something	  like	  that.	  I	  think	  it’s	  something	  that	  we	  should	  move	  to.62	  
	  
Race	  and	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  are	  clearly	  entangled,	  yet	  unlike	  the	  first	  five	  markers	  
of	  citizenship	  listed	  in	  the	  table	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter	  that	  are	  passive	  and	  
identity-­‐based,	   the	   second	   set	   constitutes	   practices	   that	   are	   active	   in	   orientation.	  
This	  is	  where	  I	  shift	  the	  discussion,	  as	  practice-­‐based	  citizenship	  integrates	  my	  third	  
conceptual	   framing	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   (interactions)	  
between	   the	   state	   and	   its	   citizens	   and	   amongst	   citizens	   themselves.	   As	   one	  
Monrovia-­‐based	   circular	   returnee	  man	   informed	  me,	  being	  a	  Liberian	   citizen	   is	   “a	  
decision,	  and	  also	  an	  act.”63	  For	   instance,	  one	  who	  naturalises	   in	  Liberia	  expresses	  
more	   active	   citizenship	   than	   someone	  who	  was	  merely	   born	   or	   raised	   in	   Liberia.	  
The	   very	   act	   of	   naturalisation	   is	   agential,	   and	   involves	   making	   a	   conscious	   and	  
deliberate	  choice	  to	  become	  a	  Liberian	  citizen.	  Therefore,	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   continuum	   would	   include	   those	   who	   become	   Liberians	   ‘by	   choice’,	  
incorporating	   individuals	   who	   naturalised	   in	   Liberia,	   or	   who	   have	   the	   ‘heart’	   for	  
Liberia,	  as	  a	  31-­‐year-­‐old	  London-­‐based	  female	  respondent	  asserted:	  
	  
‘Heart’	   in	   a	   sense	   where	   you	   love	   Liberia,	   you	   mean	   well	   for	  
Liberia	  …you	  do	  find	  people	  who	  are	  born	  in	  Liberia	  who	  don’t	  have	  
as	   much	   passion	   for	   Liberia	   compared	   to	   foreigners.	   I	   would	   say	  
people	  who	  weren’t	  born	  in	  Liberia	  but	  they	  found	  out	  about	  Liberia	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and	  they	  met	  Liberians	  and	  they’ve	  gone	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  investigating	  
about	   Liberia	   and	   they’ve	   built	   that	   passion	   and	   do	   stuff	   for	   Liberia	  
more	   than	   they	   do	   for	   themselves	   or	   their	   own	   country…I	   would	  
personally	  say	  if	  you’ve	  got	  the	  heart	  for	  Liberia	  you	  are	  a	  Liberian	  as	  
well	  as	  those	  who	  are	  born	  there...64	  
	  
The	  word	  ‘heart’	  appeared	  as	  a	  recurring	  verbal	  motif	  in	  utterances	  from	  London	  to	  
Washington,	   from	   Freetown	   to	   Accra,	   and	  within	  Monrovia,	   bringing	   us	   closer	   to	  
what	   Barry	   and	   others	   call	   ‘active	   citizenship’	   (Barry,	   2006)	   or	   citizenship	   as	   a	  
‘public	  vocation’	  in	  which	  “the	  (true)	  citizen	  plays	  a	  full	  and	  active	  part	  in	  the	  affairs	  
of	  the	  community”	  (Dagger,	  2000:	  27).	  For	  instance,	  a	  30-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  homelander	  
resident	   in	   Liberia	   all	   his	   life	   conceived	   of	   a	   Liberian	   by	   ‘heart’	   as	   someone	  who	  
prioritises	   Liberia’s	   advancement	   above	   all	   other	   nations,	   regardless	   of	   one’s	  
citizenship	  or	  residence	  status:	  
	  
When	  I	  talk	  about	  being	  a	  Liberian	  is	  by	  heart,	  it’s	  that	  no	  matter	  the	  
case,	  whether	  I	  have	  citizenship	  abroad,	  or	  whether	  I	  have	  citizenship	  
in	  Liberia,	  but	  if	  I	  have	  Liberia	  at	  heart	  and	  I	  know	  that,	  yes,	  indeed,	  I	  
am	   from	  Liberia,	  my	   root	   is	   from	  Liberia,	   all	   other	   development,	   all	  
other	  improvement	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  Liberia	  improves,	  to	  make	  sure	  
that	  Liberia	  be	  part	  of	  those	  nations	  that	  are	  up	  there,	  those	  expertise,	  
those	   knowledge	   that	   I	   have,	   I	   should	   come	   and	   invest	   it	   in	   Liberia.	  
That	  means	  I	  have	  Liberia	  at	  heart.	  Whatsoever	  I	  will	  do	  I	  will	  always	  
take	  Liberia	  first	  no	  matter	  where	  I	  am.65	  
	  
This	  respondent	  echoed	  van	  Steenbergen,	  who	  defines	  the	  ideal	  citizen	  as	  “active	  in	  
public	   life	  and	  fundamentally	  willing	  to	  submit	  his	  [or	  her]	  private	  interests	  to	  the	  
general	   interest	  of	   society”	   (van	  Steenbergen,	  1994:	  2).	  Also	  employing	   the	   ‘heart’	  
trope	   was	   a	   59-­‐year-­‐old	   woman	   resident	   in	   Accra	   on	   and	   off	   for	   15	   years,	   who	  
argued	  that,	  “…for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  a	  Liberian,	  the	  person	  must	  have	  Liberia	  at	  heart.	  I	  
mean,	  the	  person	  should	  be	  thinking	  development,	  thinking	  nation-­‐building,	  human	  
capacity...”66	  A	   35-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   London	   resident	   who	   was	   born	   in	   the	   UK	   to	   a	  
Liberian	  citizen	  mother	  used	  the	  same	  ‘heart’	  frame	  to	  articulate	  how	  a	  measure	  of	  
care	  for	  Liberia	  and	  Liberians	  makes	  one	  a	  citizen,	  regardless	  of	  birthplace:	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Whether	  you	  were	  born	  in	  the	  country	  or	  one	  of	  your	  parents	  is	  from	  
the	  country—it’s	  a	  culture	  that,	  I	  think,	  once	  it’s	  made	  its	  mark	  doesn’t	  
leave	   you…And	   I	   think	   one	   of	   the	   important	   ways	   to	   tell	   whether	  
someone	   is	   from	   any	   country	   is	   to	   see	   whether	   they	   care	   for	   the	  
country	  or	  not.	  And	  I’d	   like	  to	  think	  that	   I	  do!	  Beyond	  politics,	   I	  care	  
about	  what	  happens	  to	   the	  country	  and	  I	  care	  about	  how	  the	  people	  
develop	   and	   I’m	   not	   talking	   about,	   you	   know,	   the	   wealthy	   few.	   I’m	  
talking	  about	  everybody.67	  
	  
Similarly,	   a	   36-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   homelander	   in	   Monrovia	   equated	   ‘heart’	   with	  
jingoism	  and	  nationalist	  fervor,	  another	  common	  thread	  throughout	  my	  interviews:	  
“A	  Liberian	  has	  a	  sense	  of	  patriotism,	  belonging	   to	  Liberia,	  and	  makes	  an	  effort	   to	  
love	  his/her	  country	  thereby	  doing	  things	  that	  make	  Liberia	  progress	  or	  develop.”68	  
Indeed,	   the	   articulation	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   ‘having	   heart’	   or	   as	   being	  
patriotic	  appears	  to	  transcend	  the	  citizenship	  as	  identity	  trope	  thereby	  eliminating	  
birthplace,	  bloodline,	  or	  race	  as	  defining	  markers	  of	  Liberianness.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  many	  respondents	  in	  the	  five	  field	  sites,	  one	  who	  actively	  contributes	  
to	  Liberia’s	  development	  through	  capacity	  building,	  paying	  taxes,	  or	  investing	  in	  real	  
estate	   or	   local	   enterprise,	   demonstrates	   more	   active	   citizenship	   than	   one	   who	  
merely	   identifies	   as	   Liberian	   or	   considers	   Liberia	   ‘home.’	   A	   significant	   number	   of	  
respondents	   conceived	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   a	   form	   of	   practice,	   essentially	  
citizenship	  as	   ‘doing’	   rather	   than	   ‘being.’	  This	  brings	  us	   to	   the	  extreme	  end	  of	   the	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   continuum,	   narrowly	   defined	   as	   ‘by	   contribution’,	   in	   a	  
multitude	   of	   frames.	   For	   instance,	   a	   “Liberian	   is	   somebody	  who	   lives	   Liberia–not	  
somebody	   who	   talks	   about	   Liberia”69,	   or	   someone	   who	   is	   “prepared	   to	   give	   to	  
Liberia,	   to	   serve	  Liberia,	   to	  be	  Liberia.”70	  On	   the	  extreme	  end	  of	   the	   ‘contribution’	  
spectrum	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  is	  “one	  who	  is	  prepared	  to	  go	  to	  war	  
for	   Liberia…prepared	   to	   take	   a	   bullet	   for	   Liberia…”71	  More	   practically,	   however,	   a	  
38-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  respondent	  based	  in	  Freetown	  for	  12	  years	  argued	  that	  personal	  
and	   substantial	   investments	   in	   Liberia	   define	   a	   Liberian	   citizen,	   that	   if	   “you	   are	  
there	  and	  you	  have	  a	  very	  big	  institution	  that	  are	  contributing	  to	  the	  development	  of	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the	   country,	   I	   believe	  we	   should	   put	   hands	   around	   that	   person	   and	  make	   them	   a	  
citizen	   of	   the	   country.”72	  A	   34-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   resident	   in	   Accra	   for	   12	   years	   used	  
more	  rhetorical	  language	  to	  describe	  how	  ‘contribution’	  can	  be	  manifest	  in	  concrete	  
action:	  
	  
	   Let’s	   take	   for	   example,	   if	   you’re	   a	   Liberian	   and	   then	   you	  manage	   to	  
work	   outside	   Liberia	   and	   earn	   some	   money,	   and	   then	   you	   cannot	  
return	  back	  to	  Liberia	  and	  help	  the	  people	  there.	  For	  me,	  I	  don’t	  think	  
you	   are	   a	   Liberian,	   that’s	  what	   I	   think…People	  must	   know	   that	   that	  
country	  is	  the	  only	  thing	  we	  have,	  and	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  contribute.	  
That	   is	   how	   I	   define	   a	   typical	   Liberian,	   contributing	   in	   any	   way	  
possible	  to	  the	  society…Do	  you	  have	  family	  there,	  are	  you	  helping	  the	  
family	  there?	  Do	  you	  have	  a	  home	  there?	  Can	  people	  really	  appreciate	  
who	  you	  are?	  These	  are	  contributions…73	  
	  
Most	   respondents	  who	   coupled	   ‘citizenship’	  with	   ‘contribution’	   argued	   that	   those	  
contributions,	  however	  varied,	  should	  meaningfully	  impact	  Liberia	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  
Liberians,	  wherever	   they	   happen	   to	   reside—essentially,	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   a	  
set	  of	  relations.	  One	  38-­‐year-­‐old	  homeland	  woman	  even	  insisted	  that	  contributions	  
should	  be	  unconditional,	  debunking	  claims	  by	  some	  diaspora	  respondents	  that	  their	  
continued	   engagement	   with	   Liberia	   would	   be	   contingent	   on	   the	   passage	   of	   dual	  
citizenship	  legislation:	  	  
	  
A	  Liberian	  is	  somebody	  that	  is	  a	  true	  stakeholder…You	  know	  already	  
that	   stakeholders	   are	   people	   that	   have	   interests,	   close	   interests	   to	  
anything.	   So,	   an	   individual	   who	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   Liberian	  
shouldn’t,	   there	   shouldn’t	   be	   anything	   attached	   to	   attract	   that	  
person’s	   way	   of	   life.	   I	   say	   this	   to	   say	   that	   I	   don’t	   need	   to	   have	   X	  
number	   of	   something	   or	   cash,	   or	   work	   before	   I	   know	   that	   I	   am	   a	  
Liberian…Yes,	   to	   rebuild	   the	   country	   without	   any	   material,	   nothing	  
offered,	  without	  opportunities	  being	  offered…You	  can’t	  come	  and	  say,	  
“Before	   I	   participate	   as	   a	   Liberian,	   the	   government	   should	   give	   me	  
better	  housing;	  I	  need	  to	  be	  employed	  to	  get	  this.”74	  
	  
Similarly,	   a	   43-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homeland	   development	   specialist	   insisted	   that	  
unconditional	  commitment	  to	  Liberia	  should	  be	  a	  criterion	  for	  citizenship:	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I	   think	  anyone	  who	  has	  a	  vested	   interest	  and	  commitment	   to	   seeing	  
this	  country	  grow,	  whether	   it’s	  economically,	  whether	   it’s	  politically,	  
whether	   it’s	  culturally,	  whether	   it’s	  socially,	  but	  demonstrates	  a	  high	  
level	  of	  patriotism,	  you	  know,	  the	  love	  for	  a	  land,	  the	  love	  for	  a	  fellow	  
compatriot…Anyone	   who	   is	   coming	   and	   saying,	   “Look,	   I	   don’t	   care	  
whether	  I	  am	  offered	  a	  job	  in	  the	  government	  or	  a	  public	  agency,	  I	  just	  
want	  to	  invest.	  I	  want	  the	  opportunity	  to	  contribute.75	  
	  
While	   some	   respondents	   argued	   that	   contribution	   to	   reconstruction	   and	  
development	   should	   not	   be	   conditional,	   others,	   like	   one	   48-­‐year-­‐old	   male	  
homelander,	  maintained	  that	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  is	  bounded	  not	  only	  by	  residence	  
in	  Liberia,	  but	  also	  by	  paying	  taxes	  regularly	  to	  the	  Liberian	  state:	  
	  
First	  thing,	  it	  [citizenship]	  has	  to	  be	  tied	  to	  residency…You	  have	  to	  be	  
here,	   you	   have	   to	   pay	   tax…That	   bounds	   you	   to	   the	   state-­‐citizen	  
responsibility,	   it’s	   a	   part	   of	   the	   social	   contract…Paying	   taxes	   is	   an	  
important	   thing.	   If	   you	   are	   a	   resident,	   you	   should	   have	   a	   vested	  
interest…It	   could	   be	   in	   terms	   of	   your	   investment	   in	   businesses.	  
Investment	   in	   just...property.	   Even	   investment	   in	   how	   you	   stay	  
engaged	   with	   the	   country,	   in	   terms	   of	   even	   the	   political	   processes	  
because	  all	  of	  those	  things	  add	  to	  who	  you	  are	  as	  a	  citizen…Anybody	  
can	   carry	   a	   passport…It's	   about	   you,	   in	   your	   own	  way,	   contributing	  
whatever	  it	  is	  to	  the	  growth	  and	  development	  of	  the	  country.	  You	  then	  
have	   [a]	   stake	   in	   the	   future	  of	   that	  place	   that	   you	   call	   your	   country.	  
But	   if	   you	   are	   sort	   of	   [a]	   distance	   away,	   and	   not	   being	   in	   what	   is	  
unfolding,	   how	   do	   you	   own	   the	   future?...Yes,	   because	   it's	   not	   just	  
about	  being	  born.	   It's	   about	  belonging,	   so	   if	   you	  belong	   to	   a	   society,	  
you	  form	  part	  of	  the	  societal	  ethics	  and	  solidarity.	  You	  don't	   just	  live	  
in	   the	   abstract	   world.	   This	   is	   a	   community,	   so	   if	   you	   live	   in	   a	  
community,	   there	   are	   roles	   and	   responsibilities,	   there	   are	   duties	  
binding	  upon	  you	  to	  ensure	   that	   that	  community	   lives	  and	   fulfills	   its	  
mandate,	   not	   just	   sucking	   from	   the	   community	   but	   you	   are	  
contributing,	  giving	  back	  to	  the	  community.76	  
	  
By	   arguing	   that	   citizenship	   involves	   duties	   and	   responsibilities,	   this	   respondent	  
implicitly	  described	  citizenship	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  not	  only	  between	  the	  Liberian	  
state	   and	   its	   citizens	   (whether	   in	   Liberia	   or	   abroad),	   but	   also	   between	   Liberian	  
citizens.	   Although	   the	   respondent	   insisted	   that	   only	   residence	   could	   facilitate	  
meaningful	  contribution,	  he	  conceded	  that	  residence	  could	  be	  sporadic	  and	  circular.	  
Moreover,	   physical	   residence	   as	   a	   requirement	   for	   citizenship	   was	   not	   only	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advanced	  by	  homeland	  Liberians.	  An	  experienced	  media	   consultant	  who	  has	  been	  
shuttling	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Liberia	  since	  2006,	  one	  circular	  returnee	  respondent	  
argued	  that	  “what	  makes	  you	  a	  citizen	  of	  the	  country	  is	  to	  live,	  and	  make	  [a]	  decision	  
to	  be	  there,	   to	  be	  part	  of	   that	  culture…Because	  you	  can’t	  be	   in	  the	  US	  and	  say	   ‘I’m	  
Liberian’,	   not	   wanting	   to	   come	   home…So,	   you	   have	   to	   come	   home	   and	   be	  
Liberian.” 77 	  I	   suspect	   that	   this	   respondent’s	   resolve	   to	   return	   to	   Liberia	   was	  
primarily	  informed	  by	  his	  conception	  of	  what	  signifies	  a	  ‘true	  Liberian	  citizen’—one	  
who	  resides	  within	  the	  territorial	  confines	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  even	  if	  occasionally.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  view	  that	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  is	  territorially	  configured,	  based	  on	  
residence,	   and	   includes	   both	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   represents	   an	   extreme	  
position	   not	   shared	   by	   all	   respondents	   in	   this	   study.	   For	   instance,	   a	   56-­‐year-­‐old	  
male	   Washington	   resident	   scorned	   the	   citizenship-­‐as-­‐residence	   trope,	   instead	  
arguing	   that	   a	   Liberian	   is	   “anyone	   who	   dedicates	   his	   or	   her	   cause	   of	   life	   and	  
everything	  to	  the	  Liberian	  cause…you	  cannot	  say	  because	  that	  person	  is	  not	  in	  the	  
country,	   he	   is	   not	   a	   Liberian	   or	   she	   is	   not	   a	   Liberian.”78 	  Some	   respondents,	  
particularly	  those	  abroad,	  stressed	  their	   legal	  entitlements	  to	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  
first,	  while	  only	  belatedly	  discussing	  obligations,	  if	  at	  all.	  This	  has	  been	  corroborated	  
by	  literature	  that	  critiques	  the	  discourse	  on	  dual	  citizenship	  as	  only	  about	  rights	  and	  
privileges,	   rather	   than	   about	   duties	   and	   responsibilities	   (FitzGerald,	   2006;	  
FitzGerald,	   2012:	   285-­‐286;	   Spiro,	   2012:	   311;	   318).	   One	   58-­‐year-­‐old	   male	  
respondent	   in	   Accra	   interrogated	   the	   tendency	   of	   Liberians	   to	   omit	   the	  
‘responsibility’	  side	  of	  the	  citizenship	  equation	  altogether:	  	  
	  
Let's	  ask	  ourselves,	  do	  we	  have	  citizenship	  only	  by	  name?	  Or	  you	  have	  
citizenship	  based	  upon	  your	  responsibility	  and	  duty?	  You	  understand?	  
If	   we	   say	   we	   are	   a	   Liberian,	   what	   are	   we	   doing	   for	   Liberia	   as	   a	  
Liberian?...We	   cry	   [for]	   citizenship,	   we	   cry	   for	   rights,	   ok.	   Now,	  
everything	  we	  find	  in	  this	  earth	  today,	  it	  has	  responsibility	  attached	  to	  
it.	   You	   understand?	   We	   cry	   for	   our	   right.	   What	   right	   do	   you	   get	  
without	  duty	  and	  responsibility?79	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Although	   most	   respondents	   in	   all	   field	   sites	   claimed	   that	   a	   Liberian	   citizen	   is	  
someone	   who	   actively	   contributes	   to	   the	   country’s	   development,	   interviewees	   in	  
Freetown,	  Accra,	  and	  Monrovia	  were	  more	  explicitly	  wedded	  to	  this	  criterion.	  This	  
could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   resident	   citizens	   and	   ‘near’	   diasporas,	  
particularly	  those	  residing	  in	  countries	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  such	  as	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  
Ghana,	   are	   closer	   in	   proximity	   to	   the	   challenges	   of	   development	   and	   therefore	  
understand	   more	   intuitively	   the	   imperatives	   of	   active	   citizenship	   embodying	  
privileges	  and	  obligations.	  This	  trend	  was	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  the	  debates	  about	  
whether	   or	   not	   citizenship	   should	   be	   based	   on	   residence.	   While	   most	   diasporic	  
respondents	   dismissed	   residence	   in	   Liberia	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   citizenship,	   many	  
homeland	  respondents,	  for	  instance,	  insisted	  that	  living	  in	  Liberia	  fulltime	  would	  be	  
the	  only	  means	  of	  actively	  participating	   in	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	   life	  of	  
the	  nation.	  	  
	  
Just	   as	   the	   residence	   requirement	  appeared	   to	  be	  a	   contested	   space	  of	   inquiry,	   so	  
too	   was	   the	   citizenship	   by	   ‘contribution’	   trope,	   proving	   that	   where	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  is	  concerned	  dissent	  is	  the	  only	  constant.	  Some	  respondents	  argued	  that	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   solely	   about	   legal,	   cultural	   and	   national	   identity,	   and,	   by	  
extension,	  rights	  and	  privileges,	  such	  as	  current	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Minister	  Augustine	  
Ngafuan,	  who	   said,	   “…whether	   you	   contribute	   or	   not	   if	   you're	   a	   Liberian,	   you	   are	  
Liberian.	  No	   one	   can	   take	   that	   citizenship	   from	  you.	   It's	   part	   of	   a	   reality	   that	   you	  
refuse	   to	   contribute...you	   are	   a	   Liberian.”80	  However,	   Dr.	   C.	  William	   Allen,	   former	  
Director-­‐General	   of	   Liberia’s	   Civil	   Service	   Agency	   (CSA)	   and	   now	   ambassador	   to	  
France,	   countered	   this	   by	   providing	   the	   most	   comprehensive	   articulation	   of	   the	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  continuum:	  
	  
Well,	  I	  think	  being	  a	  Liberian	  comes	  from	  what	  I	  call	  the	  Liberianness	  
of	  a	  person.	  And,	   it's	   something	   like	  character.	   It's	   something	   that	   is	  
on	  the	  inside	  of	  you.	  What	  do	  you	  feel	  in	  your	  soul?	  What	  do	  you	  feel	  
in	  your	  inner	  self?	  Do	  you	  feel	  Liberian?	  And	  I	  think	  when	  you	  come	  to	  
grips	  with	   that	   then	   the	  outward	   expression	  of	   your	  Liberianness	   is	  
what	  makes	  you	  a	  Liberian	  [citizen].	  Do	  you	  feel	  patriotic?	  Do	  you	  love	  
your	  country?	  Do	  you	  honestly	  want	  to	  contribute	  towards	  its	  reform	  
and	   its	   reconciliation	   and	   its	   development?	   Do	   you	   remain	  
                                                




psychologically	  engaged	  with	  Liberia?	   If	  some	  other	  country	  were	  to	  
attack	  Liberia	  tomorrow,	  would	  you	  devote	  your	  resources,	  and	  your	  
time	   and	  your	   talent?	  Your	   time,	   your	   talent	   and	   your	   treasure,	   you	  
can	  put	  it	  that	  way…would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  give	  your	  time,	  treasure,	  
and	  talent	  to	  the	  defence	  of	  Liberia?	  Ok,	  now,	  time,	  we	  all	  cannot	  serve	  
in	   the	   military	   but	   could	   you	   provide	   advice?	   Treasure,	   meaning	  
would	   you	   be	  willing	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   national	   effort,	   resources,	  
money,	  to	  help	  that	  effort?	  I	  think	  these	  are	  the	  real	  things	  that	  make	  
you	   a	   Liberian	   [citizen].	   It's	   not	   what	   colour	   of	   passport	   you	   wave	  
around.81	  	  
	  
Dr.	   Allen’s	   understanding	   of	   Liberianness	   as	   being	  manifested	   in	   contributions	   of	  
‘time,	  talent,	  and	  treasure’,	  serves	  as	  a	  central	  node	  of	  this	  thesis	  because	  it	  couples	  
identity	   with	   practice	   and	   rights	   with	   responsibilities,	   simultaneously.	   This	  
particular	   frame	   is	   all-­‐encompassing,	   thereby	   illustrating	   clearly	   the	  multi-­‐layered	  
meanings	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   and	   how	   it	   has	   come	   to	   be	   reconfigured	   over	  
space	  and	  time	  as	  identity,	  practice	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   employ	   Dr.	   Allen’s	   ‘time,	   talent,	   and	   treasure’	   metaphor	   to	  
assess	  whether	  or	  not	   the	   conception	  of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   aligns	  with	  practice	  
transnationally	   and	   domestically,	   particularly	   amongst	   Liberian	   respondents	  
speaking	  in	  unofficial	  capacities	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
Time,	  Talent,	  and	  Treasure:	  How	  ‘Liberian	  Citizenship’	  Is	  Practiced	  
Transnationally	  and	  Domestically	  Amongst	  Unofficial,	  Anonymised	  Respondents	  	  
Although	   there	   are	   some	   nodes	   of	   synergy,	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  
amongst	  unofficial	  anonymised	  respondents	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  Freetown,	  and	  
Accra	   differs	   from	   those	   of	   respondents	   in	  Monrovia.	   This	   is	   unsurprising.	  While	  
diasporic	   citizenship	   practices	   occur	   within	   a	   transnational	   social	   field,	   resident	  
citizenship	  practices	  are	  largely	  bounded	  territorially	  therefore	  locally	  entrenched.	  
Amongst	   social	   actors	   in	   the	   four	   diasporic	   field	   sites,	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   a	  
continuum	   of	   transnational	   citizenship	   pursuits	   largely	   contingent	   upon	   socio-­‐
economic	   positioning	   abroad,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   Table	   7	   ranking	   transnational	  
citizenship	  practices	   from	  most	   frequent	   responses	   in	   the	   field	   to	   least	   frequent.	   I	  
compiled	   the	   list	   in	   Table	   7	   to	   illustrate	   recurring	   responses	   to	   an	   open-­‐ended	  
                                                




question	  posed	   to	  anonymised	   ‘near’	  and	   ‘wider’	  diaspora	  respondents	  about	  how	  
they	   remain	   engaged	   with	   Liberia	   and	   Liberians	   while	   abroad,	   without	   prompts	  
from	  a	  prescribed	  list.	  	  
	  
Table	  7:	  Top	  10	  Ways	  of	  Practicing	  ‘Liberian	  Citizenship’	  Transnationally	  Amongst	  
Anonymised	  ‘Near’	  and	  ‘Wider’	  Diasporas	  	  
Transnational	  Citizenship	  Practices	   Cities	   Where	   Responses	  
Frequent	  	  
1)	  Sending	  remittances	  to	  Liberia	  (in	  goods,	  cash	  and	  
kind)	  
All	   (London,	   Washington,	  
Freetown,	  Accra)	  
2)	  Participating	   in	  Liberian	  diaspora	  organisations82-­‐
fundraising,	  charity/development	  work	   in	  health	  and	  
education	  (in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad)	  
All	  	  
3)	  Paying	  school	  fees	  of	  Liberians	  in	  Liberia	  	   All	  	  
4)	  Investing	  in	  businesses	  and	  real	  estate	  in	  Liberia	  	  	   All	  	  
5)	  Paying	  property	  taxes	  in	  Liberia	  	   London,	  Washington,	  Accra	  
6)	   Engaging	   in	   investment	   promotion	   on	   behalf	   of	  
Liberia	  
London,	  Accra	  
7)	  Visiting	  Liberia	  periodically	  	  	   London,	  Washington,	  Accra	  
8)	   Collaborating	   with	   Liberian	   embassy	   (Investment	  
Forum;	  July	  26th	  celebrations;	  meetings	  with	  embassy	  
staff;	   meetings	   with	   visiting	   government	   officials;	  
Liberia	  Rising	  2030	  Forum)	  	  
London,	  Washington	  	  
9)	   Actively	   engaging	   in	   Liberia’s	   political	   processes	  
(voting	   in	   national	   elections;	   serving	   Liberian	  
government	   in	   ad-­‐hoc	   roles:	   policy	   support,	  
reconciliation	  initiative,	  capacity	  building;	  advocating	  
for	  governance	  reforms)	  
Washington,	  Accra	  	  
10)	  Engaging	  in	  direct	  capacity	  building	  in	  Liberia	  and	  
abroad	   (mentoring	   Liberians	   abroad;	   providing	  
individual	  voluntary	  service	  to	  tertiary	  institutions	  in	  
Liberia	   on	   a	   yearly	   basis;	   facilitating	   educational	  
exchanges	   between	   Liberian	   students	   and	   US	  
students;	   providing	   individual	   pro-­‐bono	   service	   to	  
health	  institutions	  in	  Liberia)	  	  
London,	  Washington,	  Accra	  
                                                
82	  London-­‐based	   respondents	   are	   members	   of	   the	   following	   organisations:	   LASO,	   Liberia	   Rebuild	  
Global	   Team,	   ELFA,	   ULO-­‐UK,	   and	   Mandingo	   Association.	   Washington-­‐based	   respondents	   are	  
members	  of	  the	  following	  diaspora	  organisations:	  R.I.S.E.,	  Liberian	  Students	  Association	  in	  America,	  
Liberian	   Community	   Association,	   Liberian	   Studies	   Association,	   Marylanders	   for	   Progress,	   Tubman	  
High	  Alumni	  Association,	  BW	  Harris	  Alumni	  Association,	  Liberian	  Professional	  Network	  (LPN),	  Sinoe	  
Reconstruction,	   Chicago	   Bright	   Foundation,	   Coalition	   of	   Concerned	   Liberians	   (CCL),	   ELFA,	   ULAA,	  
Liberian	   Development	   Group,	   Bethel	   Outreach	   Ministries,	   UNIBOA,	   and	   Grand	   Bassa	   Scholarship	  
Foundation.	   Freetown-­‐based	   respondents	   are	   members	   of	   the	   following	   diaspora	   organisations:	  
Youth	   Vision,	   Liberians	   for	   Progress,	   Kru	   and	   Bassa	   Christian	   Association,	   and	   Kru	   Development	  
Association.	  Accra-­‐based	   respondents	   are	  members	  of	   the	   following	  diaspora	  organisations:	  ULAG,	  
Liberia	   Refugee	  Women	  Organisation,	  Health	   Page	   Liberia,	   Rotary	   Club,	  Women	   of	   Glory,	   Liberian	  
Students	   Association	   (LISA),	   Liberian	   Youth	   Group,	   Foundation	   for	   Peace	   and	   Justice,	   Liberian	  




‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   practices	   amongst	   respondents	   in	   London,	   Washington,	  
Freetown	  and	  Accra	  range	  from	  individual	  activities—remitting	  money	  to	  relatives	  
and	   friends	   in	   Liberia—to	   collective	   ventures—pooling	   resources	   to	   sponsor	  
students	   in	   Liberia—in	   spite	   of	   legal	   citizenship	   status	   in	   Liberia.	   At	   the	   level	   of	  
individual	   transnational	   pursuits,	   a	   35-­‐year-­‐old	   respondent	   in	   London	   indicated	  
that	  she	  sent	  remittances	  to	  Liberia	  for	  both	  consumption	  and	  income	  generation:	  
	  
I	  send	  money	  home	  to	  my	  mom	  to	  support	  her	  quite	  regularly…She’s	  
trying	   to	   plant	   a	   couple	   of	   fruit	   farms	   so,	   you	   know,	   pineapple	   and	  
mangoes,	  so	  I	  send	  enough	  money	  for	  that	  too.	  ‘Cause	  I	  see	  it	  quite	  as	  a	  
kind	   of	   long-­‐term	   investment	   in	   the	   area	   in	   Liberia.	   It	   would	  
potentially	   be	   a	   source	   of	   income	   and	   I	  want	   to	   be	   able	   to,	  we	  both	  
want	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say,	  “Well,	  this	  is	  what	  can	  be	  done	  with	  X	  amount	  
of	  effort.	  We’ve	  done	  it	  and	  then	  maybe	  replicate	  it.”83	  
	  
Moreover,	   there	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   healthy	   balance	   amongst	   respondents	   between	  
individual	   citizenship	   practices	   and	   collective	   pursuits	   with	   Liberian	   diaspora	  
organisations	   serving	   as	   conduits	   for	   interventions	   in	   Liberia.	   For	   instance,	   a	   46-­‐
year-­‐old	  male	  resident	  in	  London	  established	  an	  organisation	  that	  transformed	  from	  
a	  social	  club	  to	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  education	  charity,	  galvanising	  the	  support	  of	  many	  UK-­‐
based	  Liberians:	  
	  
The	  charity	  work	   is	  LASO,	  Liberia	  Social	  Organisation.	  We	  organised	  
this	  charity,	  first	  as	  a	  group,	  but	  during	  the	  war	  we	  launched	  it	  into	  a	  
charity…we	   sponsor	   an	   orphanage…we’re	   building	   a	   school	   project:	  
twelve	   classrooms,	   three	   nurseries,	   and	   a	   dormitory.	   So	   it’s	   a	   big	  
project,	  so	  it’s	  all	  part	  of	  the	  reconstruction	  process.84	  	  
	  
Employing	   similar	   tactics,	   a	   60-­‐year-­‐old	  Washington	   resident	   used	   his	   hometown	  
association	   to	   raise	   funds	   for	   health	   sciences	   scholarships	   at	   tertiary	   education	  
institutions	  in	  Liberia:	  	  
	  
When	   I	   was	   president	   for	   the	   United	   Bassa	   Liberia	   Organisation	   in	  
America	   (UNIBOA)…under	  my	   leadership	  we	   sponsored	  10	   students	  
to	  Mother	  Patten	  College	  of	  Nursing,	  and	  out	  of	   the	  10,	  one	  dropped	  
[out]	   and	  nine	   graduated	   and	   they	   are	   now	  working	   in	   the	   Liberian	  
                                                
83	  [DL25]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  22,	  2012.	  




government	   as	   nurses	   in	   the	   hospital.	   Presently	   I’m	   the	   Executive	  
Director	   for	   the	   Grand	   Bassa	   Scholarship	   Foundation…We’re	  
sponsoring	   students	   to	   go	   to	   the	   Community	   College;	   right	   now	  we	  
have	  50	  students...85	  
	  
Transnational	   pursuits	   also	   vary	   from	   directly	   impacting	   Liberia	   through	   on-­‐the-­‐
ground	  development	  outputs—investing	  in	  businesses	  and	  property	  in	  Liberia—to	  
indirectly	   impacting	   the	   lives	   of	   Liberians,	  whether	   in	   Liberia	   or	   abroad,	   through	  
humanitarian	   relief	   or	   capacity	   development.	   As	   evidenced	   by	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  
number	  of	  houses	  constructed	  in	  Monrovia	  and	  its	  environs	  that	  I	  have	  observed	  in	  
the	   past	   eight	   years,	   land	   ownership	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   most	   popular	   means	   of	  
planting	  roots	  firmly	  in	  Liberia	  for	  diasporas.	  Many	  respondents	  revealed	  that	  they	  
had	   purchased	   land	   or	   already	   built	   houses	   in	   Liberia,	   such	   as	   this	   57-­‐year-­‐old	  
London-­‐based	  man:	  	  
	  
I	  went	   there	   [Liberia]	  and	  people	  were	  building,	   coming	  back	  home,	  
so	  I	  purchased	  for	  myself	  land…2005	  is	  the	  time	  I	  purchased	  the	  land,	  
then	  I	  started	  building…At	  some	  point,	  I	  bought	  these	  two	  acres.	  Then	  
there	  was	  the	  opportunity	  for	  me	  to	  buy,	  you	  know,	  land,	  which	  I	  did	  
with	  my	  wife.	  We	  bought	  about	  five	  acres…Then	  in	  Lofa,	  I	  built	  a	  three	  
bedroom	  [house]	  for	  somebody	  to	  stay	  in…86	  
	  
Similarly,	   a	   48-­‐year-­‐old	  Freetown-­‐based	  man	   talked	   about	   investing	   in	   real	   estate	  
for	  personal	  and	  commercial	  purposes,	  to	  mitigate	  affordable	  housing	  shortages	  in	  
Liberia:	  	  
	  
I’m	  developing	  a	  four-­‐acre	  property,	  my	  private	  property.	  I’m	  trying	  to	  
put	   up	   some	   real	   estate	   housing,	   affordable	   housing	   for	   rental,	  
because	   I	   have	  my	   kids	   and	   I	  would	   like	   them	   to	   have	   those…And	   I	  
have	   another	   property	   in	   the,	   how	   do	   you	   call	   it,	   Thinker’s	   Village,	  
office,	  yeah,	  in	  there.	  I	  have	  another	  property,	  that	  house	  is	  completed.	  
I	   constructed	   that	   during	   the	   Taylor,	   President	   Sirleaf	  
[administrations]	  that	  I	  reside	  there	  when	  I	  go…87	  
	  
                                                
85	  [DL55]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  October	  26,	  2012.	  	  
86	  [DL18]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  16,	  2012.	  




Besides	   developing	   real	   estate,	   other	   respondents	   boasted	   of	   substantial	  
investments	  in	  agriculture,	  particularly	  cash	  crops,	  such	  as	  this	  61-­‐year-­‐old	  man	  in	  
Washington:	  	  
	  
We	  have	  a	  business	  [of]	  which	  I’m	  a	  shareholder,	  it’s	  called	  the	  pepper	  
sauce…We	  have	  the	  hot	  pepper	  sauce,	   then	  we	  have	  the	  vinegar	  and	  
other	  stuff	  like	  that…We	  have	  a	  large…over	  500	  acres,	  a	  land	  that	  used	  
to	  be	  a	  rubber	  farm	  that	  was	  leased	  to	  me	  and	  my	  brother.	  But	  there	  is	  
no	  rubber	  on	  it	  right	  now…We’re	  trying	  to	  replant	  but	  it’s	  taking	  us	  a	  
long	  time	  because	  the	  capital	  to	  do	  it	  involved	  is	  kind	  of	  difficult,	  but	  
we	  plan	  to	  do	  that.88	  
	  
Another	   respondent,	   a	   43-­‐year-­‐old	   resident	   in	   London,	   said	   she	   used	   her	  
transnational	   cargo	   business	   to	   earn	   an	   extra	   income,	   provide	   reliable	   shipping	  
services	  to	  Liberians	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  generate	  tax	  revenue	  for	  the	  Liberian	  state:	  	  
	  
I	   think	   we’ve	   succeeded	   in	   this	   [shipping]	   business	   because	   people	  
trust	  us	  and	  they	  know	  that	  when	  we	  say	  we’re	  going	  to	  do	  something	  
we	   do	   it.	   I	   think	   we’ve	   changed	   the	   whole	   business	   ethics	   of	   doing	  
business	  in	  Liberia	  because	  I	  say	  to	  people,	  “You’re	  going	  to	  get	  your	  
things	  for	  26th”	  and	  before	  July	  26th	  [Liberia’s	  Independence	  Day]	  they	  
will	  have	  their	  things…And	  we	  have	  to	  send	  money	  from	  here	  to	  pay	  
the	  duty	  and	  everything	  and,	  you	  know,	   I	   insist	  on	  going	   the	  proper	  
way.	   The	   Liberian	   government	   says	   you	   need	   to	   pay	   your	   duty	   on	  
goods	   you	   ship	   to	   the	   country.	   I	   charge	   people	   duty.	   What	   some	  
people	  have	  come	  out	  and	  say,	  “Oh,	  you	  don’t	  need	  to	  pay	  duty	  to	  the	  
Liberian	  government!”	  I	  am	  like,	  “Look,	  whatever	  you’re	  paying	  me	  is	  
what	  is	  building	  the	  roads	  in	  Liberia	  right	  now.	  It’s	  what	  is	  developing	  
the	   country	   so	   if	   you	  don’t	  want	   to	   see	  Liberia	   get	  off	  her	   feet,	   then	  
you	  can	  go	  behind.	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  go,	  you	  know,	  [through]	  the	  back	  
door.	  I’m	  going	  to	  do	  what	  exactly	  I’m	  supposed	  to	  do.”89	  
	  
By	  paying	  taxes	  to	  the	  Liberian	  state,	  this	  respondent	  framed	  herself	  as	  contributing	  
to	   improved	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   In	   addition	   to	   owning	   the	   shipping	   company	  
with	   her	   husband,	   the	   London	   resident	   also	   served	   as	   a	   distributor	   for	  
pharmaceutical	  supplies	  to	  Liberia	  and	  boasted	  of	  other	  substantial	  investments	  in	  
the	  country,	  such	  as	  a	  cab	  service,	  a	  biofuels	  start-­‐up	  company	  in	  rural	  Liberia,	  and	  
large	  amounts	  of	  real	  estate.	  	  
                                                
88	  [DL50]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  October	  24,	  2012.	  	  




Other	  respondents	  said	  that	  they	  practiced	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  transnationally	  by	  
impacting	   the	   lives	   of	   Liberians	   abroad	   through	   humanitarian	   relief,	   such	   as	   this	  
American-­‐born	  55-­‐year-­‐old	  woman	  based	  in	  Washington:	  
	  	  
I	   use	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   Liberian	   Community	  Association	   correct,	  
yes,	  that’s	  a	  while	  ago…I	  served	  as	  its	  president	  for	  two	  years.	  I	  served	  
as	   programme	   vice-­‐president	   and	   I	   served	   as	   membership	   vice-­‐
president.	   A	   lot	   of	   the	   work	   involved	   helping	   recently	   arrived	  
immigrants	  get	  Temporary	  Protected	  Status	  (TPS),	  I	  think	  that’s	  what	  
it	  was	  called	  at	  the	  time…Some	  people	  needed	  housing,	  trying	  to	  put	  
them	  in	   touch	  with	   lawyers	  who	  we	  thought	  could	  help	   them.	  And	  a	  
lot	  of	  it	  was	  helping	  people	  who	  died,	  helping	  them	  get	  buried	  and	  all	  
that	  stuff.	  So	  we	  did	  a	  lot	  of	  that	  in	  the	  community	  besides	  just	  having,	  
you	  know,	  activities.90	  
	  
By	  participating	   in	   relief	   efforts	   to	   address	   the	  material	  well-­‐being	  of	  Liberians	   in	  
Washington,	   this	   respondent	   framed	   herself	   as	   contributing	   to	   improved	   citizen-­‐
citizen	  relations.	  	  
	  
Although	   respondents	   across	   the	   four	   diasporic	   sites	   engaged	   in	   the	   first	   four	  
transnational	   citizenship	   activities	   listed	   in	   Table	   7	   at	   varying	   degrees—diaspora	  
organisational	   support,	   remittance	   transfers	   to	   Liberia,	   school	   fees	   payments,	   and	  
investments	  in	  Liberia—careful	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  remaining	  six	  transnational	  
citizenship	   activities	   are	   unique	   to	   particular	   diasporic	   groupings	   particularly	  
because	   of	   their	   varied	   positionalities	   abroad.	   For	   instance,	   although	   some	  
respondents	   in	   Freetown	   admitted	   to	   owning	   inherited	   or	   personally	   acquired	  
property	  in	  Liberia,	  few	  indicated	  paying	  property	  taxes	  unlike	  their	  counterparts	  in	  
London,	  Washington,	  and	  Accra.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  III,	  this	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  
the	   fact	   that	   on	   average	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   status	   of	   respondents	   in	   Freetown—
most	  of	  whom	  have	  applied	  for	   local	  refugee	   integration	  in	  Sierra	  Leone—is	  much	  
lower	  than	  those	  who	  settled	  in	  London,	  Washington	  and	  Accra,	  with	  a	  few	  outliers	  
here	   and	   there.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   varies	  
considerably	  between	  relatively	  established	  resident	  Liberian	  professionals	  in	  Accra	  
and	   their	   locally	   integrated	   refugee	   counterparts.	   Although	   the	   majority	   of	  
Freetown-­‐based	   respondents	   were	   closer	   in	   proximity	   to	   Liberia,	   few	   of	   them	  
                                                




visited	   Liberia	   regularly	   primarily	   because	   of	   financial	   constraints.	   Some	   of	   their	  
counterparts	  in	  London,	  Washington,	  and	  Accra,	  however,	  said	  they	  visited	  Liberia	  
more	  regularly	  despite	  travelling	  longer	  distances	  and	  paying	  a	  higher	  premium.	  	  
	  
Professional	   and/or	   educational	   attainment	   also	   impacted	   on	   the	   citizenship	  
practices	   of	   respondents	   across	   the	   four	   diasporic	   field	   sites.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	  
respondents	   in	   London	   and	  Washington	   admitted	   to	   engaging	  directly	   in	   capacity	  
building	  and	  skills	  development	  in	  Liberia	  through	  short-­‐term	  visits	  or	  educational	  
exchanges,	  such	  as	  this	  56-­‐year-­‐old	  doctor	  based	  in	  London	  who	  visits	  Liberia	  once	  
a	  year	  to	  render	  voluntary	  medical	  services	  to	  his	  county	  of	  origin:	  
	  
Because	   every	   year	   I	   go,	   I	   offer	   voluntary	   services	   to	   hospitals	   in	  
Nimba…I	  normally	  take	  five	  weeks	  off,	  but	  it’s	  becoming	  more	  difficult	  
too	   to	   go	   away	   for	   extended	   periods	   so	   I	   think	   I	   may	   be	   taking	  
between	  three	  to	  four	  weeks	  at	  a	  time…I	  have	  taken	  equipment	  again	  
to	   Ganta	   Hospital.	   I	   have	   also	   given	   some	   services	   to	   the	   Tappita	  
Hospital,	  the	  new	  Chinese	  hospital.	  I	  went	  in	  there	  a	  year	  ago	  [2011]	  
and	  helped	  to	  set	  up	  some	  of	  their	  equipment.	  And	  also	  I	  have	  plans	  to	  
go	   again	   to	   see	   what	   new	   equipment	   they	   have	   to	   see	   if	   it	   will	   be	  
possible	   to	  help	   to	  get	   them	  going.	  The	  School	  of	  Nursing	   in	  Ganta,	   I	  
took	   a	   hundred	   stethoscopes	   to	   them.	   I	   sometimes	   take	   equipment	  
like	  sutures	  and	  other	  equipment	  to	  the	  hospitals…91	  
	  
Similarly,	  a	  59-­‐year-­‐old	   female	  health	  professional	   in	  Accra	  provides	  transnational	  
medical	  relief	  services	   for	  women	  and	  children	  in	  Liberia	   largely	   facilitated	  by	  her	  
vast	  networks	  established	  while	  living	  abroad:	  
	  
I	   came	   up	   with	   the	   first	   cancer	   awareness	   message	   in	   all	   of	   our	  
dialects	   still	   playing	   on	   UNMIL	   [United	   Nations	   Mission	   in	   Liberia]	  
Radio…I	  was	   able	   to	   treat	  nine	  women,	  brought	   them	   in	   [to	  Ghana],	  
they	  did	  all	  their	  chemo	  and	  everything	  and	  they	  are	  back	  in	  Monrovia	  
and	   they	  are	  doing	  well	   right	  now…And	   then	   I	  also,	   seven	  years	  ago	  
[2006],	  took	  on	  the	  children.	  I	  call	  them	  the	  vulnerable	  medical	  fragile	  
children,	   Liberian	   children	   suffering…So	   I	   fly	   them	   out	   [to	   receive	  
medical	   care	  abroad]	  and	   in	   seven	  years	   I’ve	  done	  149	  children	  and	  
not	  counting	  2013.92	  
	  
                                                
91	  [DL30]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  23,	  2012.	  	  




Other	   respondents	   in	   Accra—many	   of	  whom	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   UNHCR	   skills	  
development	  schemes—revealed	  that	  they	  also	  transferred	  knowledge	  to	  Liberians	  
primarily	  in	  Ghana,	  such	  as	  this	  man	  who	  organised	  vocational	  training	  for	  Liberian	  
refugees	  at	  the	  Buduburam	  Refugee	  Camp:	  	  
	  
Well,	   we	   try	   to	   give	   skills	   training	   to	   refugees,	   especially	   preparing	  
them	  to	  go	  back	  home	  [to	  Liberia]	  and	  contribute.	  So,	  we	  had	  a	  school	  
at	   the	   refugee	   camp	   and	   this	   school	   was	   set	   up	   by	   the	   late	   Bishop	  
Augustus	  Kpaweah.	  The	  school	  was	  called	  AHEAD,	  Agency	  for	  Holistic	  
Development	   something…Well,	   it	   was	   not	   an	   elementary	   school,	   it	  
was,	   let’s	   say,	   pre-­‐tertiary.	   So	   we	   trained	   people	   in	   carpentry,	  
masonry,	  tie-­‐dye,	  batik,	  but	  we	  also	  had	  some	  other	  skills	  like	  training	  
them	   in	   theology.	   Also,	   we	   had	   community	   health,	   yeah,	   and	   so	  
basically	  those	  were	  the	  areas	  of	  concentration…93	  
	  
Unlike	   respondents	   in	   London,	   Washington	   and	   Accra,	   most	   interviewees	   in	  
Freetown,	  who	   collectively	  possessed	   lower	   levels	  of	   education,	  did	  not	   engage	   in	  
capacity	  building	  efforts	  in	  Liberia	  or	  Sierra	  Leone.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  demographic	  
profiles	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  four	  ‘near’	  and	  ‘wider’	  diaspora	  field	  sites	  of	  this	  study	  
are	   indicative	   of	   continental	   trends,	   where	   African	  migrants	   who	   travel	   to	   North	  
America	  and	  Europe	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  educated	  and	  well-­‐off	  than	  their	  counterparts	  
in	  the	  Global	  South	  (Black,	  et.	  al,	  2006:	  7).	  	  	  
While	   some	   citizenship	   engagement	   patterns	   are	   based	   on	   socio-­‐economic	  
positioning	   in	   the	   country	   of	   settlement,	   others	   are	   based	   on	   networks	   in	   Liberia	  
and	  abroad.	  For	  instance,	  respondents	  in	  London	  and	  Washington	  appeared	  to	  have	  
closer	  ties	  with	  embassy	  officials	  in	  those	  locales	  and	  were	  therefore	  more	  engaged	  
with	   government-­‐sponsored	   activities	   than	   their	   counterparts	   in	   Freetown	   and	  
Accra.	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  respondent	  pool	  
in	  Freetown	  and	  Accra	  were	  former	  refugees	  whose	  status	  would	  be	  compromised	  
by	   sustained	   political	   engagement	   with	   the	   Liberian	   government.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	  
unsurprising	   that	   some	  respondents	   in	  Washington	   indicated	  being	  more	  engaged	  
in	  the	  political	  process	  in	  Liberia	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  London	  and	  Freetown,	  
given	  the	  historically	  politicised	  nature	  of	  Washington-­‐based	  diasporas	  discussed	  in	  
the	   previous	   chapter.	   One	   Washington-­‐based	   male	   respondent,	   a	   44-­‐year-­‐old	  
                                                




veteran	   political	   activist	   and	   staunch	   proponent	   of	   dual	   citizenship,	   established	   a	  
lobbying	  organisation	  in	  2003	  to	  influence	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Liberia	  and	  Liberian	  
domestic	  policy:	  	  
	  
Our	   initial	   effort	   was	   lobbying	   for	   peace	   and	   reconstruction	   in	  
Liberia…And	   then	   our	   further	   effort	   involved	   collaboration	   with	  
members	   of	   Congress,	  mainly	   Congressman	  Donald	   Payne…Yeah,	   he	  
recently	  passed	  away.	  He	  introduced	  a	  bill,	  450	  million	  [United	  States]	  
dollars	   Liberia	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development	   Act…We	   helped	   in	  
tailoring	  the	  language	  and	  the	  details	  of	  that	  bill.94	  
	  
Mirroring	   the	   profiles	   of	   their	   Washington-­‐based	   counterparts,	   respondents	   in	  
Accra	  who	  admitted	  to	  being	  actively	  engaged	  in	  domestic	  homeland	  politics	  were	  
elites	   who	   had	   previously	   worked	   for	   the	   Liberian	   government	   on	   short-­‐term	  
assignments	   or	   were	   entangled	   with	   the	   ruling	   political	   class	   through	   personal	  
connections.	   As	   evidenced	   by	   the	   examples	   detailed	   herein,	   Liberians	   across	   the	  
four	   diasporic	   field	   sites	   practice	   citizenship	   differently,	   largely	   contingent	   upon	  
their	  socio-­‐economic	  status	  and	  established	  social	  networks	  in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad.	  	  
	  
At	   this	   juncture,	   I	   shift	   the	   analysis	   from	   diasporas	   to	   consider	   the	   citizenship	  
practices	   of	   homeland	   Liberians	   above	   all	   other	   Monrovia-­‐based	   respondents,	  
primarily	   because	   they	   appear	   to	   be	   the	   most	   rooted,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   Table	   8	  
ranking	  domestic	  citizenship	  practices	  from	  most	  frequent	  responses	  in	  the	  field	  to	  
least	  frequent.	  I	  compiled	  the	  list	   in	  Table	  8	  to	  illustrate	  recurring	  responses	  to	  an	  
open-­‐ended	  question	  posed	  to	  homeland	  and	  returnee	  respondents	  about	  how	  they	  
are	  engaged	  in	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  without	  prompts	  from	  a	  prescribed	  list.	  Although	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  homelanders	  practice	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  mirrors	  returnees	  
in	  many	  ways,	  the	  depth	  and	  breadth	  of	  their	  embeddedness	  in	  Liberia	  supersedes	  
that	  of	  permanent	  and	  circular	  return	  migrants.	  This	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  on	  
average	  homelanders	  have	  spent	  longer	  periods	  of	  time	  in	  Liberia	  and	  are	  entangled	  
in	   the	   complicated	   web	   of	   social	   relations	   and	   mores,	   whereas	   returnees	   must	  
reconstitute	  networks	  or	  create	  new	  ones	  no	  matter	  how	  economically	  empowered	  
or	  politically	  connected	  they	  happen	  to	  be.	  
	  
                                                




Table	   8:	   Top	   10	   Ways	   of	   Practicing	   ‘Liberian	   Citizenship’	   Domestically	   Amongst	  
Homeland	  and	  Returnee	  Respondents	  	  
Domestic	  Citizenship	  Practices	  	   Most	   Frequent	  
Monrovia-­‐Based	  
Respondents	  	  
1)	  Engaging	   in	  capacity	  building	  work	  (teaching	  at	  all	  
levels—from	   elementary	   to	   tertiary—and	   conducting	  
teacher	   training;	   engaging	   in	   organisational	  
development,	   especially	   amongst	   NGOs;	   mentoring	  
young	  Liberians;	  providing	  scholarships)	  
All	   (homelanders,	  
permanent	   and	   circular	  
returnees)	  
2)	  Investing	  in	  Liberia	  (real	  estate,	  businesses,	  stocks)	   All	  
3)	  Paying	  income	  and	  real	  estate	  taxes	   All	  	  
4)	  Involved	  actively	   in	  political	   life	  (voting	   in	  national	  
elections;	   holding	   membership	   of	   political	   parties;	  
conducting	  elections	  monitoring	  and	  registration)	  
Homelanders	  	  
5)	   Engaging	   in	   community	   development	   activities	  
(community	   clean-­‐up	   campaigns;	   community	   peace	  
initiatives,	   blood	   donation	   drives;	   sanitation	   hygiene	  
and	   health	   promotion/awareness;	   reconstructing	  
physical	   infrastructure;	   civic	   education;	   sports	  
promotion)	  
All	  
6)	   Contributing	   to	   humanitarian,	   emergency	   and	  
development	   aid	   to	   Liberia	   (resettling	   Liberians	   after	  
war;	   demobilising	   ex-­‐combatants;	   food	   distribution;	  
grant	  writing;	  working	  with	  orphans)	  
All	  	  
7)	   Involved	   in	   advocacy,	   policy	   making,	   and	   public	  
service	   (advocating	   for	   participatory	   governance,	  
human	   rights,	   women’s	   empowerment,	   transitional	  
justice,	  media	  development)	  
All	  
8)	   Contributing	   to	   charity	   organisations	   through	  
membership	  (Rotary	  Club,	  Paramount	  Young	  Women’s	  
Initiative,	  United	  Methodist	  Youth	  Movement,	  Catholic	  
Youth	   Secretariat,	   Lion’s	   Club,	   Young	   Women’s	  
Christian	  Association)	  
All	  
9)	  Writing	  and	  publishing	  creative	  works	  about	  Liberia	   Homelanders	  	  
10)	  Conducting	  empirically	  driven	  research	  on	  Liberia	   All	  	  
	  
What	   primarily	   differentiates	   the	   citizenship	   practices	   of	   Liberian	   diasporas	   from	  
their	  Monrovia-­‐based	  counterparts,	  particularly	  homelanders,	  is	  distance	  and	  scale.	  
Most	   respondents	   in	   the	   ‘wider’	   diaspora	   were	   engaged	   in	   their	   host	   nations	   as	  
citizens	  or	  legal	  residents	  with	  the	  attendant	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  therein,	  and	  
therefore	  were	   less	   actively	   involved	   in	   Liberia	   because	   of	   their	   relative	   physical	  
distance.	  Homelanders,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  demonstrated	  citizenship	  practices	  that	  
appeared	   broader	   in	   magnitude	   and	   more	   expansive	   in	   scale.	   For	   instance,	  




in	   national	   elections	   and	   other	   electoral	   processes,	   and	   actively	   contributing	   to	  
broad	   sweeping	   political	   and	   governance	   reforms.	   For	   instance,	   a	   47-­‐year-­‐old	  
homelander	   resident	   in	   Liberia	   his	  whole	   life	  was	   one	   of	   only	   two	   respondents	   I	  
interviewed	   who	   had	   voted	   in	   all	   four	   national	   elections	   since	   198595.	   Given	  
Liberia’s	   recurring	   political	   upheavals,	   this	   is	   no	   small	   feat.	   Neither	   is	   navigating	  
through	   a	   politically	   charged	   post-­‐war	   environment	   littered	   with	   the	   competing	  
interests	  of	  donors,	  national	  government,	  civil	  society,	  multi-­‐nationals,	  and	  the	  UN,	  
but	  that	  is	  precisely	  what	  two	  male	  homelanders	  have	  managed	  to	  do.	  While	  one	  48-­‐
year-­‐old	  transitional	  justice	  expert	  was	  involved	  in	  establishing	  Liberia’s	  Truth	  and	  
Reconciliation	   Commission	   (TRC)	   in	   200596,	   a	   47-­‐year-­‐old	   legal	   scholar	   and	   pro-­‐
bono	   law	   lecturer	   served	   in	   a	   number	   of	   appointed	   positions	   in	   natural	   resource	  
governance,	   including	   as	   head	   of	   the	   Liberia	   Extractive	   Industries	   Transparency	  
Initiative	  (LEITI).97	  Regardless	  of	  failed	  outcomes	  discussed	  in	  subsequent	  chapters,	  
these	   respondents’	   efforts	   to	   strengthen	   rule	   of	   law	   has	   challenged	   the	   Liberian	  
state	  to	  improve	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  through	  better	  governance.	  	  
	  
Homelanders	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  entrenched	  in	  the	  economic	  life	  of	  Liberia	  as	  well,	  
having	   paid	   income	   and	   real	   estate	   taxes	   for	   longer	   periods	   of	   time	   than	   their	  
diaspora	   or	   returnee	   counterparts.	   While	   citizenship	   practices	   manifested	   in	   the	  
political	  seemed	  to	  be	  largely	  dominated	  by	  male	  homeland	  respondents,	  economic	  
activities	   presented	   fertile	   ground	   for	  women.	   One	   38-­‐year-­‐old	   entrepreneur	   said	  
that	  she	  managed	  multiple	  businesses	  by	  involving	  local	  communities	  in	  the	  process:	  
	  
I	   have	   a	   material	   store	   where	   I	   do	   general	   merchandise.	   I	   have	   a	  
power	  saw	  which	  I	  do	  pit	  sawing…Those	  places	  that	  we	  are	  doing	  the	  
pit	   sawing,	   many	   of	   those	   villages,	   their	   bridges	   are	   not	   intact.	   To	  
enable	  us	  to	  get	  the	  planks	  from	  those	  places	  that	  we	  are	  sawing,	  we	  
are	   compelled	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   bridges.	   So,	   we	   reconstruct.	   It’s	  
expensive	   but	   I	   persuade	   them.	   I	   get	   to	   the	   place,	   speak	   the	   local	  
dialect…Though	  I	  want	  to	  get	  cash,	  but	  I	  make	  them	  feel	  included…So,	  
in	  that	  way,	  I	  use	  their	  trees,	  fell	  the	  trees,	  we	  produce	  planks,	  I	  only	  
buy	  nails;	   labour	   is	   free.	  And	  when	   I	  bring	   the	  planks,	   I	  have	  planks	  
right	   after	   Fiamah.	   There	   is	   [a]	   sawmill.	   I	   went,	   I	   spoke	   to	   another	  
person,	  I	  got	  [a]	  sawmill.	  He	  doesn’t	  have	  planks.	  He	  makes	  no	  planks.	  
                                                
95	  [HL29]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  18,	  2013.	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  [HL45]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  24,	  2013.	  




So	  we	   keep	   our	   planks	   there.	   I	   started	  with	   them	   and	   other	   people	  
have	  joined…My	  father	  got	  a	  farmland	  but	  apart	  from	  my	  father’s	  land,	  
in	  Suakoko,	  people	  were	  selling	  their	  land	  so	  I	  bought	  three	  acres	  for	  
the	  same	  purpose	  of	  doing	  farming…98	  
	  
While	  agriculture	  and	  farming	  may	  interest	  a	  select	  few,	  many	  homeland	  Liberians,	  
like	  their	  counterparts	  abroad,	  have	  gone	  into	  real	  estate	  for	  commercial	  purposes	  
regardless	   of	   recurring	   land	   tenure	   disputes	   throughout	   the	   country.	   Despite	  
working	  full	  time	  as	  a	  project	  manager	  for	  donor-­‐funded	  initiatives,	  this	  54-­‐year-­‐old	  
male	  respondent	  said	  he	  also	  pursued	  real	  estate	  investment:	  
	  
I	  own	  a	  parcel	  of	   land	   in	  ELWA	  with	  houses	  on	   it.	   I	  own	  one	  acre	  of	  
land	  around	  Duport	  Road	  and	  I	  own	  properties	  around	  the	  Cuttington	  
University.	  So,	  I	  do	  have	  properties	  around	  Liberia…To	  be	  honest	  with	  
you,	  I	  was	  in	  real	  estate.	  Some	  of	  the	  buildings	  I	  own,	  I	  lease	  them	  out	  
and	   then	   get	   money.	   And	   I’m	   in	   the	   process	   of	   trying	   to	   build	   a	  
guesthouse.99	  
	  
Similarly,	   a	   43-­‐year-­‐old	  development	   specialist	  who	  has	   spent	   short	   stints	   abroad	  
said	   he	   invested	   in	   real	   estate	   to	   generate	   profit	   and	   create	   employment	  
opportunities	  for	  Liberians	  who	  may	  not	  have	  the	  luxury	  of	  drawing	  on	  two	  incomes:	  
	  
I	  pay	  income	  tax	  on	  my	  income	  and	  I	  pay	  real	  estate	  [tax],	  you	  know.	  
I’m	  back	  and	  making	  investments.	  Ok,	  one	  of	  the	  things	  that	  happened	  
was	   that	   during	   my	   return	   and	   between	   Sudan	   and	   these	  
consultancies	   I	  was	  doing,	   I	  was	   able	   to	   complete	  my	  building	  and	   I	  
moved	   there.	   I’ve	   done	   two	   other	   buildings	   after	   that	   and	   I’m	   now	  
investing	  in	  a	  flat	  or	  apartment	  complex,	  and,	  of	  course,	  through	  that	  
I’m	   providing	   employment.	   All	   throughout	   I	   have	   been	   providing	  
employment	  opportunities	  for	  Liberians.100	  
	  
Through	  his	  real	  estate	  business,	  this	  respondent	  framed	  himself	  as	  contributing	  to	  
improved	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  by	  employing	  his	  fellow	  Liberians.	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   practicing	   citizenship	   through	   economic	   activities,	   homelanders	  
exhibited	   higher	   levels	   of	   engagement	   in	   community	   development,	   charity	  
organisations,	   and	   the	   creative	   arts	   than	   their	   diaspora	   or	   returnee	   counterparts.	  
                                                
98	  [HL24]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  17,	  2013.	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  [HL22]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  14,	  2013.	  	  




Moreover,	  community	  outreach	  activities	  appeared	  to	  be	  gendered	  and	  age-­‐specific,	  
with	  more	  women	  and	  young	  men	  engaged	  at	  this	  micro-­‐level.	  One	  of	  the	  youngest	  
respondents,	   a	   23-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   university	   student,	   said	   that	   her	   work	   with	   a	  
young	   women’s	   organisation	   was	   contributing	   to	   gender	   equality	   and	   awareness	  
raising:	  	  
	  
I’m	  a	  member	  of	   one	  of	   the	   largest	   female	  oriented	  organisations	   in	  
Liberia,	   the	   Paramount	   Young	   Women	   Initiative,	   and	   basically	   our	  
primary	   objective	   is	   to	   educate	   and	   empower	   young	   women	   in	   the	  
field	   of	   education,	   awareness,	   HIV/AIDS,	   financial	   management,	  
personal	   hygiene,	   small	   business	   establishment;	   we	   also	   provide	  
scholarships	  to	  needy	  female	  students…101	  
	  
Inspired	   by	   her	   passion	   for	   women’s	   empowerment,	   a	   slightly	   older	   female	  
respondent	  was	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  the	  first	  organisation	  for	  women	  living	  
with	   and	   affected	   by	   HIV/AIDS.	   The	   36-­‐year-­‐old	   activist	   recognised	   that	   women	  
were	  being	  unduly	  stigmatised	  in	  communities	  largely	  dominated	  by	  men:	  	  
	  
Well,	   the	   organisation	  was	   founded	   simply	   to	   give	  women	   and	   girls	  
living	  with	  HIV	  a	  face,	  help	  them	  live	  a	  life	  of	  dignity	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
the	   pandemic.	   And	   then	   I	   realised	   that	   a	   lot	   of	   women	   who	   are	  
diagnosed	   HIV	   positive,	   they	   get	   thrown	   out	   of	   their	   homes,	   no	  
deference	  to	  the	  men,	  the	  men	  are	  the	  innocent	  ones,	  the	  women	  are	  
the	  ones	  who	  went	  out.	  Never	  mind	  that	  they	  have	  had	  children,	  they	  
have	  accumulated	  properties	  with	  some	  of	  those	  men	  and	  it's	  actually	  
through,	  as	  we	  say	   in	  Liberia,	   their	  sweat…So,	  we	  started	  with	  small	  
loans,	   kind	  of,	   sort	   of	   a	   revolving	   fund	   and	   then	  we	   tried	   to	   keep	   in	  
contact	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  with	  the	  women…Peer	  to	  peer	  counseling	  
has	  done	   a	   lot	   in	   keeping	   a	   lot	   of	  women	  alive	  because	   if	   I	   am	  HIV-­‐
positive	  and	   I	   can	  get	  another	  woman	  who	   is	  HIV-­‐positive	   to	   talk	   to	  
me	  and	  say,	   “Look,	   I’ve	  been	   through	   this	  and	   I'm	  here.	  You	  know,	   I	  
think	   you	   can	   rise	   above	   it.”	   It	   has	   helped	   greatly	   in	   increasing	   the	  
lives	  of	  women	  who	  live	  with	  HIV.102	  
	  
Given	   their	   efforts	   to	   improve	   the	   lives	   of	   women	   and	   girls	   in	   Liberia,	   the	   two	  
previous	   female	   respondents	  contributed	   to	  strengthening	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  
through	  development	  practice.	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  [HL37]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  21,	  2013.	  	  




A	   45-­‐year-­‐old	  mother	   of	   two	   also	   demonstrated	   efforts	   to	   improve	   citizen-­‐citizen	  
relations	  with	  her	  community	  development	  work:	  
	  
Wherever	   I	   find	   myself,	   I	   try	   as	   much	   as	   I	   can	   to	   bring	   people	   to	  
another	  level,	  to	  train	  them,	  to	  build	  their	  capacity.	  Likewise,	  we	  work	  
in	  our	  communities.	  I	  served	  as	  community	  leader	  before	  in	  my	  block	  
where	  I	  stay	  in	  New	  Georgia.	  So,	  we	  do	  community	  work…What	  we	  do	  
mainly	   in,	   like	   I	   live	   in	   New	   Georgia	   Block	   D;	   we	   have	   our	   own	  
committee	  so	  we	  do	  like	  clean-­‐up	  campaign,	  we	  advise	  the	  youth,	  we	  
got	  youth	  that	  we	  advise	  and	  we	  also	  do	  this	  savings	  club	  to	  help	  other	  
members…you	   invest	   money,	   you	   can	   take	   loan;	   it	   is	   not	   the	   daily	  
susu103	  or	  monthly,	   yes,	   so	   you	   can	   invest.	  We	   did	   that	   once,	   so	  we	  
wanted	   to	   generate	   profit	   to	   be	   able	   to	   do	   some	   income	   generating	  
project	  for	  the	  group.104	  
	  
As	   has	   been	   illustrated,	   the	   micro-­‐level	   community	   sphere	   appears	   to	   be	   where	  
homeland	   women	   are	   most	   visibly	   active	   and	   therefore	   empowered	   to	   perform	  
citizenship.	  It	  is	  a	  sphere	  occupied	  by	  young	  men	  as	  well,	  as	  articulated	  by	  this	  29-­‐
year-­‐old	  former	  youth	  volunteer	  and	  activist:	  	  
	  
We	  called	  ourselves	  the	  Peer	  Counsellors…So,	  we	  said	  that	  there	  were	  
[a]	  lot	  of	  ills	  in	  the	  Catholic	  school…so,	  we	  put	  ourselves	  together	  from	  
various	  schools…once	  we	  put	  a	  full	  report	  together,	  we	  went	  through	  
the	  Youth	  Director,	   it	  went	   to	   the	  Catholic	  Education	  Secretariat	  and	  
what	   we	   considered	   as	   ills	   in	   the	   various	   schools,	   we	   catalogued	  
them…In	  my	  own	  school,	  the	  principal	  got	  dismissed	  for	  that,	  for	  not	  
being	   an	   able	   leader	   to	   lead	   his	   school	   with	   all	   of	   those	  
challenges…Then	   they	   started	   that	  process	  of	   rotating	   the	  principals	  
because	  they	  noticed	  that	  people	  were	  getting	  complacent	  when	  they	  
were	  staying	  in	  one	  place	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  So,	  because	  of	  our	  
efforts,	   they	  started	  rotating	  principals	  around,	  and	  then	  gradually	   it	  
also	   led	   to	   the	   Secretariat	   having	   more	   monitoring	   activities	   in	   the	  
school.	   It’s	   not	   directly	   related	   to	   it	   but	   through	   their	   direct	  
monitoring	  and	  supervision	   they	  realised	   that	   the	  Business	  Manager	  
was	   siphoning	   the	   school’s	   resources	   and	   then	   they	   started	   the	  
process	  of	  paying	  directly	  to	  the	  bank…105	  
	  
                                                
103	  Susu	   is	   the	  Liberian	   version	  of	   a	   revolving	  micro-­‐credit	   community	   venture	   in	  which	   groups	  of	  
women	  pool	  money	   together	  monthly	  and	  each	  has	  a	  chance	   to	  collect	  a	   lump	  sum	  of	  money	  once	  
during	  the	  payment	  cycle.	  	  	  
104	  [HL4]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  5,	  2013.	  	  




It	   is	   clear	   based	   on	   analysis	   of	   the	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social/community	  
domains	  of	  homeland	  citizenship	  practices	   in	  Liberia	   that	  men	  and	  women,	  young	  
and	  old,	  practice	  citizenship	  differently	  primarily	  based	  on	  their	  social	  locations,	  and	  
that	  practices	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  set	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  Liberian	  state	  
and	  its	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  amongst	  citizens	  themselves.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   explore	   in	   more	   detail	   my	   conceptual	   framing	   of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   as	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   by	   examining	   interactions	   between	   the	   Liberian	  
state	   (through	   its	  embassies)	  and	  Liberians	   in	   ‘near’	   and	   ‘wider’	  diaspora	   sites,	   as	  
well	  as	  amongst	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  in	  regional	  diaspora	  organisations.	  	  
	  
Citizenship	  as	  a	  Set	  of	  Relations	  between	  the	  Liberian	  State	  and	  Diasporas	  	  
The	   Liberian	   embassy’s	   engagement	  with	   Liberians	   in	   the	  UK	   reveals	   loose	   state-­‐
citizen	   relations.	  The	  embassy	   lacked	  an	  official	  database,	   and	   could	  only	  boast	  of	  
registering	  1500	   to	  2000	  of	   the	   approximately	  5000	   to	  6000	  Liberians	   in	   the	  UK,	  
according	  to	  then	  Ambassador	  Johnson,	  who	  also	  indicated	  that	  aside	  from	  the	  2000	  
or	  so	  Liberian	  Londoners,	  large	  concentrations	  of	  Liberians	  reside	  in	  urban	  centres	  
such	   as	   Sheffield,	   Manchester,	   Liverpool,	   Bradford,	   and	   Milton	   Keynes.	   Beyond	  
serving	   as	   a	   channel	   for	   UK	   aid	   and	   investment	   links	   to	   Liberia,	   the	   embassy	  
appeared	  constrained	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  reach	  Liberians	  in	  London,	  and	  by	  extension,	  
the	  UK,	   especially	   those	  who	  were	  undocumented.	  Ambassador	   Johnson	   indicated	  
that	   Liberians	   in	   the	   UK	   previously	   viewed	   the	   embassy	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   a	  
transatlantic	   surveillance	   system.	   However,	   he	   could	   not	   articulate	   a	   clear	  
engagement	  strategy	  beyond	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  embassy	  assists	  Liberians	  periodically	  
who	  need	   to	   regularise	   their	   status	   in	   the	  UK	  and	   serves	   as	   a	   partner	   to	   Liberian	  
organisations	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  
That	   the	   embassy	   has	   limited	   penetration	   amongst	   Liberians	   in	   the	   UK	   was	  
particularly	  stark	  in	  my	  interview	  with	  Prince	  Taylor,	  head	  of	  the	  Union	  of	  Liberian	  
Organisations	  in	  the	  UK	  (ULO-­‐UK),	  who	  said	  that	  his	  organisation	  had	  been	  asked	  by	  
the	   embassy	   to	   gather	   demographic	   information	   on	   Liberians	   in	   the	   UK	   for	   a	  
comprehensive	  database.	  Filling	  the	  void	  in	  embassy	  engagement,	  organisations	  like	  




ULO-­‐UK	   and	   its	   member	   organisations	   facilitate	   access	   to	   social	   services	   for	  
Liberians	   thereby	   collaborating	   with	   other	   UK-­‐based	   diaspora	   organisations,	   and	  
were	   in	   the	   process	   of	   transitioning	   from	   a	   collection	   of	   social	   and	   recreation	  
oriented	  organisations	  to	  organisations	  involved	  in	  development	  activities	  in	  Liberia:	  
	  
Within	  the	  UK,	  we	  have	  been	  involved	  with	  our	  members	  who’ve	  got	  
problems	  with	  like	  immigration.	  We	  seek	  assistance	  through	  the	  legal	  
channel,	   if	   you	   like.	  We’ve	  been	   like	   a	   link	  with	   service	  providers	   in	  
the	   UK	   to	   Liberians	   who	   will	   need	   help	   or	   through	   Liberian	  
organisations…[In	   Liberia]	   we	   have	   been	   involved	   with	   the	   J.V.	  
Massaquoi	  School	  and	  at	  the	  moment	  working	  with	  other	  institutions	  
to	  see	  where	  we	  can	  get	  books	  and	  other	  materials	  for	  university,	  for	  
educational	  purpose.	  We	  had	  anticipated	  looking	  at	  the	  health	  sector,	  
but	  due	  to	  other	  constraints	  we	  haven’t	  been	  able	  to	  actually	  pour	  out	  
our	   resources	   to	   reach	   to	   those	   needed,	   people	   within	   the	   health	  
sector	  or	   the	   educational	   [sector].	  But	   specifically	   it’s	   J.V.	  Massaquoi	  
School	   that	   ULO-­‐UK’s	   been	   working	   with,	   and	   other	   local	  
organisations	   are	   also	   doing	   charity	  work	   for	   orphanages	   and	   other	  
institutions	  in	  Liberia.106	  	  	  
	  
ULO-­‐UK’s	  deliberate	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  the	  social	  to	  the	  developmental	  is	  indicative	  
of	   the	   reconfiguration	  of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	   from	   identity	   to	  political,	   economic,	  
and	  social	  practice.	  	  
	  
Because	   of	   the	   citizenship	   practices	   of	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   in	   Washington,	   the	  
Liberian	   embassy	   has	   demonstrated	   a	   more	   spirited	   engagement	   with	   citizens	  
abroad	   than	   its	   counterpart	   in	   London.	   This	   is	   evidenced	   by	   the	   previous	  
ambassador’s	  fleeting	  efforts	  to	  establish	  a	  Diaspora	  Advisory	  Board107,	  the	  current	  
ambassador’s	   establishment	   of	   a	   diaspora	   liaison	   at	   the	   embassy,	   the	   embassy’s	  
mediation	  role	  in	  a	  series	  of	  civil	  and	  criminal	  cases	  involving	  Liberians	  resettled	  in	  
the	   US	   as	   well	   as	   its	   hosting	   of	   a	   diaspora/dual	   citizenship	   symposium	   during	  
festivities	   marking	   Liberia’s	   165th	   Independence	   Day	   celebrations	   in	   July	   2012.	  
Moreover,	   the	   embassy’s	   annual	   July	   26th	   Independence	   Day	   celebration	   on	   its	  
manicured	   grounds	   attracts	   hundreds	   of	   Liberians	   and	   friends	   of	   Liberia.	   The	  
                                                
106	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  16,	  2012.	  
107	  The	  Liberian	  Diaspora	  Advisory	  Board,	  of	  which	  I	  was	  a	  member,	  had	  a	  relatively	  short	  shelf	  life	  
because	  of	   limited	  support	   from	  Monrovia.	  Ambassador	  Nathaniel	  Barnes	  established	   the	  Board	   in	  
2009	  to	  formalise	  the	  relationship	  between	  Liberians	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  Liberian	  government,	  thereby	  
attempting	   to	   harness	   the	   financial,	   political,	   social,	   and	   cultural	   capital	   of	   Liberians	   in	   the	   US	   for	  




success	   of	   July	   26th	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   embassy’s	   collaboration	   with	   Liberian	  
associations	   in	   both	   the	   planning	   and	   execution	   of	   activities,	   said	   Minister	  
Counsellor	  for	  Public	  Affairs	  Gabriel	  I.	  A.	  Williams:	  
	  
And	   we	   bring	   the	   community	   leaders,	   those	   that	   are	   here	  
[Washington],	   and	  we	   form	   a	   committee	   and	  we	   get	   them	   involved.	  
For	   example,	   this	   ‘Educate	   to	   Elevate,’	   we	   brought	   in	   alumni	  
associations	  of	  the	  various	  institutions,	  high	  schools/colleges	  that	  are	  
active	   here,	   and	   other,	   USAID	   and	   other	   agencies	   that	   support	  
education	   in	   Liberia,	   the	   alumni	   associations	   of	   the	   various	  
universities	  in	  Liberia,	  we	  bring	  their	  leaders	  here	  and	  we	  say,	  “Look,	  
this	  is	  what	  we	  want	  to	  do.”	  And	  all	  of	  them	  have	  booths	  here	  and	  then	  
we	  connect	  with	  all	   the	  community	  organisations	  across	   the	  country	  
as	  much	  as	  we	  can.	  As	  we	  move	  towards	  the	  event,	  I	  send	  out	  a	  lot	  of	  
information	  to	  the	  community,	   it’s	  a	  whole	  network,	  and	  then	  by	  the	  
time	  26th	  comes,	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  too	  they	  bring	  their	  artefacts,	  food…108	  
	  
Although	  the	  Washington	  embassy	  appeared	  committed	   to	   improving	  state-­‐citizen	  
relations,	   engagement	   was	   primarily	   confined	   to	   its	   social	   and	   political	   networks	  
with	  an	  expressed	  mandate	  to	  strengthen	  Liberian	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  abroad,	  
such	  as	  the	  Liberian	  Community	  Association	  in	  the	  Washington	  Metropolitan	  Area.	  
Vice-­‐president	  Nee	  Allison	  averred	  that	  the	  Community	  Association’s	  activities	  were	  
not	   ‘development’	   oriented	   and	   geared	   towards	   Liberia,	   per	   se,	   but	   rather	   social,	  
cultural,	   and	   humanitarian	   in	   nature	   and	   focused	   on	   interventions	   in	   the	  
Washington	   area,	   such	   as	   advocating	   on	   behalf	   of	   Liberians	   registered	   under	  
Deferred	  Enforced	  Departure	  (DED):	  
	  
Our	   community,	   we	   are	   not	   directly	   active	   in	   Liberia,	   but	   we	   work	  
with	  the	  Liberians	  in	  this	  community,	  the	  Liberians	  that	  are	  coming	  in.	  
We	  assist	  the	  senior	  citizens.	  We	  do	  have	  a	  senior	  citizen	  programme	  
for	   Liberians	   that	   are	  within	   the	   diaspora—not	   the	   diaspora,	  within	  
the	   metropolitan	   area.	   We	   also,	   on	   a	   smaller	   scale,	   we	   do	   have	  
programmes	   for	  our	  younger	  kids	  because	  a	   lot	  of	  our	  parents,	   they	  
work	  multiple	  jobs.	  Kids	  get	  in	  trouble	  when	  the	  parents	  are	  not	  home,	  
so	  we	   try	   to	   network	  with	   the	   community	   to	   assist	   them	  with	   after	  
school	   programmes,	   mentoring	   programmes	   and	   other	  
things…Presently,	  we’re	   trying	   to	   expand	  our	  programmes.	  We’re	   in	  
the	  process	  of	  acquiring	  our	  own	  building	  so	  we	  can	  have,	  it's	  going	  to	  
be	  more	   of	   a	   cultural	   centre	   because	  most	   of	   the	   Liberians	   that	   are	  
born	   here,	   they	   have	   a	   strong	   disconnect	   with	   our	   culture	   and	   we	  
                                                




need	   to	   have	   a	   place	   where	   those	   things	   can	   be	   exhibited,	   where	  
people	   can	   talk	   stories,	   folk	   tales,	   on	   things	   that	   are	   happening	   in	  
Liberia—just	   the	   basic	   things	   so	   they	   can	   have	   that	   sense	   of	  
connection	  with	  the	  community	  at	  large.109	  
	  
It	  was	  clear	  from	  Allison’s	  account	  that	  while	  the	  Community	  Association	  was	  more	  
politically	   active	   in	   the	  1990s	   and	   early	   2000s	  during	   Liberia’s	   armed	   conflicts,	   it	  
has	   adopted	   a	   rather	   apolitical	   stance	   in	   the	   past	   10	   years,	   particularly	   amongst	  
those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  regularised	  status	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  
academic	   literature	  which	   states	   that	   diasporas	   have	   cycles	   of	   active	   engagement	  
that	   often	   mirror	   the	   political	   climate	   in	   their	   countries	   of	   origin	   (Østergaard-­‐
Nielson,	  2001;	  Adamson,	  2002;	  Brinkerhoff,	  2008).	  
	  
As	  there	  was	  no	  regional	  umbrella	  organisation	  comprising	  Liberians	  in	  Freetown,	  I	  
did	  not	  interview	  a	  regional	  organisational	  head	  as	  I	  did	  in	  London	  and	  Washington	  
to	   examine	   Liberian	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations.	   Despite	   the	   fluidity	   of	   Liberian	   and	  
Sierra	   Leonean	   identities,	   the	   Freetown-­‐based	   Liberian	   embassy	   revealed	  weaker	  
state-­‐citizen	   relations	   than	   its	   counterparts	   in	   Washington	   and	   London.	   The	   late	  
Ambassador	  Brima	  admitted	  that	  because	  the	  embassy	  does	  not	  have	  a	  database	  of	  
Liberians	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  it	  relies	  heavily	  on	  UNHCR	  statistics.	  It	  was	  apparent	  from	  
our	   interview	   that	   the	   embassy	   lacks	   the	   infrastructure	   to	   document	   migration	  
flows	   from	   Liberia	   to	   Sierra	   Leone,	   prompting	   the	   ambassador	   to	   speculate	   that	  
about	   4000	   Liberians	   have	   resided	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   since	   UNHCR	   discontinued	  
refugee	   status	   for	   Liberians	   in	   June	   2012.	   Because	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   Liberians	  
who	  travelled	  to	  Sierra	  Leone	  seeking	  refuge	  from	  armed	  conflict	  were	  protected	  by	  
UNHCR,	   any	   official	   connection	   to	   the	   Liberian	   embassy	   in	   Sierra	   Leone—and,	   by	  
extension,	   the	  government	  of	  Liberia—would	   jeopardise	  their	  refugee	  status.	  This,	  
according	   to	   Brima,	   has	   severely	   constrained	   the	   embassy’s	   engagement	   with	  
Liberians	   in	   Sierra	   Leone.	   Yet,	   despite	   its	   hands-­‐off	   policy	  with	   regard	   to	   refugee	  
interference,	  the	  embassy	  has	  intervened	  on	  behalf	  of	  Liberians	  under	  the	  auspices	  
of	   UNHCR,	   particularly	   those	   who	   have	   been	   unduly	   incarcerated	   for	   criminal	  
offences,	  said	  Brima:	  
	  
                                                




…there	  was	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Liberian	  refugees	  went	  on	  the	  rampage	  
and	  they	  had	  [a]	  problem	  with	  the	  UNHCR.	  The	  UNHCR	  didn’t	  want	  us	  
to,	  at	  all,	  interfere,	  but	  I	  couldn’t	  help	  but	  do	  something	  about	  it.	  They	  
went	   through	   the	   case	   as	   a	   case	   against	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	  
government.	  They	  had	  these	  people	   incarcerated.	   I	   followed	  the	  case	  
and	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day,	   the	  merits	   they	  gave	  were	  not	  as	  grave	  as	  
the	  UNHCR	  wanted	  to	  take	  it,	  so	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  we	  were	  able	  to	  
convince	  the	  [Sierra	  Leonean]	  government	  and	  the	  case	  was	  dropped.	  
In	  those	  instances	  we	  interfere.	  If	  they	  are	  unjustly	  treated,	  of	  course	  
we	  do	  something	  about	  it.110	  
	  
Ambassador	   Brima’s	   admission	   that	   the	   embassy	   interferes	   on	   behalf	   of	   refugees	  
when	  it	  is	  warranted	  was	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  Liberian	  state’s	  engagement	  with	  its	  
nationals	   in	   Sierra	   Leone,	   albeit	   conditional,	   is	   still	   anchored	   on	   an	   expressed	  
responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  Liberian	  citizens	  abroad.	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   Brima’s	   counterpart	   in	   Accra	   did	   not	   operate	   under	   the	   abiding	  
principle	  of	  ‘responsibility	  to	  protect’.	  Of	  all	  the	  embassies	  I	  approached	  across	  the	  
four	   urban	   centres	   abroad,	   the	   Liberian	   embassy	   in	   Accra	   appeared	   the	   least	  
engaged	   with	   Liberian	   migrants,	   and	   the	   least	   successful	   in	   propelling	   the	  
‘development	   diplomacy’111	  foreign	   policy	   agenda	   introduced	   by	   former	   Liberian	  
Foreign	  Minister	  Olubanke	  King-­‐Akerele,	   a	   diaspora	   returnee	  who	   had	   previously	  
worked	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP)	  in	  Dakar,	  Senegal.	  
The	  embassy	  does	  not	  have	  a	  full	  record	  of	  Liberians	  in	  Ghana,	  and	  instead	  relies	  on	  
statistics	  from	  UNHCR,	  which	  had	  a	  database	  of	  47000	  Liberians	  in	  2005	  and	  as	  of	  
May	   2013	   had	   3000	   Liberians	   registered	   for	   local	   integration.	   Echoing	   the	  
sentiments	   of	   his	   counterpart	   in	   Freetown,	   then	   Ambassador	   Von	   Ballmoos112	  
admitted	   that	   the	   embassy	   had	   been	   constrained	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   its	  
citizens	   in	   Ghana	   because	   the	   vast	   majority	   were	   registered	   under	   UNHCR	  
protection,	   and	   therefore	   could	   not	   officially	   seek	   assistance	   from	   the	   embassy	  
without	   jeopardising	   their	   refugee	   status.	   The	   ambassador	   could	   not	   articulate	   a	  
clear	   engagement	   strategy	   for	   Liberians	   in	   Ghana,	   beyond	   the	   embassy’s	   one-­‐off	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  Semi-­‐structured	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  April	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outreach	  event	   for	  over	  1000	  Liberians	   in	  Accra	  and	   its	  environs	   in	   January	  2013,	  
executed	  by	  embassy	  2nd	  Secretary	  Angela	  Lavela	  Von	  Ballmoos.113	  	  
	  
While	   Liberian	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   are	   virtually	   non-­‐existent	   in	   Ghana,	   citizen-­‐
citizen	   relations	   appear	   to	   be	   more	   solid,	   especially	   amongst	   former	   refugee	  
members	  of	  the	  United	  Liberian	  Association	  in	  Ghana	  (ULAG).	  Established	  in	  2010,	  
ULAG	   responds	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   its	   30+	   active	   members	   by	   providing	   financial	  
support	  to	  Liberians	  in	  Accra	  and	  its	  environs	  and	  facilitating	  social	  gatherings	  for	  
community	  cohesion,	  said	  president	  Julia	  Richards:	  	  
	  
The	   main	   function	   of	   the	   organisation	   is	   to	   cater	   to	   Liberians,	   the	  
welfare	   of	   Liberians,	   socially,	   financially	   and	   bringing	   Liberians	  
together.	  That’s	  one	  of	  the	  main	  functions…to	  improve	  the	  status	  and	  
livelihood	  of	  Liberians	  living	  in	  Ghana.	  Since	  the	  UN,	  they	  did	  not	  exist	  
under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   anymore.	   Though	   it	   was	  
founded	  before	  the	  United	  Nations	  closed	   its	  operation	   in	  Ghana,	  we	  
tend	  to	  seek	  financial	  support	  for	  Liberians	  who	  are,	  like	  for	  instance,	  
maybe	  when	  they	  fall	  ill	  or	  Liberians	  who	  fall	  short	  of	  some	  financial	  
thing	   that	   they	   cannot	   take	   control	   of,	   and	   some	   Liberians	  who	   are	  
sick,	  you	  know,	  just	  to	  be	  there	  basically	  for	  Liberians	  who	  are	  unable	  
to,	  you	  know,	  handle	  all	  of	  their	  problems	  though	  we	  do	  not	  take	  care	  
of	  all	  their	  needs	  because	  ULAG	  is	  a	  small	  organisation	  and	  most	  of	  us	  
in	  Ghana	  came	  here	  as	  refugees.114	  	  
	  
In	   many	   respects,	   ULAG	   mirrors	   the	   mandate	   of	   the	   Liberian	   Community	  
Association	   in	  Washington	  yet	   it	   is	   less	   financially	   robust.	  ULAG’s	   lack	  of	   financial	  
capacity	  prohibits	   the	  kinds	  of	  development	  oriented	  collective	  efforts	  undertaken	  
by	   the	   Union	   of	   Liberian	   Organisations	   in	   the	   UK	   (ULO-­‐UK),	   for	   instance.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  Association	  helped	  to	  facilitate	  the	  Liberia	  Rising	  2030	  Town	  Hall	  
Meeting	  in	  Accra	  in	  2012	  to	  solicit	  the	  views	  of	  Liberians	  in	  Ghana	  to	  feed	  into	  the	  
country’s	   second	   major	   post-­‐war	   development	   agenda,	   proving	   its	   ability	   to	  
maintain	  satisfactory	  state-­‐citizen	  relations.	  Although	  ULAG	  appears	  to	  be	  apolitical,	  
Richards	   revealed	   that	   she	  had	  also	  collaborated	  with	   the	  European	  Federation	  of	  
Liberian	  Associations	  (EFLA)	  and	  the	  Union	  of	  Liberian	  Associations	  in	  the	  Americas	  
(ULAA)	  as	  a	   signatory	   to	   the	  petition	   for	  dual	   citizenship	  by	  members	  of	  Liberia’s	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diasporas.	  When	  EFLA	  delegates	   transited	   through	  Accra	   in	  2010	  on	   their	  way	   to	  
Monrovia	   to	   lobby	   for	   dual	   citizenship,	   Richards	   facilitated	   their	   informal	  
discussions	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  with	  Liberians	  resident	  in	  Accra	  and	  
its	   environs,	   indicating	   that	   ULAG	   also	   maintains	   strong	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations	  
with	  other	  Liberian	  nationals	  abroad.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  relations	  between	  the	  Liberian	  state	  and	  its	  
nationals	  abroad	  have	  been	  either	  limited	  or	  expansive	  largely	  because	  of	  embassy	  
engagement,	   or	   lack	   thereof,	   and	   the	   social	   locations	   (manifested	   in	   immigration	  
status)	  of	  Liberians	  abroad.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  regional	  diaspora	  organisations	  tend	  
to	   fill	   gaps	   in	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   with	   their	   own	   brand	   of	   citizen-­‐citizen	  
engagement,	  ranging	  from	  humanitarian	  relief	  abroad	  to	  transnational	  development	  
practice	  in	  Liberia.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
According	   to	   analysis	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   respondents	   whose	   narratives	   were	  
showcased	   in	   the	   introduction—Beyan,	   Teta,	   Precious,	   and	   James—would	   all	   be	  
considered	  Liberian	  citizens	  on	  a	  continuum,	  as	  would	  their	  offspring,	  because	  their	  
Liberianness	   is	   anchored	   by	   the	   fluidity	   of	   jus	   soli	   and	   jus	   sanguinis	   principles	   of	  
citizenship.	   Therefore,	   an	   ‘authentic’	   Liberian	   citizen	   does	   not	   exist.	   Instead,	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   remains	   a	   contested	   category	   of	   inquiry	   primarily	   due	   to	  
variances	   in	   the	   social	   locations	   and	   life-­‐worlds	   of	   Liberians	   within	   Liberia	   and	  
across	   transnational	   spaces.	   This	   is	   also	   emblematic	   of	   a	   larger	   narrative	   of	  
citizenship	   reconfiguration	   across	   the	   globe.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   argued	   that	  
contemporary	   constructions	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   sit	   on	   a	   continuum	   between	  
identity-­‐based	  citizenship	  and	  practice-­‐based	  citizenship,	  thereby	  transcending	  the	  
legal	   definition	   of	   citizenship	   in	   the	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law.	  While	   homeland	  
Liberians	  embody	  citizenship	  practices	  that	  are	  domestically	  rooted	  and	  territorially	  
confined	   to	  Liberia,	  diasporas	  and	   returnees	  engage	   in	   transnational	  pursuits	   that	  
attempt	   to	   positively	   alter	   citizen-­‐citizen	   and	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   abroad	   and	  
within	   Liberia.	   I	   also	   demonstrated	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   relations	   between	   the	  




the	   levels	   of	   engagement	   of	   embassies	   and	   the	   immigration	   status	   of	   nationals	  
abroad.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   four	   chapters	   that	   follow,	   I	   argue	   that	   factors	   such	   as	   conflict,	   migration,	  
globalisation	   and	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   have	   come	   to	   configure	   and	   reconfigure	  
contemporary	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   in	   the	   manner	   described	   in	   this	   chapter	   by	  
respondents—as	  identity,	  practice,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  Liberian	  state	  
and	  its	  citizens	  and	  amongst	  citizens.	  The	  next	  chapter	  examines	  how	  historical	  and	  
contemporary	   conflict	   interfaces	   have	   influenced	   the	   introduction	   and	  




























Give	  Me	  Your	  Land	  or	  I’ll	  Shoot!	  
	  
On	  December	  15,	  1821,	  Peter,	  paramount	  king	  of	  the	  Cape	  of	  Mesurado	  on	  the	  coast	  
of	  pre-­‐settler	  Liberia,	  was	  held	  at	  gunpoint	  (Levitt,	  2005:	  40-­‐41).	  His	  assailants,	  Dr.	  
Eli	   Ayers	   and	   Robert	   Stockton,	   were	   white	   agents	   of	   the	   American	   Colonisation	  
Society	  (ACS)	  (Levitt,	  2005:	  40-­‐41).	  The	  ACS	  was	  founded	  in	  Washington	  in	  1816	  to	  
solve	  the	  ‘race	  problem’	  in	  the	  US	  by	  establishing	  a	  settlement	  on	  the	  West	  African	  
coast	   for	   free	   blacks	   and	   those	   who	   agreed	   to	   migrate	   if	   they	   were	   manumitted	  
(Kieh,	  2012a:	  168).	  King	  Peter,	   like	  all	   the	  other	  African	  kings	  Ayers	  and	  Stockton	  
had	   approached	   to	   secure	   land,	   was	   intransigent.	   Use	   of	   force,	   or	   the	   threat	   of	  
violence,	   appeared	   to	   be	   the	   only	   means	   of	   pacifying	   him.	   Frustrated,	   “Stockton	  
pulled	   out	   his	   pistol,	   cocked	   it	   and	   gave	   it	   to	   Ayers	   with	   instructions	   to	   shoot	   if	  
necessary.	  He	  then	  aimed	  another	  pistol	  at	  King	  Peter’s	  head”	  and	   insisted	  that	  he	  
and	  five	  other	  kings	  relinquish	  parcels	  of	  land	  by	  ‘deed’	  in	  exchange	  for	  US$300	  and	  
tradeable	  goods	  such	  as	  rum,	  tobacco,	  and	  guns	  (Levitt,	  2005:	  40-­‐41).	  	  
	  
When	  the	  black	  settlers	  arrived	  at	  the	  Cape	  in	  1822,	  however,	  King	  Peter	  attempted	  
to	  return	  compensation	  for	  the	  land	  claiming	  that	  he	  had	  been	  duped	  (Holsoe,	  1971:	  
336;	   TRC,	   2009b:	   103-­‐104).	   This	   would	   mark	   the	   first	   documented	   conflict	   over	  
land	  ownership,	  which	  became	  a	  major	  tenet	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship.’	  In	  this	  chapter,	  
I	  argue	  that	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  has	  been	  configured	  and	  reconfigured	  because	  of	  
conflicts115	  precipitated	  by	  four	  major	  interfaces	  between	  a	  range	  of	  social	  actors:	  i)	  
the	   1847	   founding	   of	   the	   nation	   state,	   its	   pre-­‐settler	   antecedents	   and	   post-­‐
independence	   state-­‐building	   and	   nation-­‐building	   architecture;	   ii)	   the	   toppling	   of	  
True	   Whig	   Party	   rule	   in	   1980;	   iii)	   armed	   conflicts	   (1989-­‐1997	   and	   1999-­‐2003)	  
which	  ruptured	  and	  sealed	  state-­‐citizen	  and	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  simultaneously;	  
and	   iv)	   post-­‐war	   conflicts	   over	   income	   inequality,	   land	   tenure	   and	   transitional	  
justice.	   I	  argue	   further	   that	   these	   four	  sites	  of	  conflict	  reveal	  a	  crisis	  of	  citizenship	  
dating	   back	   to	   Liberia’s	   state	   formation	   beginning	   in	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century,	   and	  
                                                





therefore	   underpin	   contemporary	   claims	   for	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   against	   dual	  
citizenship.	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  Liberia’s	  citizenship	  construction	  has	  undergone	  a	  series	  of	  iterations,	  so	  too	  
have	  its	  state-­‐making	  processes,	  primarily	  triggered	  by	  conflicts	  varying	  in	  degrees	  
and	  scales.	  Conflict,	   in	  my	  analysis,	   includes	  both	  physical	  and	  structural	  violence,	  
coined	  by	  Johan	  Galtung	  (1969)	  to	  mean	  the	  social	  structures	  and	  institutions	  that	  
inhibit	   individuals	   from	  meeting	  their	  basic	  needs,	  or	   from	  actualising	  their	   fullest	  
capabilities	  (Sen,	  1999:	  291).	  While	  I	  employ	  Long’s	  notion	  of	  the	  interface	  herein,	  I	  
also	   incorporate	  Galtung’s	   conflict	   triangle	  with	   the	   elements	  of	   contradiction	   (C),	  
attitude	  (A),	  and	  behaviour	  (B)	  representing	  each	  point.	  According	  to	  Galtung	  (1996:	  
70-­‐73),	  conflict	  signifies	  a	  dynamic	  process	  in	  which	  the	  ‘incompatibility	  of	  goals’	  of	  
different	   actors	   (contradiction)	   fuels	   their	   perceptions	   and	   misperceptions	   of	  
themselves	  and	  each	  other	  (attitudes)	  thereby	  influencing	  actions	  (behaviour)	  that	  
may	  range	   from	  opposition	   to	  accommodation,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	   in	   the	  analysis	   that	  
follows.	  	  
	  





From	  Settlement	  to	  Unification	  and	  Integration	  
The	   first	   interactions	   between	   Liberia’s	   indigenes	   and	   settlers	   exemplified	   not	   a	  
‘clash	  of	  civilisations’	  (Huntington,	  1993),	  but	  rather	  a	  clash	  of	  life-­‐worlds.	  Through	  




encountered	  16	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  groups116	  who	  already	  occupied	  the	  hinterland	  and	  
coast,	  and	  had	  been	  engaged	  in	  small-­‐scale	  warfare	  over	  territory,	  trade	  (human	  and	  
commodity)	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  (Levitt,	  2005:	  25;	  Utas,	  2009:	  271).	  Eventually,	  
the	   free	   blacks	  would	   be	   joined	  by	  Africans	   from	   the	  Congo	  River	  Basin	  who	  had	  
been	  liberated	  from	  slave	  ships	  en	  route	  to	  the	  Americas	  (Levitt,	  2005:	  6).	  Whereas	  
the	  colonists	  and	  their	  settler	  counterparts	  espoused	  an	  individualistic,	  free-­‐market	  
approach	   to	   territory,	   the	   indigenes	   believed	   that	   they	   were	   the	   communal	  
custodians	  of	  land.	  According	  to	  Liberia’s	  Land	  Commission,	  the	  practice	  of	  treating	  
all	   undeeded	   land	   as	   public	   and	   easily	   acquired	   privately	  was	   a	  misguided	   policy	  
established	   by	   the	   ACS	   because,	   to	   date,	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   reconciliation	   between	  
public	  land	  and	  preexisting	  customary	  land	  rights	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2013a:	  6).	  
While	   the	  natives	  defended	   their	   territorial	   integrity	   in	  pre-­‐independence	  Liberia,	  
the	   settlers	   launched	   counter-­‐offensives,	   pushing	   further	   inland,	   appropriating	  
more	  land	  and	  establishing	  political	  dominion	  (Levitt,	  2005).	  	  
	  
They	  came	  to	  an	  eventual	  truce	  in	  1822	  and	  a	  subsequent	  peace	  settlement	  in	  1825,	  
though	   relations	   between	   the	   two	   groups	  would	   remain	   hostile,	   particularly	   over	  
trade,	  land	  tenure,	  taxation,	  and	  political	  jurisdiction,	  well	  after	  the	  colony	  drafted	  a	  
constitution	  in	  1845.	  The	  Constitution	  was	  modelled	  after	  that	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Liberia	  
became	  an	  independent	  republic	  in	  1847	  with	  the	  coastal	  counties117	  Montserrado,	  
Grand	  Bassa	  and	  Sinoe	  comprising	  its	  initial	  territory	  (Holsoe,	  1971:	  340-­‐353;	  Jaye,	  
2003:	  66-­‐68;	  Levitt,	  2005:	  89;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  17-­‐19).	  According	  to	  the	  Liberian	  Truth	  
and	   Reconciliation	   Commission	   (TRC)	   preliminary	   findings,	   contention	   between	  
settlers	   and	   indigenes	   was	   inevitable	   precisely	   because	   of	   their	   competing	   life-­‐
worlds	  and	  social	  locations:	  	  
	  
The	   new	   settlement	   was	   anti-­‐slavery,	   pro-­‐trade,	   predominantly	  
Christian	  and	  highly	  centralised;	  whereas,	  most	  coastal	  native	  groups	  
were	   pro-­‐slavery,	   commercial	   tradesman,	   non-­‐Christian	   and	   lived	  
under	  decentralised	  authority	  structures.	  Hence,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  any	  
form	  of	  union	  between	  the	  settlement	  and	  native	  nations	  was	  highly	  
unlikely	  (TRC,	  2009a:	  49-­‐50).	  	  
	  
                                                
116	  Bassa,	  Dan,	  Dei,	  Gbandi,	  Gio,	  Gola,	  	  Grebo,	  Kissi,	  Kpelle,	  Krahn,	  Kru,	  Loma,	  Mandingo,	  Mano,	  Mende,	  
Vai	  




However,	   it	   would	   be	   inaccurate	   to	   claim	   that	   all	   interactions	   between	   indigenes	  
and	   settlers	   were	   antagonistic.	   While	   some	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   communities,	   most	  
notably	   the	  Bassa,	  Dei,	  Gola,	  Grebo,	  Kru	  and	  Vai,	   resisted	  settler	  rule	   in	  a	  series	  of	  
deadly	  conflicts	  through	  to	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  others	  such	  as	  the	  Gio	  and	  Kpelle	  
were	   more	   accommodating	   (Gershoni,	   1985:	   67;	   Levitt,	   2005:	   6).	   Furthermore,	  
trade	   in	   palm	   oil,	   tobacco,	   rice,	   rum,	   cotton	   goods,	   beads,	   and	   cassava	   connected	  
settler	  costal	  towns	  to	  inland	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  indigenous	  knowledge	  in	  
medicinal	  relief	  saved	  settlers	  from	  the	  worst	  bouts	  of	  malaria	  (Clegg,	  2004:	  242).	  
	  
Ill-­‐trained,	   ill-­‐prepared,	   and	   ill-­‐educated,	   however,	   the	   settlers	   appeared	  oblivious	  
to	   the	   sophisticated	   writing	   systems,	   well-­‐developed	   trade	   routes	   and	  
administrative	   governance	   structures	   of	   the	   indigenes	   they	   encountered	   (Kieh,	  
2012a:	  169).	  Their	  dismissive	  behaviour	  was	  embedded	  in	  xenophobic	  tendencies,	  
as	   argued	  by	   a	  male	   circular	   returnee	   informant:	   “Because	   there’s	   this	   fear	   of	   the	  
stranger.	   It’s	   not	   a	   culture.	   I	   think	   it’s	   a	   historical	   thing…That	   fear	   is	   ingrained	   in	  
Liberians’	   psyche,	   so	   deep	   that	   people	   express	   it	   anywhere,	   anyhow.”118	  The	   free	  
blacks	   had	   been	   barred	   from	   citizenship	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   yet	   they	   adopted	   a	  
narrow	   definition	   of	   legal,	   national	   identity	   that	   excluded	  women,	   non-­‐Christians,	  
non-­‐blacks,	   and	   most	   indigenes,	   just	   as	   ancient	   Greek	   citizenship	   had	   excluded	  
women	   and	   slaves	   (Shafir	   and	   Brysk,	   2006:	   277).	   Though	   a	   response	   to	   the	  
invisibility	  of	  life	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  “legalised	  personhood”	  and	  “documented	  existence”	  
of	   the	   repatriated	   blacks	   infringed	   upon	   the	   life,	   liberty,	   and	   property	   of	   the	  
indigenes	  they	  encountered	  (Clegg,	  2004:	  247).	  For	  the	  newly-­‐birthed	  nation-­‐state	  
whose	  territory	  was	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  consolidated,	  a	  citizen	  was	  categorised	  as	  a	  male	  
land	   owner	   of	   ‘Negro	   descent’	   who,	   “over	   at	   least	   three	   years,	   had	   consistently	  
attended	   church	   services,	   dressed	   in	   Western	   clothes,	   and	   cultivated	   two	   acres”	  
(Burrowes,	  2004:	  69).	  	  
	  
This	  form	  of	  hegemonic	  citizenship	  had	  loopholes,	  however.	  For	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
indigenes,	   intermarriage	   and	   apprenticeship	   became	   the	   channels	   through	   which	  
citizenship	   could	   be	   acquired.	   In	   1838,	   for	   instance,	   an	   apprenticeship	   law	   was	  
enacted	   enabling	   settler	   families	   to	   take	   in	   indigenous	   children.	   In	   exchange	   for	  
                                                




their	   domestic	   labour,	   these	   children	  were	   provided	   clothing	   and	   food,	   and	   upon	  
reaching	   the	   age	   of	   majority	   (21	   for	   young	  men	   and	   18	   for	   young	  women),	   they	  
were	   considered	   ‘civilised’	   and	   therefore	   eligible	   for	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  
(Gershoni,	   1985:	   27-­‐28).	   An	   1841	   act	   further	   conferred	   citizenship	   on	   indigenes	  
who	   “abandoned	   all	   the	   forms	   of,	   customs,	   and	   superstitions	   of	   heathenism”	   and	  
adopted	  “the	  forms,	  customs	  and	  habits	  of	  civilised	  life”	  (Clegg,	  2004:	  242).	  Also	  in	  
the	  1870s,	  selected	  natives	  were	  appointed	   ‘referees’	  or	   ‘delegates’	   in	  the	  National	  
Legislature	  as	  advisors,	   followed	  by	  more	  meaningful	  participation	   in	   the	  political	  
process	   in	   the	  20th	   century	   (Dunn,	  Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	   2001:	  340-­‐341).	  Tiers	  of	  
citizenship	  soon	  developed,	  nevertheless,	  with	  the	  “settler,	  commercial,	  coastal	  and	  
political	   elite”	   at	   the	   top,	   followed	   by	   the	   “small	   business	   persons	   and	   farmers,”	  
recaptives,	   and	   select	   indigenes	   (Levitt,	   2005:	   91).	   However	   appealing	   the	  
concessions	   on	   citizenship	   appeared	   at	   the	   time,	   the	   Liberian	   state	   still	   operated	  
with	  exclusion	  and	  autocracy	  as	  its	  mandate,	  virtually	  overlooking	  indigenes	  in	  the	  
hinterland	   who	   remained	   “legally,	   politically,	   economically,	   and	   militarily	  
independent”	  until	  the	  early	  1900s	  (Levitt,	  2005:	  3).	  	  
	  
Partial	  and	  Qualified	  Citizenship	  under	  President	  Barclay	  and	  the	  ‘Hut	  Tax’	  	  
There	  were	  concerted	  efforts	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  to	  integrate	  natives	  formally	  
into	   the	   body	   politic	   although	   the	   settlers	   established	   “a	   governance	   structure	  
embedded	   in	   political	   repression	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   inequalities”	   (Kieh,	   2012a:	  
169;	   126).	   Through	   a	   system	   of	   indirect	   rule	   in	   1904,	   President	   Arthur	   Barclay	  
attempted	   to	  ward	  off	  encroachment	  by	  French	  and	  British	   imperialists	  as	  well	  as	  
establish	   a	   consistent	   stream	   of	   revenue	   for	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   hinterland	  
(Gershoni,	   1985:	   36).	   Employing	   the	   tools	   of	   state-­‐building	   as	   theorised	   by	   Tilly	  
(1975),	  Barclay	  extended	  Liberia’s	  geographic	  ambit	   through	  military	  might	  and	  a	  
system	  of	  centrally-­‐controlled	  taxation	  (Gerdes,	  2013:	  19).	  Under	  the	  ‘Barclay	  Plan’,	  
as	   it	   came	   to	   be	   known,	   Liberia	   was	   divided	   into	   administrative	   units	   under	   the	  
auspices	  of	  district	  commissioners	  who	  maintained	  law	  and	  order	  according	  to	  the	  
Liberian	  Constitution,	  reporting	  directly	  to	  the	  president,	  and	  traditional	  chiefs	  who	  
governed	   according	   to	   customary	   law	   (Gershoni,	   1985:	   38).	   The	   chiefs	   had	   a	  
semblance	  of	  autonomy,	  although	  the	  administration	  of	  traditional	  norms	  could	  not	  




such	  as	  the	  Gbandi,	  Grebo,	  Kpelle	  and	  Kru,	  a	  series	  of	  norms	  were	  instituted	  under	  
the	  ‘Barclay	  Plan’	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  military	  outposts	  in	  strategic	  locations	  
in	  rural	  Liberia	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Frontier	  Force	  (LFF)	  119,	  established	  
in	   1908	   to	   squash	   native	   rebellion	   in	   the	   hinterlands	   (Williams,	   2002:	   49;	   Levitt,	  
2005:	  147-­‐180;	  Utas,	  2009:	  277;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  23-­‐30):	  i)	  indigenous	  Liberians	  who	  
were	   educated,	   converted	   to	   Christianity	   and	   adopted	   ‘Western	   standards’	   of	  
conduct	  and	  appearance	  could	  qualify	   for	   legal	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’;	   ii)	  a	   ‘hut	   tax’	  
was	   imposed	   on	   native	   households	   and	   administered	   through	   local	   chiefs	   who	  
received	  10	  percent	  commission;	  iii)	  Poro	  and	  Sande	  secret	  societies	  were	  banned;	  
and	  iv)	  forced	  indigenous	  labour	  became	  widespread	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  1949;	  
Gershoni,	  1985:	  36-­‐48;	  Williams,	  2002:	  61;	  Jaye,	  2003:	  68-­‐69;	  Utas,	  2009:	  271;	  TRC,	  
2009b:	  115).	  	  
	  
As	   Waugh	   puts	   it,	   Liberia’s	   settlers	   and	   their	   descendants	   “never	   showed	   much	  
respect	  for	  or	  interest	  in	  developing	  the	  countryside	  except	  as	  a	  reserve	  of	  natural	  
resources	   and	   a	   supplier	   of	   manpower	   in	   peacetime	   or	   fighters	   in	   war”	   (Waugh,	  
2011:	  44).	  Effectively,	   the	   ‘Barclay	  Play’	   failed	  to	  meaningfully	   integrate	   indigenes,	  
rather	  it	  only	  “established	  a	  dual	  and	  unequal	  system	  of	  administration”	  (Jaye,	  2003:	  
70).	  Hinterland	  residents,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “uncivilised	  natives”	  in	  official	  policy	  
documents,	  were	  performing	  citizenship	  through	  their	  payment	  of	  taxes,	  yet	  treated	  
as	   colonial	   subjects	   within	   a	   bifurcated	   state	   (Mamdani,	   1996).	   There	   were	   two	  
clearly	   defined	   categories	   of	   Liberians	   in	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   those	  
governed	  nationally	  by	  the	  Liberian	  nation-­‐state	  (often	  settler	  in	  orientation,	  urban,	  
and	   considered	   ‘civilised’)	   and	   others	   governed	   locally	   by	   territorially	   bounded	  
chieftain	  authorities	  (often	  indigenous	  in	  orientation,	  rural	  and	  considered	  ‘native’)	  
(Moran,	  2006:	  75).	  Most	   inhabitants	  of	   the	  Liberian	   territory	  were	  not	  considered	  
full	   citizens	   and	   were	   therefore	   excluded	   from	   formal	   rights	   and	   privileges	   until	  
President	  William	  V.S.	  Tubman,	  Liberia’s	   longest	   serving	  head	  of	   state,	   introduced	  
the	  Unification	  and	  Integration	  Policy	  in	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century,	  nearly	  100	  years	  after	  
Liberia’s	   declaration	   of	   independence	   (Williams,	   2002:	   62;	   TRC,	   2009a:	   52;	   TRC,	  
2009b:	  118;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  23).	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  Established	   through	   financial	   and	   administrative	   support	   initially	   from	   the	   British,	   followed	   by	  




Limited	  Full	  Citizenship	  under	  Tubman’s	  Unification	  and	  Integration	  Policy	  	  
Although	  Tubman	  stretched	  the	  bounds	  of	  Liberianness	  wider	  than	  Barclay	  thereby	  
attempting	   to	   form	   a	   nation	   within	   a	   state,	   he	   fell	   short	   of	   granting	   universal	  
citizenship	  and	  therefore	  failed	  to	  consolidate	  a	  strong	  national	   identity	  in	  Liberia.	  
In	   his	   1944	   inaugural	   address,	   Tubman	   announced	   that	   hinterland	   Liberians	  who	  
owned	   property	   and	   paid	   taxes	   would	   be	   full	   citizens	   under	   his	   administration	  
rather	  than	  subjects:	  
	  
In	  the	  administration	  of	  our	  population	  inhabiting	  the	  hinterland,	  our	  
aim	   and	   purpose	   shall	   be	   to	   educate	   them	   into	   good	   and	   useful	  
citizens,	   capable	  of	  knowing	   their	  duty,	   status	  and	   rights	  as	   citizens,	  
and	  competent	  of	  exerting,	  enjoying	  and	  asserting	  them:	  to	  have	  them	  
love	  their	  native	  land	  and	  feel	  proud	  to	  be	  called	  Liberians.	  For	  it	  is	  to	  
these	   fellow	   citizens	   of	   ours,	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   hinterland,	   that	   we	  
must	   look	  very	   largely	   for	   the	   future	  maintenance	  and	  perpetuity	  of	  
the	   state;	   for	   we	   are	   aiming	   at	   developing	   a	   civilised	   state,	   the	  
civilisation	  of	  which	  will	  be	  as	  weak	  as	   its	  weakest	  pagan	   link	   if	  due	  
precaution	  not	  be	  taken	  (Tubman,	  1944).	  	  
	  
He	  also	  announced	  that	  citizenship	  would	  be	  extended	  to	  Liberian	   indigenous	  and	  
settler	  women	  who	  owned	  property,	  therefore	  enfranchising	  them	  for	  the	  first	  time:	  	  
	  
It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  if	  a	  woman	  possesses	  the	  same	  qualifications	  of	  a	  
man	  in	  the	  state	  which	  entitles	  him	  to	  enjoy	  the	  suffrage,	  the	  mere	  and	  
only	  fact	  of	  difference	  in	  sex	  should	  not	  reasonably	  form	  a	  bar	  to	  her	  
enjoying	   that	   privilege…We	   shall	   therefore	   persevere	   in	   our	  
endeavour	  to	  extend	  to	  the	  women	  of	  Liberia	  full	  participation	  in	  the	  
affairs	  of	  government	  and	  its	  political	  activities	  including	  the	  right	  of	  
woman	  suffrage	  (Tubman,	  1944).	  
	  
True	   to	   his	   inaugural	   address,	   Tubman	   officially	   launched	   the	   Unification	   and	  
Integration	   Policy	   in	   1946,	   extending	   voting	   rights,	   among	   other	   privileges,	   to	  
property	  owners	  who	  paid	  taxes	  (Dunn,	  Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	  2001:	  341).	  This	  was	  
coupled	  with	  equally	  measured,	   concessionary	   reforms:	   i)	   indigenes	  were	  entitled	  
to	   a	   small	   number	   of	   elected	   positions	   within	   the	   Legislature,	   although	   settlers	  
retained	   the	   offices	   of	   the	   speaker	   of	   the	  House	   of	   Representatives	   and	  president	  
pro-­‐tempore	   of	   the	   Senate;	   ii)	   infrastructure	   such	   as	   road	   networks,	   water	   and	  
sanitation	   services	   were	   extended	   to	   former	   hinterland	   territories;	   iii)	   and	   basic	  




citizens,	  albeit	  at	  a	  lower	  standard	  (TRC,	  2009a:	  52;	  TRC,	  2009b:	  120;	  Kieh,	  2012b:	  
9).	   In	   1964,	   Tubman	   further	   reconfigured	   Liberia’s	   political	   subdivisions	   by	  
introducing	   four	  new	   counties	   “that	   brought	   old	  hinterland	   areas	   on	  par	  with	   the	  
coastal	  counties”	  administered	  by	  settler	  elites	  (Dunn,	  Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	  2001:	  
341).	  	  
	  
In	   hindsight,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   Tubman,	   of	   non-­‐Monrovia	   elite	   stock,	   was	  
forward	   thinking	   despite	   the	   constraints	   of	   his	   time.	  However,	   his	  main	   objective	  
was	   to	   “facilitate	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   settler	   state	   and	   broaden	   its	   power	   base”	  
(Kieh,	   1992:	   33)	   by	   appeasing	   “settlers	   of	   low	   status,	   indigenous	   chiefs,	   and	  
members	   of	   the	   Monrovia	   elite	   who	   had	   become	   disaffected	   by	   their	   own	   inner	  
circle”	   (Sawyer,	   2005:	   16).	   Furthermore,	   Tubman’s	   words	   of	   unprecedented	  
conciliation	   to	   hinterland	   inhabitants	   were	   contradicted	   by	   patronising	   and	  
offensive	   references	   to	   paganism	   and	   civilisation.	   What	   his	   inaugural	   address	  
connotes	   is	   that	   the	   aim	  was	   assimilation	   rather	   than	  unification	   since	  only	   those	  
hinterland	   residents	   willing	   to	   abandon	   their	   traditional	   ‘pagan’	   ways	   and	   adopt	  
‘civilisation’	   could	   be	   embraced	   as	   citizens.	   For	   settler	   Liberians,	   being	   ‘civilised’	  
was	  often	  conflated	  with	  being	  a	  citizen,	  demarcated	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  English	  
fluently,	  membership	  in	  a	  Christian	  church,	  employment	  in	  the	  formal	  economy	  as	  a	  
wage	  labourer,	  residence	  in	  urban	  centres	  such	  as	  Monrovia,	  and	  the	  consumption	  
of	  Western	  products	   (Moran,	  2006:	  78).	   	  However,	  native	  Liberians	  did	  not	   adopt	  
the	   same	   conception	   of	   Liberianness,	   as	   their	   “local	   identities	   were	   built	   around	  
either	  small	  clusters	  of	  towns	  with	  their	  accompanying	  farmlands	  (in	  the	  south	  and	  
east)	   or	   loosely	   structured,	   often	  multi-­‐ethnic	   and	  multi-­‐lingual	   chiefdoms	   (in	   the	  
north	   and	  west)”	   (Moran,	   2006:	   79).	   Throughout	   the	  20th	   century,	   a	  ward	   system	  
replicated	  the	  19th	  century	  apprenticeship	   law	  in	  which	  children	  of	  native	   families	  
were	   shuttled	   to	  Monrovia	   to	   be	   raised	   and	   educated	   by	   settler	   families	   (Cooper,	  
2008;	  Sirleaf,	  2009;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  25-­‐27).	  While	  the	  process	  of	  assimilation	  enabled	  
the	  adoption	  of	  settler	  names,	  conversion	  to	  Christianity,	  and	  formal	  incorporation	  
into	  a	  highly	  stratified	  elite	  social	  structure,	  it	  also	  alienated	  natives	  from	  their	  rural	  
counterparts	   (Waugh,	   2011:	   26-­‐27).	   Effectively,	   becoming	   a	   ‘civilised’	   citizen	  was	  





Indeed,	   the	  Unification	   and	   Integration	  Policy	  was	   nothing	  more	   than	  pacification	  
intended	   to	   create	   a	   cult	   around	   Tubman,	   support	   his	   patronage	   networks,	   and	  
facilitate	  unencumbered	  exploitation	  of	  Liberia’s	  natural	  resources	  by	  foreign	  multi-­‐
nationals.	   Because	   citizenship	   was	   still	   tied	   to	   private	   property	   ownership,	   the	  
Policy	   effectively	   negated	   indigenous	   forms	   of	   communal	   land	   ownership	   and	  
alienated	  men	  and	  women	  who	  did	  not	  have	   the	  wherewithal	   to	  acquire	   land	  and	  
pay	   taxes	   on	   that	   land.	   As	   such,	   the	   Policy	   did	   not	   fundamentally	   reconfigure	   the	  
institution	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’.	  Furthermore,	  although	  Tubman	  sought	  to	  create	  
national	   cohesion,	   his	   administration	   was	   characterised	   by	   political	   repression,	  
where	  opponents	  were	  either	  jailed	  or	  forced	  into	  exile;	  economic	  elitism,	  in	  which	  a	  
few	   families	   controlled	   the	   export-­‐based	   economy	   that	   relied	   heavily	   on	   the	  
extraction	  of	  mineral	  and	  agricultural	  resources	  such	  as	  rubber,	   iron	  ore,	  gold	  and	  
timber	  without	  value	  addition;	  de	  facto	  one-­‐party	  state	  entrenchment	  characterised	  
by	  ‘selections’	  rather	  than	  ‘elections’;	  and	  social	  alienation	  embedded	  in	  hierarchies	  
of	   skin	   colour,	   ethnicity,	   class	   &	   caste	   coupled	   with	   religious	   intolerance	   against	  
non-­‐Christians	   (Jaye,	   2003:	   73-­‐77;	  Kieh,	   2004:	   60-­‐67;	   Levitt,	   2005:	   181-­‐190).	   The	  
end	   of	   Tubman’s	   27-­‐year	   reign,	   upon	  his	   death	   in	   1971,	  would	   usher	   in	   the	  most	  
agential	   forms	   of	   citizenship	   practice	   Liberia	   had	   seen	   to	   date.	   The	   expansion	   of	  
citizenship	   rights	   and	   privileges	   facilitated	   increased	   political	   activism	   in	   Liberia,	  
culminating	  in	  a	  1980	  coup	  that	  effectively	  toppled	  settler	  hegemony.	  	  
	  
1980	  Coup	  Pushes	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  Liberian	  Citizen	  Agency	  
In	   addition	   to	   overthrowing	   the	   True	   Whig	   Party	   dynasty,	   the	   1980	   coup	  
symbolically	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   casting	   it	   as	   an	   institution	   that	   all	  
Liberians	  of	  ‘Negro	  descent’	  could	  access	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  As	  product	  of	  a	  cauldron	  
that	   had	   been	   bubbling	   for	   over	   100	   years,	  William	   Tolbert,	   Tubman’s	   successor,	  
had	   opened	   up	   the	   political	   space	   considerably	   to	   “indigenous	   and	   settler	  
intelligentsia,	  technicians,	  civil	  service	  personnel,	  rural	  educated	  elite,	  military	  elite,	  
local	  business	  interests,	  university	  professors	  and	  teachers	  and	  other	  professionals,	  
students	  and	  trade	  unions,”	  thereby	  alienating	  members	  of	  the	  top	  brass	  of	  his	  party	  
(Levitt,	   2005:	   192).	   A	   number	   of	   interconnected	   factors	   in	   the	   late	   1970s	  
contributed	   to	   the	  dismantling	  of	  True	  Whig	  party	  rule,	   top	  among	  which	  was	   the	  




(Konneh,	  2002:	  76-­‐79;	  Williams,	  2002:	  64-­‐65;	  Levitt,	   2005:	  191-­‐197;	  TRC,	  2009b:	  
129-­‐139;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  34;	  58;	  61-­‐63).	  	  
	  
First,	  Liberia’s	  economy	  experienced	  a	  nosedive	  because	  of	  the	  downward	  spiral	  of	  
global	  commodity	  prices	   in	  exports	  such	  as	  palm	  oil,	   rubber,	   iron	  ore,	  and	   timber.	  
Eclipsed	   by	   the	   oil	   crisis,	   Liberia’s	   economic	  meltdown	   led	   to	   increased	   inflation,	  
food	   insecurity,	   and	   increased	   rural	   to	  urban	  migration.	   Second,	   large	  numbers	  of	  
indigenes	  began	  attending	  universities	  in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad	  through	  government-­‐
sponsored	   scholarships,	   and	  upon	   their	   return	   they	   assumed	  positions	  within	   the	  
civil	   service	   though	   rarely	   at	   high	   managerial	   levels.	   Third,	   although	   President	  
Tolbert	  attempted	  to	  adopt	  gradual	  political	  reforms,	  he	  appointed	  members	  of	  his	  
family	   to	   strategic	  positions	  within	   the	  executive	  branch	  of	  government,	   including	  
the	  ministries	  of	  defence	  and	  finance,	   leading	  to	  public	  rumblings	  about	  patronage	  
and	   nepotism.	   Fourth,	   civil	   unrest	   came	   to	   a	   head	   on	   April	   14,	   1979	   when	   state	  
security	   forces	   attacked,	   arrested,	  wounded	   and	   killed	   street	   demonstrators	   after	  
the	   government	   proposed	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   price	   of	   imported	   rice	   “designed	   to	  
benefit	   the	   president	   and	   other	   ‘absentee	   farmers’	   who	   stood	   to	   gain	   from	   the	  
increase”	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  175).	  Although	  the	  proposed	  price	   increase	  may	  also	  have	  
been	   intended	   to	   encourage	   consumption	  of	   the	   country’s	   locally	   produced	   staple	  
crop,	  it	  had	  not	  accompanied	  positive	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  living	  conditions	  of	  
the	  majority	  of	  Liberians.	  Therefore,	   the	   ‘rice	   riots’,	   as	   they	  were	  popularly	  called,	  
mirrored	   simultaneous	   labour	   strikes	   advocating	   for	   higher	   salaries	   and	   better	  
working	  conditions.	  	  
	  
When	   President	   Tolbert	   spent	   an	   estimated	   US$200	   million	   in	   hosting	   the	  
Organisation	   of	   African	   Unity	   (OAU)	   Summit	   in	   Liberia	   in	   July	   1979	   amidst	  
economic	   decline,	   there	   was	   widespread	   and	   visible	   discontent	   amongst	   an	  
increasingly	   politicised	   populace	   (Kieh,	   2012b).	   Similarly,	   the	   emergence	   of	  
opposition	   groups—such	   as	   the	   Movement	   for	   Justice	   in	   Africa	   (MOJA),	   the	  
Progressive	  Alliance	   of	   Liberia	   (PAL),	   and	   the	   Progressive	   People’s	   Party	   (PPP)—
permitted	   to	   register	   and	   operate	   freely—unsettled	   True	  Whig	   Party	   rule	   for	   the	  
first	  time	  in	  over	  25	  years	  since	  opposition	  parties	  were	  banned	  in	  the	  1950s	  (Kieh,	  




it	  was	  his	  exposure	  to	   the	  relatively	  egalitarian	  political	  systems	   in	   the	  US	  while	  a	  
student	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  galvanised	  him	  to	  join	  the	  opposition	  movement	  in	  Liberia	  
in	  the	  1980s:	  
	  
[I	  discovered]	  this	  is	  real	  freedom	  here	  [in	  the	  US].	  Why	  [do]	  we	  have	  
one	  and	  only	  one	  political	  party	  in	  Liberia?	  It	  can	  be	  better!	  Then	  we	  
organised	  PAL,	  which	   is	   the	  Progressive	  Alliance	  of	   Liberia,	  Bacchus	  
Matthews,	  Samuel	   Jackson,	  Oscar	  Quiah,	  Marcus	  Dahn,	  all	  of	  us	  were	  
there	   then	  and	  we	  organised	   the	  Progressive	  Alliance	  of	  Liberia	  and	  
we	  began	  to	  challenge	  the	  government	  on	  the	  one	  party	  state.	  And	  so	  
by	   1984/85	   we	   became	   a	   registered	   party	   called	   PPP,	   Progressive	  
People’s	  Party,	  and	  then	  from	  there	  we	  became	  United	  People’s	  Party	  
which	  we	  are	  still	  today.	  Fortunately	  for	  us	  Ellen	  [Johnson	  Sirleaf]	  was	  
one	  of	   those	  who	  was	  an	  activist,	  you	  know,	  she	  never	  per	  se	   joined	  
but	   she	  was	   a	   serious	   supporter	   of	   us	   and	   she	   saw	   a	   vision	   for	   the	  
country	  that	   it	  can	  be	  better.	  You	  don’t	  have	  to	  have	  one	  party	  state,	  
you	  don’t	  have	  to	  be	  a	  politician	  to	  get	  a	  job.	  You	  can	  be	  apolitical	  or	  
just	   have	   the	  mind,	   get	   the	   education,	   get	   the	   experience	   and	   that’s	  
it.120	  	  	  
	  
Imbibing	   the	  spirit	  of	  native	  resistance,	  marginalised	  groups	  of	  Liberians	  began	  to	  
make	  claims	  to	  citizenship	  that	  effectively	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  a	  coup.	  On	  April	  12,	  1980,	  
a	   group	   of	   non-­‐commissioned	   officers	   in	   the	   AFL,	   led	   by	   an	   unknown	   master	  
sergeant,	   Samuel	   K.	   Doe,	   entered	   the	   Executive	   Mansion,	   assassinated	   President	  
Tolbert,	  and	  declared	  military	  rule	  (Dunn,	  Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	  2001:	  90-­‐91).	  They	  
executed	  13	  members	  of	  Tolbert’s	  cabinet	  immediately	  after	  the	  coup,	  symbolising	  
the	   annihilation	   of	   settler	   hegemony	   (Sawyer,	   1987).	   A	   Krahn	   man	   of	   limited	  
education,	   Doe	   was	   celebrated	   as	   a	   channel	   through	   which	   indigenous	   Liberians	  
could	   finally	   access	   the	   tenets	   of	   full	   citizenship.	   He	   subsequently	   suspended	   the	  
1847	  Constitution	  and	  instituted	  a	  more	  inclusive	  military	  government,	  the	  People’s	  
Redemption	   Council	   (PRC),	   hiring	   a	   number	   of	   indigenous	   civilians	   who	   had	  
returned	   to	   Liberia	   with	   terminal	   degrees	   from	   US	   universities;	   those	   of	   settler	  
lineage	  were	  also	  incorporated	  in	  various	  ministerial	  posts	  (Sawyer,	  1987;	  Konneh,	  
2002:	   78).	   Months	   after	   the	   coup,	   the	   PRC	   abolished	   the	   controversial	   ‘hut	   tax’,	  
thereby	  enabling	   those	  who	  did	  not	  own	  property	   to	  become	  citizens	   for	   the	   first	  
time	  (Dunn,	  Beyan	  and	  Burrowes,	  2001:	  170).	  	  
	  
                                                




Doomed	   to	   follow	   the	   mistakes	   of	   his	   predecessors,	   however,	   Doe	   became	  
increasingly	   agitated	  with	   students,	   labour	   unions,	   clergy,	   and	   opposition	   leaders	  
who	  resisted	  his	  authoritarian	  dismissal	  of	  popular	  dissent.	  He	  developed	  an	  inner	  
circle	  comprising	  members	  of	  his	  own	  ethnicity,	  the	  Krahns,	  invested	  heavily	  in	  the	  
military,	   confiscated	   property,	   imposed	   curfews	   and	   restricted	   the	   movement	   of	  
civilians	   (Konneh,	   2002:	   78).	   After	   appointing	   in	   1981	   a	   National	   Constitution	  
Commission	   to	   draft	   a	   new	  Constitution	   that	  would	   return	   the	   country	   to	   civilian	  
rule	   in	   1986,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   Doe	   was	   not	   fundamentally	   interested	   in	  
challenging	   the	   status	   quo	   (Sawyer,	   1987).	   Dismissing	   the	   Commission’s	   draft	  
Constitution,	  which	   limited	   presidential	   powers	   amongst	   other	   recommendations,	  
Doe	  co-­‐opted	  a	  Constitutional	  Assembly,	  whose	  members	  had	  political	  ambitions,	  to	  
revise	  the	  draft	  by	  increasing	  the	  terms	  of	  office	  for	  president	  from	  four	  to	  six	  years	  
in	  exchange	  for	  increasing	  the	  terms	  of	  office	  for	  senators	  from	  six	  to	  nine	  years	  and	  
representatives	   from	   four	   to	   six	   years	   (Sawyer,	   1987;	   Kieh,	   2012b:	   166).	  When	   a	  
1985	  election	  should	  have	  returned	  Liberia	  to	  civilian	  rule,	  Doe	  allegedly	  rigged	  the	  
ballot	   boxes	   to	   win	   the	   presidency	   by	   a	   51	   percent	   majority	   (Konneh,	   2002:	   79;	  
Williams,	   2002:	   77).	   Although	   Doe’s	   coup	   ultimately	   expanded	   the	   parameters	   of	  
legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  by	  repealing	  the	  ‘hut	  tax’,	  his	  reign	  ironically	  muzzled	  the	  
political	  practices	  of	  citizens	  who	  gained	  the	  franchise	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  
	  
In	   November	   1985,	   Thomas	   Quiwonkpa,	   one	   of	   Doe’s	   trusted	   allies,	   was	  
assassinated	   after	   attempting	   to	   topple	   the	   military	   regime	   (Dunn,	   Beyan	   and	  
Burrowes,	   2001:	   275).	   Reprisals	   against	   ethnic	   Mano	   and	   Gio	   civilians	   in	  
Quiwonkpa’s	  Nimba	  County	   ensued	  until	   a	   general	   amnesty	  was	   adopted	   in	   1986	  
(Konneh,	   2002:	   79).	   Following	   the	   attempted	   coup,	   Liberia	   was	   marked	   by	  
entrenched	   authoritarianism,	   economic	   decline,	   and	   the	   politicisation	   of	   ethnicity.	  
Doe	  responded	   to	   repeated	  protests	  with	  violence;	  amassed	  personal	  wealth	   from	  
millions	  of	  dollars	   in	   foreign	  aid	   thereby	  neglecting	  public	   spending	  on	   important	  
social	  services;	  and	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  Krahn	  members	  in	  his	  cabinet	  (Konneh,	  
2002:	  80-­‐81).	  One	  respondent,	  a	  63-­‐year-­‐old	  Washington	  resident,	  recalled	  how	  the	  





It	  was	  the	  coup	  d’état	  that	  really	  drove	  some	  of	  us	  from	  there	  [Liberia]	  
because	   there	  was	  a	   lot	  of	   instability,	  anticipated	   instability,	   that	  we	  
knew	   was	   going	   to	   happen…Before	   the	   coup	   took	   place	   everything	  
was	  fine.	   I	  was	  working	  as	  assistant	  minister,	  special	  assistant.	   I	  was	  
working	  as	  Director	  for	  Research	  and	  Planning.	  And	  then	  we	  realised	  
that	   the	  country	  was	  getting	  harder	  and	  harder	  because	   there	  was	  a	  
flight	  of	   capital.	  All	   the	  companies	  were	   leaving,	   they	  had	  packed	  up	  
and	  they	  had	  left,	  so	  I	  just	  decided,	  “Well,	  I	  think	  I	  will	  go	  to	  a	  greener	  
pasture”…because	  I	  had	  anticipated	  that	  something	  bigger	  was	  going	  
to	  happen…From	  there	  that	  was	  it;	  it	  just	  went	  downward.121	  	  
	  
As	   foreshadowed	   by	   this	   respondent,	   Liberia’s	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   would	   be	  
transformed	   through	   conflict	   once	   again	   with	   intermittent	   warfare	   beginning	   in	  
1989	   and	   ending	   officially	   in	   2003.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   mainstream	   literature	   that	  
characterises	   Liberia’s	   wars	   as	   localised	   and	   ‘civil’,	   however,	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	  
various	  actors	  involved	  that	  the	  wars	  had	  international	  dimensions.	  They	  were	  also	  
indicative	   of	   state	   collapse,	   representing	   continuations	   of	   the	   state-­‐building,	   and	   I	  
would	  argue	  the	  citizenship	  construction,	  project	  started	  in	  1822	  (Gerdes,	  2013:	  6).	  	  
	  
Two	  Uncivil	  Wars,	  the	  Rupture	  &	  Melding	  of	  State-­‐Citizen/Citizen-­‐Citizen	  
Relations	  	  
On	   Christmas	   Eve	   in	   1989,	   Charles	   Taylor,	   a	   former	   cabinet	   official	   in	   Doe’s	  
administration,	  launched	  an	  insurgency	  from	  neighbouring	  Ivory	  Coast	  to	  topple	  his	  
former	   boss	   (Waugh,	   2011).	   According	   to	   Kieh,	   “Taylor's	   strategy	   for	   winning	  
support	  was	  anchored	  on	   the	  exploitation	  of	   the	  grievances	  of	   the	  various	  groups	  
who	   were	   essential	   to	   the	   success	   of	   his	   military	   campaign”	   (Kieh,	   1992:	   130).	  
Backed	   by	   external	   forces	   such	   as	   Libya,	   Ivory	   Coast,	   Burkina	   Faso,	   and	   Liberian	  
exiles	  in	  the	  US,	  Taylor’s	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (NPFL)	  was	  multi-­‐ethnic	  
and	  comprised	  large	  numbers	  of	  Gio	  and	  Mano	  dissidents	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  131;	  Konneh,	  
2002:	   83;	   Kieh,	   2004:	   69;	   Waugh,	   2011).	   A	   number	   of	   other	   insurgent	   groups	  
emerged,	   but	   it	   was	   a	   splinter	   faction	   from	   the	   NPFL,	   the	   Independent	   National	  
Patriotic	   Front	   of	   Liberia	   (INPFL)	   led	   by	   former	   Taylor	   ally	   Prince	   Johnson,	   who	  
would	   lure	   Doe	   to	   the	   Freeport	   of	   Monrovia	   in	   1990,	   torture	   and	   kill	   him	   while	  
taping	   the	   assassination	   (Waugh,	   2011).	   Akin	   to	   the	   brutal	   murder	   of	   President	  
Tolbert	  a	  decade	  before,	  Doe’s	  death	  represented	  a	  symbolic	  levelling	  of	  illegitimate	  
                                                




state	  authority	  by	  disgruntled	  citizens.	  	  
Fuelled	  and	  funded	  in	  part	  by	  the	  exploitation	  of	  Liberia’s	  timber	  and	  diamonds,	  the	  
first	  war	  ebbed	  and	   flowed	  between	  1989	  and	  1997.	  Fearing	  a	   regional	   crisis,	   the	  
Economic	   Community	   of	   West	   African	   States	   (ECOWAS)	   deployed	   an	   ad-­‐hoc	  
peacekeeping	  mission,	  ECOMOG,	  which	  eventually	  became	  a	  party	  to	  the	  conflict	  by	  
allying	   itself	   with	   various	   warring	   factions	   (Jaye,	   2003).	   Nevertheless,	   ECOMOG	  
assisted	  in	  bringing	  the	  war	  to	  an	  end	  in	  1996	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Abuja	  II	  Peace	  
Agreement,	  the	  last	  of	  17	  agreements	  total,	   followed	  by	  elections	  in	  July	  1997	  that	  
ushered	  in	  Taylor’s	  presidency	  (Konneh,	  2002:	  85;	  Kieh,	  2011:	  53-­‐54;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  
228).	   Eschewing	   the	   one-­‐dimensional	   frame	   of	   analysis	   marked	   by	   much	   of	   the	  
literature	  on	  Liberia’s	  first	  war	  (Ellis,	  1999),	  Kieh	  adopts	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  causal	  
frame,	  arguing	  that	  armed	  conflict	  was	  precipitated	  by	  historical,	  political,	  cultural,	  
economic,	  social,	  and	  military	  factors	  already	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter	  (Kieh,	  
2004:	  60-­‐67;	  TRC,	  2009b).	  Kieh’s	  ‘crises	  of	  underdevelopment’	  analysis	  supports	  my	  
claims	   that	   Liberia’s	   contemporary	   conflicts	   are	   underpinned	   by	   unresolved	  
historical	  crises	  of	  citizenship.	  
After	  two	  years	  of	  relative	  peace	  under	  Taylor’s	  administration,	  his	  reign	  of	   terror	  
and	   subsequent	   foray	   into	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	   crisis	   incited	   two	   rebel	   groups	   to	  
stage	  a	  second	  war	  in	  1999.	  Comprising	  former	  combatants	  from	  the	  first	  Liberian	  
war	   and	   anti-­‐Taylor	   enthusiasts,	   the	   Liberians	   United	   for	   Reconciliation	   and	  
Democracy	  (LURD)	  launched	  an	  offensive	  from	  neighbouring	  Guinea	  (Waugh,	  2011:	  
264-­‐268;	   Hazen,	   2013:	   105-­‐110).	   Backed	   by	   the	   Guinean	   and	   American	  
governments	  and	  supported	  by	  financial	  contributions	  from	  Liberians	  abroad,	  LURD	  
also	   sustained	   itself	   through	   looting	   and	   diamond	   extraction	   (Hazen,	   2013:	   113-­‐
118).	  The	  splinter	  group	  MODEL	  began	   its	   incursion	   into	  Liberia	   in	  2003	  and	  was	  
hoisted	   up	   by	   political	   support	   from	  Liberians	   abroad	   as	  well	   as	   the	  military	   and	  
economic	   assistance	   of	   then	   Ivory	   Coast	   president	   Laurent	   Gbagbo	   (Hazen,	   2013:	  
121;	  131-­‐133).	  Although	  Taylor	  had	  an	  advantage	   in	   terms	  of	   supply	  networks	  of	  
guns	   and	   money,	   LURD	   and	   MODEL	   gained	   the	   upper	   hand	   when	   his	   arms	   and	  
revenue	   stockpiles	   began	   to	   dwindle	   in	   2003	   (Hazen,	   2013:	   107).	  With	  mounting	  
international	  pressure	  to	  step	  down	  and	  LURD	  and	  MODEL	  approaching	  Monrovia,	  




in	   August	   2003,	   leading	   to	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   Comprehensive	   Peace	   Agreement	  
which	  ushered	  in	  a	  transitional	  government	  in	  2005	  (Waugh,	  2011:	  273-­‐274;	  Hazen,	  
2013:	  107).	  
	  
Although	  the	  vast	   literature	  on	  armed	  conflict	  emphasises	  poverty,	   inequality,	  bad	  
neighbourhoods	   and	   governance,	   weak	   state	   institutions,	   and	   natural	   resource	  
dependency	   as	   the	   causal	   factors	   (Collier	   and	   Hoeffler,	   2000;	   Fearon	   and	   Laitin,	  
2003),	  Call	  argues	  that	  grievances	  against	  Taylor’s	  exclusionary	  behaviour	  after	  the	  
1997	   elections—repression	   and	   assassination	   of	   political	   opponents,	   media	  
suppression,	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  former	  enemies	  within	  the	  security	  forces—led	  to	  
war	  recurrence	  in	  Liberia	  (Call,	  2010:	  353-­‐356).	  Kieh	  (2009)	  further	  concludes	  that	  
failures	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   transitional	   and	   peace-­‐building	   processes	   led	   to	   overall	  
deprivation.	  Furthermore,	  young	  ex-­‐combatants	  underwent	  demobilisation	  without	  
the	  necessary	  reintegration.	  They	  were	  socially	  excluded	  and	   further	  marginalised	  
because	  of	  their	  war-­‐time	  status,	  proving	  that	  state	  failure	  and	  its	  aftermath	  affects	  
citizens	  in	  disparate	  ways.	  
	  
When	  Two	  Elephants	  Fight,	  the	  Grass	  Suffers122	  
By	  its	  very	  definition,	  citizenship	  signifies	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  agency,	  of	  empowerment,	  
of	   men	   and	   women	   making	   sense	   of	   their	   natural	   environment	   (Castles	   and	  
Davidson,	  2000:	  21).	  It	  is	  supposed	  to	  bring	  about	  order,	  yet	  Liberians	  were	  forced	  
to	  redefine	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  be	  citizens	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  functioning	  state	  during	  
the	   two	  wars.	   In	   fact,	  most	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   left	   Liberia	   for	   short	   stints,	  
extended	  periods,	  or	  indefinitely	  during	  this	  time,	  fundamentally	  altering	  how	  they	  
identified	   with	   the	   state	   and	   with	   each	   other.	   The	   breakdown	   of	   law	   and	   order	  
constituted	   this	   mass	   exodus,	   said	   one	   Washington	   based	   53-­‐year-­‐	   old	   female	  
respondent:	   “We	  wouldn’t	  have	   left	   in	   those	  numbers	  were	   it	  not	   for	   the	   fact	   that	  
there	  was	  no	  rule	  of	  law,	  no	  respect	  for	  property	  because	  there	  were	  soldiers	  getting	  
in	   peoples'	   houses,	   toilets	   are	   busted	   out,	   you	   know,	   glasses	   busted	   out	   of	   the	  
windows.”123	  Echoing	   this	   respondent’s	   assertions,	  Cletus	  Wotorson,	   chief	   sponsor	  
of	  the	  dual	  citizenship	  proposed	  bill,	  argued:	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  A	  Liberian	  proverb.	  	  




Liberians	  by	  nature	  love	  their	  country	  and	  they	  never	  like	  to	  part	  from	  
their	   country…the	   drafters	   of	   Liberia’s	   Constitution	   did	   not	   foresee	  
that	   we	   were	   going	   to	   have	   a	   destabilising	   civil	   war	   that	   would	  
displace	  our	  citizens,	  most	  of	  them	  involuntarily,	  to	  countries,	  some	  of	  
which	  were	  hostile,	   in	  a	  hostile	   environment,	   and	   for	  which	   reasons	  
their	  choices	  were	  limited.124	  	  
	  
Yet,	   the	   trajectory	   of	   Liberia’s	   conflicts—from	   settler	   state	   formation	   to	   the	   1980	  
coup—uniquely	  foreshadowed	  outbreaks	  of	  direct	  violence.	  	  
One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  two	  wars	  were	  indicative	  of	  a	  long	  trajectory	  of	  conflict	  and	  
“the	   continuation	  of	   state-­‐run	  violence	   in	   the	  hinterland”	   (Utas,	   2009:	   281).	   From	  
Liberia’s	  inception,	  rural	  dwellers	  were	  limited	  in	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  political	  
and	  economic	   life	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state.	  They	  could	  hardly	  boast	  of	  experiencing	   full	  
citizenship	   with	   the	   attendant	   rights	   and	   responsibilities,	   even	   after	   measured	  
reforms	  instituted	  by	  Tubman,	  Tolbert	  and	  Doe.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder,	  then,	  that	  Liberia’s	  
two	  major	   armed	   conflicts	  were	   launched	   from	   ungoverned	   rural	   spaces—Nimba	  
County	  in	  1989	  and	  Lofa	  County	  in	  1999.	  What	  differentiated	  the	  armed	  conflicts	  in	  
Liberia	   from	  those	   in	  neighbouring	  Guinea,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	   Ivory	  Coast,	  was	   the	  
wanton	  destruction	  of	  essential	   infrastructure	  such	  as	   the	  Mt.	  Coffee	  hydroelectric	  
facility	  built	  in	  the	  1960s,	  roads,	  bridges	  and	  power	  plants	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  
2011a:	   57).	   According	   to	   Liberian	   environmental	   activist	   Alfred	   Brownell,	   urban	  
infrastructure	  represented	  easily	  expendable	  “monuments	  of	  hatred”125	  in	  the	  eyes	  
of	  young	  combatants	  because	  they	  could	  not	  access	  these	  fully	  in	  their	  communities.	  	  
Mats	  Utas	  reveals	  how	  “the	  failure	  of	  impoverished	  youth	  to	  find	  a	  place	  in	  Liberian	  
society”	   represented	   a	   key	   motivation	   for	   joining	   a	   number	   of	   competing	   armed	  
factions	   in	   the	   first	   and	   second	  Liberian	  wars	   (Utas,	   2005:	  151).	   In	  Utas’	   analysis,	  
young	  combatants,	  undeniably	  victims	   in	  their	  own	  right,	  asserted	  their	  agency	  by	  
transitioning	   into	   adulthood	   through	   the	   AK-­‐47.	   Although	   there	   was	   forced	  
conscription	   during	   Liberia’s	   first	   war,	   most	   young	   combatants	   joined	   various	  
factions	  of	  their	  own	  volition,	  primarily	  to	  topple	  “an	  elitist	  urban	  leadership	  made	  
up	  of	  autocrats”	  as	  well	  as	  “rural	  gerontocratic	  leadership”	  (Utas,	  2009:	  270):	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Thus	   war	   was	   fought	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   by	   marginalised	   peoples,	  
predominantly	   youth,	   who	   saw	   the	   hostilities	   as	   possibly	   the	   only	  
opportunity	  for	  them	  to	  experience	  mobility	  from	  the	  margins	  into	  the	  
centre	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  economy	  (Utas,	  2009:	  270).	  
	  
Based	   on	   his	   extensive	   field	   research	   on	   young	   ex-­‐combatants	   in	   Liberia,	   Utas’	  
findings	  support	  my	  claims	  that	  while	  the	  wars	  ruptured	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  for	  
some,	  it	  provided	  the	  impetus	  for	  others	  to	  access	  forms	  of	  citizenship	  that	  had	  been	  
previously	   denied	   by	   structural	   forces.	   Systematically	   disenfranchised,	   Liberia’s	  
urban	  and	  rural	  youth	  used	  the	  wars	   to	  rage	  against	  state	  machinery,	  said	  Gabriel	  
Williams	  of	  the	  Liberian	  embassy	  in	  Washington:	  	  
	  
The	  society	  over	   the	  years	  has	  been	  structured	   in	  such	  a	  way	   that	   it	  
hasn’t	  given	  back	  to	  its	  own	  people	  where	  you	  have	  feelings.	  Look	  at	  
the	  war,	  how	  these	  young	  kids	  came	  and	  destroyed	  everything.	  They	  
have	  no	  stake	   in	   it.	  We’re	  not	   the	  only	  country	   that	  had	  war,	   look	  at	  
Sierra	  Leone	  next	  door,	  look	  at	  Ivory	  Coast,	  the	  people	  got	  their	  lights	  
on.	  What	  did	  we	  do	   in	  Liberia?	  We	  cut	  down	   the	  poles.	  You	  have	   to	  
pass	   the	  wire	   over	   people,	   people	   have	  houses	   in	   their	   villages,	   you	  
know,	  and	  then	  even	  the	  hospitals,	  they’re	  dying,	  and	  you	  expect	  that	  
we’re	  going	  to	  protect	  those	  things?	  They	  have	  no	  reasons.126	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   wanton	   destruction	   of	   physical	   infrastructure	   by	   disaffected	  
young	   people,	   Taylor’s	   counter-­‐revolution	   followed	   by	   the	   LURD	   and	   MODEL	  
insurgencies	  effectively	  reconfigured	  citizenship	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Liberians	  in	  
the	  most	  profound	  ways.	  During	  the	  first	  war	  alone,	  a	  quarter	  million	  people	  died,	  as	  
many	  as	  700,000	  Liberians	  sought	  refuge	  in	  neighbouring	  Guinea,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  
Ivory	  Coast,	  and	  approximately	  1.2	  million	  were	  internally	  displaced	  (Dick,	  2002:	  2;	  
Konneh,	   2002:	   84).	   Unprecedented	  waves	   of	   out-­‐migration,	   discussed	   in	   detail	   in	  
Chapter	  VI,	  prompted	  the	  official	  rupture	  of	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  for	  many.	  One	  46-­‐
year-­‐old	  Accra-­‐based	  man,	  for	  instance,	  vowed	  to	  never	  resettle	  in	  Liberia	  because	  
of	  the	  trauma	  and	  loss	  he	  experienced	  during	  the	  war.127	  Another	  respondent,	  a	  55-­‐
year-­‐old	  woman	  who	  settled	  in	  the	  Gambia	  from	  1996	  to	  1998	  before	  relocating	  to	  
London,	   said	   she	   grew	   increasingly	   frustrated	   with	   the	   war	   because	   of	   the	  
continuous	  loss	  of	  livelihood:	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I	  got	  tired.	  I	  kept	  waiting	  for	  the	  war	  to	  finish,	  you	  know.	  Ok,	  as	  soon	  
as	   it	   started	  we	  didn’t	   have	   any	  plane	   again	   so	   that	  was	   gone.	  But	   I	  
was	  still	  trying,	  trading,	  going	  to	  Guinea	  or	  Ivory	  Coast;	  make	  my	  way,	  
buy	  things.	  Because	  my	  husband	  got	  killed	  during	  the	  war	  and	  I	  had	  
the	  kids.	  So	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  find	  [a]	  way	  to	  make	  money,	  you	  know,	  to	  
get	  them	  out,	  because	  for	  me	  I	  could	  have	  gone	  to	  the	  [United]	  States,	  
but	  I	  couldn’t	  just	  go	  and	  leave	  my	  children.	  So,	  I	  said	  well,	  we	  will	  all	  
go	  somewhere	  until	  I	  really	  know,	  you	  know,	  that	  they	  are	  safe,	  then	  I	  
can	  take	  the	  next	  step.	  So,	  I	  was	  just	  tired.	  You	  work,	  you	  think	  things	  
are	  getting	  better,	  when	  you	  look	  again	  another	  one	  [war]	  starts	  and	  
everything	  is	  gone…I	  think	  most	  of	  us	  didn’t	  understand	  civil	  war.	  We	  
had	  been	  through	  coups,	  so	  we	  thought	  it	  was	  the	  same	  thing;	  it	  will	  
blow	  over	  one	  month,	  you	  know…So,	  we	  said	  we’ll	  hang	  around…I’m	  a	  
Mandingo	   and	   anyway	   business	   is	   in	   our	   blood.	   That’s	   what	   we	   do	  
best.	  So,	  I	  said,	  ok,	  next	  thing,	  let	  me	  start	  trading,	  you	  know.	  I	  took	  the	  
kids	  to	  Ivory	  Coast,	  put	  them	  in	  the	   international	  school	  there.	   I	  was	  
trading	  backward	  and	  forward.	  And	  then	  when	  you	  look	  again,	  I	  don’t	  
know	  what	  faction	  it	  was	  or	  whatever	  happened,	  all	  my	  market	  went	  
again.	  It	  happened	  three/four	  times.	  I	  said,	  no,	  look	  I’m	  getting	  tired	  of	  
this.	   I’m	   not	   going	   anywhere	   and	   this	   thing	   is	   not	   going	   to	   end	   just	  
now.	  So,	  I	  just	  decided	  to	  leave.128	  
	  
Some	   Liberians	   lost	   faith	   in	   a	   state	   that	   was	   already	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   implosion,	  
argued	   a	   32-­‐year-­‐old	   man	   who	   spent	   13	   years	   in	   Nigeria	   before	   relocating	   to	  
London:	  	  
	  
People	   didn’t	   trust	   the	   system	   in	   Liberia,	   even	   when	   peace	   was	  
coming	  back	  to	  Liberia…there’s	  another	  war	  again.	  And	  my	  mom	  was	  
like,	  during	  the	  war,	  “Let’s	  get	  out	  of	  this	  country	  and	  go	  because	  this	  
thing	  will	  still	  continue.”	  And	  when	  I	  left	  I	  think	  there	  were	  [a]	  series	  
of	  wars	  still…and	  that	  shows	  that	  at	  the	  time	  people	  were	  not	  trusting	  
the	   system.	   So,	   they	   felt	   like,	   “Let	  me	  get	   the	   citizenship	   [of	   another	  
country],	   let	  me	  be	  surviving,	  let	  me	  see	  how	  I	  can	  move	  on	  with	  my	  
life.”129	  
	  
According	   to	   a	   44-­‐year-­‐old	  Washington-­‐based	  male	   respondent	  who	   left	   Liberia	   a	  
few	  months	   before	   the	   first	   war,	   some	   Liberians	   abroad	   “acquired	   these	   [foreign	  
citizenships]	  circumstantially…for	  survival	  reasons”130	  or	  as	   insurance	  in	  the	  event	  
of	  future	  crisis.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  the	  majority	  of	  Liberia-­‐born	  respondents	  in	  this	  
study	  who	  naturalised	  in	  other	  countries,	  did	  so	  during	  or	  after	  the	  second	  war.	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Discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   VI,	   revoking	   legal	   citizenship	   ties	   to	   Liberia,	  
however,	   does	   not	   imply	   Liberians	   became	   any	   less	   Liberian	   ‘by	   heart.’	   While	  
warfare	  undoubtedly	  erodes	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  for	  many,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
disrupt	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations.	  For	   instance,	   some	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   said	  
the	  armed	  conflicts	  became	  opportunities	  for	  them	  to	  practice	  citizenship	  from	  afar,	  
as	  long-­‐distance	  nationalists	  advocating	  for	  the	  cessation	  of	  war	  (Anderson,	  1992),	  
or	  by	  sending	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  relatives	  who	  got	  stuck	  in	  the	  crossfire.	  Senator	  
Sumo	  Kupee,	  one	  of	  four	  sponsors	  of	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill,	  quipped	  that	  
“there	   are	   two	   things	   Liberians	   were	   looking	   up	   to	   [during	   the	   war]:	   God	   and	  
Western	  Union”131	  because	  remittances	  were	  the	  only	  reliable	  means	  of	  survival	  for	  
those	   who	   could	   not	   leave.	   For	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   informants	   in	   this	   study,	  
citizenship	  was	  not	  fundamentally	  tied	  to	  an	  abstract	  notion	  of	  statehood,	  but	  rather	  
belonging	   to	   a	   community	   and	   being	   accountable	   to	   and	   responsible	   for	   that	  
community—essentially,	  a	  set	  of	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations.	  	  
Some	   Liberians	   abroad,	   however,	   undermined	   citizen-­‐citizen	   and	   state-­‐citizen	  
relations	   by	   stoking	   the	   flames	   of	   war	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   toppling	   Doe.	   This	  
phenomenon	  is	  now	  so	  widespread	  that	  a	  growing	  body	  of	   literature	  has	  emerged	  
on	   diasporas	   as	   warmongers	   (Appadurai,	   1995;	   Danforth,	   1995),	   countering	   the	  
literature	  on	  diasporas	  and	  development.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Liberia,	  Ellen	  Johnson	  Sirleaf,	  
now	   president	   of	   Liberia,	   and	   Dr.	   Amos	   Sawyer,	   now	   Governance	   Commission	  
chairman,	   were	   the	   masterminds	   behind	   a	   pressure	   group,	   the	   Association	   of	  
Constitutional	   Democracy	   in	   Liberia	   (ACDL),	   which	   provided	   financial	   support	   to	  
Taylor’s	   insurgency	   against	   Doe	   (Sirleaf,	   2009;	   TRC,	   2009b).	   Nevertheless,	   not	   all	  
politically	   active	  Liberians	  were	  wedded	   to	   the	   idea	  of	   a	   violent	   regime	  change.	  A	  
55-­‐year-­‐old	   respondent	   based	   in	   Washington	   recalled	   how	   during	   initial	   ACDL	  
meetings	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   she	   served	   as	   a	   lone	   voice	   against	   overthrowing	   Doe	  
through	  unconstitutional	  means:	  	  
We	  went	   to	  Minnesota	   because	   the	   Nimba	   People’s	   Association	   had	  
wanted	  ACDL	  to	  come,	  and	  so,	  we	  went,	  I	  went	  on	  that	  trip…And	  one	  
of	   the	   concerns	   that	   I	   had	   was	   that	   however	   we	   felt	   about	   the	  
Government	   and	   what	   was	   going	   on	   politically	   and	   the	  
disenfranchisement	   of	   the	   people,	  waging	  war	   in	   the	  manner	   that	   it	  
                                                




was	   waged,	   I	   didn’t	   feel	   it	   was	   appropriate…I	   didn’t	   feel	   that	   he	  
[Taylor]	   needed	   to	   invade	   his	   own	   country	   in	   order	   to	   get	   his,	  
whoever	  was	  in	  charge,	  get	  them	  out.	  I	  thought	  he	  should	  have	  tried	  to	  
use	  the	  Constitution	  because	  he	  could	  have	  gotten	  on	  a	  ballot,	  gotten	  
petitions,	  or	  whatever,	  but	  he	  didn’t	  do	  that…So,	  that	  was	  my	  position	  
and	   that	   was	   something	   that	   I	   had	   a	   difference	   of	   opinion	  with	   the	  
other	  people	  because	  at	  the	  time	  it	  was,	  “We	  want	  to	  have	  one	  voice	  
and	  the	  voice	  should	  be	  support	  Charles	  Taylor	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  Doe”,	  and	  
I	  said,	  “I	  can’t	  do	  that.”132	  
	  
The	  pitfalls	  of	  practicing	  transnational	  citizenship	  to	  incite	  conflict	  has	  not	  been	  lost	  
on	  Liberians	  who	  did	  not	  have	  the	  wherewithal	  to	  leave	  during	  the	  war,	  argued	  this	  
Accra	  based	  male	  respondent:	  	  	  
	  
When	  the	  war	  started	  those	  who	  had	  other	  citizenships,	  they	  all	  fled.	  
They	  all	  left,	  and	  those	  of	  us	  who	  didn’t	  have,	  we	  had	  to	  stay	  there	  and	  
go	  through,	  even	  though	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  were	  caused	  by	  them.	  
But	  they	  all	  could	  leave	  and	  could	  be	  evacuated…133	  
	  
Indeed,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  war	  that	  some	  Liberians	  either	  reject	  dual	  
citizenship	  entirely	  or	  insist	  on	  instituting	  measures	  to	  curb	  abuse	  if	  it	  is	  enacted,	  as	  
discussed	   later	   in	   this	   chapter.	   In	   fact,	   a	   57-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   respondent	   based	   in	  
London	  said	  that	  Liberia’s	  wars	  have	  engendered	  deep	  reflection	  about	  the	  tenets	  of	  
active	  citizenship:	  
	  
Because	  the	  war	  displaced	  people.	   It’s	   today	  because	  of	   the	  war	  that	  
we	  are	  talking	  about	  dual	  citizenship.	  The	  number	  of	  people	  that	  died,	  
the	   family	   conflict,	   the	   kind	   of,	   you	   know,	   things	   that	   we	   have	  
destroyed,	  our	  resources,	  where	  we’re	  coming	  from,	  our	  culture	  have	  
all	   been	   dismantled.	   We	   now	   need	   to	   have	   a	   better	   attitude	   about,	  
“This	  is	  my	  country,	  whatever	  happens,	  whatever	  political	  changes	  it	  
should	  not	  result	  into	  violence.”134	  	  
	  
Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   discourse	   is	   infused	   with	   debates	   about	   the	   trajectory	   of	  
reconstruction	   and	   citizen	   participation	   in	   that	   development	   process.	   Principally,	  
conflicts	   tend	   to	   arise	   around	   issues	   of	   income	   inequality,	   land	   tenure,	   and	  
transitional	  justice,	  which	  ultimately	  underpin	  claims	  for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	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dual	   citizenship.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   term	   ‘post-­‐conflict’	   is	   highly	   problematic	   and	  
inaccurate	  in	  the	  Liberia	  case,	  as	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  sections	  that	  follow.	  	  	  	  
	  
Post-­‐War	  Ideologies	  Re-­‐Inscribe	  Pre-­‐War	  Crisis	  of	  Citizenship	  	  
Malkki	  (1995)	  argues	   that	  “in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  violent	  conflict,	  many	  elements	  are	  
reconfigured:	  relations	  of	  power,	  techniques	  of	  government,	  modes	  of	  organisation,	  
livelihoods,	   identities	   and	   collective	   memories,	   and	   the	   relations	   between	   people	  
and	  places”	  (Malkki,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Long,	  2001:	  231).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Liberia,	  competing	  
post-­‐war	   ideologies	   about	   income	   inequality,	   land	   tenure,	   and	   transitional	   justice	  
have	  re-­‐inscribed	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	  conflicts	  over	  claims	  to	  citizenship.	  This	   is	  
primarily	  manifested	  in	  the	  ‘incompatibility	  of	  goals’	  between	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  
whose	   perceptions	   and	   misperceptions	   of	   each	   other	   influence	   their	   actions	   and	  
interactions.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  analysis,	  I	  take	  on	  the	  most	  extreme	  views	  espoused	  by	  
respondents	   in	   this	   study	   because	   I	   draw	   on	   historical	   comparisons	   of	   interface	  
encounters	   between	   settlers	   and	   indigenes.	  What	   often	   differentiates	   Liberians	   in	  
the	  post-­‐war	  milieu	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  identifies	  as	  a	  diaspora,	  a	  returnee,	  or	  a	  
homelander.	   These	   categories	   of	   social	   differentiation	   pit	   one	   group	   against	   the	  
other	   in	   interface	   situations	   that	   often	   mirror	   19th	   and	   20th	   century	   conflicts	  
discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
	  
Although	  there	  are	  slight	  remnants	  of	  the	  settler-­‐native	  divide	  in	  post-­‐war	  Liberia,	  
multiple	  factors	  such	  as	  intermarriage,	  civil	  unrest,	  migration,	  exile	  and	  return	  have	  
blurred	   these	   lines,	   instead	   creating	   two	   diametrically	   opposed	   markers	   of	  
citizenship	   differentiated	   by	   war-­‐time	   experiences.	   On	   one	   hand,	   those	   who	  
travelled	   abroad	   during	   the	   intermittent	   crises	   are	   often	   framed	   as	   not	   being	  
‘Liberian	  enough’	  because	  they	  did	  not	  suffer	  the	  dredges	  of	  war,	  said	  this	  36-­‐year-­‐
old	   female	   respondent	  who	   relocated	   to	   London	   a	   few	  years	   before	   Liberia’s	   first	  
armed	  conflict:	  	  
	  
It’s	   interesting	  because	  we	  hadn’t	  experienced	  “the	  war,”	   there	  were	  
times	   when	   people	   would	   make	   that	   almost	   a	   criteria	   of	   being	   [a]	  
Liberian	   [citizen].	   And	   I’m	   like,	   “Hello!”,	   you	   know,	   “I	   don’t	   think	   I	  
need	  to	  dodge	  bullets	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  Liberian.”135	  
                                                




Yet,	   direct	   war-­‐time	   experiences	   embolden	   claims	   to	   citizenship	   that	   indirectly	  
exclude	   those	  who	   fled	  Liberia	  voluntarily	  or	   involuntarily,	   argued	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
Minister	  Augustine	  Ngafuan,	  a	  homeland	  cabinet	  official:	  
	  
There	   are	   a	   lot	   of	   people	   here	  who	   feel	   that	   they	   did	   not	   run	   away	  
from	   the	   country.	   They	   ate	   the	   “Borbor	   John”...the	   greens	   that	   they	  
took	  from	  the	  swamp	  when	  they	  couldn't	  get	  potato	  greens.	  Whatever	  
they	  got	  in	  the	  swamp	  they	  ate	  and	  they	  survived…they	  went	  through	  
check-­‐points,	  and	  they	  were	  here	  for	  all	  the	  wars…They	  take	  some	  of	  
their	   brothers	   that	   come	   from	   the	   diaspora	   as	   those	  who	   chickened	  
out.	   “When	   those	   times	   of	   difficulties	   existed,	   you	   were	   more	   than	  
glad	   to	   run	   away	   and	   not	   to	   face	   the	   burden	  with	   us.	   Now	   that	   the	  
country	   has	   gotten	   stable	   and	   opportunities	   are	   coming,	   then	   you	  
come	   and	   say	   you	   are	   a	   Liberian	   [citizen].”…Local	   people,	   some	   of	  
them,	   detest	   diasporans	   too	   much.	   They	   carry	   their	   fear	   and	   their	  
paranoia	  to	  [a]	  ridiculous	  extent	  because	  part	  of	  it,	  some	  are	  afraid	  of	  
competition	  and	  they	  just	  feel	  that	  you	  are	  not	  a	  Liberian	  if	  you	  were	  
not	  recruited	  from	  Liberia	  and	  that	  is	  unfair…136	  	  
	  
Extreme	   perceptions	   and	   misperceptions	   about	   returnees	   are	   completely	  
unfounded	  and	  often	  create	   feelings	  of	  alienation,	   argued	  one	  44-­‐year-­‐old	  circular	  
returnee	  male	  respondent	  who	  relocated	  to	  Monrovia	  with	  his	  entire	  family	  in	  2012:	  	  
	  
Well,	   the	   first	   and	   the	   only	   person	   who	   has	   said	   to	   me,	   “Welcome	  
home!”	  was	  the	  Lebanese.	  I’ve	  never	  gotten	  the	  welcome	  home,	  even	  
from	  Liberian	  members	  of	  my	   family.	  Now,	   I	  don’t	   think	   it’s	  because	  
they	  necessarily	  have	  some	  deep-­‐seated	  animosity	   towards	  me	  but	   I	  
do	  think	  it	  is	  because	  –	  whether	  most	  Liberians	  want	  to	  admit	  it	  or	  not	  
–	   I	   do	   believe	   there	   is	   some	   low-­‐level	   animosity,	   envy,	   or	  whatever	  
you	   want	   to	   call	   it,	   that	   they	   have	   towards	   returnees.	   There	   is	   an	  
assumption	   that	   we	   are	   returning	  with	   all	   this	   wealth,	   and	   that	   we	  
don’t	  understand	  all	  that	  they	  went	  through	  during	  the	  war	  years	  and	  
the	  post-­‐war	   years,	   and	   that	  we	   are	   returning	  with	   this	   chip	   on	  our	  
shoulder…137	  
	  
Contrary	   to	   this	   respondent’s	   claims,	   Minister	   Ngafuan	   admitted	   that	   returnee	  
arrogance	  is	  particularly	  prevalent	  in	  government	  circles:	  	  
	  
From	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   regime,	   there	   was	   a	   concept,	   there	   was	  
some	  notion	  that	  people	  on	  the	  ground	  might	  not	  have	  been	  too	  good	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enough…The	   contempt	   they	   have,	   the	   contempt	   diasporans	   in	  
government	  have	  for	  local	  people…it	  still	  exists.138	  
	  
While	  returnees	  are	  caricatured	  as	  pompous	  and	  ego-­‐maniacal,	  with	  a	  semblance	  of	  
settler	   sensibilities,	   those	   who	   remained	   in	   Liberia	   are	   often	   stereotyped	   as	  
unskilled	  and	  incapable	  of	  handling	  the	  demands	  of	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  said	  this	  24-­‐
year-­‐old	  male	  homelander:	  	  	  
	  
In	  Liberia,	  one	  other	  thing	  I	  observe	  about	  our	  society	  is	  that	  we	  are	  
like,	   let	  me	   use	   the	   term	   ‘xenocentric’	   [ethnocentric].	  We	   believe	   in	  
foreign	  policies,	  foreign	  activities,	  foreign	  education,	  and	  foreign	  stuff	  
more	  than	  our	  own.	  So,	  if	  a	  Liberian,	  in	  Liberia,	  that	  acquires	  a	  certain	  
degree,	   for	   a	   typical	   example	   from	   the	   University	   of	   Liberia	   or	   any	  
other	   university	   like	   the	   United	  Methodist	   University,	   and	   someone	  
coming	   from	   the	   United	   States,	   like	   Harvard	   University	   or	   the	  
University	  of	  Georgia,	  you	  will	   find	  out	   that	   the	  person	  coming	   from	  
abroad	  will	  be	  given	  more	  credence,	  more	  preference,	  than	  the	  person	  
in	  Liberia	  with	  the	  Liberian	  diploma	  or	  the	  Liberian	  degree.139	  	  
	  
The	   distorted	   perceptions	   of	   homelanders	   as	   parochial	   and	   incompetent—
essentially	   ‘incomplete’	   citizens—conjures	  up	  19th	   and	  20th	   century	  notions	  of	   the	  
‘civilised	   citizen’	   as	   practicing	   Christianity	   and	   consuming	  Western	   products.	   The	  
markers	  of	  civilisation	  in	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  milieu	  are	  defined	  as	  Western	  education,	  
Western	   inflection,	   extensive	   travel	   experiences,	   and	   networks	   abroad.	   However	  
baseless,	   these	   social	   categories	   of	   differentiation	   often	   inform	  policy-­‐making	   and	  
fuel	  discrimination	  and	  discontent,	  said	  one	  48-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  homelander:	  	  
	  
Generally,	   there	   is	   the	   perception	   that	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   in	   the	   human	  
resource	   base…there	   is	   a	   tendency	   by	   the	   government	   and	  
international	  partners	  to	   look	  down	  on	  the	  existing	  resource	  base	  as	  
not	   being	   adequate	   enough	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   post-­‐conflict	  
environment.	   Therefore,	   maybe	   some	   of	   what	   they’ve	   learned	   from	  
abroad	   might	   not	   be	   applicable	   to	   our	   national	   context…It	   doesn't	  
really	  mean	  that	  you	  qualify	  or	  [it]	  makes	  you	  competent,	  particularly	  
if	  you	  have	  lived	  out	  of	  here	  for	  a	  long	  time	  of	  your	  life.	  You	  grew	  up	  in	  
a	  different	  societal	  context,	  from	  abroad,	  so	  when	  you	  come	  here,	  even	  
though	   you're	   a	   Liberian	   but	   you’re	   still	   new	  because	   the	   context	   is	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different…So,	   it	   thus	   created	   [an]	   'us	   versus	   them'	   sort	   of	  mentality	  
and	  it	  placed	  us	  in	  the	  way	  that	  people	  get	  appointed.140	  
	  
Although	   the	   ideologically	   driven	   perspectives	   I	   have	   highlighted	   herein	   are	  
embedded	  in	  some	  national	  policy	  making	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  it	  would	  be	  
misleading	   to	   assume	   that	   all	   Liberians	   espouse	   these	   extreme	   views.	   As	   former	  
Justice	  Minister	  Christiana	  Tah	  reflected	  soberingly,	   “everybody	  who	  is	  here	   is	  not	  
unfriendly	  towards	  Liberians	  who	  come	  in,	  and	  everybody	  who	  comes	  in	  do[es]	  not	  
come	  with	  an	  air	  of	  arrogance…”141	  
	  
Post-­‐War	   Policies	   on	   Income,	   Land	   Tenure,	   and	   Transitional	   Justice	   Fuel	  
Conflict	  	  
It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   post-­‐war	   conflicts	   between	   social	   actors	   who	   operate	  
domestically	  and	  transnationally	  are	  often	  fuelled	  by	  misguided	  national	  policies	  on	  
income,	  land	  tenure,	  and	  transitional	  justice.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  income	  allocation	  within	  
the	   executive	   branch	   of	   national	   government,	   for	   example,	   Ellen	   Johnson	   Sirleaf’s	  
administration	  has	  effectively	  created	  multi-­‐tiered	  income	  levels	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
multi-­‐layered	   citizenship	   hierarchies	   of	   the	   19th	   and	   20th	   centuries.	   According	   to	  
Kieh,	  prior	  to	  the	  1980	  coup,	  members	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  and	  urban	  dwellers	  earned	  
an	   average	   annual	   income	   of	   US$600	   while	   their	   rural	   counterparts	   earned	   only	  
US$70	   (Kieh,	   1992:	   128).	   That	   was	   then.	   Now	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	  
emergency	  capacity	  building	  programmes	  such	  as	   the	  Liberia	  Emergency	  Capacity	  
Building	  Support	  (LECBS),	  the	  Transfer	  of	  Knowledge	  Through	  Expatriate	  Nationals	  
(TOKTEN),	  and	  the	  Senior	  Executive	  Service	  (SES),	  funded	  by	  philanthropist	  George	  
Soros,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP),	  and	  Humanity	  United,	  
respectively,	   Liberian	   returnees	   are	   often	   paid	   wages	   far	   exceeding	   that	   of	   their	  
homeland	   counterparts,	   as	   a	   top-­‐off	   of	   their	   civil	   servant	   salaries	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	   2010a;	   Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2012a).	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   diaspora	  
returnees	   in	   managerial	   positions	   are	   paid	   US$3,500	   untaxed	   under	   the	   SES	  
programme	   while	   their	   equally	   qualified	   homeland	   counterparts	   can	   make	   up	   to	  
US$2,000.	   While	   the	   SES	   and	   TOKTEN	   programmes	   are	   more	   transparent,	   with	  
wages	   of	   the	   different	   tiers	   of	   income	   published,	   the	   LECSBS,	   now	   phased	   out	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because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  funding,	  was	  shrouded	  in	  secrecy	  and	  under	  the	  sole	  discretion	  
of	  President	  Sirleaf.	  As	  someone	  who	  benefitted	  from	  LECBS	  for	  one	  year	  and	  was	  
privy	  to	  confidential	  information	  about	  remunerations,	  I	  can	  attest	  that	  there	  was	  a	  
wide	   variation	   between	   what	   some	   officials	   were	   paid	   compared	   to	   others,	   in	  
addition	   to	   receiving	   their	   government	   of	   Liberia	   salaries	   and	   amenities	   such	   as	  
assigned	   vehicles,	   gasoline	   vouchers,	   and	   top-­‐up	   phone	   cards.	   The	   rationale	   for	  
allocating	   these	   incomes	   was	   based	   not	   on	   core	   competencies	   or	   considerable	  
contributions	   to	   post-­‐war	   recovery,	   but	   solely	   on	   the	   president’s	   personal	  
preferences.	  	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  Civil	  Service	  Agency	  tried	  to	  standardise	  civil	  service	  pay	  scales	  during	  
my	   time	   in	   the	  Office	  of	   the	  President,	   the	  proposed	  reforms	  were	  often	  met	  with	  
half-­‐hearted	   commitments.	   I	   attribute	   this	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   political	   will	   from	   the	  
president	   and	   the	   reluctance	   of	   high-­‐level	   appointees,	   since	   their	   incomes	   benefit	  
from	  a	   lacklustre	   approach	   to	   genuine	   reforms.	   Some	   returnees	   in	   Liberia’s	   semi-­‐
autonomous	  agencies	  earn	  up	  to	  US$15,000	  a	  month,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	   former	  
EU-­‐funded	  Auditor-­‐General	   John	  Morlu	   (Government	   of	   Liberia	   and	   the	   European	  
Commission;	   2007:	   117;	   154).	   Liberia’s	   adoption	   of	   the	   international	   system	   of	  
unequal	   remuneration,	   in	   which	   agencies	   such	   as	   the	   UN	   and	   World	   Bank	   pay	  
expatriate	   staff	   exorbitant	   salaries	   while	   compensating	   local	   staff	   at	   much	   lower	  
‘domestic	  rates’,	  has	  hastened	  resentment	  and	  compromised	  productivity.	  One	  29-­‐
year-­‐old	   homelander	   who	   handles	   salary	   arrangements	   within	   an	   international	  
organisation	   in	  Liberia	   revealed	  how	  domestic	   senior	   staff	   earn	   less	   than	  many	  of	  
the	  US	  citizen	  Liberians	  who	  are	  under	  their	  supervision:	  	  
	  
We	   have	   [a]	   couple	   of	   Liberians	   who	   were	   employed	   on	   US	  
citizenship…They	   purely	   interact	   like	   Liberians;	   they	   speak	   like	  
Liberians.	  It’s	  only	  when	  you	  have	  to	  prepare	  immigration	  documents	  
you	   know	   that,	   or	  when	   you	   have	   to	   deal	  with	   their	   salary	   issues…	  
They	  get	  paid	  more.	  They	  are	  hired	  because	  they	  are	  foreign	  nationals	  
living	  here	  so	  they	  got	  a	  lot	  of	  allowances.	  And	  I	  can	  say	  for	  sure	  that	  
they’re	   not	   paying	   taxes.	   Some	   of	   their	   money	   is	   not	   going	   back	   to	  
Liberia.	  So,	   it’s	  going	  outside	  of	  Liberia…And,	  so,	  even	   in	   the	  project,	  
there	  are	  senior	  staff	  who	  are	  getting	  less	  than	  they	  because	  they	  are	  
known	  as	  foreign	  nationals.142	  	  
                                                




It	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   examples	  detailed	  herein	   that	   the	   inflated	   salaries	   of	   diaspora	  
returnees	   are	   indicative	   of	   international	   income	   inequalities	   that	   have	   widened	  
across	   the	   globe	   (Held	   and	  McGrew,	   2007:	   130),	   thereby	   creating	   a	   clash	   of	   life-­‐
worlds.	  While	  some	  returnees	  justify	  their	  excessive	  earnings	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  the	  
‘sacrifice’	  of	  return	  migration,	  homelanders,	  such	  as	  this	  43-­‐year-­‐old	  man,	  scorn	  the	  
policy	  as	  misguided	  and	  downright	  criminal:	  
	  
How	  can	  you	  be	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  country	  where	  poverty	  is	  at	  its	  peak,	  
and	  you	  feel	  proud	  that	  you	  make	  15	  to	  20,000	  [United	  States]	  dollars	  
a	  month?	  And	  there’s	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  it	  because	  you’re	  qualified	  
and,	  you	  know,	  you’re	  being	  paid	  for	  a	  professional	  service…So,	  I	  think	  
there	  are	  some	  inconsistencies	  around	  values,	  around	  principles	  and	  
how	  it	  translates	  into	  professionalism	  and	  our	  quest	  for	  what	  we	  call	  
‘giving	   back	   to	   a	   country.’	   So,	   I	   think	   there’s	   a	   total	   disconnect	  
between	   our	   commitment,	   you	   know,	   as	   patriotic	   citizens	   and	   our	  
quest	  and	  ego	  for	  affluence.143	  
	  
Others	  argue	  that	  given	  the	  relative	  deprivation	  of	  most	  Liberians	  in-­‐country,	  a	  real	  
sacrifice	   would	   mean	   moving	   one’s	   family	   to	   Liberia,	   relinquishing	   a	   mortgage	  
abroad,	   and	   investing	   wholeheartedly	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   economy	   instead	   of	  
transferring	  money	  to	  maintain	  a	  transnational	  lifestyle.	  
	  
Besides	  income	  inequality,	  land	  tenure	  is	  also	  indicative	  of	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  crisis	  
of	   citizenship.	   As	   has	   been	   argued,	   private	   property	   was	   a	   primary	   criterion	   for	  
citizenship	  up	  to	  the	  early	  1980s	  when	  the	  ‘hut	  tax’	  was	  abolished	  by	  President	  Doe.	  
Though	  no	   longer	  a	  criterion	  for	  citizenship,	   land	  ownership	  now	  defines	  a	  right	  of	  
citizenship	  though	  it	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  crisis:	  	  
	  
Land	   tenure	   arrangements	   and	   administration—as	   well	   as	   the	  
ownership	  and	  use	  of	   the	  various	   resources	  affixed	   to	  and	  buried	   in	  
the	   land—are	  not	  well	  developed	  and/or	  contradictory,	  contributing	  
to	  poor	   land	  use	  and	  management	  plan,	   skewed	  wealth	  distribution,	  
environmental	   damages,	   and	   contention	   and	   conflict	   between	  
stakeholders	   (owners	   and	   users	   access	   rights).	   For	   example,	   while	  
most	   of	   the	   land	   in	   cities	   like	   Monrovia	   are	   privately	   claimed	   or	  
deeded,	   land	   outside	   of	   cities	   or	   rural	   land	   have	   overplaying	   access	  
and	  ownership	  rights.	  This	  arrangement	  has	  led	  to	  a	  dual	  land	  market	  
and	   administration,	   between	   customary	   land	   and	   statutory	   land,	  
                                                




leading	  to	  a	  general	  atmosphere	  of	  confusion	  and	  conflict	  between	  the	  
state,	  citizens,	  and	  investors	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2010b:	  14).	  	  
	  
With	   less	   than	   20	   percent	   of	   Liberia’s	   land	   privately	   titled	   and	   registered,	   the	  
government	  adopted	  reform	  measures	  such	  as	  the	  Community	  Rights	  Law	  of	  2006	  
and	   the	   Community	   Rights	   Act	   of	   2009	   to	   “properly	   formalise	   community	  
ownership”;	   however,	   “land	   rights	   remain	   poorly	   defined,	   with	   many	   rural	   lands	  
having	  overlapping	  and	  unresolved	  ownership”	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  4).	  
The	   post-­‐war	   transition	   further	   exacerbated	   this	   trend	   (UN	   Panel	   of	   Experts	   on	  
Liberia,	   2011:	   57).	   Because	   of	   Liberia’s	   two	   intermittent	  wars,	  which	   fuelled	  both	  
rural	   to	  urban	  and	   international	  migration,	   land	  was	  often	   left	  unclaimed	   for	   long	  
periods	   of	   time	   and	   then	   appropriated	   by	   squatters	   having	   no	   legitimate	   deeds.	  
With	  the	  return	  of	  Liberians	  from	  abroad,	  some	  of	  whom	  revoked	  their	  citizenship	  
and	  therefore	  legally	  relinquished	  their	  entitlements	  to	  property	  once	  owned,	  land	  
tenure	   has	   become	   increasingly	   tenuous.	   This	   23-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   homelander	  
reflected	  on	  how	  land	  crises	  can	  often	  turn	  violent	  very	  fast	  between	  two	  competing	  
claimants:	  	  
	  
The	  thing	  about	  land	  issue	  in	  Liberia	  is	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  over	  
emphasised.	  You	  have	  a	  land,	  and	  this	  person	  abandon[s]	  this	  land	  for	  
close	  to	  twenty-­‐five	  years.	  Other	  people	  took	  the	  land	  and	  built	  houses	  
on	   it	  and	  other	  people	  started	   investing	   in	   this	   land.	  All	  of	  a	  sudden,	  
you	  say	  the	  person	  came	  from	  America	  and	  want[s]	  to	  gain	  their	  land	  
back.	  You	  know	  land	   issue,	   it	  cause[s]	  serious	   trouble	  all	  around	  the	  
world	  and	  not	  only	   in	  Liberia.	  Other	  people	   feel	  bitter,	   other	  people	  
feel	  because	  they’re	  not	  of	  that	  class	  so	  other	  people	  want	  to	  over	  ride	  
them…The	  other	  one	  that	  happened	  recently	  on	  the	  Robertsfield	  Road	  
[Highway],	   the	  police	  had	  to	  go	  there,	  about	  the	  Cooper	  family.	  They	  
burned	  tires	  on	  the	  road,	  and	  started	  burning	  the	  tires.	  People	  took	  up	  
cutlasses,	  sticks.	  It	  can	  be	  very	  brutal.	  It’s	  not	  something	  to	  see.	  Land	  
issue	  is	  a	  very	  serious	  thing.144	  
	  
The	   land	   crisis	   became	   so	   grave	   that	   the	   government	   established	   in	   2009	   a	   Land	  
Commission	  which	  finalised	  the	  country’s	  first	  Land	  Rights	  Policy	  in	  2013	  to	  reform	  
the	  tenure	  system	  for	  public,	  private,	  government	  and	  customary	  land	  (Government	  
of	  Liberia,	  2013a).	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  section	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  examine	  in	  
detail	   the	   reforms	   undertaken	   so	   far,	   but	   suffice	   it	   to	   say	   that	   the	   Commission	  
                                                




discovered	   a	   number	   of	   anomalies	   that	   it	   is	   attempting	   to	   resolve,	   such	   as	   the	  
appropriation	   of	   customary	   land	   by	   private	   citizens,	   unannounced	   evictions,	   the	  
exercise	  of	  unlawful	  eminent	  domain	  by	  government,	  failure	  by	  individuals	  owners	  
and	   commercial	   bodies	   to	   pay	   applicable	   land	   taxes,	   and	   the	   inability	   of	   the	  
government	   to	  enforce	  and	  collect	  property	   taxes	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2013a).	  
Although	   the	   Commission’s	   proposed	   reforms	   are	   admirable,	   the	   government	   has	  
undermined	  these	  efforts	  by	   leasing	  a	   third	  of	  Liberia’s	   landmass	  to	   foreign	  multi-­‐
nationals	   for	   the	   extraction	   of	   iron	   ore,	   rubber,	   timber,	   and	   oil	   palm	   (Siakor	   and	  
Knight,	  2012).	  The	  overreliance	  on	  concession	  wealth	  and	  unauthorised	  seizure	  of	  
communal	   land	  has	  eroded	  relations	  between	  the	  state	  and	   its	  citizens,	  and	  pitted	  
local	  communities	  against	  multi-­‐nationals	  (Pailey,	  2014a:	  4).	  	  
	  
Liberians	   abroad	   who	   own	   large	   tracks	   of	   unused	   land	   in	   the	   country	   have	   also	  
begun	   to	   raise	   alarm	  about	   the	   government’s	   haphazard	   approach	   to	   land	   tenure.	  
One	   53-­‐year-­‐old	   US	   born	   woman	   whose	   Liberian	   citizen	   parents	   acquired	   prime	  
property	   in	   Monrovia	   and	   elsewhere,	   took	   serious	   exception	   to	   the	   prospect	   of	  
eminent	  domain:	  	  
	  
If	   you	  were	   born	   in	   Liberia,	   you	   grew	   up	   in	   Liberia	   and,	   you	   know,	  
forget	  about	  people	  like	  me	  who	  might	  have	  been	  born	  overseas,	  but,	  
let’s	  say,	  just	  the	  basic	  folks	  who	  were	  born	  there,	  grew	  up	  there,	  and	  
then	  left	  there	  during	  the	  war,	  came	  here	  [the	  US],	  have	  settled	  here,	  
been	  here	  for	  35	  years.	  We	  cannot	  look	  at	  those	  people	  and	  say,	  “Look,	  
you	   guys	   are	   abandoning	   your	   property;	   you’re	   not	   doing	   this	   and	  
that”,	   because,	   ultimately,	   if	  we	   could	  have	  been	  at	  home,	  we	  would	  
have	  been	  at	  home.	  Most	  of	  us	  would	  have	  been	  at	  home;	  we	  wouldn’t	  
have	   left	   the	   country…So,	   all	   of	   a	   sudden,	   you’re	   saying	   to	  me,	   and	  
again,	  this	  is	  going	  back	  to	  your	  question	  of	  property,	  you	  know,	  being	  
abandoned,	  you’re	  saying	  to	  me,	  “Well,	  you	  abandoned	  your	  property,	  
so	  we	  have	  the	  right	  of	  eminent	  domain.	  We’re	  gonna	  take	  that	  over	  
and	  we’ll	  sell	  it	  off	  to	  the	  highest	  bidder	  or	  to	  whomever”,	  which,	  and	  
seen	   in	   parenthesis,	   is	   the	   Lebanese	  who	   have	   the	  money.	   So,	   then,	  
you	  know,	  the	  Liberians	  are	  saying,	  “You	  know,	  wait	  a	  minute.	  I	  was	  at	  
home	  perfectly	  fine	  until	  you	  all	  started	  shooting	  in	  the	  air.	  And	  I	  don’t	  
feel	  like	  I	  should	  have	  stayed	  there	  and	  gotten	  shot	  up,	  so	  I	  left!145	  
	  
                                                




Although	   this	   respondent	   raised	   valid	   points	   about	   her	   family’s	   property	   being	  
abandoned	  as	  a	  result	  of	  warfare	  beyond	  their	  control,	  her	  defensive	  posture	  about	  
eminent	  domain	  calls	   into	  question	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  commands	  of	  citizenship—
owning	   land—should	   somehow	   supersede	   the	   demands	   of	   citizenship—land	  
development	  and	  payment	  of	  taxes.	  	  	  
	  
In	  addition	   to	   land	   tenure,	  another	  post-­‐war	  governance	   issue	   that	  has	   revealed	  a	  
clash	   of	   life-­‐worlds	   and	   crisis	   of	   citizenship	   is	   transitional	   justice,	   which	   has	  
effectively	   pitted	   ‘perpetrators’	   against	   ‘victims’,	   although	   the	   two	   categories	   can	  
often	   be	   blurred.	   As	   one	   35-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homelander	   revealed	   to	   me,	   “a	   victim	  
cannot	   be	   a	   citizen”146	  because	   victimhood	   connotes	   an	   absence	   of	   agency	   and	  
without	   justice	   agency	   cannot	   be	   restored.	   Disagreeing	   with	   this	   respondent’s	  
analysis,	   I	   believe	   victimhood	   and	   agency	   are	   not	   incompatible	   and	   that	   even	   the	  
most	   marginalised	   groups	   can	   possess	   agency.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   recognise	   that	   the	  
inability	   of	   Liberia’s	   government	   to	   implement	   the	  more	   controversial	   aspects	   of	  
Liberia’s	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission	   (TRC)	   recommendations	   has	  
revealed	  a	   crisis	   of	   citizenship	   and	  engendered	  a	  polarised	  discourse	  on	  post-­‐war	  
impunity.	  	  	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  provisions	  within	  the	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  (CPA)	  ending	  the	  
second	   Liberian	   war	   was	   the	   passage	   of	   a	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Act	   in	   2005	  
establishing	   a	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission	   (TRC,	   2009a;	   TRC,	   2009b).	  
Mandated	  to	  systematically	  chart	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  Liberia’s	  two	  wars;	  investigate	  
gross	   human	   rights	   violations,	   violations	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   and	  
other	  abuses;	  and	  determine	  who	  bore	  the	  greatest	  responsibility	  and	  their	  impacts	  
on	   survivors	  of	   the	   conflict,	   the	  TRC	  began	   full	  operations	  with	  public	  hearings	   in	  
2008	   and	   released	   its	   findings	   and	   recommendations	   in	   2009	   (TRC,	   2009a;	   TRC,	  
2009b).	   Although	   the	   Commission	  was	  mandated	   to	   evaluate	   the	   periods	   January	  
1979	   through	   October	   14,	   2003,	   in	   their	   findings,	   however,	   there	   is	   unequivocal	  
admission	  that	  Liberia’s	  contemporary	  armed	  conflicts	  date	  back	  to	  the	  antecedents	  
of	  state	  formation	  in	  1822	  (TRC,	  2009a:	  2;	  TRC,	  2009b:	  17).	  It	  further	  identified	  four	  
major	  conflict	  issues,	  which,	  in	  my	  analysis,	  are	  underpinned	  by	  asymmetrical	  state-­‐
                                                




citizen	  relations:	  voice	  and	  accountability,	  and	  the	  lack	  thereof;	  land	  and	  property-­‐
related	  disputes;	  the	  dualism	  of	  Liberian	  identity	  and	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity;	  and	  
the	  marginalisation,	  alienation	  and	  manipulation	  of	  youth	  (TRC,	  2009b:	  211-­‐213).	  	  	  
	  
Unlike	   the	  South	  African	  TRC,	  which	   served	  as	  a	  model,	   the	  Liberian	  TRC	   in	  2009	  
proffered	   a	   series	   of	   controversial	   recommendations	   aimed	   at	   addressing	  
asymmetries	  of	  power	  between	  the	  state	  and	  its	  citizens,	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	  
of	   an	   extraordinary	   criminal	   court	   for	   over	   100	   individuals	   deemed	   to	   have	  
committed	   gross	   human	   rights	   violations,	   including	   Charles	   Taylor	   and	   Prince	  
Johnson;	   the	   barring	   from	   public	   office	   (lustration)	   of	   those	   recommended	   for	  
prosecution	   (both	  war	  crimes	  and	  domestic	  criminal	  prosecution)	   in	  addition	   to	  a	  
special	   category	   of	   individuals	   publically	   sanctioned	   for	   financing	   and	   supporting	  
warring	  factions,	  including	  then	  sitting	  President	  Ellen	  Johnson	  Sirleaf,	  for	  a	  period	  
of	  30	  years;	  the	  seizure	  and	  restitution	  of	  individual	  and	  corporate	  assets	  acquired	  
by	  means	  of	  economic	  pillage	  during	  the	  wars;	  reparations	  for	  designated	  survivors	  
administered	   through	   a	   Reparations	   Trust	   Fund;	   the	   transformation	   of	   Liberia’s	  
national	  motto	   from	   ‘the	   love	  of	   liberty	  brought	  us	  here’	   to	   the	   ‘the	   love	  of	   liberty	  
brought	  us	  together’;	  and	  the	  enactment	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  and	  diaspora	  
transnational	  voting	  (TRC,	  2009b:	  347-­‐353;	  359-­‐362;	  369-­‐376;	  377-­‐379;	  400;	  396-­‐
397).	  Essentially,	   the	  TRC	  recommendations	  mentioned	  herein	  were	  an	  attempt	  at	  
strengthening	   citizen-­‐citizen	   and	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   through	   processes	   of	  
accountability	  and	  justice.	  	  
	  
Illustrating	   the	   contested	  nature	  of	   the	   recommendations	   and	   the	  politicisation	  of	  
the	  Commission	  after	   three	  years	  of	   collecting	  over	  20,000	   statements	   from	  more	  
than	   17,000	   individuals	   throughout	   Liberia	   and	   in	   select	   diaspora	   sites	   abroad,	  
three	  of	  the	  nine	  commissioners	  abstained	  from	  affixing	  their	  signatures	  to	  the	  final	  
report	  signifying	  dissent	  (TRC,	  2009b:	  xxvi;	  186-­‐187).	  Although	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
Liberians	  home	  and	  abroad	  hailed	  the	  report	  as	  a	  vindication	  of	  their	  losses,	  those	  
implicated	   have	   made	   full	   implementation	   impossible	   either	   through	   political	  
intimidation	   and	   threats	   of	   renewed	   violence	   or	   by	   completely	   ignoring	   the	  
recommendations	  altogether	  (Weah,	  2012).	  To	  date,	  the	  only	  TRC	  recommendation	  




National	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (INCHR),	  which	  has	  yet	  to	  fulfil	  its	  mandate	  
of	   implementing	   all	   TRC	   recommendations	   (TRC,	   2009b:	   388-­‐389).	   Other	  
recommendations	   are	   currently	   under	   consideration,	   such	   as	   proposed	   dual	  
citizenship	   legislation	   and	   a	   comprehensive	   review	   of	   Liberia’s	   national	   symbols	  
including	   the	   national	   motto,	   flag,	   and	   seal.	   Through	   its	   endorsement	   of	  
deterritorialised	  citizenship	  as	  a	  reconciliatory	  imperative	  for	  Liberia,	  the	  TRC	  was	  
able	  to	  balance	  its	  portrayal	  of	  diasporas	  by	  acknowledging	  in	  an	  earlier	  part	  of	  the	  
report	   their	   past	   role	   in	   fuelling	   conflict	   while	   subsequently	   recognising	   their	  
potential	  contributions	  to	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  (TRC,	  2009b:	  396).	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  crisis	  of	  citizenship	  has	  re-­‐emerged	  in	  Liberia’s	  
post-­‐war	   milieu,	   disguised	   as	   conflicts	   over	   income	   inequality,	   land	   tenure,	   and	  
transitional	   justice	  which	  harken	  back	  to	  pre-­‐war	  societal	  fissures	  that	  were	  never	  
fully	  resolved	  and	  therefore	  underpin	  21st	  century	  anti-­‐dual	  citizenship	  sentiments.	  
In	   the	  next	   section,	   I	  provide	  a	  deeper	  analysis	  of	  how	  the	   three	  post-­‐war	  conflict	  
issues	   identified	  herein	  have	   influenced	   the	   range	  of	   competing	   claims	  about	  dual	  
citizenship,	  as	  it	  represents	  the	  entry	  point	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  
The	  Passport	  Can	  Change	  but	   the	  Heart	  Cannot:	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Claims	  and	  
Counter-­‐Claims	  	  
It	  is	  worthwhile	  here	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  analysis	  of	  how	  the	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  in	  
my	  study	  responded	  to	  the	  question	  of	  dual	  citizenship,	  given	  that	  the	  proposed	  bill	  
represents	   a	   manifestation	   of	   the	   reconfiguration	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   across	  
space	   and	   time	   and	   a	   site	   of	   extreme	  post-­‐war	   contestation.	  Of	   the	   202	   Liberians	  
interviewed	   for	   this	   thesis,	   123	   supported	   dual	   citizenship;	   30	   supported	   dual	  
citizenship	   with	   reservations;	   37	   rejected	   dual	   citizenship;	   nine	   expressed	  
ambivalence	   about	   dual	   citizenship;	   one	   policy	   maker	   provided	   no	   recorded	  
response	  because	  he	  said	  that	  he	  would	  have	  to	  thoroughly	  study	  the	  issue	  in	  more	  
detail	   for	   an	   informed	   opinion;	   and	   one	   policy	   maker	   in	   Monrovia	   and	   another	  
embassy	  official	  in	  Accra	  did	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  offer	  an	  opinion	  about	  dual	  
citizenship	  explicitly	  because	  of	   time	   limitations	  during	   their	   interviews.	  Although	  
the	  percentages	  captured	  in	  Table	  9	  are	  not	  representative,	   they	  reveal	  qualitative	  




Furthermore,	  I	  recognise	  that	  the	  percentages	  could	  have	  been	  drastically	  different	  
had	   I	   interviewed	   more	   homeland	   Liberians	   or	   ‘near’	   diasporas	   in	   Accra	   and	  
Freetown.	  
	  
Table	  9:	  Breakdown	  of	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Perspectives	  Amongst	  202	  Respondents	  	  














London	  (32)	   27	   3	   0	   2	   0	  
Washington	  (33)	   26	   3	   4	   0	   0	  
Freetown	  (21)	   18	   1	   1	   1	   0	  
Accra	  (33)	   20	   4	   7	   1	   1	  
Monrovia	  (83)	   32	   19	   25	   5	   2	  
Total	   Absolute	  
Number/	  


















Based	   on	   statistical	   analysis	  within	   the	   respondent	   pool	   captured	   in	   Table	   9,	   it	   is	  
clear	   that	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   interviewees—76	   percent—conceive	   of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   as	   territorially	   unbounded,	   as	   illustrated	   by	   their	   support	   of	   dual	  
citizenship	   as	   a	   policy	   prescription	   for	   Liberia	   in	   principle.	   Conjuring	   up	   the	  
ubiquitous	  ‘heart’	  trope,	  one	  38-­‐year-­‐old	  Freetown-­‐based	  male	  respondent	  argued:	  
	  
If	  a	  man	  must	  contribute	  to	  his	  nation,	  most	  especially	  like	  Liberia,	  the	  
man	  must	  go	  out	  [of	  the	  country].	  And	  if	  the	  man	  goes	  out,	  he	  acquires	  
knowledge	  that	  can	  help	  Liberia.	   If	  you	  will	  stop	  a	  man	  from	  being	  a	  
citizen	   in	   another	   country	   that	   will	   be	   contributing	   to	   the	   man’s	  
development	  and	  indirectly	  contributing	  to	  the	  nation,	  Liberia,	  then	  it	  
means	  you’ll	  be	  hindering	  the	  development	  in	  Liberia...I	  support	  dual	  
citizenship	   [one]	   hundred	   percent	   because	   the	   book	   [passport]	   can	  
change	  but	  the	  heart	  cannot	  change.147	  
	  
Employing	  Liberia’s	  future	  development	  as	  her	  frame	  of	  analysis	  as	  well,	  a	  36-­‐year-­‐
old	  female	  respondent	  based	  in	  London	  argued	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  would	  facilitate	  
civic	  responsibility	  amongst	  Liberians	  abroad:	  	  
	  
People	  are	  preparing	  to	  come	  back	  [to	  Liberia]	  and	  I	  think	  if	  you	  make	  
people	  feel	  excluded,	  or	  on	  the	  outside,	  or	  as	  outsiders	  coming	  in,	  you	  
                                                




know,	  you’re	   trying	   to	  get	  people	  on	  board,	   all	   this	   ‘Lift	  Liberia’	   and	  
stuff	   like	   that.	   I	   think	  people	  need	   to	   share	  ownership	  of	   that	  vision	  
and	   if	   they	   feel	   that	   they	  are	  going	  to	  be	  dipping	   in	  and	  out	  or	  come	  
when	   they’re	   ready,	   you	   know,	   then	   that	   commitment	   will	   not	   be	  
strong.	  People	  will	  commit	  if	  they	  feel	  that	  something	  is	  theirs…148	  
	  
However,	   respondents	   who	   supported	   dual	   citizenship	   with	   reservations	   argued	  
that	   the	   proposed	   bill	   must	   clearly	   articulate	   provisions	   about	   the	   rights	   and	  
responsibilities	   of	   would-­‐be	   dual	   citizens	   in	   order	   to	   curb	   abuse.	   A	   42-­‐year-­‐old	  
female	   respondent	   in	   London,	   who	   did	   not	   naturalise	   in	   the	   UK	   despite	   being	  
eligible	  for	  citizenship,	  articulated	  her	  misgivings	  clearly:	  
	  
It	  is	  nice	  to	  have	  dual	  citizenship	  to	  know	  that	  you	  still	  have	  allegiance	  
to	  your	  country	  of	  birth	  or	  country	  of	  natural,	  you	  know,	  heritage.	  But	  
I	   think	   the	   bill	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   qualified	   because	   of	   national	   security,	  
foreign	  affairs	  and	  things	  like	  that,	  you	  know,	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  nation,	  
so	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  not	  compromised	  when	  it	  comes	  to,	  
you	  know,	  who’s	  doing	  what	  and	  what	  status	  has	  this	  person	  got.149	  
	  
Interviewees	   who	   expressed	   ambivalence	   about	   dual	   citizenship	   were	   agnostic,	  
articulating	  effectively	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  the	  debate	  without	  siding	  with	  any	  one	  
view.	   Ranked	   in	   order	   from	  most	   to	   least	   frequently	   cited,	   Table	   10	   summarises	  
major	  reasons	  given	  for	  supporting	  or	  rejecting	  dual	  citizenship,	  which	  appear	  to	  be	  
diametrically	  opposed	  to	  one	  another.	  
	  
Table	   10:	   Catalogue	   of	   the	   Pros	   and	   Cons	   of	   Dual	   Citizenship	   Culled	   from	   202	  
Respondents	  	  	  
Pros	  of	  Dual	  Citizenship	   Cons	  of	  Dual	  Citizenship	  
1)	   Liberians	   were	   forced	   out	   of	   the	  
country	   involuntarily	   and	   may	   have	  
naturalised	   abroad	   because	   of	  
circumstances	  beyond	  their	  control	  
Liberians	   are	   not	   patriotic	   or	  
nationalistic,	   and	   will	   exploit	   dual	  
citizenship	  for	  their	  own	  selfish	  interests	  	  
2)	  Denying	  citizenship	  would	  negate	  the	  
past	   and	   present	   development	  
contributions	   of	   Liberians	   abroad	  
(remittances,	   skills	   transfer,	  
humanitarian	  relief)	  
Those	  who	  fuelled	  Liberia’s	  crises	  had	  
the	  luxury	  of	  stoking	  the	  fires	  of	  conflict	  
in	  the	  comfort	  and	  security	  of	  their	  lives	  
abroad,	  and	  could	  do	  so	  again	  if	  granted	  
dual	  citizenship	  
3)	   Liberians	   abroad	  will	   be	   encouraged	  
to	   participate	   fully	   in	   future	   home-­‐
country	   development	   (brain	   gain,	  
Liberia	   would	   become	   a	   farmland	   of	  
extraction,	  where	  would-­‐be	  dual	  citizens	  
would	   cultivate	   Liberia,	   and	   send	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  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  13,	  2012.	  	  




investment,	   paying	   taxes,	   establishing	  
middle	  class)	  	  
revenues	   from	   that	   cultivation	   abroad,	  
similar	  to	  multinationals	  
4)	   Other	   countries	   (particularly	   within	  
the	   sub-­‐region)	   have	   enacted	   dual	  
citizenship	   legislation,	   and	   Liberians	  
have	  benefitted	   from	  the	  protection	  and	  
citizenship	  of	  more	  pluralistic	  nations	  
Liberia’s	   development	   priorities	   and	  
challenges	   are	   innumerable,	   and	  
enacting	  dual	  citizenship	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  
of	  urgency	  
	  
5)	  Enacting	  dual	  citizenship	  will	  legislate	  
what	   already	   exists	   in	   practice,	   i.e.,	   de	  
facto	   dual	   citizenship,	   thereby	  
encouraging	   those	   who	   carry	   two	  
passports	  illegally	  to	  come	  out	  of	  hiding	  
Dual	   citizenship	   would	   privilege	   an	  
already	   privileged	   social	   class	  
(diasporas/transnationals),	   thereby	  
increasing	   inequality	   in	   Liberia	   and	  
replicating	   the	   19th	   century	  
settler/native	  divide	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  	  	  
6)	   Dual	   citizenship	   will	   facilitate	   family	  
reunification	   and	   encourage	   second	  
generation	   Liberians	   to	   be	   more	  
connected	  to	  the	  country	  	  
National	   reconciliation	   and	   healing	  
through	   the	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	  
Commission	   (TRC)	   recommendations	  
must	   be	   addressed	   before	   dual	  
citizenship	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  debated	  
7)	   Dual	   citizenship	   will	   enable	   free	  
movement	   to	   and	   from	   Liberia	   without	  
visa	  regulation	  hurdles	  	  
Dual	   citizenship	   would	   enable	   violation	  
of	   Liberia’s	   already	   weak	   penal	   laws,	  
thereby	   facilitating	   transnational	   crime	  
(corruption,	   fraud,	   money	   laundering)	  
with	  impunity	  
8)	  Revocation	  of	  jus	  soli	  and	  jus	  sanguinis	  
citizenship	   is	   unconstitutional	   because	  
citizenship	   is	   the	   birth	   right	   of	   all	  
Liberians	  	  
Dual	   citizenship	  will	  dilute	   the	   tenets	  of	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  ‘truly	  Liberian’	  
	  
9)	   Liberia	   needs	   to	   wean	   itself	   off	   the	  
assistance	  of	  foreign	  agents,	  and	  replace	  
them	  with	  capable	  Liberian	  development	  
partners	   who	   may	   have	   naturalised	  
abroad	  	  
Dual	   citizenship	   would	   create	   divided	  
loyalties	   and	   one	   cannot	   “serve	   two	  
masters	  at	  the	  same	  time”	  	  
	  
10)	   Liberians	   abroad	   will	   be	   able	   to	  
influence	   governance	  positively	   through	  
active	   participation	   in	   the	   political	  
process	  (voting,	  holding	  political	  office)	  
Transnational	   and	   diasporic	   Liberians	  
cannot	   have	   the	   same	   rights	   and	  
privileges	   as	   resident	   Liberian	   citizens	  
(such	   as	   owning	   property,	   voting	   in	  
national	   elections,	   holding	   high	   political	  
office)	   because	   their	   relationship	   with	  
the	   Liberian	   state	   is	   distant	   and	  
contested	  	  
	  
It	   is	   worthwhile	   noting	   here	   that	   no	   single	   category	   of	   respondents	   unanimously	  
opposed	   or	   favoured	   dual	   citizenship,	   further	   reinforcing	   the	   contested	   space	  
citizenship	  occupies	  amongst	  Liberians	  across	  varying	  spatial	  landscapes.	  Therefore,	  





Of	  the	  32	  respondents	  in	  London,	  the	  vast	  majority	  (27)	  supported	  dual	  citizenship	  
with	  only	   five	   expressing	   reservations	  or	   ambivalence.	  While	   the	   regional	  head	  of	  
ULO-­‐UK	  and	  two	  diaspora	  respondents	  argued	  that	  they	  would	  support	  a	  bill	  with	  
clearly	   defined	   stipulations,	   two	   other	   London-­‐based	   respondents	   were	   more	  
ambivalent.	  In	  Washington,	  the	  breakdown	  was	  similar,	  with	  the	  vast	  majority	  (26)	  
of	   respondents	   supporting	   dual	   citizenship	   while	   three	   expressed	   reservations.	  
Unlike	   London,	   however,	   four	  Washington-­‐based	   respondents	   completely	   rejected	  
dual	  citizenship	  as	  a	  policy	  prescription.	  	  The	  slight	  contrast	  in	  perspectives	  on	  dual	  
citizenship	   between	   London	   and	   Washington	   respondents	   is	   reflected	   in	   their	  
citizenship	   profiles,	   where	   more	   interviewees	   in	   Washington	   (11)	   retained	   their	  
legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  while	  abroad	  than	  their	  London	  counterparts	  (6).	  	  
	  
Of	   the	   21	   respondents	   in	   Freetown,	   the	   vast	   majority	   (18)	   supported	   dual	  
citizenship	   carte	   blanche.	   One	   expressed	   support	   with	   reservations,	   and	   one	  
respondent	  completely	  rejected	  dual	  citizenship.	  Liberia’s	  late	  ambassador	  to	  Sierra	  
Leone,	   Thomas	   Brima,	   noted	   his	   ambivalence	   about	   the	   proposed	   bill.	   Unlike	   his	  
counterparts	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  US,	  Ambassador	  Brima’s	  personal	  views	  differed	   from	  
the	   de	   facto	   official	   policy	   line	   on	   dual	   citizenship	   by	   the	   executive	   branch	   of	   the	  
Liberian	  government.	   Instead,	  he	  expressed	  concern	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  could	  be	  
subject	  to	  abuse	  and	  manipulation	  if	  it	  is	  not	  regulated	  thoroughly:	  “I	  don’t	  think	  it	  
will	   improve	  anything.	   I	   think	   it	  will	   just	  give	   [a]	  chance	   for	  people	   to	  exploit	   two	  
situations	  at	  their	  advantage.”150	  His	  admission	  that	  he	  did	  not	  fully	  agree	  with	  the	  
Liberian	   president’s	   position	   points	   to	   a	   somewhat	   varied	   government	   stance	   on	  
dual	   citizenship,	   despite	   the	   official	   message	   being	   maintained.	   This	   mirrors	   the	  
range	   of	   divergent	   opinions	   amongst	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   in	   Liberia	   and	   those	  
abroad.	  Many	  Liberian	  citizen	  residents	  in	  Freetown	  stated	  that	  they	  would	  not	  opt	  
for	   naturalising	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   if	   dual	   citizenship	   were	   enacted	   because	   being	   a	  
Liberian	   is	   just	   like	   being	   a	   Sierra	   Leonean,	   with	   very	   few	   distinct	   markers	   of	  
identity.	   Implied	   in	   their	   responses	   was	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   sharp	   consciousness	  
about	  the	  obligations	  of	  citizenship,	  with	  many	  arguing	  that	  being	  a	  Liberian	  is	  more	  
than	  just	  carrying	  a	  passport,	  or	  being	  born	  within	  the	  country’s	  territorial	  borders.	  
Rather,	   being	  a	  Liberian	  means	  making	   some	  kind	  of	   concrete	   contribution	   to	   the	  
                                                




country’s	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  This	  level	  of	  conscientiousness	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  
fact	   that	   Liberians	   residing	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   have	   a	   better	   appreciation	   of	   the	  
importance	  of	  citizen	  participation	  in	  development	  outcomes	  because	  they	  reside	  in	  
a	  country	  where	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  is	  lived	  and	  experienced	  first-­‐hand,	  unlike	  their	  
counterparts	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  US.	  	  
	  
In	  Accra,	  20	  of	  the	  33	  respondents	  endorsed	  dual	  citizenship	  for	  Liberia,	  while	  four	  
supported	  it	  with	  reservations	  and	  one	  appeared	  ambivalent.	  Within	  the	  respondent	  
pool	  of	  diasporas,	  Accra	  represents	  the	  site	  where	  rejection	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  was	  
most	   apparent	   with	   seven	   respondents	   snubbing	   the	   policy	   prescription	   as	   un-­‐
nationalistic	   and	   unpatriotic.	   Strong	   opposition	   to	   dual	   citizenship	   could	   be	  
attributed	  to	  that	  fact	  that	  while	  national	  identity	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  is	  
more	  heterogeneous	  and	  malleable,	  national	   identity	   in	  Ghana	   is	  homogenous	  and	  
entrenched	  despite	  the	  country’s	  enactment	  of	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  dual	  citizenship	  
act	   in	  2002.	  Therefore,	  respondents	   in	  Accra	  appeared	  to	  have	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  
long	  distance	  nationalism	  (Anderson,	  1992)	  than	  their	  counterparts	  elsewhere,	  with	  
many	   subscribing	   to	   the	   notion	   that	   citizenship	   is	   essentially	   bounded	   within	   a	  
unitary	  nation-­‐state.	  Many	  Accra-­‐based	  respondents	  argued	  that	  their	  Liberianness	  
had	  been	  strengthened	  almost	  by	  compulsion	  because	  they	  reside	  in	  a	  country	  that	  
explicitly	   delineates	   ‘foreigner’	   from	   ‘native’,	   regardless	   of	   one’s	   acquired	  
citizenship	   status.	   Echoing	   these	   sentiments,	   a	   female	   entrepreneur	   and	   14-­‐year	  
resident	  of	  Accra,	  said:	  	  	  
	  
I	  love	  my	  country	  [Liberia],	  come	  what	  may.	  And	  I	  don’t	  see	  the	  need	  
of	  becoming	  a	  Ghanaian	  when	  we	  are	  all	  ECOWAS.	  There’s	  no	  need	  for	  
that…They	   [Ghanaians]	   protect	   themselves.	   I	   think	   it’s	   a	   good	   thing,	  
unlike	  we	  Liberians,	  we	  don’t	   do	   that.	  We	   love	   strangers	  more	   than	  
our	  own	  or	  ourselves.	   So,	   actually	  no	  matter	  what	   it’s	   their	   country,	  
you	  have	  to	  accept	  anything…Because	  you	  either	  take	  it	  or	  you	  leave	  
it.151	  
	  
Moreover,	   respondents	   in	  Accra	  were	  similar	   to	   their	  counterparts	   in	  Freetown	   in	  
admitting	  that	  they	  would	  pursue	  non-­‐African	  citizenships	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity,	  
because	  of	  perceived	  benefits	  derived.	  Although	  this	  28-­‐year-­‐old	  opted	  for	  refugee	  
                                                




integration	   to	   attend	   university	   in	   Ghana,	   she	   visibly	   scoffed	   at	   the	   thought	   of	  
naturalising	  in	  Ghana,	  or	  any	  other	  African	  country	  for	  that	  matter:	  
	  
Why	   should	   I	   get	   another	   African	   country	   citizenship	   when	   my	  
country	   is	   an	   African	   country?...But	   when	   you	   look	   at	   the	   Western	  
world	  there	  are	  so	  many	  facilities,	  there	  are	  things	  that	  I	  can	  have	  in	  
America,	  London,	   that	   I	   cannot	  have	   in	  my	  country.	  So,	   if	  America	   is	  
requesting	   for	   a	   citizenship	   before	   I	   can	   get	   those	   things,	   I	   prefer	  
having	   the	   citizenship	  because	   if	   I	   come	   to	  my	   country	   I	  won’t	  have	  
that	  thing	  they	  are	  offering	  me.152	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  however,	  a	  51-­‐year-­‐old	  self-­‐professed	  Pan-­‐Africanist153	  said	  that	  if	  dual	  
citizenship	   were	   enacted	   in	   Liberia	   she	   would	   opt	   for	   another	   African	   passport	  
rather	  than	  naturalise	  in	  Europe	  or	  the	  US,	  proving	  that	  the	  social	  locations	  and	  life-­‐
worlds	  of	  individuals	  often	  shape	  their	  personal	  choices	  and	  political	  stances.	  After	  
moving	  to	  the	  US	  after	  the	  1980	  coup	  and	  residing	  there	  for	  28	  years,	  this	  Monrovia-­‐
based	  circular	  returnee	  retained	  her	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  although	  most	  of	  her	  
immediate	  family	  became	  US	  citizens.	  	  
	  
In	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   perspectives	   of	   respondents	   in	   London,	   Washington,	  
Freetown,	   and	   Accra,	   the	   majority	   of	   whom	   explicitly	   approved	   of	   blanket	   dual	  
citizenship	   for	   Liberia,	   the	   greatest	   resistance	   to	   dual	   citizenship	   came	   from	  
homelanders	   in	   Monrovia.	   Of	   the	   50	   homeland	   interviewees,	   22	   emphatically	  
rejected	  dual	  citizenship,	  either	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  or	  as	  a	  legal	  instrument	  
for	  Liberia.	  The	  majority	  of	   those	  who	  denounced	  dual	   citizenship	  were	  Liberians	  
who	  admitted	   to	  physically	   residing	   in	   the	   country	   throughout	   the	   course	  of	   their	  
lives.	   This	   supports	  my	   initial	   hypothesis	   that	   Liberians	  who	  never	   physically	   left	  
the	   country	  might	  have	   slightly	  different	   conceptions	  of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   and	  
the	  rights/responsibilities	  therein,	  than	  those	  who	  travelled	  for	  short-­‐stints,	  or	  lived	  
abroad	   for	   longer	   periods	   of	   time.	   Sometimes	   employing	   symbolic	   imagery	   from	  
slavery	   to	   describe	   citizens	   as	   slaves	   and	   nation-­‐states	   as	   ‘masters’,	   those	   who	  
rejected	  dual	  citizenship	  said	  that	  Liberians	  who	  naturalised	  abroad	  had	  abandoned	  
Liberia	   by	   denouncing	   their	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   “second	   master”	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  interview	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  May	  18,	  2013.	  




thereby	   exhibiting	   no	   loyalty	   to	   Liberia	   or	   divided	   loyalties	   at	   best.	   Invoking	   the	  
‘heart’	   motif,	   one	   30-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homelander	   emphatically	   rejected	   dual	  
citizenship	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  divided	  loyalties:	  	  	  
	  
You	   cannot	   serve	   two	   masters.	   There	   is	   no	   way	   that	   one	   man	   can	  
serve	   two	  masters.	   You	   cannot	   have	   two	   captains	   running	   one	   ship.	  
You	  will	   always	   have	   the	   head	   captain,	   he’s	   there	   to	  make	   the	   final	  
decision…If	  you	  have	  ten	  children	  or	  fifteen	  children,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  
you	  can	   love	  every	  one	  of	   them	  equally.	  Even	   if	  you	  have	  two	  wives,	  
there	   is	   no	   way	   you	   can	   love	   two	   of	   them	   equally.	   You	  will	   always	  
have	  love	  for	  one	  and	  it	  will	  exceed	  the	  other.	  So,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  one	  
can	  love	  two	  countries	  at	  heart.154	  
	  
This	  particular	  position	  is	  theorised	  by	  Turner,	  who	  makes	  an	  interesting	  distinction	  
between	   ‘hot/cool	   loyalty’	   and	   ‘thick/thin	   solidarity’	   (Turner,	   2000:	   141).	   For	  
instance,	   it	   is	  speculated	  that	  while	  cosmopolitan	  citizens	  exhibit	   ‘cool’	   loyalties	   to	  
any	  particular	  nation-­‐state	  and	  ‘thin’	  patterns	  of	  solidarity	  with	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  
nationals	   governed	   within	   a	   nation-­‐state,	   their	   non-­‐cosmopolitan	   counterparts	  
exhibit	   ‘hot’	   loyalties	   and	   ‘thick’	   patterns	   of	   solidarity	   within	   a	   particular	   nation-­‐
state	   (Turner,	   2000:	   141).	   In	   addition	   to	   rejecting	   the	   presumed	   divided	   loyalties	  
underpinned	   by	   dual	   citizenship,	   homeland	   respondents	   also	   argued	   that	   the	  
proposed	  bill	  would	  exacerbate	  an	  already	  widening	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  and	  
encourage	  fraud	  and	  corruption.	  	  
	  
Although	   the	   majority	   of	   homeland	   interviewees	   rejected	   dual	   citizenship,	   12	  
endorsed	  the	  policy	  prescription	  arguing	  that	  Liberians	  should	  not	  be	  penalised	  for	  
seeking	   better	   opportunities	   abroad.	   These	   homelanders	   asserted	   that	   dual	  
citizenship	  would	  encourage	  Liberians	  who	  naturalised	  abroad	  (and	  their	  children)	  
to	   reconnect	  with	   the	   country	   and	   become	   even	  more	   involved	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
reconstruction.	   This	   perspective	   is	   supported	   by	   my	   earlier	   assertion	   that	   the	  
movement	   of	   people,	   ideas,	   and	   capital	   across	   national	   territorial	   boundaries	   has	  
impacted	  Liberians	  currently	  residing	  in	  the	  country.	  So,	  rather	  than	  representing	  a	  
composite	  opinion	  about	  dual	  citizenship,	  homeland	  interviewees	  appeared	  divided	  
along	  ideological	  lines	  precisely	  because	  of	  migration	  and	  globalisation.	  While	  only	  
                                                




two	   homelanders	   vacillated	   about	   dual	   citizenship,	   14	   expressed	   reservations,	  
arguing	  that	  if	  the	  proposed	  bill	  were	  passed,	  airtight	  provisions	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
included	  (and	  most	   importantly,	  enforced)	  to	  curb	  abuse	  and	  violation	  of	  Liberia’s	  
laws.	   These	   homelanders	   expressed	   further	   reservations	   about	   the	   premature	  
timing	   of	   the	   proposed	   bill	   considering	   Liberia’s	   weak	   legal	   frameworks	   and	   the	  
challenge	   of	   protecting	   the	   rights	   and	   privileges	   of	   those	   with	   legal	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  alone.	  	  
	  
Variations	  in	  perspectives	  on	  dual	  citizenship	  were	  also	  apparent	  amongst	  returnee	  
respondents,	  further	  illustrating	  the	  contested	  nature	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  across	  
space	  and	  time.	  While	  six	  of	   the	  10	  permanent	  returnee	  respondents	   favoured	  the	  
proposed	   bill	   and	   one	   admitted	   to	   supporting	   dual	   citizenship	   with	   a	   few	  
reservations,	   three	   categorically	   rejected	   such	  a	  policy	  prescription	   for	  Liberia.	  Of	  
those	   who	   supported	   dual	   citizenship,	   one	   55-­‐year-­‐old	   US	   born	   respondent	  
admitted	   that	   she	   practiced	   de	   facto	   dual	   citizenship	   because	   of	   her	   doubly	  
inscribed	  identity:	  
	  
I	   feel	   that	   I	  am	  a	  Liberian	  and	   I	   feel	   that	   I	  am	  an	  American	  by	  birth.	  
And	   I	   feel	   that	   these	   two	   countries	   are	   not	   in	   war,	   they’re	   not	   in	  
conflict.	   I’m	   not	   aspiring	   to	   be	   president	   or	   any	   high	   government	  
official,	   personally.	   So,	   what	   is	   the	   conflict?	   I	   know	   it’s	   against	   the	  
Liberian	  law	  but	  I	  also	  know	  that	  people	  turn	  the	  other	  way	  a	  lot.	  And	  
why	  should	  I	  inconvenience	  myself	  by	  giving	  up	  one	  citizenship	  or	  the	  
other?	  Both	  are	  valued	  to	  me.155	  
	  
The	  only	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  perspectives	  about	  dual	  citizenship	  in	  this	  study	  came	  
from	   circular	   returnee	   respondents,	   all	   of	   whom—except	   one	   who	   expressed	  
ambivalence—admitted	  to	  supporting	  dual	  citizenship	  carte	  blanche.	  One	  44-­‐year-­‐
old	  male	  born	  in	  the	  US	  to	  Liberian	  citizen	  parents	  discussed	  why	  Liberians	  of	  his	  ilk	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  legitimately	  carry	  two	  passports:	  	  
	  
As	   a	   post-­‐war	   country,	   we	   should	   be	   clamouring,	   we	   should	   be	  
clawing,	  screaming,	  fighting	  tooth	  and	  nail	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  everyone	  
who	   even	   has	   an	   inkling	   of	   wanting	   to	   be	   considered	   Liberian,	  
particularly	   if	   they	  have	  something	  to	  offer,	  we	  should	  be	   fighting	  to	  
                                                




get	   them	   to	   be	   Liberian.	   There	   is	   no	   reason	  why	  we	   should	   have	   a	  
nuclear	   physicist	   or	   two,	   or	   three,	   or	   four,	   an	   endocrinologist,	   a	  
general	   surgeon	   or	   four,	   or	   five	   or	   six	   whatever,	   out	   there	   who	   by	  
simple	   virtue	   of	   their	   partial	   parentage	   or	   perhaps	   during	   the	   war	  
years,	   they	  were	  born	  outside	   this	  country	  but	   they	  actually	  want	   to	  
identify	   with	   Liberians.	   There	   is	   no	   reason	   why	   we	   should	   not	   be	  
pulling	  those	  people	  in.156	  
	  
	  
Such	   an	   impassioned	   appeal	   reinforces	   the	   argument	   that	   dual	   citizenship	   is	   of	  
significant	   importance	   to	  social	  actors	  who	   lead	   transnational	   lives,	  as	   they	  would	  
be	  the	  primary	  beneficiaries	  of	  legislation	  in	  this	  regard.	  
	  
The	  most	  revealing	  manifestation	  of	  citizenship	  as	  a	  contested	  space	  of	   inquiry	  for	  
Liberia	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   one	   of	   the	   sponsors	   of	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill,	  
Senator	  Jewel	  Howard	  Taylor,	  expressed	  ambivalence	  about	  the	  policy	  prescription	  
while	   her	   other	   co-­‐sponsors	   emphatically	   endorsed	   it.	   Taylor	   said	   she	   now	   has	  
misgivings	  about	  the	  bill’s	  unintended	  consequences,	  given	  its	   implications	  for	  her	  
own	   political	   future	   in	   Liberia.	   She	   therefore	   questioned	   the	   motives	   of	   Liberian	  
diaspora	  proponents	  of	  dual	  citizenship:	  
	  
What	  they’re	  actually	  clamouring	  for	  is	  political	  ownership	  of	  Liberia.	  
It’s	   not	   economic;	   it’s	   not	   developmental.	   That’s	   how	   I	   feel.	   Because	  
they	  want	  to	  determine	  who	  becomes	  president	  in	  Liberia…So,	  they’re	  
looking	  for	  political	  capital;	  I	  don’t	  see	  them	  looking	  for	  development	  
or	   the	   interest	   in	   Liberia	   as	   we	   want	   to	   see…So,	   can	   you	   imagine	  
people	  want	  to	  stay	  in	  America	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunities	  
there,	   live	   in	   the	   luxury	   that	   they	   have,	   they	   don’t	   care	   what’s	  
happening	  here	   [Liberia],	  but	  when	   it’s	   time	   to	  vote,	  all	  of	   them	  will	  
rush	   home	   and	   say,	   “Oh,	   I’m	   a	   Liberian	   citizen.”…I	   don’t	   want	  
somebody	   living	   in	   America…then	   you	   come	   and	   say…“Let	   [a]	  
thousand	  of	  us	  go	  decide,	  ok,	  Senator	  Taylor	  will	  not	  be	  president	  for	  
Liberia.	  Let’s	  make	  sure	  we	  get	  George	  Weah”	  because	  you	  like	  George	  
Weah…So,	  I’m	  one	  of	  those	  that	  have	  really	  taken	  a	  step	  back	  because	  
we	  need	   to	  be	   a	   little	   careful,	   because	   I	   don’t	  want	   to	  do	   something	  
that	   in	   the	   end	   will	   hamper	   the	   lives	   of	   my	   children…I’m	   not	  
withdrawing	  as	  a	  sponsor,	  but	  I	  think	  until	  we	  get	  the	  issues	  a	  little	  bit	  
clearer,	  we	  need	  to	  really	  look	  at	  it.157	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Although	   implicitly	   self-­‐serving,	   Senator	   Taylor’s	   statement	   is	   supported	   by	   the	  
academic	  literature.	  Using	  Ghana,	  Kenya,	  and	  Senegal	  as	  case	  studies,	  Whitaker	  has	  
also	   argued	   that	   increased	   claims	   for	   dual	   citizenship	  may	   be	   driven	   as	  much	   by	  
selfish	   political	   interests	   as	   by	   concerns	   about	   national	   reconstruction,	   economic	  
development,	  or	  security,	  especially	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  multi-­‐party	  competition,	  the	  
involvement	  of	  emigrants	  in	  homeland	  politics,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  African	  politicians	  
to	  establish	  constituencies	  abroad	   for	  support	  and	   funding	  (Whitaker,	  2011:	  756).	  
For	   instance,	  although	  dual	  citizenship	  proponents	   in	  Liberia	  and	  elsewhere	  argue	  
for	  enactment	  based	  on	  assumptions	  about	  economic	  gains	  to	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  
there	   is	   no	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   explicitly	   recognises	   a	   correlation	   between	  
increased	   economic	   contributions	   by	   a	   country’s	   diasporas	   and	   the	   enactment	   of	  
dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  (Whitaker,	  2011).	  Therefore,	  Senator	  Taylor’s	  comments	  
unsettle	   the	   very	   foundation	   upon	  which	   the	   bill	   was	   proposed,	   consensus	   by	   its	  
sponsors.	  If	  the	  proposed	  bill’s	  sponsors	  disagree	  about	  its	  potential	  merits,	  then	  it	  
is	  no	  wonder	  that	  Liberians	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  clash	  over	  what	  it	  signifies	  for	  them.	  	  
	  
The	  inconsistency	  in	  perspectives	  about	  dual	  citizenship	  amongst	  legislative	  branch	  
sponsors	  of	   the	  proposed	  bill	   is	  also	  mirrored	   in	   the	  divergent	  viewpoints	  of	   their	  
executive	   branch	   counterparts.	  Whereas	   two	   of	   the	   eight	   executive	   policy	  makers	  
fully	   endorsed	   dual	   citizenship	   as	   an	   important	   policy	   imperative,	   four	   others	  
expressed	  reservations	  admitting	  that	  provisions	  in	  the	  proposed	  bill	  would	  have	  to	  
restrict	  the	  privileges	  of	  would-­‐be	  dual	  citizens,	  such	  as	  serving	  in	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  
of	  Liberia	   (AFL)	  or	  holding	  high	  political	  office.	  One	  policy	  maker	  wavered	  on	   the	  
issue,	  neither	  fully	  rejecting	  nor	  endorsing	  dual	  citizenship.	  Another	  abstained	  from	  
offering	   an	   opinion	   about	   dual	   citizenship.	   It	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   high-­‐ranking	  
officials	   in	   this	   study	   that	   the	   Liberian	   government,	   particularly	   the	   executive	  
branch,	   lacks	   a	   unified	   policy	   position	   despite	   President	   Ellen	   Johnson	   Sirleaf’s	  
public	  statements	  endorsing	  dual	  citizenship.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  apparent	  based	  on	  the	  divergent	  life-­‐worlds	  and	  social	  locations	  of	  Liberians	  in	  
Liberia	  and	  abroad	   that,	  as	  a	  policy	   intervention,	  dual	  citizenship	   is	  yet	   to	  reach	  a	  
consensus.	   This	   is	   not	   surprising,	   however,	   since	   the	   conception	   and	   practice	   of	  





It	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   analysis	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   King	   Peter’s	   coerced	   sale	   of	  
indigenous	  land	  in	  1821	  marked	  the	  first	  in	  a	  long	  series	  of	  conflicts	  over	  citizenship.	  
Four	  major	  interfaces	  of	  conflict	  ultimately	  followed,	  thereby	  reconfiguring	  ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  from	  passive	  and	  fixed	  to	  active	  and	  constructed.	  According	  to	  Utas,	  “the	  
social	   contract	  of	   the	  modern	   state	  has	  never	  been	   signed	   in	  Liberia,	   as	   there	  has	  
never	   been	   any	   established	   reciprocity	   between	   state	   and	   citizens”	   (Utas,	   2009:	  
283).	  Disagreeing	  with	  Utas’	  claim,	  I	  demonstrated	  that	  while	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  
have	  engendered	  conflict,	  divergence	  and	  opposition—i.e.,	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  ‘hut	  
tax’;	   protests	   against	   the	   proposed	   increase	   in	   the	   price	   of	   rice;	   the	   thwarted	  
constitutional	  review	  process—improvements	  in	  those	  relations	  have	  also	  ushered	  
in	   intervals	  of	  consent,	  convergence,	  and	  accommodation—i.e.,	   the	  Unification	  and	  
Integration	  Policy;	  repeal	  of	  the	  ‘hut	  tax’;	  and	  the	  Land	  Rights	  Policy	  of	  2013.	  I	  have	  
traced	   the	   defining	   moments	   in	   which	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   have	   employed	   a	  
variety	  of	  domestic	  and	  transnational	  tactics	  such	  as	  protest	  and	  resistance	  to	  hold	  
their	  state	  accountable,	  with	  state	  responses	  ranging	  from	  repression	  to	  conciliation.	  	  
	  
While	   Moran’s	   study	   explores	   the	   symbiotic	   relationship	   between	   violence	   and	  
democracy	   amongst	   the	   Grebo-­‐speaking	   people	   of	   southeastern	   Liberia	   (Moran,	  
2006),	  I	  argued	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  conflict	  and	  citizenship	  have	  served	  as	  mutually	  
reinforcing	   elements	   of	   the	   “struggle	   for	   voice	   and	   autonomy”	   amongst	   Liberian	  
social	  actors	  (Moran,	  2006:	  162).	  Just	  as	  the	  French	  Revolution	  of	  1799	  was	  fought	  
on	   the	  grounds	  of	   citizenship,	   so	   too	  were	  Liberia’s	  multiple	  upheavals,	  beginning	  
with	   the	   indigenous	   wars	   of	   resistance	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   and	   climaxing	   in	   21st	  
century	  post-­‐war	  rifts	  over	   income	   inequality,	   land	  tenure	  and	  transitional	   justice.	  
Based	  on	   the	  analysis	  presented	   in	   this	   chapter,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   contestations	  over	  
proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  serve	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   has	   been	   configured	   across	   space	   and	   time	   and	   is	   still	  
undergoing	  reconfiguration.	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   examine	   how	   a	   second	   socio-­‐political	   process,	   namely	  




citizenship’,	   thereby	   influencing	   claims	   for	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   against	   dual	  


















































They’re	  Not	  Your	  Citizens…Oh,	  Yes,	  They	  Are!	  
	  
A	  permanent	  returnee	  based	  in	  Monrovia,	  55-­‐year-­‐old	  Denise158	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  
exceedingly	   complex	  historical	   and	   contemporary	  migratory	  patterns	   to	   and	   from	  
Liberia.	  Born	   in	   the	  American	  South	   to	   two	  Liberian	  citizen	  parents,	  one	  of	  whom	  
was	  in	  medical	  school	  at	  the	  time	  of	  her	  birth,	  Denise	  and	  her	  brother	  once	  held	  dual	  
citizenship.	  Not	  the	  de	  facto,	  illegal	  kind	  practiced	  by	  some	  Liberian	  transnationals	  
nowadays,	  but	  the	  legal	  kind	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  country’s	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law.	  
As	   a	   child,	   Denise	   shuttled	   between	   Liberia	   and	   the	   US	  with	   ease	   as	   a	   jus	   soli	   US	  
citizen/jus	  sanguinis	   Liberian	   citizen.	   In	  preparation	   for	   a	   return	   trip	   to	  Liberia	   in	  
the	   early	   1960s,	   Denise’s	   parents	   attempted	   to	   obtain	   US	   visas	   for	   her	   and	   her	  
brother.	   Halting	   them	   in	   their	   tracks,	   the	  US	   immigration	   officer	   at	   the	   time	   said,	  
“But,	  we	  don’t	  give	  our	  own	  citizens	  visas,”	  to	  which	  Denise’s	  father	  replied,	  “They’re	  
not	  your	  citizens!”	  The	  immigration	  officer	  offered	  a	  cheeky,	  yet	  measured,	  retort,	  “I	  
beg	   your	   pardon,	   sir,	   but	   until	   they	   are	   old	   enough	   to	   choose,	   they	   are	   American	  
citizens!”	  Thereafter,	  Denise	  and	  her	  brother	  carried	  two	  passports—American	  and	  
Liberian—because	  they	  belonged	  to	  both	  nations	  legally,	  at	  least	  until	  reaching	  the	  
age	  of	  majority.	  	  
	  
As	   the	   above	   vignette	   illustrates,	   Liberia’s	   contemporary	   history	   is	   steeped	   in	  
processes	   of	  migration,	  mobility	   and	   flux.	  Whereas	  movement	   in	   the	   19th	   century	  
was	   directed	   inwards,	   the	   late	   20th	   century	   was	   characterised	   by	   unprecedented	  
out-­‐flows	   in	   which	  migration	   touched	   the	   lives	   of	   all	   Liberians.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	  
argue	   that	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   migration	   to/from	   Liberia	   has	  
simultaneously	   challenged	   and	   reinforced	   the	  merits	   of	   Liberia’s	   legal	   citizenship	  
framework,	   thereby	   influencing	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	  
proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation.	   First,	   I	   present	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	  
migration	   literature	   relevant	   for	   this	   study.	  Second,	   I	   trace	  Liberia’s	  historical	  and	  
contemporary	  migration	  trends,	  paying	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  migratory	  patterns	  of	  
social	  actors	  in	  this	  study.	  Third,	  I	  present	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  citizenship	  status	  of	  
                                                




respondents	   and	   their	   motivations	   for	   naturalising	   or	   not	   naturalising	   abroad.	   I	  
discuss	  how	  the	  divergent	  citizenship	  status	  choices	  of	  respondents	  both	  strengthen	  
and	   challenge	   claims	   to	   dual	   citizenship.	   Lastly,	   I	   explore	   how	   the	   challenges	  
embedded	  in	  processes	  of	  migration	   influence	  claims	  for	  dual	  citizenship.	   In	  order	  
to	  maintain	  a	   focused	  discussion,	   this	  chapter	  examines	   international	  migration	   to	  
and	   from	  Liberia	   rather	   than	   internal	  migration	  within	   Liberia,	   primarily	   because	  
emigration	  has	  influenced	  more	  significantly	  the	  introduction	  and	  postponement	  of	  
proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  than	  internal	  migration.	  	  
	  
Contestations	  Over	  Mobility	  and	  Place	  Complicate	  Migration	  	  
Migration	  appears	   to	  be	  embedded	   in	  philosophical	  debates	   about	  movement	   and	  
stasis.	  According	  to	  Cresswell,	  there	  are	  two	  paradigms	  framing	  mobility	  and	  place.	  
On	  one	  hand,	  contemporary	  social	  thought	  depicts	  mobility	  as	  “progressive,	  exciting,	  
and	   contemporary”	   while	   rootedness,	   stasis	   and	   sedentarism	   are	   seen	   as	  
“reactionary,	  dull	  or	  of	   the	  past”	   (Cresswell,	  2006:	  25).	  Furthermore,	  movement	   is	  
embedded	   in	   social	   and	   political	   history,	   in	   which	   “people	   have	   always	   moved,	  
whether	   through	   desire	   or	   through	   violence”	   (Malkki,	   1992:	   24).	   This	   could	   be	  
attributed	   to	   the	  motivations	   for	   introducing	   Liberia’s	   dual	   citizenship	   bill,	   as	   the	  
bill	   represents	   simultaneously	   recognition	   of	   Liberia’s	   history	   of	   migration	   and	  
conciliation	   to	   emigrants	   residing	   abroad,	   discussed	   later	   in	   this	   chapter.	   The	  
‘nomadic	   metaphysic’,	   as	   it	   is	   called,	   “links	   mobility	   to	   forms	   of	   subaltern	  
power…central	   to	   the	   practices	   of	   transgression	   and	   resistance”	   (Creswell,	   2006:	  
46).	  	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   is	   an	   alternative	   school	   of	   thought	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  
‘sedentarist	   metaphysic’,	   in	   which	   “people	   are	   often	   thought	   of,	   and	   think	   of	  
themselves,	  as	  being	  rooted	  in	  place	  and	  as	  deriving	  identity	  from	  that	  rootedness”	  
(Malkki,	  1992:	  27).	  This	  paradigm	  influences	  backlash	  against	  dual	  citizenship	  and	  
the	  subsequent	  postponement	  of	  the	  proposed	  bill	  in	  Liberia.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  one	  
28-­‐year-­‐old	   Monrovia-­‐based	   circular	   returnee	   in	   this	   study	   described	   herself	   as	  
‘deeply	  rooted’	  even	  though	  she	  had	  only	  returned	  to	  Liberia	  in	  2011	  after	  21	  years	  




respondent	  ironically	  questioned	  the	  logic	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  
rootlessness:	  
	  
If	   people	   have	   dual	   citizenship	   they	   are	   basically	   in	   a	   win-­‐win	  
situation	   because	   it	   almost	   forces	   them	   not	   to	   be	   deeply	   rooted	  
somewhere.	   It’s	   just	   like	   if	   they	   are	   in	  Liberia,	   if	   something	  pops	  up	  
they	  can	  just	  pick	  up	  and	  leave	  to	  go	  somewhere	  else.	  So,	  there	  is	  this	  
level	  of,	  like,	  non-­‐attachment	  to	  a	  place.	  So,	  I	  think	  that,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  Liberia,	  having	  people	  not	  be	  deeply	  rooted	  and	  not	  be	  attached	  to	  
this	  place	  could	  possibly	  be	  dangerous…I	  think	  right	  now	  for	  Liberia,	  
we	  need	  people	   that	   are	  deeply	   rooted	  here…because	   I	   think	  where	  
your	  heart	  is,	  is	  where	  your	  energy	  is	  going	  to	  be…159	  
	  
Embedded	  in	  nationalist	  discourse	  and	  entangled	  with	  arborescent	  metaphors,	  the	  
‘roots’	   paradigm	   frames	   mobility	   as	   pathological,	   dysfunctional	   and	   threatening	  
(Malkki,	   1992:	   27-­‐28;	   Cresswell,	   2006:	   27;	   31).	   This	   frame	   has	   fundamentally	  
influenced	   the	   securitisation	   of	  migration,	  where	   heightened	   preoccupations	  with	  
containment	  have	  emboldened	  modern	  nation-­‐states	  to	  adopt	  restrictive	  citizenship	  
and	  visa	  regimes	  as	  well	  as	  border	  controls	  (Dannreuther,	  2007:	  101;	  105-­‐107;	  110-­‐
111;	  Duffield,	   2008:	   146;	   152-­‐155).	  According	   to	   this	   frame	   “mobility	   is	   often	   the	  
assumed	  threat	  to	  the	  rooted,	  moral	  and	  authentic	  existence	  of	  place”	  and	  mobility	  
involves	  “the	  absence	  of	  commitment	  and	  attachment	  and	  involvement”	  (Cresswell,	  
2006:	  31).	  This	  paradigm	  colours	  the	  thinking	  of	  opponents	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  for	  
Liberia;	  while	  they	  may	  see	  migration	  as	  involuntary,	  they	  often	  view	  naturalisation	  
abroad	  as	  a	  voluntary	  abdication	  of	  commitment	  to	  Liberia	  and	  its	  citizens.	  It	  can	  be	  
argued	   that	   those	   who	   view	   naturalisation	   abroad	   as	   a	   legitimate	   response	   to	  
protracted	  conflict	  view	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  through	  a	  nomadic	  metaphysical	  lens,	  
while	   those	   who	   adopt	   a	   sedentarist	   metaphysic	   argue	   that	   naturalisation	   is	   an	  
illegitimate	   revocation	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   legal,	   cultural	   and	   national	  
identity.	  	  
	  
Yet,	   displacement,	   particularly	   of	   refugees,	   unsettles	   sedentarist	   biases	   in	   some	  
ways.	   Just	   as	   mobility	   is	   seen	   as	   unnatural	   in	   the	   sedentarist	   metaphysic,	  
displacement	  caused	  by	  violence	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  rupturing	  the	  ‘natural	  order	  
of	   things’,	   in	   which	   case	   refugees	   fleeing	   armed	   conflict	   cannot	   be	   framed	   as	  
                                                




aberrations.	  In	  her	  empirical	  study	  on	  Hutu	  refugees	  in	  Tanzania,	  Malkki	  discovered	  
that	   while	   refugees	   settled	   in	   urban	   centres	   juggled	   multiple	   identities	   through	  
partial	   assimilation,	   those	   inhabiting	   camps	   staunchly	   held	   onto	   an	   essentialist	  
construction	  of	  national	  identity	  bounded	  by	  territory	  (Malkki,	  1992:	  35-­‐36).	  Camp	  
refugeeism	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  cultural	  purity	  and	  a	  status	  signifying	  “the	  ultimate	  
temporariness	  of	  exile	  and	  of	  the	  refusal	  to	  become	  naturalised,	  to	  put	  down	  roots	  
in	  a	  place	  to	  which	  one	  did	  not	  belong”	  (Malkki,	  1992:	  35).	  In	  my	  study	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
Malkki’s,	  keeping	  one’s	  citizenship	  and	  refusing	   to	  assimilate	  signifies	  authenticity	  
and	  rootedness	  for	  some,	  however	  imagined.	  	  
	  
Just	   as	   the	   sedentarist	   and	   nomadic	   metaphysics	   challenge	   understandings	   of	  
mobility	  and	  place,	  contemporary	  migration	  flows,	  whether	  internal	  or	  international,	  
disrupt	   widely	   held	   assumptions	   that	   migration	   is	   unidirectional	   and	   permanent	  
(Leitner,	  2003:	  450-­‐451).	  Migration	  may	  occur	  in	  stages,	  with	  multiple	  intermediate	  
destinations	  over	  a	  protracted	  period	  of	  time.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  circular	  or	  cyclical,	  with	  
migrants	  moving	   regularly	   between	   two	   or	  more	   locales	   representing	   destination	  
and	  origin	  countries,	  as	   is	  evidenced	  by	   the	  circular	  returnees	   in	   this	  study.	  While	  
migration	   may	   change	   from	   temporary	   to	   permanent,	   it	   can	   also	   involve	   return	  
migration	  after	  a	   long	  period	  of	  exile.	  These	  trends	  are	   indicative	  of	   the	  migratory	  
flows	   to	  and	   from	  Liberia,	  which	   can	  be	   considered	   circular	   in	  nature	   rather	   than	  
unidirectional,	  from	  pre-­‐settler	  origins	  to	  contemporary	  migration	  patterns.	  	  
	  
Quite	  often,	  migration	   is	   	   ‘mixed’	   in	   terms	  of	  motivations	  with	   the	  nature	  of	   flows	  
essentially	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  compulsion	  and	  choice	  (Van	  Hear,	  et	  al:	  2009:	  1):	  
	  
It	  is	  increasingly	  recognised	  that	  few	  migrants	  are	  wholly	  voluntary	  or	  
wholly	  forced.	  Almost	  all	  migration	  involves	  some	  kind	  of	  compulsion;	  
at	   the	   same	   time	   almost	   all	   migration	   involves	   choices.	   ‘Economic’	  
migrants	  make	  choices,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  within	  constraints.	  For	  example,	  
what	   is	   the	  balance	  of	   force	  and	  choice	   for	   the	  supposed	   ‘voluntary’,	  
‘economic’	   migrant	   who	   ‘chooses’	   to	   seek	   work	   in	   her	   country’s	  
capital	  or	  abroad,	  but	  whose	  child	  would	  otherwise	  die	  if	  she	  does	  not	  
earn	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  medical	  treatment?	  ‘Forced’	  migrants	  likewise	  
make	  choices,	  within	  a	  narrower	  range	  of	  possibilities;	  but	  even	  in	  the	  
most	   dire	   circumstances,	   there	   is	   still	   some	   choice,	   since	   some	  may	  
choose	  to	  stay	  and	  suffer	  starvation	  or	  violence	  rather	  than	  leave	  their	  




migrants	   have	   more	   choices	   than	   others…Thus,	   while	   outward	  
movement	  may	  be	  forced,	  precipitated	  by	  persecution,	  conflict,	  war	  or	  
some	   other	   life-­‐threatening	   circumstance,	   inward	   or	   onward	  
movement,	   including	   the	   choice	  or	  determination	  of	   the	  destination,	  
may	   be	   shaped	   by	   economic,	   livelihood,	   betterment	   or	   life-­‐chance	  
considerations.	  At	  some	  point,	  then,	  forced	  migration	  may	  transmute	  
into	  economic	  or	  livelihood	  migration…(Van	  Hear,	  et	  al,	  2009:	  3-­‐4).	  
	  
Just	   as	   contemporary	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   sits	   on	   a	   continuum	   of	   passivity	   and	  
activity,	  so	  too	  do	  migration	  motivations	  and	  flows	  sit	  on	  a	  continuum	  “ranging	  from	  
‘choice’	  or	   ‘more	  options’	  at	  one	  end	  to	   ‘little	  choice’	  or	   ‘few	  options’	  at	   the	  other”	  
(Van	  Hear,	  et	  al,	  2009:	  3).	  Mixed	  migration	  recognises	  the	  nuanced	  structural	  forces	  
at	   play,	  while	   simultaneously	   acknowledging	   the	   agency	  of	  migrants.	   This	   level	   of	  
analysis	  serves	  as	  the	  bedrock	  of	  my	  discussion	  later	  in	  the	  chapter	  about	  whether	  
or	  not	  naturalisation	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  compulsion	  or	  a	  choice.	  	  
	  
While	   discussion	   about	   the	   continuum	   of	   choices	   in	   migration	   remains	   dynamic,	  
other	   debates	   have	   emerged	   about	   the	   assumed	   symbiotic	   relationship	   between	  
migration	  and	  development.	  Perspectives	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  migration	  
and	   development	   have	   shifted	   considerably	   in	   the	   last	   60	   years	   “from	  
developmentalist	  optimism	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  to	  neo-­‐Marxist	  pessimism	  over	  
the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  towards	  more	  optimistic	  views	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s”	  (de	  
Haas,	  2010:	  227).	  	  While	  migration	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  process,	  it	  has	  been	  catalysed	  
in	  the	  21st	  century	  by	  neo-­‐liberal	  capitalist	  expansion	  and	  accumulation,	  argue	  some	  
authors	   (Canterbury,	   2012:	   1).	   Others	   believe	   that	   while	   migration	   can	   be	   a	  
consequence	   of	   capitalist	   development,	   it	   has	   also	   been	   employed	   as	   a	   livelihood	  
strategy	   to	   “overcome	   local	   development	   constraints”	   (de	   Haas,	   2010:	   251).	  
Nevertheless,	   scholars	  often	   agree	   that	  migration	   alone	   cannot	  mitigate	   structural	  
constraints	  such	  as	  “endemic	  corruption,	  misguided	  macro-­‐economic	  policies,	  credit	  
and	   insurance	   market	   failure	   and	   insecure	   property	   rights”	   because	   states	   must	  
assume	   responsibility	   for	   instituting	   general	   reforms	   (de	   Haas,	   2010:	   251;	   256).	  
Consequently,	   development	   in	   emigration	   states	   such	   as	   Liberia	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  
“prerequisite	   for	   investment”	   by	   migrants	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   “consequence	   of	  





Empirical	  evidence	  has	  shown	  that	  impacts	  of	  migration	  on	  development	  are	  neither	  
completely	  positive	  nor	  negative	  in	  their	  outcomes,	  argues	  de	  Haas:	  	  
	  
While	   neo-­‐classical	   and	   developmentalist	   perspectives	   on	  migration	  
and	   development	   tend	   to	   underestimate,	   structuralist	   perspectives	  
tend	   to	   overestimate	   the	   importance	   of	   structural	   constraints	   and	  
thereby	  also	   largely	   rule	  out	  agency.	  Hence,	  an	   improved	   theoretical	  
perspective	  on	  migration	  and	  development	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  account	  
for	   the	   role	   of	   structure—the	   constraining	   or	   enabling	   general	  
political,	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   context	   in	   which	   migration	  
takes	   place—as	   well	   as	   agency—the	   limited	   but	   real	   capacity	   of	  
individuals	  to	  overcome	  constraints	  and	  potentially	  reshape	  structure	  
	  	   (de	  Haas,	  2010:	  241).	  
	  
Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  migration	  and	  development,	  
rather	  than	  linear	  or	  causal	  (de	  Haas,	  2010:	  253).	  Neo-­‐classical	  models	  of	  migration	  
simplistically	   categorise	   migrants	   as	   individuals	   motivated	   by	   utilitarian	   aims,	  
thereby	   thoroughly	   disregarding	   how	   households,	   social	   networks,	   and	   families	  
influence	   decisions	   to	   migrate	   (Leitner,	   2003:	   454;	   de	   Haas,	   2010:	   231).	   As	   an	  
alternative	   to	   the	   neo-­‐classical	   model,	   the	   New	   Economics	   of	   Labour	   Migration	  
(NELM)	   frames	   the	   household	   or	   family	   as	   the	   basic	   unit	   of	   analysis	   in	  migration	  
decision-­‐making	   and	   risk	   sharing	   practices,	   thereby	   casting	   migration	   as	   one	   of	  
many	   livelihood	  strategies	  employed	  by	  households	  and	   their	   individual	  members	  
(de	   Haas,	   2010:	   242-­‐244).	   Yet,	   this	   model	   has	   also	   been	   critiqued	   for	   its	   limited	  
focus	   on	   labour	   migration	   and	   skewed	   analysis	   of	   the	   family/household	   as	   a	  
homogenous	  entity	  with	  singular	  interests	  and	  no	  power	  differentials	  (Leitner,	  2003:	  
455).	  	  
	  
Following	   this	   brief	   literature	   review	   is	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   historical	   and	  
contemporary	  migration	  patterns	   to	  and	   from	  Liberia,	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  
movement	   across	   diverse	   spatial	   landscapes	   has	   configured	   and	   reconfigured	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’.	  	  
	  
This	  Land	  of	  Migration,	  Not	  ‘Liberty’	  	  
Long	   before	   the	   arrival	   of	   black	   settlers	   in	   the	   19th	   century,	   there	  was	   significant	  




Liberia’s	   16	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   groups	   are	   not	   ‘indigenous’	   at	   all.	   They	   migrated	   in	  
several	  waves,	  with	  the	  Gbandi,	  Gio,	  Kpelle,	  Lorma,	  Mandingo,	  Mano,	  Mende,	  and	  Vai	  
arriving	  between	  the	  12th	  and	  17th	  centuries	  from	  far-­‐flung	  West-­‐African	  territories	  
such	   as	   contemporary	   Burkina	   Faso,	   Guinea,	   Ivory	   Coast,	   Mali,	   and	   Sierra	   Leone	  
(Guannu,	   1983:	   9-­‐10;	   Konneh,	   1996:	   7-­‐11).	   Other	   early	   documented	   waves	   of	  
migration	   began	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   15th	   century,	   when	   Mande-­‐speaking	   peoples	  
cascaded	   up	   the	   Niger	   River,	   settling	   in	   present-­‐day	   Sierra	   Leone	   and	   Liberia	  
(Gershoni,	   1985:	   2).	   The	   Mane	   warriors,	   whose	   descendants	   are	   the	   Gbandi	   and	  
Lorma,	  constituted	  another	  wave	  of	  migration	  as	  they	  settled	  in	  what	  is	  modern-­‐day	  
northern	   Liberia	   and	   southern	   Sierra	   Leone,	   thereby	   pushing	   the	   Golas	   further	  
south	  into	  the	  forest	  belt	  (Gershoni,	  1985:	  2).	  Traditionally	  seafarers	  who	  travelled	  
along	  the	  West	  African	  coast	  and	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  to	  Europe	  as	  early	  as	  the	  
19th	  century,	  the	  Krus	  from	  southeastern	  Liberia	  also	  exhibited	  migratory	  patterns	  
that	   gradually	   spread	   into	   “the	   area	   between	   the	   central	   Liberian	   coast	   and	   the	  
hinterland,	  up	  to	  the	  San	  Pedro	  River	  in	  what	  is	  now	  Ivory	  Coast”	  (Gershoni,	  1985:	  
2;	  Black,	  et.	  al,	  2006:	  41).	  Migrants	  were	  particularly	  attracted	  to	  the	  coast	  because	  
of	   interactions	  with	  Portuguese	  seamen	  who	  began	  making	   regular	  expeditions	   to	  
trade	  with	  the	  local	  people	  in	  the	  mid-­‐15th	  century	  (Gershoni,	  1985:	  3).	  In	  exchange	  
for	   brass,	   glass,	   clothes,	   and	   iron	   supplies,	   the	   local	   populations	   traded	   in	   slaves,	  
skins,	  gold,	  and	  ivory	  (Gershoni,	  1985:	  3).	  	  
	  
By	  the	  time	  repatriated	  blacks	  arrived	  on	  the	  coast	  of	  pre-­‐settler	  Liberia	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
19th	   century,	   250	   years	   of	   migration	   had	   preceded	   them,	   with	   various	   ethno-­‐
linguistic	   communities	   virtually	   settled	   in	   their	   confederations	   of	   clans	   and	  
chieftaincies,	   “traditions	  of	  alliances,	  and	  rivalries”	  (Gershoni,	  1985:	  3-­‐4).	  Between	  
1822	  and	  1867,	  the	  American	  Colonisation	  Society	  (ACS)	  facilitated	  the	  emigration	  
of	  18,858	  blacks	  to	  Liberia.	  Of	  the	  total,	  6000	  emigrants	  had	  been	  granted	  freedom	  
on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  leave	  the	  United	  States;	  others	  were	  either	  born	  free	  or	  
had	   purchased	   their	   freedom	   (Gershoni,	   1985:	   8).	   Although	   recaptives	   from	   the	  
Congo	   River	   Basin	   trickled	   into	   pre-­‐settler	   Liberia,	   the	   1850s	   marked	   a	   surge	   in	  
their	  immigration.	  Between	  1858	  and	  1861,	  nearly	  a	  dozen	  slave	  ships	  en	  route	  to	  
Cuba	  and	  other	  places	  in	  the	  Americas	  were	  intercepted	  and	  diverted	  to	  the	  shores	  




2004:	   245;	   Moran,	   2006:	   2).	   These	   numbers	   were	   augmented	   by	   a	   few	   hundred	  
immigrants	  from	  Barbados	  after	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  on	  that	  island	  (Moran,	  2006:	  
2).	  	  
	  
Consequently,	   citizenship	   in	   post-­‐independence	   Liberia	   was	   embedded	   in	  
experiences	  of	  migration.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  earliest	  presidents	  of	  
Liberia	  were	  born	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  West	  Indies,	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  (Guannu,	  1989).	  As	  
one	   29-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homelander	   in	   this	   study	   acknowledged,	   what	   ultimately	  
defines	  Liberia	  is	  its	  “various	  shades	  of	  immigration”:	  	  
	  
I’ve	   always	   had	   this	   opinion	   that	   defining	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   a	  
very,	  very	  difficult	  thing	  because	  I	  think	  Liberians	  don’t	  have	  a	  unique	  
identity	   that	   you	   can	   easily	   look	   at	   and	   say,	   “This	   guy	   is	   a	  
Liberian.”…you	   have	   a	   lot	   of	   Mandingoes	   who	   have	   relatives	   in	  
Guinea…They	   are	   Liberians.	   They	   can	   easily	   mingle	   in	   Guinea;	   they	  
could	  easily	  pass	  on	  as	  citizens	  in	  Guinea.	  You	  have	  some	  people	  of	  the	  
Kissi	  tribe	  who	  have	  relatives	  across	  the	  border	  in	  Sierra	  Leone…They	  
can	   easily	   mingle	   as	   Sierra	   Leoneans;	   they	   could	   easily	   mingle	   as	  
Liberians.	   We	   also	   have	   some	   Liberians,	   way	   back,	   when	   we	   were	  
much	   younger,	   people	   used	   to	   laugh	   at	   the	  Ghana	  Kru	   and	  Nigerian	  
Kru.	  But,	  actually,	  there	  are	  Kru	  people	  who…most	  of	  the	  Kru	  people,	  
some	  of	  them	  will	  tell	  you,	  “I	  was	  born	  in	  Ghana,	  then	  I	  came	  on	  this	  
side	   [Liberia].”…So,	   that	   was	   it.	   Even	   my	   own	   situation,	   my	  
grandfather,	  my	   paternal	   grandfather,	   came	   from	  Ghana	   and	   settled	  
here	  and	  then	  he	  had	  a	  Kpelle	  woman	  who	  had	  my	  father.	  And	  now,	  
my	  mother	  is	  a	  Kru.	  So,	  sometimes	  identifying	  myself	  as	  a	  Liberian	  can	  
be	   a	   little	   bit	   tricky…And	   then,	   historically,	  most	   of	   the	   tribes	   came	  
from	   right	   around	   West	   Africa.	   So,	   if	   you	   came	   from	   around	   West	  
Africa	   and	   settled	   here,	   other	   people	   came	   from	   maybe	   the	   Congo	  
basin,	   or	   they	   came	   from	   the	  US,	   they	   settled	  here,	   after	   a	  period	  of	  
time,	   if	   there	   are	   other	   people	   who	   [are]	   settling	   on	   that	   side	   and	  
coming	   here,	   how	   do	   you	   define	   yourself	   as	   more	   a	   Liberian	   than	  
those	  who	  are	  just	  settlers	  like	  you	  are?160	  
	  
As	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  homeland	  respondent,	  the	  trajectory	  of	  Liberia’s	  migratory	  
flows	  and	   its	  bearing	  on	  citizenship	  construction	   is	  exceedingly	  complex.	  Whereas	  
Liberia’s	  first	  citizens	  were	  immigrants	  with	  no	  filial	  ties	  to	  the	  land,	  the	  institution	  
of	  citizenship	  became	  increasingly	  defined	  by	  residence	  and	  land	  ownership	  for	  the	  
first	   100	   years	   of	   the	   history	   of	   the	   republic.	   Emigration	   from	   Liberia	   was	   rare	  
                                                




during	  the	  early	  processes	  of	  state	  formation	  and	  later	  stages	  of	  attempted	  nation-­‐
state	  consolidation.	  During	  the	  Tubman	  and	  Tolbert	  regimes,	  for	  instance,	  Liberians	  
who	  could	  afford	  to	  travelled	  abroad,	  particularly	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  vacation	  
or	   for	   studies,	   but	   rarely	   ever	   stayed	   for	   prolonged	   periods	   of	   time	   (TRC,	   2009b:	  
118).	   After	   the	   1980	   coup,	   however,	   the	   citizenship-­‐as-­‐residence	   trope	   no	   longer	  
held	   sway	   since	   Liberians	   fleeing	   the	   ensuing	   crises	   still	   considered	   themselves	  
citizens.	   As	   indicated	   in	   Liberia’s	   TRC	   report,	   the	   reconfiguration	   of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  as	   identity,	  practice	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  was	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  
migration	  patterns	  post-­‐1979:	  
	  
The	  Liberian	  diaspora	  prior	  to	  1980	  was	  composed	  mostly	  of	  students	  
and	   individuals	   with	   diplomatic	   and	   business	   connections	   in	   the	  
international	  community.	  The	  Liberian	  conflict	  fundamentally	  altered	  
the	  nature	  of	   the	  Liberian	  diaspora,	  however,	  both	  by	   increasing	   the	  
diaspora’s	   size	   and	   changing	   its	   composition	   to	   reflect	   the	   political,	  
economic,	   and	   social	  divides	   in	  Liberia	  during	   the	   conflict.	   Liberians	  
who	  were	  outside	  of	  Liberia	  when	   the	  civil	  upheaval	  began	  with	   the	  
Doe	  coup,	  and	  particularly	  when	  the	  civil	  wars	  began	  in	  full	  intensity	  
in	   1990,	   found	   themselves	   trapped	   with	   neither	   support	   nor	   the	  
means	  to	  return	  home	  (TRC,	  2009b:	  283).	  
	  
Although	  the	  first	  Liberian-­‐American	  diasporas	  developed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  settlement	  
in	  the	  19th	  century,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  Liberian	  diaspora	  identities	  fundamentally	  
crystallised	  in	  the	  1980s	  through	  to	  the	  early	  2000s	  because	  of	  conflicts	  varying	  in	  
scale	   and	   magnitude,	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   One	   55-­‐year-­‐old	  
Washington-­‐based	  female	  respondent	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  political	  
contestations	  in	  Liberia	  and	  subsequent	  mass	  migration	  that	  diasporas	  emerged:	  
	  
I	  think	  it	  still	  concerns	  me	  that	  I	  still	  hear	  people	  say,	  “I	  don’t	  want	  to	  
be	  involved	  in	  politics”,	  or	  “I’m	  not	  political”,	  or	  “This	  is	  not	  a	  political	  
organisation”,	   and	   I	   don’t	   know	   how	   you	   live	   and	   it’s	   not	  
political…The	   whole	   reason	   we’re	   in	   the	   diaspora	   is	   a	   political	  
issue…So,	  when	  people	  say,	  “I’m	  not	  political,”	   I	   think	  it’s	   like	  a	  split,	  
that	  they	  mean	  a	  disconnect	  between	  the	  reason	  you’re	  actually	  here	  
in	  the	  diaspora,	  whether	  you’re	  in	  France,	  in	  Germany,	  in	  Sweden	  or	  in	  
Australia,	  you	  forget	  that	  the	  reason	  you’re	  in	  these	  places	  is	  because	  
of	   politics.	   Because	   if	   politics	   hadn’t	   played	   the	   way	   it	   played,	   we	  
wouldn’t	  be	  here,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  number	  that	  we	  are…So,	  when	  we	  say	  




don’t	  want	  to	  be	   involved	   in	  a	  political	  organisation	  I	   think	  we	  are,	   I	  
don’t	  know,	  deluding	  ourselves…161	  
	  
Moreover,	   the	   nation-­‐state	   of	   Liberia	   became	   fundamentally	   multi-­‐territorialised,	  
with	   a	   sizeable	   number	   of	   Liberians	   scattered	   throughout	   the	   globe,	   yet	   still	   fully	  
engaged	  transnationally	  as	  a	  result	  of	  armed	  conflict.	  In	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  
Liberia	  represented	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  refugee	  producing	  countries	  in	  Africa	  (Black,	  
et.	  al,	  2006:	  5),	  with	  record	  highs	  in	  internal	  migration.	  Table	  11	  indicates	  that	  while	  
there	   was	   a	   gradual	   decrease	   in	   the	   numbers	   of	   registered	   Liberian	   refugees	  
worldwide	   between	   1993	   and	   2005,	   the	   numbers	   of	   internally	   displaced	   persons	  
spiked	   one	   year	   before	   each	   of	   Liberia’s	   armed	   conflicts	   ended	   (1996	   and	   2002,	  
respectively).	  	  
	  
Table	  11:	  UNHCR	  Refugee/Asylum/IDP	  Population	  Statistics	  for	  Liberia	  	  
Category/Year	   1993	   1996	   1999	   2002	   2005	  
Refugees	   150,153	   120,061	   96,317	   64,956	   10,168	  
Asylum	  
Seekers	  	  
N/A	   1	   29	   10	   29	  
IDPs	   N/A	   320,000	   90,584	   304,115	   237,822	  
Source:	  2002	  UNHCR	  Statistical	  Yearbook-­‐Liberia	  	  
	  
Various	  sources	  estimate	  that	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	  of	  Liberians	  fled	  the	  country	  
during	   the	   wars	   to	   locations	   as	   diverse	   as	   Ghana	   (with	   a	   refugee	   settlement	  
exceeding	  30,000	  Liberians	  as	  of	  2007),	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Ivory	  Coast	  and	  Guinea	  in	  the	  
West	   African	   sub-­‐region,	   which	   hosted	   as	   many	   as	   780,000	   Liberian	   refugees	   in	  
1996	   (UNHCR,	   2007).	   Liberians	   also	   fled	   to	   other	   destinations	   around	   the	   globe,	  
particularly	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   Sweden,	   and	   Norway	   in	   Western	   Europe	   and	  
Providence,	   Rhode	   Island,	   Minneapolis/St.	   Paul,	   Minnesota,	   Philadelphia,	  
Pennsylvania,	   and	   Staten	   Island,	  New	  York,	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   though	   the	   exact	  
number	   and	   size	   of	   Liberians	   in	   these	   regions	   is	   contested	   (Scott,	   1998;	   US	  
Department	   of	   State,	   2001;	   Lubkemann,	   2008:	   49;	   Advocates	   for	   Human	   Rights,	  
2009;	  TRC,	  2009b).	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  the	  distribution	  of	  populations	  in	  the	  United	  
States	   is	   the	   least	   verifiable,	   with	   estimates	   ranging	   from	   under	   10,000	   to	   over	  
450,000	  (Lubkemann,	  2008:	  49;	  TRC,	  2009b:	  68).	  
	  
                                                




Apart	   from	   the	   West-­‐African	   sub-­‐region,	   the	   United	   States	   hosts	   the	   largest	  
population	   of	   Liberians	   outside	   of	   Liberia.	   This	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	   number	   of	  
factors,	   namely,	   the	   historical	   links	   between	   Liberia	   and	   the	   United	   States;	   the	  
temporary	   migratory	   flows	   of	   Liberian	   elites	   to	   the	   United	   States	   pre-­‐armed	  
conflicts;	   and	   that	   the	  US	  boasted	  one	  of	   the	   largest	   resettlement	  programmes	   for	  
Liberian	  refugees.	  The	  US	  government	  granted	  Temporary	  Protected	  Status	  (TPS)	  to	  
approximately	   200,000	   Liberians	   living	   in	   America,	   and	   this	   has	   been	   renewed	  
annually	  since	   it	  started	   in	  1991	  (Waugh,	  2011:	  313).	  Additionally,	   the	  US	  refugee	  
resettlement	   programme	   offered	   naturalisation	   as	   a	   durable	   solution	   to	   two	  
categories	  of	  Liberians:	  asylum	  applicants	  who	  could	  prove	  political	  persecution	  in	  
Liberia	  and	  those	  who	  demonstrated	  considerable	   family	   ties	   to	   the	  US	  who	  could	  
be	   reunited	   (Waugh,	   2011:	   314).	   According	   to	   Gabriel	   Williams	   of	   the	   Liberian	  
embassy	  in	  Washington,	  the	  generations	  of	  Liberians	  who	  eventually	  settled	  in	  the	  
US	  are	  indicative	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐war	  patterns	  of	  migration:	  	  
	  
People	  who	  are	  older,	  50,	  60,	  70	  years	  or	  older,	  many	  of	   them	  came	  
here	   [US]	   for	   education	   and	   then	   over	   time	   they	   over	   stayed,	  
especially	  during	  the	  1960s	  coming	  through	  the	  1970s.	  And	  then	  you	  
have	  all	  of	   the	  civil	  upheavals	   that	  we	  had	   in	  Liberia	  beginning	  with	  
the	  Rice	  Riots	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  that	  culminated	  into	  the	  1980	  military	  
coup,	  so	  many	  of	  those	  people	  from	  that	  background	  who	  came	  here	  
for	  educational	  purposes	  to	  get	  various	  professional	  background	  to	  go	  
back	   just	   stayed.	   And	   then	   of	   course	   you	   had	   the	   nearly	   20	   years,	  
more	   than	   15	   years	   of	   civil	   upheaval,	   the	   civil	   war	   that	   allowed	  
thousands	   of	   people	   to	   vote	   with	   their	   feet	   and	   many	   of	   them	   on	  
resettlement.	   Other	   people	   came	   here	   and	   gained	   political	   asylum.	  
This	   is	   how	   we	   have	   the	   huge	   exodus	   that	   led	   to	   brain	   drain	   in	  
Liberia.162	  
	  
Trends	  in	  the	  regularisation	  of	  status	  of	  Liberians	  in	  the	  US	  also	  mirror	  the	  conflict-­‐
peace	  cycles.	  Table	  12	  captures	  how	  many	  Liberians	  were	  newly	  registered	   in	   the	  
US	   as	   permanent	   residents,	   naturalised	   US	   citizens,	   refugees	   and	   asylees.	   The	  
figures	   for	   permanent	   residents	   are	   captured	   as	   early	   as	   1970-­‐1979,	   as	   this	  
timeframe	  represented	  an	  initial	  spike	  in	  newly	  registered	  Liberians	  in	  the	  US.	  The	  
1970s	  were	  also	  indicative	  of	  increased	  out-­‐migration	  as	  a	  result	  of	  brewing	  conflict	  
in	  Liberia	  following	  the	  death	  of	  President	  Tubman	  in	  1971.	  	  
                                                








Permanent	  Residents	   US	  Citizens	   Refugees	   Asylees	  
1960-­‐1969	   841	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
1970-­‐79	   2,391	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
1980-­‐89	   6,420	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
1990-­‐1999	   13,587	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
2000	   1,570	   1,022	   2,620	   782	  
2002	   2,869	   1,047	   560	   746	  
2004	   2,757	   1,218	   7,140	   399	  
2006	   6,887	   2,193	   2,402	   113	  
2008	   7,193	   2,468	   992	   91	  
2010	   4,837	   3,360	   244	   61	  
2012	   4,109	   4,332	   69	   35	  
Source:	  US	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  2008	  &	  2012	  Yearbook	  of	  
Immigration	  Statistics	  	  
	  
As	  the	  table	  illustrates,	  the	  number	  of	  Liberia-­‐born	  newly	  registered	  US	  permanent	  
residents	  more	   than	  doubled	   in	   the	  1990-­‐1999	  period,	  when	  Liberia	  was	   its	  most	  
unstable.	   Similarly,	   the	   numbers	   of	   Liberia-­‐born	   newly	   registered	   US	   refugees	  
spiked	  in	  2004,	  one	  year	  after	  Liberia’s	  second	  armed	  conflict	  ended,	  before	  steadily	  
declining.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  number	  of	  Liberia-­‐born	  newly	  registered	  US	  asylum	  
grantees	  declined	  after	  2002	  as	  Liberia	  became	  more	  stable.	  Whereas	  the	  number	  of	  
newly	  registered	  US	  permanent	  residents	  fluctuated	  from	  2000	  to	  2012,	  the	  number	  
of	  newly	  registered	  US	  citizens	  increased	  consistently.	  The	  DHS	  official	  statistics	  on	  
newly	  registered	  US	  citizens	  reinforces	   the	   findings	  of	  my	  study,	   in	  which	  eight	  of	  
the	  12	  Liberia-­‐born	  Washington-­‐based	  residents	  who	  naturalised	  opted	  to	  do	  so	  in	  
the	  2000s	  although	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	   them	  were	  eligible	   for	  US	  citizenship	   long	  
before	   this	   time.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	   later	   in	   this	  chapter,	  respondents	  adamantly	  
held	  onto	  their	  legal	  Liberian	  citizenships,	  either	  opting	  for	  naturalisation	  long	  after	  
the	  second	  armed	  conflict	  ended	  or	  dismissing	  naturalisation	  altogether.	  	  
	  
Just	   as	   assumptions	   about	   naturalisation	   trends	   for	   Liberians	   abroad	   have	  
influenced	  the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation,	  so	  too	  has	  post-­‐
war	  migration	  data,	  albeit	  scanty.	  According	  to	  UN	  figures,	   the	  number	  of	  Liberian	  
refugees	   decreased	   since	   the	   cessation	   of	   armed	   conflict	   in	   2003.	   UNHCR,	   for	  




of	   February	   2006	   with	   numbers	   declining	   to	   just	   over	   75,000	   in	   2008	   (UNHCR,	  
2007).	   It	   is	   unclear,	   however,	   how	   many	   Liberians	   actually	   reside	   abroad	   today,	  
with	  the	  statistics	  on	  return	  migration	  to	  Liberia	  equally	  as	   inconclusive.	  Although	  
policy-­‐making	   and	   academic	   research	   has	   been	   infused	   by	   the	   recognised	  
importance	   of	   Liberians	   abroad,	   the	   lack	   of	   reliable	   statistical	   data	   on	   Liberia’s	  
diasporas	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  huge	  impediment.	  The	  gaps	  in	  data	  on	  contemporary	  
out-­‐migration	   and	   return	   migration	   represent	   a	   microcosm	   of	   the	   “conflicting	  
accounts	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  migration	  in	  contemporary	  Africa,	  reflecting	  the	  paucity	  of	  
data	  sources	  and	  their	  often	  poor	  quality”	  (Black,	  et.	  al,	  2006:	  5).	  	  
	  
Regardless	   of	   the	   dearth	   of	   reliable	   data	   on	   contemporary	   migration	   flows	   for	  
Liberia,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  process	  of	  migration,	  whether	  in-­‐bound	  or	  outbound,	  has	  
touched	  the	  lives	  of	  all	  Liberians	  thereby	  invariably	  influencing	  the	  introduction	  and	  
postponement	  in	  passage	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
migration	   patterns	   of	   Liberia-­‐born	   ‘unofficial’	   anonymised	   interviewees	   in	   this	  
study—those	   not	   speaking	   in	   their	   official	   capacities	   as	   government	   of	   Liberia	  
representatives	  or	  heads	  of	  regional	  diaspora	  organisations—is	  a	  particularly	  stark	  
illustration	   of	   how	   migration	   became	   a	   mainstay	   in	   contemporary	   Liberian	  
demography.	   As	   Table	   13	   indicates,	   of	   the	   163	   Liberia-­‐born	   anonymised	  
respondents,	  84	  percent	  had	  traveled	  outside	  the	  territorial	  confines	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  at	  some	  point	  in	  their	  lives.	  Though	  16	  percent,	  principally	  homeland	  Liberians,	  
had	  never	  travelled	  internationally,	  all	  interviewees	  admitted	  to	  having	  at	  least	  one	  
relative	   abroad,	   primarily	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   armed	   conflict.	   Although	   the	  
percentages	   captured	   in	   the	   table	   are	   not	   representative,	   they	   certainly	   reveal	  









Table	   13:	   First-­‐Time	   Migration	   Patterns	   of	   163	   Anonymised	   Liberia-­‐born	  
Respondents163	  	  	  
Field	  Site/	  
Migration	  





























London	  (28)	   1	   10	   14	   2	   1	   N/A	  
Washington	  
(24)	  
1	   9	   10	   3	   1	   N/A	  
Freetown	  (15)	   N/A	   2	   7	   2	   4	   N/A	  
Accra	  (30)	   N/A	   3	   19	   7	   1	   N/A	  
Monrovia	  (66)	   1	   6	   25	   6	   2	   26	  
Total	   Absolute	  
Number/	  





















From	  the	  numbers	   tabulated	   in	  Table	  13,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  highest	   spike	   in	   first-­‐	  
time	  migration	  amongst	  Liberia-­‐born	  anonymised	  respondents	  occurred	  during	  the	  
first	  armed	  conflict,	  which	  brought	  Charles	  Taylor	  to	  power	  in	  1997.	  Unsurprisingly,	  
first-­‐time	   migration	   also	   increased	   from	   the	   1980	   coup	   to	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   first	  
insurgency	  by	  Taylor	  in	  1989.	  Of	  the	  28	  London-­‐based	  Liberia-­‐born	  respondents,	  12	  
had	  spent	  some	  time	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Guinea,	  Gambia,	  Ivory	  Coast	  or	  Nigeria	  before	  
settling	   in	   the	   UK,	   proving	   that	   West	   Africa	   served	   as	   a	   transit	   point	   before	  
settlement.	   Of	   the	   24	  Washington-­‐based	   Liberia-­‐born	   respondents,	   only	   four	   had	  
transited	  for	  some	  time	  through	  another	  African	  country—namely	  Nigeria,	  Guinea,	  
Zimbabwe	  or	  Ghana—before	  settling	   in	   the	  US.	  Of	   the	  15	  Freetown-­‐based	  Liberia-­‐
born	  respondents,	  only	   three	  had	   transited	   through	  Guinea,	   Ivory	  Coast,	  Ghana	  or	  
Nigeria	   before	   initially	   settling	   in	   Freetown;	   the	   other	   12	   travelled	   directly	   to	  
Freetown.	  This	  is	  unsurprising	  given	  that	  Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  share	  a	  common	  
border.	  Of	  the	  30	  Accra-­‐based	  Liberia-­‐born	  respondents,	   five	  had	  spent	  some	  time	  
in	   the	  US	  or	  Europe	  before	  settling	   in	  Ghana,	  while	   five	  had	  passed	   through	  Togo,	  
                                                
163	  I	  did	  not	  capture	  the	  migratory	  patterns	  of	  foreign-­‐born	  Liberians	  in	  this	  table	  because	  I	  wanted	  
to	  establish	  a	  baseline	  of	  first-­‐time	  migration	  for	  those	  who	  were	  born	  in	  the	  country.	  I	  deliberately	  
refrained	   from	   explicitly	   asking	   the	   21	   government	   officials	   and	   heads	   of	   regional	   organisations	  





Guinea,	   Sierra	   Leone,	   or	   Nigeria	   before	   settling	   in	   Ghana.	   The	   remaining	   20	   had	  
travelled	   to	   Ghana	   directly	   from	   Liberia.	   Of	   the	   24	   homeland	   Liberians	   who	   had	  
travelled	  abroad,	  many	  of	   them	  migrated	   for	   short	   stints	   to	   the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐
region	   before	   returning	   subsequently	   to	   Liberia.	   Quite	   often	   their	   migratory	  
patterns	  were	  circular	  in	  nature,	  with	  out-­‐migration	  peaking	  during	  times	  of	  conflict	  
and	  return	  migration	  increasing	  during	  times	  of	  relative	  peace.	  These	  varying	  trends	  
are	   supported	   by	   the	   academic	   literature,	   which	   argues	   that	   contemporary	  
migration	  is	  neither	  unidirectional	  nor	  permanent	  (Leitner,	  2003:	  450-­‐451).	  
	  
In	   the	   sections	   that	   follow,	   I	   explore	  how	  migration	  has	   simultaneously	   expanded	  
and	  contracted	   the	  menu	  of	   legal	   citizenship	  options	   for	  Liberians	  abroad	   thereby	  
influencing	   their	   perspectives	   on	   the	   merits/demerits	   of	   bounded	   or	   unbounded	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’.	  	  
	  
A	  Complex	  Web	  of	  Citizenship	  Configurations	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   has	   become	   exceedingly	   nuanced	   and	   multi-­‐dimensional,	  
largely	  brokered	  by	  processes	  of	  migration.	  As	  Table	  14	  capturing	  citizenship	  status	  
suggests,	   the	   majority	   of	   ‘unofficial’	   anonymised	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   were	  
Liberia-­‐born	   Liberian	   citizens	   (65	   percent),	   followed	   by	   Liberia-­‐born	   naturalised	  
foreign	   citizens	   (24	  percent).	   Although	   these	   statistics	  may	  not	   be	   representative,	  
they	   do	   indicate	   that	   slightly	   higher	   numbers	   of	   Liberians	   maintained	   their	   legal	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   than	  naturalised	   abroad,	   contrary	   to	   popular	   lore.	   Thus,	   one	  
assumption	  embedded	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation—
that	  Liberians	  abroad	  have	  naturalised	  in	  record	  numbers—may	  be	  more	  politically	  







































London	  (30)	   6	   22	   N/A	   2	   N/A	  
Washington	  (30)	   11	   12	   1	   6	   N/A	  
Freetown	  (20)	   12	   3165	   N/A	   3166	   2	  
Accra	  (30)	   29	   1	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
Monrovia	  (71)	   59	   6	   1	   4	   1	  














The	   third	   largest	  category	  of	  respondents	  (8	  percent)	  were	  Liberians	  born	  abroad	  
who	  automatically	  obtained	   jus	  soli	   foreign	   citizenships,	   a	   function	  of	   the	   complex	  
and	   varied	   migratory	   patterns	   and	   circumstances	   of	   Liberians	   worldwide.	   The	  
respondents	   in	   this	   study	   who	   were	   born	   outside	   of	   Liberia	   before	   the	   onset	   of	  
contemporary	  conflict	   in	  1979	  admitted	  that	  their	  parents	  lived	  abroad	  because	  of	  
school	  or	  work	  opportunities.	  This	   is	   supported	  by	  demographic	  migration	   trends	  
for	  Liberians	  pre-­‐1980.	  Contrastingly,	  jus	  soli	  foreign	  citizen	  respondents	  born	  1980	  
and	  after	  admitted	   that	   they	  were	  born	  abroad	  because	  of	  continued	   instability	   in	  
Liberia.	   This	   is	   further	   supported	   by	   the	   spike	   in	   emigration	   after	   the	   coup	   that	  
toppled	   Tolbert.	   One	   of	   the	   most	   salient	   ways	   in	   which	   migration	   reconfigured	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   that	   it	   created	   a	   hybrid	   category	   of	   simultaneous	   jus	   soli	  
foreign	   citizens/jus	   sanguinis	   Liberian	   citizens	   like	   Denise,	   described	   in	   the	  
introduction	   of	   this	   chapter.	   By	   virtue	   of	   the	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law,	   dual	  
citizenship	  is	  recognised	  for	  these	  conditional	  Liberian	  citizens	  although	  they	  must	  
decide	  at	  the	  age	  of	  majority	  whether	  to	  maintain	  their	  foreign	  citizenship	  by	  birth	  
or	   their	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   by	   ancestry.	   One	   respondent,	   a	   43-­‐year-­‐old	   London	  
                                                
164	  I	  deliberately	  refrained	   from	  explicitly	  asking	   the	  21	  government	  officials	  and	  heads	  of	   regional	  
organisations	   about	   their	   citizenship	   status,	   as	   I	   realised	   early	   on	   that	   this	   would	   be	   a	   sensitive	  
subject	   to	   broach	   for	   those	   speaking	   in	   their	   official	   capacities.	   Therefore,	   this	   information	   is	   not	  
captured	  in	  my	  analysis.	  	  	  
165	  In	  Freetown,	  two	  of	  the	  three	  Liberia-­‐born	  Sierra	  Leoneans	  admitted	  that	  though	  they	  did	  not	  go	  
through	  any	  formal	  channels	  of	  naturalisation	  they	  still	  obtained	  Sierra	  Leonean	  passports.	  
166	  One	  of	  the	  three	  Sierra	  Leone-­‐born	  Liberians	  admitted	  that	  though	  he	  was	  born	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  
he	  had	  to	  officially	  naturalise	  when	  he	  returned	  to	  the	  country	  in	  2011	  because	  he	  had	  spent	  most	  of	  





resident	  who	  was	  born	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  Liberian	  citizen	  parents	  but	  grew	  up	  in	  Liberia,	  
admitted	  that	  she	  feels	  more	  Liberian	  than	  British,	  and	  would	  rather	  not	  relinquish	  
the	  Liberian	  passport	  that	  she	  carries	  illegally:	  	  	  
	  
…it	  would	  break	  my	  heart	  if	  I	  couldn’t	  get	  a	  Liberian	  passport.	  I	  don’t	  
want	  to	  be	  British.	  I	  live	  here	  [the	  UK]	  but	  I’m	  a	  Liberian	  and	  I	  say	  it	  all	  
the	  time,	  you	  know.	  I	  may	  live	  in	  this	  country,	  but	  I’m	  traditionally	  a	  
Liberian.	  I	  eat	  Liberian	  food,	  I	  train	  my	  children	  the	  Liberian	  way,	  you	  
see	  what	  I	  mean?167	  
	  
If	   enacted,	   Liberia’s	   proposed	  dual	   citizenship	   bill	  would	  mitigate	   the	   concerns	   of	  
this	  respondent	  by	  enabling	  her	  to	  legally	  carry	  UK	  and	  Liberian	  passports.	  
	  
Other	  categories	  of	  Liberians	  tend	  to	   further	  complicate	  what	  appear	   to	  be	  clearly	  
defined	  stipulations	  on	  citizenship	  in	  the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law,	  such	  as	  jus	  soli	  
Liberian	  citizens	  who	  retained	  their	  foreign	  citizenship	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  born	  to	  at	  
least	  one	  foreign	  citizen	  parent	  (1	  percent	  of	  the	  respondent	  pool)	  and	  jus	  sanguinis	  
Liberian	   citizens	   born	   abroad	   who	   retained	   their	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   by	  
virtue	   of	   having	   at	   least	   one	   Liberian	   citizen	   parent	   (1	   percent	   of	   the	   respondent	  
pool).	   These	   two	   categories	   of	   Liberians	   were	   fewer	   in	   number	   in	   this	   study,	  
although	   I	   suspect	   that	   a	   comprehensive	   quantitative	   study	   will	   show	   they	  
represent	   a	   larger	   percentage	   of	   the	   overall	   Liberian	   emigrant	   pool.	   Moreover,	  
Liberia-­‐born	   jus	   sanguinis	   foreign	   citizens	   and	   foreign-­‐born	   jus	   sanguinis	   Liberian	  
citizens	  occupy	  a	  unique	  space	  within	  the	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship	  continuum’	  because	  
they	  made	  choices	  that	  were	  contrary	  to	  their	  native-­‐born	  citizenship	  status.	  While	  
the	   jus	  soli	  Liberians	   took	  on	  the	   foreign	  citizenships	  of	   their	   foreign-­‐born	  parents	  
by	  the	  age	  of	  majority,	  their	  jus	  sanguinis	  counterparts	  maintained	  the	  citizenship	  of	  
their	   Liberia-­‐born	   citizen	   parents.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   one	   35-­‐year-­‐old	   Monrovia-­‐
based	  permanent	  returnee,	  whose	  parents	  were	  working	  in	  East	  Africa	  at	  the	  time	  
of	   his	   birth,	   retained	   his	   jus	   sanguinis	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	   Even	   though	   he	   was	  
entitled	   to	  Kenyan	  citizenship	  by	  birth	  and	  eligible	   for	  US	  citizenship	  having	   lived	  
there	  for	  over	  a	  decade	  as	  a	  permanent	  resident,	  this	  respondent	  opted	  for	  ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  instead:	  
                                                




I	  met	  some	  Kenyan	  people	   in	   the	  UN	  system	  here	   [Liberia]	  and	  they	  
were	   like,	   “You	   were	   born	   in	   Kenya!	   You	   should	   apply	   for	   Kenyan	  
citizenship;	  you	  are	  entitled!”	  I’m	  like,	  I	  haven’t	  really	  taken	  the	  time	  
to	  investigate	  that	  but	  seeing	  once	  again	  the	  dual	  citizenship	  faux	  pas,	  
and	   I	   haven’t	   really	   been	   inspired	   to	   go	   after	   it…When	   I	   went	   into	  
Kenya	   [in	  May	   2009],	   the	   immigration	   officer	   at	   the	   airport,	  when	   I	  
paid	  my	   ten	   [US]	  dollars	   for	   the	  airport	  visa,	  he	   said,	   “But	  you	  were	  
born	  in	  Kenya,	  how	  come	  you	  have	  a	  Liberian	  passport?!”	  My	  parents	  
were	   just	   working	   here,	   so	   [he	   said]…“You	   have	   to	   get	   a	   Kenyan	  
passport!”…Well,	  I	  knew	  at	  the	  time	  that	  Liberia	  did	  not	  honour	  dual	  
citizenship	  and	  I	  always	  felt	  like	  I	  would	  be	  selling	  my	  soul	  by	  going	  to	  
another	  nationality.	  But	  that’s	  just	  me.168	  
	  
The	   respondent’s	   decision	   to	   choose	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   from	   a	   menu	   of	   three	  
legal	   identity	   options	   illustrates	   the	   intricate	   nature	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  
construction	   and	   practice.	   Discussed	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   motivations	   for	  
making	  divergent,	  personal	  choices	  about	  which	  citizenship	  to	  maintain	  is	  entangled	  
in	   a	   complex	   web	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   practice	   de	   jure	   or	   de	   facto	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  Liberian	  ‘officially’	  or	  ‘unofficially.’	  
	  
While	   I	   argued	   in	   Chapter	   IV	   that	   contemporary	   constructions	   of	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   transcend	   the	   legal	   definition	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Aliens	   and	  Nationality	  
Law—moving	   from	   passive,	   identity-­‐based	   citizenship	   to	   active,	   practice-­‐based	  
citizenship—it	   is	  still	   important	   to	  explore	   trends	   in	   the	   legal	  citizenship	  status	  of	  
informants	   in	   this	   study.	   After	   all,	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   respondents	   altered	   or	  
maintained	  their	  Liberian	  citizenships	  is	  indicative	  of	  their	  varied	  life-­‐worlds,	  social	  
locations,	  and	  the	  divergent	  circumstances	  that	  influenced	  their	  choices.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  
point,	   the	   highest	   proportion	   of	   ‘unofficial’	   anonymised	   Liberia-­‐born	   respondents	  
(65	   percent)	   retained	   their	   legal	   Liberian	   citizenships,	   with	   a	   disproportionate	  
number	  represented	  by	  ‘near’	  diasporas	  in	  Accra	  and	  Freetown	  and	  Monrovia-­‐based	  
homelanders.	  Of	  the	  50	  homeland	  Liberians,	  slightly	  over	  half	  (52	  percent)	  said	  they	  
had	  never	   travelled	  outside	  of	  Liberia,	  and	   therefore	  would	  not	  have	  been	  eligible	  
for	  foreign	  citizenships.	  Of	  the	  110	  total	  anonymised	  Liberian	  diaspora	  respondents,	  
slightly	   over	   50	   percent	   retained	   their	   legal	   Liberian	   citizenships	   despite	   having	  
lived	  abroad	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  In	  the	  ‘wider’	  diaspora	  (UK	  and	  US),	  London-­‐
based	   Liberians	   naturalised	   at	   a	   far	   greater	   rate	   than	   their	   Washington-­‐based	  
                                                




counterparts.	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   III,	   this	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   highly	  
politicised	   nature	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   in	   the	  US	   capital.	   In	   the	   ‘near’	   diaspora	  
(Sierra	   Leone	   and	   Ghana),	   however,	   the	   number	   of	   naturalised	   Liberians	   in	  
Freetown	   and	   Accra	   is	   negligible.	   As	   mentioned	   in	   previous	   chapters,	   this	  
demographic	   trend	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  while	   Sierra	   Leonean	   and	  
Liberian	  identity/citizenship	  are	  mutually	  inclusive,	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  Liberia-­‐born	  
Liberian	   citizens	   in	   Accra	   were	   refugees	   and	   therefore	   ineligible	   for	   foreign	  
citizenships	   before	   the	   UNHCR	   revoked	   in	   2012	   the	   refugee	   status	   of	   Liberians	  
worldwide.	  Of	  the	  50	  ‘near’	  diasporas	  in	  Freetown	  and	  Accra,	  slightly	  less	  than	  half	  
(48	   percent)	   were	   refugees	   who	   would	   not	   have	   been	   eligible	   for	   foreign	  
citizenships	  without	  formal	  resettlement	  proceedings.	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   ineligibility	   does	   not	   necessarily	   lessen	   one’s	   hunger	   to	   naturalise,	  
particularly	   in	   the	   Global	   North.	   The	   record	   numbers	   of	   Liberians	   who	   apply	  
annually	  for	  the	  Diversity	  Immigrant	  Visa	  (DV)	  Programme169	  to	  travel	  to	  the	  US	  or	  
who	   still	   yearn	   for	   resettlement	   in	   Australia	   and	   Europe	   despite	   the	   cessation	   of	  
automatic	   refugee	   status	   for	   Liberians	   abroad	   proves	   that	   ineligibility	   does	   not	  
evidence	   diminished	   desire.	   Similarly,	   eligibility	   does	   not	   necessarily	   evidence	   a	  
strong	  compulsion	  to	  naturalise.	  Like	  me,	  many	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  held	  onto	  
their	   legal	   Liberian	   citizenships	   despite	   being	   eligible	   to	   naturalise	   abroad.	  
Furthermore,	  for	  those	  who	  naturalised,	  the	  decision	  was	  often	  slow,	  measured	  and	  
calculated.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  explore	  how	  respondents’	  decisions	  to	  naturalise	  or	  
not	   naturalise	   were	   largely	   contingent	   upon	   their	   experiences	   of	   migration,	   their	  
life-­‐worlds	  and	  social	  locations	  alike.	  	  
	  
Naturalisation	  as	  Betrayer	  and	  Betrayed	  	  
Pakistani	  writer	  Kamila	   Shamsie	  wrote	   in	   a	  March	  4,	   2014	  Guardian	   essay170	  that	  
she	  was	  ambivalent	  about	  naturalising	  as	  a	  UK	  citizen,	  even	   though	  naturalisation	  
                                                
169	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  website,	  the	  Diversity	  Visa	  Immigration	  (DV)	  Programme	  
enables	   “’diversity	   immigrants’	   from	   countries	   with	   historically	   low	   rates	   of	   immigration	   to	   the	  
United	  States”	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  visas	  available	  annually.	  These	  visas	  enable	  recipients	  







officially	  ended	  her	  panicked	  bouts	  with	  fear	  of	  deportation	  from	  a	  country	  that	   is	  
becoming	  exceedingly	  anti-­‐immigrant.	  In	  Shamsie’s	  heart-­‐felt	  piece,	  naturalisation	  is	  
described	  as	  a	  process	  of	  being	  both	  ‘betrayer’	  and	  ‘betrayed’:	  	  
	  
I	  had	  thought	  dual	  citizenship	  would	  feel	  like	  a	  gain,	  not	  a	  loss.	  Instead,	  
as	  I	  took	  my	  seat	  in	  the	  chamber	  I	  found	  myself	  reflecting	  on	  what	  it	  
means	   to	  be	   from	  a	  country	   in	  which	  acquiring	  a	  second	  passport	   is	  
regarded	   across	   the	   board	   as	   reason	   for	   celebration.	  Weeks	   later,	   I	  
was	  trying	  to	  explain	  this	  to	  British-­‐Libyan	  writer,	  Hisham	  Matar,	  who	  
knew	   exactly	   what	   I	   meant.	   "In	   that	  moment	   you	   are	   betrayed	   and	  
betrayer	   both,"	   he	   said.	   "You're	   betraying	   your	   country	   by	   seeking	  
another	  passport,	  and	  you're	  betrayed	  by	  your	  country	  which	  makes	  
you	  want	  to	  seek	  another	  passport"…the	  process	  of	  coming	  to	  British	  
citizenship	  through	  six	  years	  of	  residence	  can't	  really	  be	  a	  process	  of	  
feeling	   increasingly	   British	   when	   it	   is	   so	   marked	   with	   threat	   and	  
insecurity.	  We	  want	   the	   paper	   that	   says	  we	   are	   citizens	   in	   order	   to	  
protect	  us	  from	  the	  state's	  growing	  antipathy	  to	  migrants	  and	  its	  ever	  
shifting	  laws	  (Shamsie,	  2014).	  	  
	  
The	  uncertainty	  and	  paranoia	  Shamsie	  faced	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  Liberia-­‐
born	   emigrants	   in	   this	   study	   who	   naturalised	   abroad,	   whose	   motivations	   ranged	  
from	  job	  security	  to	  ease	  of	   travel.	  Though	  Shamsie	  was	  able	  to	  officially	  maintain	  
her	  Pakistani	  citizenship,	  Liberians	  who	  naturalised	  in	  the	  UK,	  US,	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  
Sierra	   Leone	   in	   this	   study	   felt	  more	   intensely	   ‘betrayed’	   by	   a	   state	   that	   could	   not	  
protect	   them	  yet	   revoked	   their	   citizenship	  upon	  naturalisation.	  One	   respondent,	   a	  
49-­‐year-­‐old	   London-­‐based	  woman	  whose	   foster	  mother	   brought	   her	   to	   the	  UK	   in	  
the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   admitted	   that	   she	   felt	   compelled	   to	   naturalise	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	  
because	  of	  continued	  instability	  in	  Liberia:	  	  
	  
I	   think	   that	   [the]	  majority	   of	   Liberians	  will	   tell	   you	  we	   are	   here	   for	  
that	   simple	   reason	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   had	   to	   survive	   and	   we	   took	  
naturalisation,	   British	   naturalisation,	   because	   it	   was	   part	   of	   the	  
survival	  mechanism.	  You	  know,	  being	  Liberian	   is	  more	   important	   to	  
me	   than	   being	   British…I	   never	   tried	   to	   change	   my	   [legal]	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   until	   the	   war.	   I	   always	   had	   maintained,	   even	   though	   I	  
came	  here	  at	  a	  really	  young	  age,	  I	  always	  have	  maintained	  my	  [legal]	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’…But	  I	  had	  all	  my	  years	  of	  being	  here,	  I	  was	  here	  
for	  like	  20	  odd	  years	  before	  I	  even	  considered	  [naturalising]	  and	  this	  
was	  mainly	  because	  the	  war	  just	  continued	  on	  and	  on…171	  
	  
                                                




What	  was	  clear	  from	  respondents	  abroad	  like	  this	  one	  was	  an	  explicitly	  articulated	  
metaphysical	   connection	   to	   Liberia,	   that	   they	   were	   simply	   abroad	   because	  
continued	  instability	  forced	  them	  to	  consider	  the	  US,	  UK,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  Ghana	  a	  
second	   home.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   assumption	   that	   all	   migrants	   clamour	   to	   attain	  
Western	  citizenships,	  many	  respondents	  held	  onto	  their	  legal	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  
status	   long	   after	   they	   were	   eligible	   to	   naturalise	   abroad	   because	   they	   believed	  
armed	   conflict	  would	   end	   eventually	   and	   they	  would	  be	   able	   to	   return	   to	   Liberia.	  
When	  those	  hopes	  were	  abandoned,	  they	  naturalised	  because	  of	  increased	  political	  
and	   economic	   entitlements	   of	   citizenship	   abroad.	  What	  was	   clear	   from	   the	   social	  
actors	  who	  naturalised	  was	   that	   they	   remained	  psychologically	   and/or	   financially	  
invested	  in	  Liberia,	  still	  referring	  to	  the	  country	  as	  ‘home.’	  	  	  
	  
Explaining	  why	   she	   held	   onto	   her	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   for	   20	   years	   despite	  
being	   eligible	   for	   naturalisation	   in	   the	   UK,	   the	   previously	   referenced	   respondent	  
attributed	  her	  actions	  to	  a	  deep	  and	  abiding	  love	  for	  Liberia.	  Yet,	  she	  admitted	  that	  
the	  need	  to	  survive	  trumped	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  patriotic:	  	  
	  
I	  think	  it’s	  just,	  I’ll	  put	  it	  down	  to	  nationalism,	  that	  sort	  of	  thing	  where	  
you,	  you	  know,	  it’s	  an	  identity.	  It’s	  your	  identity	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  lose.	  
If	  you	  don’t	  have	  to,	  you	  don’t	  want	  to.	  But	  then	  now	  we	  find	  ourselves	  
in	  a	  Catch	  22	  situation.	  We	  didn’t	  want	   to,	  we	  had	   to	  because	  of	   the	  
war.	  And	  now	  we’re	  being	  penalised	  for	  taking	  on	  British	  citizenship,	  
and	   it	  was	   just	  about	  survival	   really,	   in	  a	   lot	  of	  ways.	  Whenever	  you	  
went	   for	   a	   job	  or	   anything	   like	   that	   it	  was	   really	  difficult	  presenting	  
your	  Liberian	  passport.	  When	  a	  war	  was	  going	  on	  in	  your	  country,	  a	  
lot	  of	  people	   in	  England	  never	  really	  knew	  about	  Liberia.	  You	  say	   to	  
them	   ‘Liberia’	   and	   they’re	  hearing	   ‘Nigeria’…So	   it	  was	   really	  difficult	  
in	  a	   lot	  of	  ways	  because	  you	  did	  not	  have	  a	  British	  citizenship.	  So,	   it	  
was	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  you	  have	  to	  survive,	  you	  have	  to	  get	  on,	  you	  don’t	  
know	  when	  the	  war	  is	  going	  to	  end.	  And	  even	  if	  the	  war	  ended…You	  
had	   to	  make	   sure	   there	  was	   stability	   before	   you	   even	   start	   to	   think	  
about	  going	  back	  home	  or	  establishing	  yourself	  back	  home	  in	  any	  kind	  
of	  way.	  So,	  for	  that	  reason,	  I	  think	  a	  lot	  of	  us	  decided,	  “You	  know	  what?	  
This	  war	  isn’t	  going	  to	  end	  just	  now	  and	  we	  just	  need	  to	  carry	  on	  with	  
our	  lives.”	  So	  we	  did.172	  
	  
Echoing	   this	   respondent’s	   sentiments,	   a	   Monrovia-­‐based	   homelander	   who	   still	  
carries	   a	   US	   Green	   Card	   though	   he	   has	   not	   lived	   in	   the	  United	   States	   since	   1998,	  
                                                




defended	   the	  decision	  of	  his	  relatives	  who	  naturalised	  abroad	  and	  other	  Liberians	  
who	  felt	  compelled	  by	  survival	  to	  take	  on	  foreign	  citizenships:	  	  
	  
…historically	  Liberians	  were	  never	  a	  people	  to	  want	  to	  take	  on	  anyone	  
else’s	   nationality…Yeah,	   we	   have	   Liberians	   that	   travelled	   abroad	  
many,	  many,	  many	  years	  ago.	  Some	  took	  on	  foreign	  wives	  and	  it	  never	  
crossed	   their	   minds	   to	   take	   on	   citizenship	   of	   other	   countries	   or	   of	  
their	  spouses’.	  There	  is	  a	  reason	  why	  Liberians	  now	  do	  that	  and	  it’s	  an	  
understandable	   and	   justifiable	   reason…A	   lot	   of	   Liberians	   travelled,	  
left	   Liberia	   and	   that	   exodus	   started	   in	  1980.	   In	  1990,	   it	   escalated	   to	  
levels	   unthinkable.	  When	   I	   lived	   in	   the	   US	   then,	   between	   1980	   and	  
1982	  and	  1990/’98,	  especially	  early	  on	  in	  ’82,	  if	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  me	  
to	  take	  on	  or	  to	  get	  residence	  or	  US	  citizenship,	  to,	  in	  fact,	  allow	  me	  to	  
go	   to	   school	   cheaper,	   I	   would	   have,	   alright?	   But	   at	   the	   time,	   that	  
wasn’t	  the	  case.	  In	  1990,	  because	  of	  the	  war,	  I	  became	  a	  resident.	  We	  
all	   filed	   for	   political	   asylum.	   Some	   people	   did	   what	   they	   had	   to	   do	  
because	  they	  were	  in	  foreign	  lands,	  not	  because	  of	  their	  own	  choosing	  
but	  because	   they	  had	   to	  survive	  as	  best	  as	   they	  could…As	  old	  as	  my	  
parents	  were	  at	  the	  time,	  they	  took	  on	  American	  citizenship	  because	  it	  
afforded	  certain	  benefits	  in	  the	  US	  as	  old	  people.	  My	  dad	  passed	  away	  
last	   year	   [2012],	   he	  was	   99	   years	   old.	   You	   couldn’t	   tell	   him	   that	   he	  
wasn’t	  a	  Liberian.	  He	  had	  held	  almost	  every	  position	  in	  Liberia,	  but	  he	  
took	  on	  an	  American	  citizenship	  when	  he	  went	  in	  1990	  because	  at	  his	  
age	  he	  got	  some	  benefits	  as	  compared	  to	  being	  a	  non-­‐American.	  I	  have	  
siblings	   who	   live	   here	   [Liberia]	   permanently,	   and	   had	   Green	   Cards,	  
and	   just	   said,	   “Just	   for	   the	   hell	   of	   it,	   I’m	   going	   to	   get	   an	   American	  
citizenship.”173	  	  
	  
For	  many	  respondents,	  the	  immediate	  gratification	  of	  naturalisation	  outweighed	  the	  
metaphysical	  guilt	  of	  revoking	  their	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  status.	  While	  ease	  of	  
travel	   did	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   a	  major	  motivator	   for	  Washington-­‐based	   respondents	  
who	   naturalised,	   their	   London-­‐based	   counterparts	   constantly	   referenced	   it	   as	   an	  
impetus	   for	   taking	  on	  UK	  citizenship.	  This	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	   the	   fact	   that	  as	  a	  
global	   city	   London	   represents	   a	   hub,	   with	   very	   accessible	   EU,	   African,	   North	  
American	  and	  Asian	  flight	  routes.	  The	  49-­‐year-­‐old	  London-­‐based	  woman	  referenced	  
earlier	  also	  spoke	  about	  how	  the	  world	  became	  her	  oyster	  with	  a	  British	  passport:	  	  	  
	  
Most	  Liberians	  will	  tell	  you	  it	  was	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  difficult	  
to	  have	  rights	  to	  do	  certain	  things	  and	  you	  want	  to	  travel,	  and	  having	  a	  
Liberian	  passport	   it	  would	  be	   just	   really,	   really	  difficult.	   I	   remember	  
having	   a	   situation	   where,	   number	   one,	   the	   American	   embassy	   was	  
                                                




giving	  me	  a	  hard	  time	  to	  get	  a	  visa	  to	  visit	  America.	  Then	  I	  wanted	  to	  
travel	  to	  Africa	  and	  I	  remember	  having	  a	  real	  hard	  time	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  
visa	  to	  go	  to	  Nigeria…And	  this	  was	  in	  1993	  or	  ‘94…It	  was	  really,	  really	  
difficult.	  And	  so,	  I	  guess	  I	  was	  just	  advised,	  you	  know	  you’ve	  been	  here	  
for	  twenty	  odd	  years	  you	  might	  as	  well	  get	  your	  naturalisation	  so	  that	  
will	   offer	   you	   the	   opportunity	   to	   be	   able	   to	   travel	   more	   or	   less	  
anywhere	  you	  want	  without	  the	  hassle…174	  
	  
One	   respondent,	   a	   36-­‐year-­‐old	  woman	  who	  migrated	   to	   the	  UK	   in	  1986	   to	   attend	  
school,	   said	   that	  after	  she	  obtained	   the	  red	  British	  passport	   in	  2000,	   she	  began	   to	  
recognise	  the	   international	  system	  of	  citizenship	  tiers,	  as	  theorised	  by	  Yuval-­‐Davis	  
(2000),	   in	   which	   passport-­‐holders	   from	   the	   Global	   North	   are	   treated	   better	   than	  
passport-­‐holders	  from	  the	  Global	  South,	  particularly	  Africa:	  	  
	  
Just	  recently	   last	  year	   [2011],	   I	  went	   to	  Ghana	  by	   [Royal]	  Air	  Maroc.	  
The	  flight	  was	  delayed	  and	  we	  had	  to	  be	  put	  up	  in	  a	  hotel	  for	  a	  couple	  
nights.	   And	   it	   was	   interesting	   how	   they	   treated	   those	   who	   had	   a	  
British	  passport	  and	  those	  who	  had	  African	  passports…And	  we	  were	  
put	  in	  this	  hotel	  which	  was	  in	  the	  centre	  with	  all	  the	  amenities…And	  
those	   who	   had	   like	   African	   passports	   who	   needed	   to,	   I	   don’t	   know	  
how	   they	   got	   [visas],	   whether	   they	   had	   to	   in	   the	   end,	   but	   they	  
required	  a	  visa	  to	  get	  out.	  You	  know,	  so	  it	  was	  just	  like,	  “I	  didn’t	  plan.	  
You’re	  the	  one	  who	  put	  me	  in	  this	  position.	  I	  didn’t	  plan	  to	  get	  stuck	  
here.”	  So,	  they	  had	  to	  wait	  and	  so	  they	  were	  really	  angry.	  They	  were	  
put	  up	   in	   this	  hotel	  which	  was	  nearer	   to	   the	  airport.	  They	  were	   just	  
handled	  differently	  and	  that	  was,	  you	  know,	  quite	  racist,	  actually…175	  
	  
Also	   lamenting	   the	   limitations	   of	   travel	   with	   a	   Liberian	   passport,	   a	   47-­‐year-­‐old	  
London-­‐based	  male	  respondent	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  USSR	  and	  US	  previously,	  said:	  
“Our	   passports	   are	   not	   respected	   equally…A	   British	   passport	   holder	   can	   go	  
anywhere	   in	   the	  world	  but	   a	  Liberian	  passport	  holder	   cannot	   go	   anywhere	   in	   the	  
world.” 176 	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	   ease	   of	   travel	   was	   a	   recurring	   motivation	   for	  
naturalisation,	   particularly	   for	   this	   30-­‐year-­‐old	   London-­‐based	  man	   and	   former	  US	  
resident:	  “…traveling	  with	  my	  Liberian	  passport,	  I	  still	  can	  be	  randomly	  selected	  for	  
searches	   at	   American	   airports.	   I’d	   still	   be	   denied	   entry	   into	   certain	   countries	   or	  
denied	  visas.”177	  
                                                
174	  [DL6]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  12,	  2012.	  	  
175	  [DL8]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  13,	  2012.	  	  
176	  [DL27]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  London	  on	  June	  22,	  2012.	  	  




Besides	  ease	  of	   travel,	  one	  57-­‐year-­‐old	  man	   in	  London	  who	  migrated	   to	   the	  UK	   in	  
1989	  to	  obtain	  a	  masters	  degree,	  listed	  a	  long	  menu	  of	  other	  benefits	  of	  naturalising	  
in	   1992,	   including	   opportunities	   for	   career	   advancement	   and	   reduced	   university	  
fees,	   social	   security	   and	   retirement	   perks,	   investment	   incentives,	   and	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  sponsor	  the	  migration	  of	  his	  Liberia-­‐based	  relatives:	  
	  
It	  [naturalising	  in	  the	  UK]	  was	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  out	  to	  help	  me	  promote	  
my	  career.	  I	  was	  in	  the	  university	  as	  a	  researcher	  when	  my	  passport	  
expired.	  They	  had	  to,	  they	  could	  not	  renew	  anything	  and	  so	  one	  of	  the	  
suggestions	  my	  course	  tutor	  give	  me	  was,	  “DL18,	  try	  [and]	  get	  all	  your	  
papers	  together,	  that’s	  the	  only	  way	  you	  can	  cross.”…Before	  you	  get	  a	  
job	   here,	   you	   have	   to	   either	   come	   from	   the	   Commonwealth,	   either	  
you’re	   a	   European	   or	   British.	   I	   didn’t	   meet	   any	   of	   those	   so	   only	  
because	  of	  my	  stay	  in	  the	  university	  class,	  that	  was	  one	  of	  the	  things	  
that	   picked	   me	   up…My	   children	   are	   British,	   which	   means	   all	   the	  
educational	  opportunities…I’ve	  been	  able	  to	  take	  up	  employment	  that	  
would	  have	  been	  ring	   fenced…When	  I	  get	  old	  here	  they	  will	  give	  me	  
[a]	  pension	  book…When	   I	   retire,	   they	  will	  give	  me	  a	  book	  and	  a	  bus	  
pass…It	  [naturalising	  in	  the	  UK]	  gave	  me	  the	  opportunity	  to	  send	  for	  
my	  two	  children…It	  gave	  me	  an	  opportunity	  to	  invest	  in	  this	  country.	  
It	  gave	  me	  an	  opportunity	  to	  identify	  with	  the	  reality,	  which	  is	  I	  am	  in	  
Britain	   and	   I	   have	   no	   other	   means	   of	   perhaps	   leaving	   Britain	   so	  
quickly.	   So,	   I	   needed	   to	   become	   recognised	   through	   the	   paper	   and	  
naturalisation.	  It	  was	  the	  best	  option.178	  
	  
Narrowly	   focused	  on	   career	  progression,	   one	  63-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  Washington-­‐based	  
IT	   professional,	   exemplified	   what	   Ong	   (1999)	   calls	   the	   ‘flexible	   citizen.’	   This	  
respondent’s	  motivation	  for	  naturalising	  in	  1986,	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  recorded	  in	  this	  
study,	  was	  solely	  based	  on	  economic	  gain,	  rather	  than	  on	  coercion	  or	  compulsion:	  	  
	  
I	   naturalised	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   number	   one,	   for	   convenience,	  
economic	   convenience…Professional	   convenience...Because	   in	   my	  
profession	  as	  an	   IT	  specialist,	  all	  of	  my	   jobs	  are	  government	  related,	  
all	   of	   my	   jobs,	   in	   fact,	   especially	   a	   sensitive	   job,	   all	   our	   jobs	   are	  
sensitive	  so	  we	  got	  to	  have	  clearance.	  You	  see,	  right	  now	  I	  have	  top-­‐	  
secret	   clearance,	   SCI,	   and	   polygraph.	   That’s	   what	   I	   got,	   the	   highest,	  
and	   I	   work	   with	   the	   FBI	   right	   now.	   I	   do	   contract	   for	   the	   FBI…So,	  
naturally	  you	  got	   to	  be	  a	  US	  citizen	   in	  order	   to	  work	   in	  some	  places	  
with	   regards	   to	   my	   job.	   You	   see?	   That’s	   one	   of	   the	   main	  
reasons…Yeah,	  to	  work	  with	  the	  federal	  government,	  companies	  that	  
                                                




work	  for	  federal	  government,	  when	  they	  are	  hiring	  you,	  you	  got	  to	  be	  
a	  US	  citizen…179	  
	  
Besides	   professional	   advancement,	   political	   participation	   abroad,	   and	   the	   lack	  
thereof	   in	   Liberia,	   motivated	   other	   Liberian	   social	   actors	   to	   naturalise.	   Having	  
travelled	   to	   the	   US	   with	   her	   student	   parents	   in	   1982,	   a	   39-­‐year-­‐old	   female	  
respondent	  based	   in	  Washington	  said	   that	  she	   finally	  naturalised	   in	  2009	  because	  
she	  had	  never	  voted	  in	  a	  Liberian	  election	  and	  wanted	  to	  exercise	  her	  franchise	  after	  
living	  abroad	  for	  27	  years:	  	  
	  
I	   held	   on	   [to	  my	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’],	   I	   really	   held	   on…there	  
were	   several	   things	   that	   served	   as	   impetus	   for	   my	   decision	   [to	  
naturalise	  in	  the	  US].	  I	  think	  one	  had	  to	  do	  with	  my	  social	  capacity.	  I	  
felt	  that,	  “Ok,	  where	  am	  I	  a	  citizen	  of?”	  I	  couldn’t	  really	  identify	  myself.	  
Yeah,	   I’m	   Liberian	   by	   consanguinity.	   I’m	   born	   in	   Liberia	   but	   I	   can’t	  
vote	   there,	   then	   I	   can’t	   vote	  here	   [US],	   so	  where	  am	   I	   legitimised?...I	  
think	   it	  was	  best	   for	  me	   to	   vote,	   to	   become	  a	  US	   citizen.	   I	   had	  been	  
here	  at	  that	  time	  for	  nearly	  30	  years,	  and	  so	  my	  whole	  life	  is	  here.180	  	  	  
	  
Whereas	  some	  respondents	  in	  this	  study,	  like	  the	  two	  described	  earlier,	  admitted	  to	  
naturalising	  for	  purely	  selfish	  reasons,	  others	  argued	  that	  they	  did	  it	  for	  the	  greater	  
good.	   Claiming	   that	   he	   needed	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   an	   American	   passport	   to	   remain	  
politically	  engaged	  with	  TPS	  and	  DED	  advocacy	  on	  behalf	  of	  Liberians	  in	  the	  US,	  one	  
49-­‐year-­‐old	  Monrovia-­‐based	  permanent	  returnee	  said	  he	  was	  driven	  by	  altruism	  to	  
naturalise:	  	  
	  
I	  was	  deep	  into	  immigration	  advocacy	  at	  the	  time	  and	  I	  found	  myself	  
walking	   the	  House	  of	  Congress	   talking	   for	  TPS	  and	   then	  also	   talking	  
about	   peace.	   We	   became	   very	   good	   friends	   with	   the	   Rhode	   Island	  
Legislative	  Caucus.	  Every	  time	  we	  went	  to	  these	  places,	  I	  felt	  like	  I	  had	  
a	  much	  smaller	  voice.	  I	  could	  not	  ask	  these	  guys	  to	  commit	  a	  lot	  more	  
and	   for	   me,	   I	   really	   wanted	   to	   make	   an	   impact,	   personally.	   So,	   I	  
thought	   that	   going	   the	   next	   step	   up	   [naturalising],	   I	   really	   didn't	  
realise	   the	  depth	   of	   this.	   I	   didn't	   realise	   that	   tomorrow	  would	   come	  
and	  you	  would	  come	  home	  and	  you	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  stranger.	  If	  
I	  could	  do	  it	  again,	  I	  would	  do	  it	  again.	  I	  feel	  that	  the	  [US]	  citizenship	  
gave	  me	  access	  to	  something	  that	  helped	  this	  country	  [Liberia].181	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  [DL58]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  October	  27,	  2012.	  	  
180	  [DL49]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  October	  24,	  2012.  




For	   Freetown-­‐based	   respondents,	   being	   politically	   active	   was	   not	   as	   much	   a	  
compelling	   motivation	   for	   naturalisation	   as	   owning	   private	   property.	   Similar	   to	  
Liberia,	   land	  ownership	  is	  one	  of	  the	  definitive	  rights	  of	  citizens	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.	  A	  
38-­‐year-­‐old	  Freetown-­‐based	  respondent	  who	  was	  born	  to	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  mother	  
and	  Sierra	  Leonean	  citizen	  father,	  said	  that	  he	  felt	  compelled	  to	  naturalise	  in	  2012	  
because	  he	  had	  lived	  out	  of	  the	  country	  for	  25	  years	  and	  wanted	  to	  own	  land:	  “You	  
need	  to	  at	  least	  be	  a	  citizen	  or	  else	  your	  property,	  it	  will	  not	  be	  authentic…”182	  
	  
Just	  as	  the	  motivations	  for	  naturalising,	  mentioned	  herein,	  are	  varied,	  complex	  and	  
largely	   based	   on	  migration	   experiences,	   constraints	   and	   opportunities,	   so	   too	   are	  
the	  motivations	  for	  not	  naturalising,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  that	  follows.	  
	  
No	  Matter	  How	  Long	  a	  Rock	  Stays	  in	  a	  River,	  It	  Can	  Never	  Turn	  to	  Catfish	  
While	   Liberia-­‐born	   respondents	   who	   naturalised	   abroad	   did	   so	   because	   they	   felt	  
‘betrayed’	  by	  Liberia,	   those	  who	  opted	  not	   to	  naturalise	   said	   they	  did	  not	  want	   to	  
become	  a	  ‘betrayer’	  of	  the	  country	  and	  its	  citizens,	  regardless	  of	  their	  limitations	  as	  
immigrants.	   The	   perspectives	   of	   these	   respondents	   completely	   unsettles	   core	  
assumptions	   about	   how	   migrants	   from	   the	   Global	   South	   are	   utility	   maximising	  
agents	  who	   clamour	   for	   citizenships	   from	   the	  Global	  North.	   For	   instance,	   one	   74-­‐
year-­‐old	   permanent	   resident	   in	  Washington	   said	   that	   although	   he	   spent	   over	   18	  
consecutive	   years	   in	   the	   US,	   from	   the	   onset	   of	   armed	   conflict	   in	   1989,	   he	   would	  
never	  naturalise:	  	  	  
	  
I	  refuse	  to	  become	  an	  American	  citizen.	  I’m	  obligated	  to	  Liberia	  and	  I	  
think	   I	  will	   die,	   and	   I	   told	  my	   family	   I	  must	   be	   buried	   in	   Liberia	   or	  
Liberia	   is	   where	   my	   ashes	   are	   supposed	   to	   be…I’m	   proud	   to	   be	  
Liberian…So,	   you	   know,	   I’m	   very	   patriotic	   and	   I	   think	   that	   there’s	  
hope	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Liberia…So,	  Liberia	  is	  in	  my	  blood.183	  	  	  
	  
Using	   an	   African	   parable	   to	   describe	   his	   deep	   and	   abiding	   loyalty	   to	   Liberia,	   and	  
motivations	  for	  not	  wanting	  to	  naturalise,	  even	  if	  eligible,	  one	  Accra-­‐based	  58-­‐year-­‐
old	  former	  refugee	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  Togo	  previously	  before	  migrating	  to	  Ghana	  in	  
2006,	  said:	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  [DL62]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Freetown	  on	  April	  11,	  2013.  




No	   matter	   how	   long	   a	   rock	   stays	   in	   a	   river,	   it	   can	   never	   turn	   to	  
catfish…it	  means	  that	  your	  nationality	   is	   just	  your	  nationality,	  unless	  
you	  want	  to	  fool	  yourself.	  Even	  if	  you	  say	  you	  want	  to	  go	  naturalise	  in	  
Great	   Britain,	   yeah,	   they	   will	   say	   African-­‐British…If	   you	   turn	   to	  
American,	  they	  will	  say	  African-­‐American…So,	  it	  means,	  are	  you	  pure	  
American?...No	   matter	   how	   long	   I	   stay	   outside	   [of	   Liberia],	   I’m	   still	  
Liberian	  by	  birth,	  I’m	  still	  Liberian	  by	  nationalism.	  Because,	  in	  the	  first	  
place,	   the	  Ghanaians	  here	  themselves,	   they’re	  calling	  me	  Liberian.	  So	  
who	  am	  I?	  Who	  am	  I	  to	  tell	  myself	  [I’m	  not]…?184	  
	  
While	   some	   respondents	   discussed	   the	   philosophical	   tenets	   of	   retaining	   legal	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   others	   said	   that	  naturalisation	   simply	  was	  not	  necessary	   for	  
immigrant	   life.	   A	   32-­‐year-­‐old	   London-­‐based	   student	   who	   migrated	   to	   the	   UK	   in	  
2010	   after	   living	   in	  West	   Africa	   for	   16	   years	   said	   that	   he	   opted	   not	   to	   naturalise	  
abroad	   because	   he	   was	   relatively	   comfortable	   after	   graduating	   from	   college	   and	  
obtaining	   a	   good	   job	   in	   Nigeria.	   His	   admission	   that	   other	   Liberians	   may	   have	  
naturalised	   out	   of	   necessity	   is	   an	   indication	   that	   the	   more	   settled	   abroad	   one	   is	  
without	  foreign	  citizenship,	  the	  less	  inclined	  one	  will	  be	  to	  naturalise:	  	  
	  
I	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   naturalise	   in	   Nigeria,	   actually.	   I	   lived	   in	  
Nigeria	   for	   ten	   years	   and	   I	   think	   I	   felt	   like	   I	   didn’t	  want	   to	   lose	  my	  
identity,	   right?...For	  other	  obvious	  reasons,	  people	  will	   lose	   it	   simply	  
because	  they	  feel	  that	  they	  need	  to	  get	  some	  benefits	  from	  the	  country.	  
I	  do	  accept	  that.	   I	  do	  understand	  that.	  But	  I	  went	  to	  Nigeria	  with	  the	  
intention	   of	   going	   to	   school…So	   I	   was	   like,	   I	   don’t	   think	   I	   need	   the	  
citizenship…“Why	  I	  should	  go	  for	  Nigerian	  citizenship?”185	  
	  
Similarly	  comfortable	   in	  her	  position	  as	  a	  US	  permanent	  resident,	  one	  51-­‐year-­‐old	  
Monrovia-­‐based	  circular	  returnee	  said	  that	  naturalisation	  never	  appealed	  to	  her	  as	  a	  
necessity	  even	  though	  she	  lived	  in	  the	  US	  for	  22	  years	  on	  and	  off.	  Having	  emigrated	  
after	   Liberia’s	   1980	   coup,	   this	   woman	   also	   previously	   lived	   in	   four	   other	   African	  
countries:	  	  	  	  
	  
I	   never,	   and	   I	   still	   don’t	   care	   to	   be	   a	   US	   citizen…I	   never	   really	   felt	  
completely	  at	  home	  in	  America.	  Never,	  ever.	  And	  that’s	  probably	  one	  
of	  the	  reasons	  I	  kept	  finding	  my	  way	  back	  [to	  Liberia]	  one	  way	  or	  the	  
other.	  It	  [the	  US]	  never	  really	  felt	  like	  home	  for	  me…I	  was	  really	  hard	  
pressed	  at	  one	   time,	   I	  wanted	   to	  do	   it	   ‘cause	  all	  my	   family	  members	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were	   becoming	   US	   citizens	   and	   I	   remember	   one	   time	   having	   a	  
discussion	  with	  my	  father	  and	  it	  was	  so	  funny.	  He	  came	  home	  that	  day	  
with	  his	  [US]	  citizenship	  and	  I	  said,	  “Ok,	  we	  have	  to	  be	  careful	  how	  we	  
say	  certain	  things	  around	  you	  because	  you	  have	  defected.”	  But,	   I	   felt	  
that	   all	   the	   certain	   privileges,	   I	   still	   was	   able	   to	   get	   student	  
loans	   …They	   related	   to	   me	   as	   a	   black	   American.	   Yeah.	   So,	   I	   really	  
didn’t	   see	   what,	   how	   being	   a	   US	   citizen	   would	   have	   made	   a	  
difference.186	  
	  
Though	  other	  Liberians	  could	  not	  boast	  of	  the	  relative	  comfort	  abroad	  described	  by	  
the	   previous	   respondents,	   many	   admitted	   that	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   real	   challenges	   of	  
immigration,	  they	  still	  held	  onto	  their	  legal	  Liberian	  citizenships.	  While	  this	  56-­‐year-­‐
old	  Washington-­‐based	  male	  admitted	  that	  he	  was	  on	  Deferred	  Enforced	  Departure	  
(DED)	   since	   migrating	   in	   2002	   and	   therefore	   ineligible	   to	   naturalise	   in	   the	   US,	  
naturalisation	  never	  occurred	  to	  him	  as	  a	  durable	  solution	  to	  his	  immigration	  limbo:	  
	  
I	  was	  a	   full-­‐grown	  man	  before	   I	  came	  to	   this	  country	   [US].	  Maybe	   in	  
the	  early	  80s	  when	  I	  came	  here	  to	  do	  my	  grad	  degree,	  you	  know,	  I	  was	  
young,	  frisky	  and	  everything.	  Maybe	  had	  I	  been	  here	  at	  that	  time,	  you	  
know,	   24,	   25,	   thereabouts,	   becoming	   an	   American	   citizen	   would	   be	  
something	   of	   a	   celebration	   and	   what	   have	   you.	   But	   now,	   I’m	   just	  
passing	   through,	   you	   know.	   I’m	   just	   passing	   through.	   I’ve	   invested	  
much	   in	  Liberia	   in	   terms	  of	  human	  capital	  development	   and	  all	   that	  
kind	  of	   a	   thing,	  not	  necessarily	  material	   things.	  My	  mind,	   you	  know,	  
my	  soul…everything	  is	  out	  there	  in	  Liberia.	  That’s	  what	  it	  is.187	  
	  	  
It	  is	  this	  respondent’s	  perspective	  that	  I	  turn	  to	  now	  to	  show	  that	  although	  conflict	  
in	  Liberia	  may	  have	  presented	  few	  options	  beyond	  migration,	  settlement	   in	  a	  host	  
country	   does	   not	   necessarily	   compel	   one	   to	   naturalise,	   thereby	   revoking	   legal	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	   Thus,	   backlash	   against	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	  
rests	  on	  the	  fundamental	  interrogation	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  naturalisation	  is	  by	  force.	  
One	   36-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   Monrovia-­‐based	   permanent	   returnee	   who	   had	   lived	   in	  
Ghana	  previously	  as	  a	  refugee	  for	  11	  years,	  argued	  vehemently	  that	  naturalisation	  is	  
a	  matter	  of	  choice:	  	  
	  
…you	  are	  free	  to	  decide	  whether	  you	  want	  to	  be	  a	  citizen	  or	  you	  don’t	  
want	   to	   be	   a	   citizen	   [of	   Liberia]...I	   think	   it’s	   a	   lame	   argument	   to	   say	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that	   because	   you	  wanted	   to	   leverage	   on	   the	   opportunities	   available	  
[abroad],	  that’s	  why	  you	  became	  a	  citizen	  [abroad]	  and	  now	  you	  want	  
to	   enjoy	   the	   benefits	   of	   both	   countries…It's	   [Liberian	   citizenship’s]	  
your	   birth	   right,	   the	   [Liberian]	   Constitution	   recognises	   your	   birth	  
right,	  but	   it	  also	  recognises	   the	   fact	   that	  you	  have	  a	  will	   to	  decide	  to	  
continue	  to	  maintain	  your	  birth	  right	  or	  to	  give	  it	  up.188	  	  	  	  
	  
Other	  Monrovia-­‐based	  residents,	  however,	  adopt	  a	  more	  nuanced	  perspective	  about	  
the	   choice/force	   binary.	   This	   53-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homelander	   who	   has	   extensive	  
family	   ties	   to	   the	   US	   and	   previously	   lived	   there	   for	   a	   decade,	   subscribes	   to	   the	  
argument	  made	  by	  Van	  Hear,	  et	  al	  (2009)	  that,	  where	  migration	  is	  concerned,	  some	  
choices	  are	  more	  limited	  than	  others:	  	  
	  
It	   [naturalisation]	   is	   by	   choice	   but	   that	   choice	   can	   be	   driven	   by	  
necessity.	  So,	  yes,	  it’s	  your	  choice	  to	  say,	  “I	  pledge	  allegiance,”	  but	  it	  is	  
my	  choice	  to	  say,	  “I	  want	  rice	  or	  I	  don’t	  want	  rice.”	  But	  if	  I’m	  hungry,	  
then	   really	   I	   don’t	   have	  much	   of	   a	   choice	   in	   that	  matter.	   I	   will	   say,	  
“Please	  give	  me	  rice.”189	  
	  
Though	   the	   line	   appears	   blurred	   between	   force	   and	   choice	   in	   motivations	   for	  
naturalising	   where	   eligible—similar	   to	   the	   structure	   versus	   agency	   debate	   still	  
raging	  in	  modern	  sociological	  theory—deciding	  not	  to	  naturalise	  when	  eligible	  was	  
framed	   as	   a	   choice	   for	   respondents	   in	   this	   study.	   One	   55-­‐year-­‐old	   permanent	  
resident	   of	   the	   UK	  who	  migrated	   in	   1998	   said	   that	   although	   she	   faces	   challenges	  
traveling	   with	   a	   Liberian	   passport,	   her	   motivation	   for	   not	   naturalising	   was	  
continued	   legitimacy	   in	   Liberia,	   especially	   at	   the	   port	   of	   entry	   where	   a	   Liberian	  
carrying	  a	  foreign	  passport	  might	  be	  scrutinised	  more	  intently:	  	  
	  
…when	  I	  go	  home	  [to	  Liberia],	  nobody	  will	  tell	  me	  bullshit!	  No	  bullshit	  
to	   that	   airport!...I’m	   proud	   to	   be	   a	   Liberian.	   Despite	   everything	   we	  
have	  been	  through,	  I	  think	  we	  are	  lovely	  people	  and	  I’m	  proud	  of	  it.190	  	  
	  
Also	   citing	   her	   patriotism	   and	   love	   of	   country,	   one	   42-­‐year-­‐old	   London-­‐based	  
respondent	   who	   migrated	   to	   the	   UK	   in	   1993,	   said	   that	   she	   retained	   her	   legal	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‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  because	  she	  has	  political	  ambitions	  and	  Liberian	  law	  prohibits	  
non-­‐citizens	  from	  holding	  elected	  office:	  	  
	  
I	   love	   being	   a	   Liberian.	   And	   I	   was	   very	   doubtful	   of	   giving	   up	   my	  
natural	  identity	  and	  to	  take	  on	  another	  one,	  when	  I	  was	  aware	  that	  if	  I	  
were	   to	   change	   my	   nationality,	   I	   wouldn’t	   be	   able	   to	   participate	   in	  
quite	  a	  few	  things	  in	  Liberia…[like]	  working	  in	  certain	  public	  offices.	  I	  
have	  ambition	  to	  someday	  become	  a	  senator	  [in	  Liberia]	  and	  I	  know	  
that	   will	   affect	   my	   rights	   so	   I’ve	   retained	   that	   [legal	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’]	   but	   it’s	   becoming	   a	   little	   more	   difficult	   because	   my	  
daughter’s	   born	   here	   [the	  UK]	   so	   it	   is	   questionable.	   But	   I’m	   hopeful	  
that,	   you	   know,	   at	   some	   point	   I	   will,	   I	   just	  wanted	   to	   be	   able	   to	   go	  
home	   someday…and	   not	   be	   questioned	   about	  my	   obligations	   or	  my	  
rights	  to	  being	  a	  Liberian.191	  
	  
Similarly,	  a	  45-­‐year-­‐old	  Washington-­‐based	  refugee	  who	  had	  previously	  lived	  in	  the	  
USSR,	  followed	  by	  Ghana,	  said	  that	  his	  political	  aspirations	  for	  Liberia	  and	  loyalty	  to	  
the	  country	  made	  him	  reject	  Ukrainian	  citizenship,	  on	   the	  grounds	  that	   “accepting	  
foreign	  citizenship	  would	  have	  deprived	  Liberia	  of	  yet	  another	  potential	  intellectual	  
skill.”192	  This	  respondent	  appeared	  to	  have	  a	  complex	  immigration	  history,	  claiming	  
that	  the	  US	  had	  refused	  him	  a	  Green	  Card	  because	  of	  his	  former	  residence	  in	  Soviet	  
Russia.	  	  
	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   examples	   explored	   thus	   far,	   the	   perks	   of	   maintaining	   one’s	   legal	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   are	   not	   only	   felt	   in	   Liberia.	   Whereas	   the	   advantages	   of	  
settlement	  in	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  may	  have	  been	  greater	  for	  Liberians	  who	  naturalised,	  
the	   maintenance	   of	   one’s	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   in	   Accra	   and	   Freetown	  
facilitated	  certain	  benefits	  from	  the	  UN	  for	  refugees.	  For	  instance,	  many	  Accra-­‐based	  
former	  refugees	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  admitted	  begrudgingly	  that,	  despite	  the	  
challenges	  of	   refugee	   life,	   they	  had	  received	  access	   to	   free	   land	  at	   the	  Buduburam	  
Refugee	   Camp	   on	   which	   to	   build	   their	   very	   own	   houses,	   scholarships	   to	   attend	  
school,	  and	  security	  and	  protection	  from	  both	  UNHCR	  and	  the	  Ghanaian	  government.	  
As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   one	   university	   lecturer	   who	   had	   migrated	   to	   Ghana	   in	   1990	  
admitted	  that	  amongst	  other	  benefits,	  his	  high-­‐level	  academic	  pursuits	  were	  due	  in	  
large	  part	  to	  support	  from	  UNHCR:	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My	   training	   for	   undergrad	   and	   masters	   was	   sponsored	   by	   the	  
UN…And	   a	   number	   of	   Liberians	   went	   to	   school	   here	   on	   UN	  
scholarships.	  Then	  others	  had	  skills	  training	  for	  those	  who	  could	  not	  
get	  the	  pre-­‐tertiary	  and	  then	  even	  some	  had	  secondary	  education,	  so	  
there’ve	  been	  a	  number	  of	  benefits.	  There	  was	  feeding	  before,	  during	  
the	   emergency	   period	   they	   were	   rationing	   food	   and…What	  
else?...They	  provided	  some	  Medicare…193	  
	  
	  
I	   have	   argued	   in	   this	   section	   that	  while	   the	  motivations	   for	   naturalisation	   abroad	  
have	  impacted	  the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  for	  Liberia,	  
the	  motivations	   for	   not	   naturalising	   have	   challenged	   core	   assumptions	   about	   the	  
necessity	  of	  such	  a	  policy	  prescription.	  In	  the	  section	  that	  follows,	  I	  explore	  how	  the	  
difficult	   adjustments	   embedded	   in	   the	  migration	   experiences	   of	   Liberians	   abroad	  
have	  influenced	  the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  	  
	  
You	  Na	  Foreigner!	  
For	   migrants	   who	   travel	   to	   and	   settle	   in	   a	   host	   country,	   the	   challenges	   can	   be	  
innumerable—language	   barriers;	   access	   to	   basic	   social	   services,	   rights	   and	  
privileges;	   status	   regularisation;	   social/cultural	   alienation,	   amongst	  others.	  One	  of	  
the	   motivations	   underpinning	   the	   introduction	   of	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	  is	  recognition	  that	  migration	  can	  be	  a	  torturous	  process—for	  the	  highly-­‐	  
skilled	  and	  prosperous	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  low-­‐skilled	  and	  poor—and	  that	  upholding	  
citizenship	   ties	   to	   Liberia	   may	   somehow	   assuage	   the	   pain	   of	   destabilisation	   and	  
separation	  from	  the	  homeland.	  	  
	  
A	   common	   thread	   throughout	   my	   interviews	   was	   the	   varied	   experiences	   of	  
discrimination	   across	   spatial	   landscapes,	   regardless	   of	   socio-­‐economic	  positioning	  
abroad.	   For	   instance,	   a	   43-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   respondent	  who	   transited	   through	   the	  
Ivory	  Coast	  for	  two	  years	  before	  arriving	  in	  London	  in	  2007,	  talked	  about	  how	  she	  
was	  confronted	  with	  racism	  for	  the	  first	  time:	  
	  
I	   first	  realised	  when	  I	  came	  to	  this	  country	  [UK]	  that	  I	  was	  coloured,	  
whereas	   when	   you	   are	   in	   Liberia	   you	   don’t	   see	   yourself	   as	   being	  
coloured…And	   in	   terms	   of	   work	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   working	   in	   a	   local	  
                                                




government	   or	   in	   a	   predominately	   white	   office,	   growth	   and	   career	  
progression	   is	   far	   slower	   than	   in	   a	   multi-­‐cultural	   employment	  
environment.	  I	  mean,	  they	  do	  say	  that	  it’s	  equality	  and	  everything	  but	  
it’s	  really	  institutionalised...You	  can	  try	  to	  work	  your	  butt	  off	  and	  they	  




Whereas	   this	   respondent’s	   skin	   colour	   enabled	   her	   to	   blend	   easily	   in	   Liberia,	   a	  
predominantly	  black	  country,	  her	  racial	  positioning	  in	  the	  UK	  catapulted	  her	  into	  a	  
strange	   realm	  of	   otherness	   despite	   being	   a	   naturalised	  British	   citizen.	   Similarly,	   a	  
57-­‐year-­‐old	  medical	   doctor	  who	  migrated	   to	   the	   UK	   to	   continue	   his	   education	   in	  
1988,	   admitted	   that	   regardless	   of	   his	   specialised	   skills	   and	   knowledge,	   he	   must	  
constantly	  defend	  his	  British	  citizenship	  in	  both	  social	  and	  professional	  interfaces:	  
	  
Well,	   sometimes	   in	   some	   communities	   they	   don’t	   accept	   you	   as,	  
especially	  some	  of	  the	  very	  conservative	  areas,	  they	  don’t	  accept	  you	  
as	   a	   citizen.	   And	   people	   will	   always	   ask	   you,	   “Where	   do	   you	   come	  
from?”…I	  had	  gone	  to	  a	  conference	  and	  someone	  asked	  me,	  “Where	  do	  
you	  come	   from?”	  And	   I	   said,	   “I’m	   from	  Dorset.”	  And	   they	  said,	   “No,	   I	  
mean,	  where	  do	  you	  come	  from?”,	  and	  I	  said,	  “I’m	  from	  Dorset.”…And	  
trying	   to	  keep	   calm	  when	  people	   challenge	  you	   time	  and	   time	  again	  
about	  where	   you’re	   from…as	   a	  non-­‐white	   and	   also	   as	   someone	  who	  
trained	  outside	  of	  the	  UK,	  you	  find	  that	  you	  have	  to	  be	  twice	  as	  good	  
as	  the	  indigenous	  [British]	  person	  to	  get	  half	  way	  where	  they	  are.	  And	  
besides	  that,	  you	  find	  that	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  barriers	  that	  are	  in	  place	  
to	  prevent	   you	   from	  getting	   any	  higher	   than	   the	  British	  person…Oh,	  
for	  example,	  when	  I	  started	  my	  training	  they	  had	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  system.	  
Even	  though	  we	  all	  did	  the	  same	  training,	  we	  were	  classed	  as	  visiting	  
registrars	   and	   those	   who	   were	   UK	   citizens	   were	   classed	   as	   career	  
registrars.	  So,	  there	  were	  at	  least	  two	  classes	  and	  the	  career	  registrars	  
were	   given	   a	   number,	  which	  meant	   that	   at	   the	   end	   of	   their	   training	  
there	  was	  a	  post	   for	   them…Automatically	   there	  was	  a	  post	  available	  
for	  them	  whereas	  the	  visiting	  registrars	  didn’t	  have	  a	  post	  to	  go	  to.	  So,	  
unless	   you	   were	   extremely	   lucky,	   you	   weren’t	   going	   to	   get	   a	  
consulting	   post	   and	   you,	   the	   idea	   was	   that	   you	   would	   go	   back	   to	  
wherever	  you	  came	  from.	  You	  see?	  So,	  for	  career	  progression	  there	  is	  
a	  big	  disadvantage	   [of	  not	  naturalising]	   even	   though	   in	  your	  normal	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	   interaction	   with	   patients,	   you	   find	   that	   patients	   will	  
respect	   you	   just	   as	   much	   as	   they	   respect	   the	   [white	   British	  
doctor]…195	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  in	  London	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  10,	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Whereas	  Liberians	   in	   the	  UK	  may	  assimilate	   into	  black	  British	  anonymity,	   thereby	  
facing	   the	   same	   sets	   of	   challenges	   as	   their	   Caribbean	   and	   African	   brethren,	   their	  
counterparts	   in	   the	  US	   often	   have	   two	   choices:	   become	  African-­‐American	   or	   hold	  
onto	  one’s	  Liberianness.	  The	  alternatives	  have	  varying	  consequences.	  On	  one	  hand,	  
Liberians	   who	   assimilate	   as	   African-­‐Americans	   face	   discrimination	   borne	   by	  
centuries	  of	  slavery	  and	  institutionalised	  racism	  in	  the	  US.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  those	  
who	  maintain	  strong	  cultural	  ties	  to	  Liberia	  and	  are	  educated	  often	  serve	  as	  model	  
immigrants	   and	   exceptions	   to	   the	   ‘African-­‐American	  malaise.’	  Minimally	   tolerated	  
by	  white	  American	  society	  but	  not	  wholly	  accepted,	  these	  Liberians	  often	  encounter	  
strong	  anti-­‐immigrant	  scapegoating,	  particularly	   from	  other	  racial	  minorities.	  As	  a	  
case	   in	  point,	   one	  59-­‐year-­‐old	  Washington-­‐based	   female	  medical	  practitioner	  who	  
migrated	  to	  the	  US	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  to	  pursue	  a	  masters	  degree,	  revealed	  how	  she	  
was	  interrogated	  by	  an	  African-­‐American	  patient	  who	  asked	  her:	  “Why	  is	  it	  that	  you	  
foreigners	  come	  into	  this	  country	  and	  you	  get	  our	  good	  jobs?	  And	  our	  people	  there,	  
our	  brothers	  and	  sisters,	  and	  children,	  they	  can’t	  even,	  they	  can’t	  hardly	  get	  a	  good	  
job?”196	  Although	   this	   respondent	   admitted	   feeling	   deeply	   troubled	   by	   constantly	  
having	   to	   prove	   herself	   as	   a	   naturalised	   US	   citizen,	   she	   seemed	   to	   accept	  
discrimination	  as	  a	  function	  of	  immigrant	  life:	  	  
	  
There’s	   a	   little	   discrimination…Racism,	   they	   hate	   you,	   which	   you	  
know.	  When	   I	   think	   about	   it,	   I	   don’t	   think	   it’s	   too	  much	   of	   a	  major	  
thing	  because	  that’s	  just	  how	  the	  world	  is.	  As	  I	  just	  told	  you,	  when	  I	  go	  
home	   [Liberia]	   people	   think	   I’m	   a	   foreigner	   too	   because	   I	   have	   an	  
[American]	   accent.	   You	   know,	   I’m	   not	   in	   that	   country	   [Liberia]	  
anymore.	  So	  it’s	  the	  same	  with	  them	  [Americans]…When	  you	  come	  to	  
a	  country	  and	  you	  try,	  you	  know,	  to	  better	  yourself	  or	  even	  if	  you	  live	  
there,	  you	  will	  always	  have	  some	  people	  that	  will	  discriminate	  against	  
you.197	  
	  
In	  Accra,	   Julia	  Richards,	  head	  of	   the	  United	  Liberian	  Association	   in	  Ghana	   (ULAG),	  
also	   took	   on	   a	   defeatist	   stance,	   somehow	   accepting	   anti-­‐immigrant	   backlash	   as	  
inevitable:	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The	  difficulty	  is	  being	  a	  Liberian…Some	  do	  accept	  you	  but	  sometimes	  
because	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  some,	  yeah,	  people	  don’t	  take	  you	  kindly	  
or	  they	  don’t	  accept	  you	  easily.	  And	  to	  be	  accepted	  you	  have	  to	  go	  to	  
school	  here	  [Ghana],	  you	  have	  to	  stay	  long	  here,	  be	  able	  to	  speak	  the	  
dialect,	  the	  language	  barrier…I	  think	  it’s	  like	  that	  because	  everybody,	  
like	   you	   and	   I…everybody	   tries	   to	   protect	   his	   or	   her	   own,	   you	  
understand?	  “So,	  this	  is	  my	  country,	  who	  are	  you	  to	  come	  here	  and	  tell	  
me	  what	  I	  should	  do	  and	  what	  I	  shouldn’t	  do?”...So	  you	  have	  to	  know	  
where	   to	  stop	  and	  where	  not	   to	  stop.	  As	   the	  saying	  goes,	  where	  one	  
man’s	  freedom	  begins…another	  man’s	  freedom	  ends.198	  
	  
While	   Richards	   and	   others	   feel	   cowed	   by	   anti-­‐immigrant	   sentiments,	   other	  
respondents	  are	   less	  deflated.	  One	  48-­‐year-­‐old	  businessman	  and	  consultant	  based	  
in	  Freetown	  scoffed	  at	  the	  tendency	  of	  native-­‐born	  Sierra	  Leoneans	  to	  discriminate	  
against	  him	  and	  others	  investing	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  country:	  	  
	  
	   These	  are	  people	  here…they	  are	  die-­‐hard	  Sierra	  Leonean,	  and	  they’re	  
quick	  to	  put	  it	  in	  your	  face,	  “You’re	  a	  foreigner!	  You	  think	  you	  na	  come	  
now	  here,	  you	  do	  this?	  You	  na	  foreigner!”…So,	  it	  makes	  you	  feel	  hurt,	  
[you]	   say,	   “But	   I’m	   here,	   I’m	   doing	   all	   of	   this.	   And	   still,	   they	   don’t	  
appreciate	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  they	  say	  you’re	  a	  foreigner.”	  You	  
know?	   So,	   using	   that	  word	   [foreigner],	   as	   an	  African,	   I	   think	   it’s	   not	  
appropriate	  because	  it	  kills	  your	  desire.	  Yeah,	  it	  kills	  that	  desire,	  that	  
enthusiasm	  you	  have	  made	  up	  to	  do	  something	  for	  them	  and	  then	  you	  
see	  they	  begin	  to	  pinpoint	  and	  say,	  “No,	  you’re	  not	  part	  of	  us!...”	  So,	  it’s	  
not	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  the	  country.199	  
	  
Although	   the	  Liberian	  emigrants	   I	   interviewed	   in	   the	  Global	   South	  and	  North	   face	  
similar	   challenges	   varying	   in	   degree	   and	   scale,	   the	   discrimination	   borne	   by	  
migration	   to	  West	  Africa	   is	   particularly	   debilitating,	   especially	   for	   poor	   and	   semi-­‐
educated	  migrants	  in	  Freetown	  and	  Accra.	  Liberia’s	  late	  ambassador	  to	  Sierra	  Leone	  
revealed	   that	   despite	   his	   country’s	   prominent	   position	   in	   the	   Mano	   River	   Union	  
(MRU)	   and	   Economic	   Community	   of	   West	   African	   States	   (ECOWAS),	   Liberian	  
migrants	   are	   often	   banned	   from	   developing	   livelihood	   strategies	   and	   often	  
criminalised	  unnecessarily	  in	  Sierra	  Leone:	  	  
	  
The	  first	  thing	  is	  getting	  absorbed…If	  you	  look	  at	  it	  from	  the	  outside,	  it	  
looks	   like	   it’s	   very	   easy.	   But	   it	   is	   not,	   if	   you	   really	   go	   into	   the	   nitty-­‐
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gritty	  of	  it.	  Like	  I	  realise	  on	  the	  border,	  most	  Liberians	  that	  came	  over	  
were	  not	  allowed	  to	  farm.	  No.	  Even	  though	  they	  are	  relatives,	  they	  will	  
say,	  okay,	  you	  come	  here	  as	  a	  refugee,	  but	  you	  are	  not	  allowed	  to,	  for	  
instance,	   cut	   palm	   nut	   without	   permission,	   you	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	  
make	   farms…Strangers,	   they	   call	   them	   strangers,	   not	   only	  
Liberians…the	  only	  other	   thing	   is	   that,	  what	   I	   realised,	   and	  we	  have	  
taken	   measures	   to	   correct	   that,	   to	   be	   honest,	   normally,	   normally,	  
cases	  involving	  Liberians	  who	  do	  not	  have	  any	  particular	  reason	  to	  be	  
here	  are	  a	  little	  harsh,	  like	  prison	  terms.200	  
	  
Though	   the	   challenges	   for	   Liberian	   emigrants	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   cannot	   be	   negated,	  
Freetown-­‐based	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   encountered	   fewer	   obstacles	   to	  
assimilation	   than	   their	   Accra-­‐based	   counterparts.	   What	   was	   clear	   during	   my	  
interviews	  in	  Accra	  was	  recognition	  that	  Ghanaians	  can	  be	  exceedingly	  xenophobic	  
and	  have	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  nationalism/patriotism,	  which	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  
the	  lack	  of	  patriotism	  in	  Liberia.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  I,	  Liberia	  did	  not	  undergo	  a	  
fierce	   nationalist	   struggle,	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   strong	   national	   identity	   and	   patriotic	  
fervour	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   over	   100	   years	   of	   exclusionary	   citizenship.	   For	  
Accra-­‐based	   respondents,	   the	   challenges	   of	  migration	   are	   embedded	   in	   structural	  
and	  societal	  forces	  of	  containment.	  As	  discussed	  by	  this	  42-­‐year-­‐old	  female	  resident	  
of	   the	   Buduburam	   Refugee	   Camp	   since	   2000,	   the	   threat	   of	   physical	   violence	  
represents	  one	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  control:	  	  
	  
Liberians	   have	   been	   killed	   here	   and	   nothing	   came	   out	   of	   it	   because	  
they	  [the	  assailants]	  were	  Ghanaians.	  So	  many	  instances,	  even	  on	  the	  
Camp	   here.	   Yeah,	   like	   before	   then	   you	   used	   to	   leave	   your	   window	  
open,	  Ghanaians	  will	  pass	  at	  the	  window	  and	  juke	  you.	  You	  know,	  stab	  
you.	  And	  then	  one	  of	  these	  days,	  Liberians	  got	  annoyed	  and	  they	  went	  
on	   the	   rampage,	   they	   said	   that	   they	  were	   going	   to	   really	   get	   at	   the	  
Ghanaians	   because	   one	   of	   the	   boys	   was	   caught	   red	   handed	   who	  
stabbed	   a	   Liberian	   and	   then	   the	   Liberians	   also	   caught	   the	  Ghanaian	  
and	   they	  beat	  him	  up	  and	   they	  said	   that	   the	  police	   should	  keep	  him	  
and	  see	  if	  the	  Liberian	  dies,	  they	  were	  also	  going	  to	  kill	  him.	  And	  the	  
Liberian	  died	  and	  the	  Ghanaians	  released	  the	  boy	  to	  go.	  So,	  because	  of	  
that	  the	  Liberians	  got	  annoyed;	  they	  burned	  the	  police	  station	  at	   the	  
time.201	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Alienation	  is	  another	  form	  of	  containment	  that	  renders	  Liberians	  inert	  and	  unable	  to	  
voice	   their	   grievances,	   according	   to	   this	   56-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   respondent	   who	   has	  
lived	  in	  Ghana	  as	  a	  refugee	  since	  fleeing	  Liberia’s	  first	  armed	  conflict	  in	  1992:	  	  
	  
I	   don’t	   know	   what	   to	   say,	   they	   [Ghanaians],	   they	   don’t	   really	   love	  
strangers,	  only	  few,	  only	  the	  educated	  ones…I	  don’t	  care	  how	  long	  you	  
have	  been	  with	  them…they	  always	  want	  to	  let	  you	  know	  that	  you	  are	  
not	  from	  here…They,	  I	  don’t	  know,	  discriminate…they	  love	  it	  a	  lot…So	  
it’s	   difficult,	   even	   to	   sell	   in	   the	   market.	   The	   accent,	   our	   accent	   is	  
different,	   so	   if	   they	   are	   selling	   something	   to	   their	   people	   for	   certain	  
price,	   if	   you’re	   a	   Liberian,	   go	   and	   ask,	   by	   the	   time	  you	   ask	   and	   they	  
hear	  you,	  the	  accent,	  forget	  it.	  Your	  price	  will	  go	  up,	  your	  prices	  will	  go	  
up.	  And	  certain	  places	  they	  don’t	  even	  allow	  you	  to	  talk,	  in	  their	  buses	  
you	   have	   to	   be	   careful,	   even	   if	   they	   do	   something	   and	   you	  want	   to	  
defend	  yourself	  as	  a	  human	  being	  and	  not	  as	  a	  Liberian,	  oh,	  they	  will	  
lash	  at	  you…202	  
	  
Tales	   of	   arbitrary,	   discriminatory	   treatment	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   Ghanaians	   were	  
commonplace	  amongst	  respondents	  in	  Accra,	  especially	  since	  the	  Liberian	  embassy	  
exhibited	   a	   hands-­‐off	   approach	   concerning	   refugee	   matters.	   A	   resident	   of	  
Buduburam	  since	  2004,	  one	  53-­‐year-­‐old	  university	  instructor	  explained	  how	  he	  was	  
taunted	  when	   a	   bus	   attendant	   insisted	   that	   he	   pay	  more	   than	   the	   fare	   Ghanaians	  
were	  paying	  on	  a	  routine	  ride	  from	  his	  job	  to	  the	  Camp:	  	  
	  
After	  I	  got	  down,	  before	  I	  got	  down,	  they	  said,	  “Refugee!”	   I	  said,	  “I’m	  
not	  a	  refugee,	  I	  don’t	  hold	  that	  status	  any	  longer.”	  And	  I	  showed	  them	  
my	  ID	  Card.	  “I	  teach	  at	  the	  university	  here.	  I’m	  moulding	  the	  minds	  of	  
people.	  So	  I	  am	  not	  just	  any	  other	  person.”203	  
	  
Apart	   from	   the	   challenges	   of	   social	   alienation,	   some	   Liberians	   in	   Accra	   also	  
lamented	   the	   limited	  opportunities	   to	   attend	   school	   and	  develop	  professionally.	  A	  
refugee	  who	   fled	   Liberia’s	   second	   armed	   conflict	   in	   2001,	   one	   28-­‐year-­‐old	   female	  
respondent	  admitted	  that	  the	  high	  foreign	  student	  fees	  outside	  of	  the	  Camp	  setting	  
had	  deterred	  her	  from	  pursuing	  university	  education:	  	  
	  
Going	  to	  school	  here	  [Ghana]	  is	  very	  difficult,	  especially	  as	  a	  Liberian.	  
Because,	   if	   you	   enter	   a	   school	   and	   you	   can’t	   speak	   the	   people’s	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language,	   they	   get	   to	   know	   that	   you	   are	   a	   Liberian,	   your	   fees	   are	  
different.	   So,	   it’s	   very	   difficult.	   It’s	   because	   of	   it	   that	   we	   are	   just	  
learning	   on	   the	   Camp.	   We	   cannot	   leave	   the	   Camp	   to	   go	   and	   learn.	  
Because	  the	  money	  I	  will	  pay	  on	  [the]	  Camp,	  the	  money	  I	  will	  pay	  in	  
Accra,	   I	   cannot	  pay	   that	  money	  on	   [the]	  Camp.	   So,	   I	   prefer	  being	  on	  
[the]	  Camp	  to	  learn	  then	  go	  to	  Accra	  as	  a	  Liberian.	  And	  on	  [the]	  Camp	  
we	  are	  not	  getting	  the	  full	  education…So,	  I	  see	  that	  as	  a	  big	  challenge	  
and	   seriously	   it’s	   really	  wasting	  my	   time.	   So	   that’s	   the	  main	   reason	  
why	  I	  really	  want	  to	  go	  back	  [to	  Liberia]	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  year	  [2013]	  
if	  I	  don’t	  enter	  school…204	  
	  
Other	  Liberians	  in	  Accra,	  like	  this	  male	  respondent	  who	  relocated	  to	  Ghana	  in	  1990,	  
complained	   that	   their	   professional	   growth	   had	   been	   stunted	   because	   of	   national	  
laws	  barring	  foreigners	  from	  taking	  certain	  jobs:	  
	  
Ghanaians	   are	   friendly	   but	   there	   are	   a	   few	   who	   still	   harbour	   some	  
form	  of	  xenophobic,	  you	  know,	  behaviour	  towards	  foreigners…I	  mean,	  
even	  the	  idea	  of	  going	  into	  business	  is	  a	  very	  big	  issue	  now	  in	  Ghana.	  
The	   foreigner	   [is]	   restricted	   and	   the	   amount	   of	  money	   you	   need	   to	  
start	  a	  business,	  I	  mean,	  is	  so	  much	  if	  you	  are	  a	  foreigner	  and	  then	  you	  
are	  restricted	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  businesses,	  you	  know,	  so	  there’s	  an	  
on-­‐going	   issue	   now	   between	   foreigners	   and	   Ghanaians,	   especially	  
Nigerians,	   you	   know,	   even	   though	   there’s	   an	   ECOWAS	   protocol	   that	  
allows	   one	   from	   [an]	   ECOWAS	   country	   to	   be	   treated	   similarly	   as	   a	  
local.	   But	   the	   Ghanaians	   are	   still	   saying	   that	   they	  want	   to	   protect	   a	  
certain	   part	   of	   their	   trade	   and	   commerce	   for	  Ghanaians	   only.	   And,	   I	  
mean,	   it	   goes	   as	   far	   as	   even	   jobs,	   even	   jobs,	   you	   find	   that	   there	   are	  
very	   few	   foreigners	  you	   find	  working	  and	  because	   the	  policy	  here	   is	  
Ghanaians	   first.	   So,	   if	   there’s	   a	   vacancy	   they	   look	   and	   see	   whether	  
there’s	  no	  Ghanaian	  to	  fill	  up	  that	  vacancy	  before	  a	  foreigner	  is	  given	  
the	  option.	  And	  even	   if	  you	  open	  a	  company,	   I	  mean,	  by	   law	  you	  are	  
entitled	  to	  employ	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  Ghanaians…205	  
	  
Restrictions	  on	  employment	  and	  education	  opportunities	  represent	  the	  most	  salient	  
forms	  of	  containment	  by	  host	  states	  like	  Ghana,	  which	  embolden	  emigrants	  to	  yearn	  
for	   their	   putative	   homeland.	   A	   27-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   respondent	   in	   Accra	   since	   2003	  
admitted	  that	  what	  fortifies	  him	  amidst	  the	  injustices	  of	  life	  in	  Ghana	  is	  his	  desire	  to	  
one	  day	  to	  return	  to	  Liberia:	  	  
	  
I	  work	  with	  a	  contracting	  company	  and	  sometimes	  [I	  am]	  intimidated	  
at	   [my]	   job	   because	   I’m	   not	   a	   Ghanaian,	   neither	   a	   naturalised	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Ghanaian…my	  salary	   is	  determined	  by	  whatever	   they	   think	   they	  can	  
pay	  me	  and	  somehow	  I’m	  not	  still	  deterred.	  [I]	  can	  just	  accept	  it	   like	  
that	  because	  I	  know	  I	  [will]	  one	  day	  return	  home	  [to	  Liberia]…206	  
	  
Indeed	  the	  vagaries	  of	  immigrant	  life	  and	  the	  challenging	  migration	  experiences	  of	  
Liberian	   social	   actors	   abroad	   have	   in	   many	   ways	   facilitated	   the	   introduction	   of	  
proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Just	   as	   she	   did	   as	   a	   child,	   in	   her	   adulthood	   Denise	   has	   swung	   on	   a	   pendulum	  
between	  Liberia	  and	  the	  US	  until	  she	  finally	  settled	  in	  Monrovia	  in	  her	  middle-­‐age.	  
Hers	   is	   a	   story	   that	   typifies	   the	   migration	   experiences	   of	   countless	   Liberians	  
explored	  in	  this	  chapter,	  whose	  movement	  is	  neither	  completely	  unidirectional	  nor	  
permanent.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  migration	  waves	  to	  and	  from	  Liberia	  in	  the	  
19th,	   20th	   and	   21st	   centuries	   complicated	   the	   choice/force	   binary	   and	   created	  
Liberians	   who	   defy	   the	   legal,	   identity-­‐based	   definition	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’.	  
Through	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  complex	  and	  varied	  citizenship	  status	  choices	  of	  the	  
respondents	   in	   this	   study,	   I	   showed	   how	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	   is	   an	  
attempt	   to	   reconcile	   the	  migration	   of	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	   Liberians	   before,	  
during,	   and	   after	   intermittent	   armed	   conflicts.	   This	   chapter	   illustrated,	   however,	  
that	   dual	   citizenship	   enactment	   has	   stalled	   because	   although	   some	   Liberians	  
acknowledge	   migration	   as	   an	   involuntary	   act,	   others	   view	   naturalisation	   outside	  
Liberia	   as	   a	   fundamental	   denial	   of	  what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   a	   Liberian	   citizen,	   both	   in	  
name	  and	  in	  practice.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  how	  globalisation—a	  process	  of	  movement	  in	  goods,	  
services	   and	   ideas—has	   fundamentally	   shaped	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   configuration	  
and	   practice	   thereby	   impacting	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	  





                                                





Stopping	  Firestone	  and	  Starting	  a	  Citizen	  Revolution	  from	  Below	  
	  
Firestone	   has	   the	   world’s	   largest	   industrial	   rubber	   plantation	   in	   Liberia—a	  
sprawling	   118,990	   acres	   adjacent	   to	   the	   country’s	   only	   international	   airport—
where	  the	  stench	  of	  raw	  latex	  smells	  like	  “rotting	  cheese”	  (Pailey,	  2007).	  Less	  than	  
ten	   years	   ago,	   the	   company’s	   workers	   would	   carry	   on	   their	   bare	   shoulders	   iron	  
poles	  with	   two	   colourful	   buckets	   attached	   on	   each	   end,	   filled	  with	   raw	   latex	   they	  
had	  manually	  squeezed	  out	  of	  rubber	  trees	  (Pailey,	  2007).	  These	  21st	  century	  rubber	  
tappers	  resembled	  forcefully	  conscripted	  labour	  in	  the	  1920s,	  when	  Firestone	  first	  
started	   operations	   in	   Liberia	   under	   a	   severely	   flawed	   99-­‐year	   lease	   agreement	  
brokered	  by	  the	  Liberian	  government	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  39;	  Pailey,	  2007;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  
28;	   Kieh,	   2012b:	   170).	   Nearly	   a	   century	   later,	   backlash	   against	   economic	  
globalisation	   and	   the	   exploitative	   nature	   of	   corporate	   citizenship	   crystallised	   in	   a	  
transnational	  campaign,	  Stop	  Firestone,	  spearheaded	   in	  2005	  by	  Liberians	  abroad,	  
their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   homeland	   and	   an	   international	   coalition,	   to	   hold	   the	  
corporation	  accountable	  (Pailey,	  2007:	  82).	  	  
	  
Building	   on	   this	   momentum	   in	   November	   2005,	   35	   Liberian	   homeland	   plaintiffs	  
filed	   a	   class	   action	   suit	   in	   a	   US	   court	   alleging	   that	   Bridgestone	   Corporation	   and	  
Bridgestone	   North	   American	   Tire,	   the	   parent	   company	   of	   Firestone	   Liberia,	   had	  
violated	  labour	  laws	  by	  using	  children	  to	  tap	  raw	  latex,	   inflicted	  unusual	  and	  cruel	  
labour	   practices	   by	   instituting	   unrealistic	   daily	   quotas	   for	   tree	   tappers,	   and	  
degraded	   the	   environment	   by	   deliberately	   dumping	   toxic	   substances	   in	   the	  
plantation’s	   only	   water	   source,	   the	   Farmington	   River	   (Pailey,	   2007:	   78).	   As	   legal	  
representatives	  of	  the	  plaintiffs,	  the	  International	  Labour	  Rights	  Forum	  invoked	  the	  
Alien	   Torts	   Claim	   Act,	   under	   which	   US	   companies	   can	   be	   held	   liable	   for	   human	  
rights	  abuses	  committed	  abroad	  (Advocates	   for	  International	  Development,	  2008).	  
Although	  the	  plaintiffs	  lost	  the	  case	  in	  2011,	  their	  decision	  to	  challenge	  Firestone	  in	  
a	  court	  of	   law	  was	  unprecedented;	   it	  marked	   the	   first	   time	  Liberian	  citizen	  claims	  




undoubtedly	   impacted	   Liberia’s	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   Firestone	   concession	  
agreement	  between	  2006	  and	  2008.	  	  
	  
As	   indicated	   by	   the	   Firestone	   example,	   Liberia’s	   incorporation	   into	   the	   global	  
capitalist	   system	   has	   both	   eroded	   and	   strengthened	   citizenship.	   On	   one	   hand,	  
foreign	   direct	   investment	   placed	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   investor	   ‘above’	   the	   state,	  
thereby	   undermining	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   created	   an	  
increasingly	  politicised	  workforce	   and	   transnational	   network	  of	   Liberian	   activists,	  
thereby	   strengthening	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   argue	   that	  
globalisation	  has	   fundamentally	   configured	  and	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  
across	  space	  and	  time	  through	  parallel	  processes—the	  globalisation	  of	  capital	  (aid,	  
trade	   &	   investments,	   and	   remittances)	   and	   the	   globalisation	   of	   ideas,	   values	   &	  
practices	   (universalised	   notions	   of	   citizenship	   and	   human	   rights)—thereby	  
influencing	   claims	   against	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   for	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation.	  The	  chapter	   is	  organised	  as	   follows:	  First	   I	  present	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  
academic	  literature	  on	  globalisation	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  citizenship.	  Second,	  I	  examine	  
how	  Liberia’s	  20th	  century	  capitalist	  integration	  and	  21st	  century	  re-­‐integration	  have	  
impacted	   backlash	   against	   dual	   citizenship.	   And	   lastly,	   I	   explore	   how	   the	  
international	   rights	   regime	   manifested	   in	   discourses	   about	   human	   rights	   has	  
influenced	   a	   measured	   acceptance	   of	   the	   merits	   of	   deterritorialising	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’.	  	  
	  
‘Globalisation’	  or	  More	  of	  the	  Same?	  
Although	   globalisation	   is	   not	   new—having	   manifested	   in	   deeply	   exploitative	  
processes	  such	  as	  the	  transatlantic	  slave	  trade	  and	  colonialism—it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  
1960s	   and	   70s	   that	   the	   term	   became	   prevalent,	   reaching	   high	   levels	   of	   public	  
awareness	   in	   the	   1990s	   (Held	   and	   McGrew,	   2003:	   2).	   Intermittently,	   an	  
international	   discourse	   on	   globalisation	   was	   sparked	   in	   the	   1980s	   when	   the	  
struggles	  for	  citizenship	  exemplified	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  in	  Germany	  and	  the	  
pro-­‐democracy	   rally	   in	   Tiananmen	   Square	   in	   China	   were	   transported	   globally	  
through	   international	  media	   (Urry,	   2000:	   62).	   Globalisation	   denotes	   “a	   structural	  
shift	   underway	   in	   the	   organisation	  of	   human	  affairs:	   from	  a	  world	   of	   discrete	  but	  




McGrew,	   2007:	   2).	   It	   further	   involves	   “the	   accelerating	   pace	   of	   transborder	  
interactions	  and	  processes”,	  “a	  stretching	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  activities	  
across	   political	   frontiers”,	   and	   “the	   growing	  magnitude,	   of	   interconnectedness,	   in	  
almost	   every	   sphere	  of	   social	   existence”	   (Held	   and	  McGrew,	  2007:	  2-­‐3).	  However,	  
globalisation	   has	   not	   produced	   global	   equality	   or	   global	   cohesion,	   rather,	   it	   is	  
“deeply	  divisive	  and,	  consequently,	  vigorously	  contested…it	   is	   far	   from	  a	  universal	  
process	  experienced	  uniformly	  across	   the	  entire	  planet”	   (Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2003:	  
1).	  According	  to	  Held	  and	  McGrew,	  contestations	  about	  globalisation	  are	  rooted	   in	  
“two	  principal	  axes	  of	  disagreement”:	  
	  
The	  first	  concerns	  the	  contested	  intellectual	  hegemony	  of	  the	  concept	  
of	   globalisation	   in	   the	   social	   sciences:	   its	   descriptive,	   analytical	   and	  
theoretical	   purchase.	   The	   second	   concerns	   values	   and	   normative	  
attachments:	  whether	   on	   ethical	   grounds	   globalisation	   as	   a	   political	  
project	   or	   ideal	   is	   to	   be	   defended,	   transformed,	   resisted	   or	   rejected	  
(Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2007:	  5).	  	  
	  
While	   statists	   question	   the	   primacy	   of	   globalisation	   in	   a	   post/911	  world	   that	   has	  
shifted	  from	  “multilateralism	  to	  unilateralism,	  stability	  to	  insecurity,	  cooperation	  to	  
geopolitical	   competition,	   and	   soft	   power	   to	   hard	   power”,	   globalists	   believe	   that	  
globalisation	   is	   more	   “widespread,”	   “resilient,”	   and	   “socially	   embedded”	   than	  
sceptics	   will	   acknowledge,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   worldwide	   diffusion	   of	   capital,	  
democratic	  ideals,	  information	  and	  communications	  (Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2007:	  6-­‐10).	  	  
	  
Because	  of	  globalisation,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  new	  configuration	  of	  power	  in	  which	  the	  
binaries	   of	   core-­‐periphery,	   North-­‐South,	   First	   and	   Third	   World	   are	   contested	  
although	  admittedly	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   “inequalities	  and	  differences	  brought	  
about	  and	   institutionalised	  by	   such	  older	  divisions	  have	   suddenly	   ceased	   to	  exist”	  
(Isin,	   2000:	   2-­‐3).	   Rather,	   interactions	   between	   nation-­‐states	   and	   citizens	   within	  
those	   territories	   are	   highly	   differentiated	   and	   based	   on	   entrenched	   hierarchies	   of	  
power,	   as	   the	   composition	   of	   global	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council,	   the	  
World	   Trade	   Organisation	   and	   the	   G7	   prove.	   Those	   who	   challenge	   claims	   about	  
global	  interconnectedness	  remain	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  exceedingly	  asymmetrical	  and	  
relatively	  slow	  in	  intensity	  and	  velocity.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  




are	  therefore	  regionalised,	  not	  globalised	  (Wade,	  2003:	  34).	  Moreover,	  international	  
trade	   is	   more	   segmented	   than	   integrated,	   with	   countries	   in	   the	   Organisation	   for	  
Economic	   Cooperation	   and	   Development	   (OECD)	   accounting	   for	   the	   largest	  
concentration	  of	  world	   trade,	   followed	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  East	  Asian	  countries,	  
which	  account	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  South-­‐South	  trade	  (Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2007:	  76).	  
Globalisation,	  some	  argue,	  is	  constructed	  and	  regulated	  by	  states	  and	  international	  
financial	   agencies	   “dominated	   by	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   North”;	   furthermore,	   “the	  
subjects,	   or	   agents,	   of	   globalisation	   are	  mainly	   situated	   in	   the	   rich	   North	   but	   the	  
objects,	   that	   is	   countries	   that	   rely	  most	   heavily	   in	   these	   processes,	  mainly	   in	   the	  
South”	  are	  invariably	  and	  negatively	  impacted	  (Kuisma,	  2008:	  621).	  While	  sceptics	  
argue	   that	   globalisation	   is	   a	   euphemism	   for	   the	   spread	  and	  expansion	  of	  Western	  
imperialism	   and	   Americanisation,	   globalists	   believe	   that,	   though	   globalisation	  
unevenly	  benefits	  “powerful	  economic	  and	  social	  forces	  in	  the	  West,”	  it	  actually	  is	  an	  
“expression	  of	  deeper	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  modern	  social	  organisation”	  
such	  as	   the	  expansion	  of	  multi-­‐national	   corporations	  and	  global	   financial	  markets,	  
the	   “diffusion	   of	   popular	   culture	   and	   the	   salience	   of	   global	   environmental	  
degradation”	  (Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2003:	  5-­‐6).	  	  
	  
One	  of	   the	  consequences	  of	  globalisation	   is	   that	   it	  makes	  some	  states	   increasingly	  
“more	  accountable	  to	  external	  than	  to	  internal	  forces”	  (Overbeek,	  2002:	  84),	  which	  
may	  erode	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  in	  countries	  like	  Liberia	  with	  limited	  economic	  and	  
political	   capital.	   The	   process	   of	   globalisation	   has	   been	   unrestrained,	   without	   an	  
accompanying	   global	   governance	   regime	   to	   curb	   abuses	   and	   mediate	   power	  
asymmetries	  between	  the	  Global	  North	  and	  Global	  South,	  such	  as	  unfair	  trade	  rules	  
in	  which	  poor	  countries	  are	  coerced	  into	  opening	  up	  their	  markets	  and	  eliminating	  
subsidies	  while	  rich	  countries	  maintain	  subsidies	  in	  agriculture	  and	  textiles	  (Stiglitz,	  
2003:	   54-­‐57).	  As	   a	   result	   of	   economic	   globalisation,	   nation-­‐states	  primarily	   in	   the	  
Global	   South	   have	   been	   constrained	   to	   adopt	   neoliberal	   economic	   policies	   that	  
advocate	   fiscal	   discipline,	   deregulation,	   and	   macro-­‐economic	   management	   (Held	  
and	  McGrew,	  2003:	  55)	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  pro-­‐poor	  spending,	  and	  Liberia	  is	  without	  
exception.	   For	   example,	   Liberia’s	   US$4.9	   billion	   debt	   relief	   through	   the	   Heavily	  
Indebted	   Poor	   Countries	   (HIPC)	   initiative	   largely	   brokered	   through	   the	   IMF	   and	  




privatisation	  of	  state-­‐owned	  parastatals,	  liberalisation	  of	  trade,	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  
a	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy	  Paper	  while	  simultaneously	  cutting	  spending	  in	  health	  
and	  education	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  4).	  	  
	  
The	   old	  Washington	   Consensus	   of	   the	   1990s	   has	   been	   largely	   anchored	   by	   a	   21st	  
century	   neo-­‐liberal	   agenda	   promoting	   free	   market	   capitalism,	   free	   trade	   and	  
privatisation,	  which	  effectively	   “underplays	   the	  role	  of	  government,	   the	  need	   for	  a	  
strong	  public	  sector	  and	  the	  requirement	  for	  multilateral	  governance”	  (Held,	  2005:	  
9-­‐10).	  Yet,	  this	  ‘race	  to	  the	  bottom’	  claim	  completely	  negates	  the	  capacity	  of	  states,	  
however	   limited,	   to	   manoeuvre	   global	   and	   domestic	   demands,	   and	   the	   power	   of	  
citizens	  to	  mediate	  state	  authority	  (Mosley,	  2007:	  110-­‐120).	  Sassen	  calls	  for	  a	  more	  
nuanced	  understanding	  of	  state	  authority	   in	   the	  process	  of	  economic	  globalisation	  
regardless	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  positioning	  in	  the	  world	  order,	  arguing	  that	  “the	  state	  
is	  engaged	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  global	  processes,	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  ‘victim’	  of	  
these”	   (Sassen,	   2007:	   98).	   For	   example,	   Liberia	   in	   2006	   and	   2008,	   respectively,	  
renegotiated	  its	  concession	  agreements	  with	  Mittal	  Steel	  and	  Firestone	  Liberia	  in	  an	  
attempt	  at	  balancing	  demands	  for	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  with	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  
the	   rights	   of	   domestic	   labour	   (Government	   of	   Liberia	   and	   Mittal	   Steel	   Liberia	  
Limited,	   2006;	   Government	   of	   Liberia	   and	   Firestone	   Liberia,	   2008).	   Nevertheless,	  
some	  have	  argued	   that	   the	   renegotiated	  agreements	  have	  not	  altered	  state-­‐citizen	  
relations	   because	   the	   conditions	   of	   Liberian	   workers	   have	   not	   fundamentally	  
improved,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
	  
Although	   processes	   of	   globalisation	   unsettle	   the	   “relative	   significance	   of	   bounded	  
territories”	   with	   states	   “increasingly	   embedded	   in	   webs	   of	   regional	   and	   global	  
interconnectedness	   permeated	   by	   supranational,	   intergovernmental	   and	  
transnational	  forces”	  (Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2007:	  4),	  it	  is	  national	  governments,	  as	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   Liberia,	   that	   “remain	   the	   only	   proper	   and	   proven	   mechanisms	   for	  
ameliorating	   and	   combating	   the	   scourge	   of	   global	   inequality	   and	   uneven	  
development”	   through	  effective	  domestic	  policy-­‐making	   (Held	   and	  McGrew,	  2003:	  
87).	  According	  to	  Stiglitz,	  countries	  that	  can	  boast	  of	  development	  successes	  are	  the	  





The	  most	  successful	  countries	  of	  the	  world,	  notably	  those	  in	  East	  Asia,	  
had	   growth	   that	   has	   been	   based	   on	   exports,	   which	   depended	   on	  
globalisation.	   But	   this	   growth	   involved	   gradual	   trade	   liberalisation,	  
not	  capital	  market	  liberalisation—they	  did	  not	  open	  up	  their	  markets	  
to	  speculative	  capital	  flows,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  critical	  early	  years	  (Stiglitz,	  
2003:	  52).	  	  	  
	  
Yet,	   what	   Stiglitz	   and	   others	   fail	   to	   realise	   is	   that	   nation-­‐states	   have	   varying	  
historical,	   political	   and	   economic	   trajectories	   that	   may	   hamper	   or	   facilitate	   the	  
adoption	  of	  protectionist	  measures.	  Comparing	  countries	   in	  East	  Asia	  with	  nations	  
in	   West	   Africa,	   for	   instance,	   that	   were	   colonised	   and	   underwent	   structural	  
adjustment	   programmes	   is	   misguided	   at	   best.	   Regardless	   of	   a	   state’s	   economic	  
position	   in	   the	   geopolitical	   order,	   however,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   IMF	   doctrine	   that	  
states	  must	   liberalise	   is	   fundamentally	   flawed,	   since	   the	  most	  successful	  emerging	  
market	   in	   attracting	   foreign	   direct	   investment,	   China,	   has	   not	   followed	   this	   edict	  
(Stiglitz,	  2003:	  52).	  Moreover,	  the	  highly	  protected	  economies	  of	  China,	  India,	  Japan,	  
Taiwan,	   and	  South	  Korea	  prove	   that	   “countries	  do	  not	  have	   to	   adopt	   liberal	   trade	  
policies	  in	  order	  to	  reap	  benefits	  from	  trade,	  to	  grow	  fast,	  and	  to	  grow	  an	  industrial	  
structure	  able	  to	  produce	  an	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  national	  consumption”	  (Wade,	  
2003:	   31-­‐32).	   After	   all,	   OECD	   countries	   instituted	   protectionist	   measures	   before	  
gradually	   integrating	   into	   the	   global	   capitalist	   system,	   and	   as	   such,	   cannot	  
legitimately	   demand	   that	   developing	   nations	   institute	   economic	   policies	   within	   a	  
short	  period	  of	  time	  that	  they	  spent	  decades	  perfecting.	  Furthermore,	  higher	  levels	  
of	   trade	   openness	   for	   countries	   with	   low	   to	   middle	   levels	   of	   income	   per	   capita	  
actually	  fuels	  inequality	  while	  higher	  levels	  of	  openness	  for	  higher	  income	  countries	  
facilitates	  equality	  (Wade,	  2003:	  32).	  	  
	  
My	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   has	   shown	   that	   globalisation	   remains	   contested	   in	  
theory	  and	  practice,	  with	  divergent	  outcomes	  for	  the	  set	  of	  relations	  between	  states	  
and	  their	  citizens.	  While	  it	  has	  challenged	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  nation-­‐states,	  
thereby	   eroding	   state-­‐citizen	   relations,	   some	   states	   have	   responded	   with	  
mechanisms	  of	  their	  own	  to	  maintain	  autonomy,	  thereby	  strengthening	  state-­‐citizen	  
and	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations.	   In	   the	   section	   that	   follows,	   I	   examine	   how	   the	  





Globalisation	  and	  the	  Tenets	  of	  Territorially	  Bounded	  Citizenship	  	  
Globalisation	   and	   citizenship	   are	   both	   widely	   contested	   intellectual	   spaces	   of	  
inquiry.	   The	   polarised	   debates	   about	   the	   bounded	   or	   unbounded	   nature	   of	  
citizenship	  are	  mirrored	  in	  debates	  about	  globalisation,	  pitting	  those	  who	  advocate	  
for	   the	   increased	   relevance	   of	   nation-­‐states	   and	   territorially	   bounded	   citizenship	  
against	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  nation-­‐states	  are	  not	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  analysis	  or	  the	  
custodians	   of	   citizenship,	   but	   one	   of	   many	   institutions	   whose	   powers	   extend	  
transnationally,	   such	   as	   multilateral	   agencies,	   multinational	   corporations	   and	  
international	   NGOs	   (Glick	   Schiller,	   2009:	   6).	   According	   to	   Isin,	   globalisation	   has	  
affected	  citizenship	  in	  two	  fundamentally	  entangled	  ways:	  	  
	  
On	   one	   hand,	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   global	   flows	   of	   capital,	   images,	   ideas,	  
labour,	   crime,	   music	   and	   regimes	   of	   governance,	   the	   sources	   of	  
authority	  of	  citizenship	  rights	  and	  obligations	  have	  expanded	  from	  the	  
nation-­‐state	   to	   other	   international	   organisations,	   corporations	   and	  
agencies	   such	  as	   the	  World	  Bank,	   the	   IMF,	   the	   internet,	  Greenpeace,	  
Amnesty	   International,	  Micro-­‐soft	  and	  Coca-­‐Cola.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  
the	  dominance	  of	  such	  global	  agents	  was	  accompanied	  by	  the	  decline	  
of	  the	  capacity	  of	  nation-­‐states	  to	  set	  sovereign	  policies	  (Isin,	  2000:	  2).	  
	  
Isin’s	   complex	   framing	   of	   citizenship	   and	   globalisation	   as	   mutually	   reinforcing	  
brings	  these	  two	  seemingly	  contested	  processes	  together.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	   explore	   the	   nuanced	  ways	   in	  which	   globalisation	   has	   simultaneously	   unsettled	  
and	  entrenched	  territorially	  bounded	  citizenship,	  as	  this	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	   for	  
my	   analysis	   of	   how	   globalisation	   has	   configured	   and	   reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  across	  space	  and	  time	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  	  
	  
Whereas	  Marshall’s	  brand	  of	  civil,	  political	  and	  social	  citizenship	  is	  based	  on	  “stasis,	  
of	   the	   rights	   and	   duties	   attributed	   to,	   and	   available	   to,	   those	   living	   and	   working	  
within	  a	  given	  territory	  by	  virtue	  of	  long-­‐term	  membership	  within	  a	  given	  society,”	  
citizenship	  brokered	  by	  processes	  of	  globalisation	  is	  based	  on	  “flow,	  concerned	  with	  
the	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  flows	  across	  borders	  of	  risks,	  cultures,	  migrants	  
and	  visitors,	   respectively”	   (Urry,	  2000:	  63-­‐64).	  Although	  globalisation	  necessitates	  
the	   free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	   ideas,	   there	  has	  been	  an	   increase	   in	  surveillance	  
and	  control	  of	  international	  mobility	  and	  migration	  after	  911.	  Thus	  globalisation	  has	  




ways	  in	  which	  people	  think	  about	  their	  sense	  of	  citizenship,	  their	  sense	  of	  belonging	  
and	   their	   sense	   of	   responsibility”	   (Desforges,	   et.	   al,	   2005:	   442).	   According	   to	  
Palacios,	   global	   citizens	   avert	   the	   adverse	   effects	   of	   globalisation	   by	   collaborating	  
across	  territorial	  boundaries:	  	  
	  
The	  appearance	  of	   the	  global	  or	  cosmopolitan	  citizen,	  who	   is	  mobile	  
by	  nature	  and	  bears	  multiple	  citizenships,	  is	  in	  turn	  giving	  way	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  global	  civil	  society,	  which	  is	  facilitating	  the	  creation	  of	  
rules	  and	  structures	  for	  regulating	  and	  restraining	  the	  power	  of	  global	  
corporate	  citizens,	  making	  them	  more	  accountable	  and	  responsible	  in	  
their	  operations	  (Palacios,	  2010:	  386-­‐387).	  
	  
Individuals	  may	  form	  bonds	  of	  solidarity	  across	  transnational	  spaces	  in	  response	  to	  
the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   economic	   globalisation	   (Falk,	   2000:	   7)	   while	  
simultaneously	  maintaining	   their	   territorially	  bounded	  citizenships	  and	  calling	   for	  
universalised	  notions	  of	  personhood,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Stop	  Firestone	  Campaign.	  
Moreover,	  human	  rights	  activists	  employ	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
to	   propel	   citizenship	   rights	   ‘above	   the	   state’	   thereby	   stretching	   the	   philosophical	  
tenets	   of	   citizenship	   from	   membership	   within	   a	   political	   territory	   to	   individual	  
humanity	  and	  personhood	  (Shafir	  and	  Brysk,	  2006:	  275;	  277).	  Yet,	  the	  relevance	  of	  
nationally	  bounded	  citizenship	  is	  maintained	  despite	  the	  globalisation	  of	  ideas	  and	  
the	   assumed	   universalisation	   of	   human	   rights.	   Although	   citizenship	   rights	   can	   be	  
claimed	   and	   protected	   by	   law,	   however	   limited	   in	   scope,	   human	   rights	   cannot	  
(Shafir	  and	  Brysk,	  2006:	  285).	  Furthermore,	  the	  tenets	  of	  universal	  personhood	  are	  
still	  highly	  contested.	  	  
	  
While	   some	   assert	   that	   territorially	   bounded	   citizenship	   is	   more	   entrenched	   than	  
ever	   before	   in	   spite	   of	   globalisation,	   others	   argue	   it	   has	   fundamentally	   lost	   its	  
relevance.	  Although	  setting	  the	  often	  stringent	  parameters	  on	  citizenship	  marks	  one	  
of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   states	  maintain	   autonomy	   in	   an	   increasingly	   interconnected	  
world,	   globalisation	  has	   virtually	   eroded	   the	  basic	   tenets	   of	   citizenship	  because	   its	  
forces	  (transnational	  corporations	  and	  international	  non-­‐government	  organisations)	  
are	  ‘above’	  and	  ‘below’	  the	  level	  of	  the	  state,	  and,	  “as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  processes	  
of	   globalisation,	   the	   ability	   of	   states	   to	   implement	   the	   values	   of	   citizenship,	   the	  




2008:	   619).	   According	   to	   Tan,	   “the	   ‘transnational’	   and	   ‘supraterritorial’	   aspects	   of	  
globalisation	  put	   tremendous	  pressures	  on	   the	  prevalent	  concept	  of	   citizenship”	  as	  
territorially	   bounded	   (Tan,	   2005:	   6-­‐7).	   Furthermore,	   “people	   of	   the	   Global	   South	  
have	   been	   increasingly	   subordinated	   to	   global	   corporations”	   thereby	   transforming	  
them	   from	  agential	   national	   citizens	   to	   “corporate	   subjects	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   their	  
livelihood	  and	  well-­‐being	  is	  dependent	  on	  corporations”	  (Ikeda,	  2004:	  334).	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   economic	   globalisation,	   corporate	   citizenship	   has	   emerged	   as	   a	  
counterpart	   to	   cosmopolitan	   and	   global	   citizenship	   thereby	   rivalling	   traditional	  
notions	   of	   citizenship	   that	   position	   an	   individual	   within	   a	   nationally	   bounded	  
territory	   (Palacios,	   2010:	   389).	   Corporate	   citizens,	   mostly	   multi-­‐national	   and	  
transnational	   companies,	   are	   governed	   by	   the	   tenets	   of	   corporate	   social	  
responsibility	   to	   ‘do	   no	   harm’,	   abide	   by	   state	   laws,	   protect	   the	   environment,	   and	  
ensure	  workers’	  benefits	  (Palacios,	  2010:	  391),	  yet	  in	  many	  instances	  their	  ‘bottom-­‐
line’	  motivations	   for	  maximising	   profit	   are	   contrary	   to	   these	   ideals,	   as	   the	   case	   of	  
Firestone	   in	   Liberia	   illustrates.	   Furthermore,	   corporate	   claims	   to	   citizenship	   are	  
inherently	   contradictory	   because	   as	   “artificial	   persons”	   corporations	   exhibit	  
“inherent	   capacities	   that	  mortal	   citizens	   do	   not	   possess”	   and	   are	   often	   ‘above’	   the	  
state	   (Greider,	   1996:	   331).	   Therefore,	   they	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   undermine	   state-­‐
citizen	   relations.	  Although	   there	   are	   countless	   examples	   of	   citizens	   challenging	   the	  
primacy	  of	  corporate	  power,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  class	  action	  suit	  against	  Firestone,	  
questions	   abound	   about	   how	   far	   citizens	   can	   go	   in	   fundamentally	   altering	   the	  
hierarchies	  of	  power	  among	  nation-­‐states	  and	   the	  multi-­‐nationals	  operating	  within	  
their	  territories.	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   examine	   how	   economic	   globalisation	   has	   configured	   and	  
reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   through	   space	   and	   time,	   thereby	   undermining	  
state-­‐citizen	  relations	  and	  causing	  backlash	  against	  dual	  citizenship.	  	  
	  
From	  Fernando	  Po	   to	  Open	  Door:	   Impact	  of	  Liberia’s	  Capitalist	  Development	  
on	  Citizenship	  Construction	  	  	  
The	   impact	  of	  economic	  globalisation	  on	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	   construction	  can	  be	  




Although	  pre-­‐settler	  Liberia	   established	   trade	   relations	  with	  Europe	   in	   the	  1500s,	  
post-­‐independence	   Liberia	   began	   full	   integration	   into	   the	   international	   capitalist	  
system	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  thereby	  invariably	  impacting	  the	  institution	  of	  citizenship	  
(Kieh,	  1992:	  36).	  For	  instance,	  it	  was	  during	  the	  administration	  of	  President	  Charles	  
D.B.	   King	   (1920-­‐1930)	   that	   indigenes	   were	   conscripted	   for	   road	   construction	  
projects	   throughout	   the	   country	   and	   also	   forcibly	   shipped	   to	   the	   cocoa	  producing	  
Spanish	   colony	   of	   Fernando	   Po	   to	   work	   under	   labour	   conditions	   akin	   to	   chattel	  
slavery	   (Kieh,	   1992:	   32-­‐33).	   Considered	   subjects	   rather	   than	   citizens,	   hinterland	  
inhabitants	   were	   easily	   expendable	   and	   could	   be	   used	   as	   commodities	   to	   attract	  
foreign	  capital.	  The	  Fernando	  Po	  crisis,	  as	   it	  came	  to	  be	  known,	  triggered	  a	   formal	  
inquiry	   by	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   condemning	   Liberia	   and	   prompting	   the	  
impeachment	  and	  later	  resignation	  of	  President	  King	  and	  his	  vice	  president	  in	  1930	  
(Kieh,	  1992:	  33;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  28-­‐29).	  This	  crisis	  effectively	  foreshadowed	  Liberia’s	  
enduring	  struggle	  to	  match	  pro-­‐capitalist	  economic	  growth	  with	  pro-­‐citizen	  holistic	  
development.	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  conflict	  in	  varying	  degrees	  and	  scales	  has	  engendered	  a	  crisis	  of	  citizenship	  
in	  Liberia,	   so	   too	  has	   the	  country’s	   incorporation	   into	   the	  global	   capitalist	   system,	  
facilitated	   initially	  by	   flows	  of	   aid	  and	   trade	   (Kieh,	  1992:	  38).	  The	  most	  egregious	  
example	   of	   Liberia’s	   coupling	   of	   debt	   servicing	   with	   foreign	   direct	   investment	  
occurred	  in	  1926	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  controversial	  President	  King.	  Desperate	  to	  
ward	   off	   encroachment	   into	   its	   territory	   by	   European	   colonialists,	   Liberia	  
contracted	  a	  US$5	  million	  loan	  from	  the	  Finance	  Corporation	  of	  America,	  sponsored	  
by	  US-­‐based	  Firestone	  Tire	   and	  Rubber	  Company,	   at	   an	   interest	   rate	  of	   7	  percent	  
(Kieh,	   2012b:	   93).	   Opposed	   by	   members	   of	   King’s	   cabinet,	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   loan	  
dictated	   that	   an	   American	   financial	   advisor	   had	   to	   approve	   the	   Liberian	   budget	  
annually	   and	   that	   Liberia	   could	   not	   borrow	   further	   without	   Firestone’s	   written	  
consent	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  3;	  40;	  44).	  In	  exchange	  for	  said	  loan,	  Liberia	  signed	  a	  
concession	  agreement	  with	  Firestone,	   its	   first	  major	   foreign	   investor,	  enabling	   the	  
company	   to	   lease	   one	   million	   acres	   of	   land	   for	   99	   years	   at	   six	   cents	   per	   acre	   to	  
extract	  unprocessed	  raw	  latex	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  39;	  Waugh,	  2011:	  28;	  Kieh,	  2012b:	  170).	  
The	  agreement	  included	  no	  provisions	  for	  renegotiations	  or	  annual	  financial	  reports	  




Agreement	   signed	   in	   1935	   exempted	   Firestone	   “from	   all	   and	   any	   taxes,	   duties,	  
excises,	   licence	   or	   other	   fees…by	   the	   same	   agreement	   the	   company’s	   expatriate	  
employees	   became	   exempt	   from	   any	   and	   all	   direct	   or	   personal	   taxes”	   (Van	   der	  
Kraaij,	  1983:	  55-­‐60).	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  1935	  Agreement	  would	  be	  revised	  periodically	  from	  the	  1950s	  to	  the	  
1970s	   thereby	   eventually	   taxing	   Firestone	   and	   increasing	   social	   benefits	   for	  
Liberian	  workers207,	  Liberia	  effectively	  became	  a	  “Firestone	  Colony	  or	  Protectorate”	  
during	  King’s	   administration	   (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	   1983:	  55-­‐60;	  303),	  which	  weakened	  
state	   sovereignty	   and	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   While	   the	   Liberian	   Constitution	  
enabled	   private	   ownership	   of	   land	   for	   citizens	   only,	   the	   99-­‐year	   lease	   agreement	  
with	  Firestone	  effectively	  transferred	  land	  into	  corporate	  hands	  thereby	  displacing	  
indigenous	  populations	  from	  what	  had	  been	  communally	  held	  land	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  
1983:	   53).	   As	   a	   result,	   those	   inhabiting	   the	   concession	   area	   were	   uprooted	   and	  
forcefully	   conscripted	   to	   work	   for	   Firestone	   as	   rubber	   tappers	   under	   slave-­‐like	  
working	   conditions	   that	   persist	   today	   (Jaye,	   2003:	   69;	   Kieh,	   2012b:	   75).	   This	  
marked	   the	   first	   major	   example	   of	   corporate	   citizenship	   undermining	   Liberia’s	  
state-­‐citizen	  relations	  and	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  country’s	  integration	  into	  the	  global	  
commodity	   exchange	   race.	   It	   effectively	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   Tubman’s	   Open	   Door	  
Policy	   launched	   in	   the	   late	  1940’s	  which	  mortgaged	  Liberia’s	   rubber,	   iron	  ore	  and	  
forest	   products	   without	   value	   addition	   to	   primarily	   large-­‐scale	   American	   and	  
European	   multi-­‐national	   investors,	   thereby	   transforming	   the	   country	   into	   “an	  
export	  enclave	  for	  raw	  materials”	  and	  cheap,	  exploited	  labour	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  39;	  42).	  
	  
Unhinging	  the	  Door	  of	  Liberia’s	  Economy	  to	  Capital	  Flows	  of	  Trade	  and	  Aid	  	  
When	  President	  Tubman	  entered	  office	  in	  1944,	  Liberia	  was	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  capital,	  
infrastructure,	   and	   technical	   expertise	   in	   fiscal	  management,	   so	  he	   introduced	   the	  
Open	  Door	  Policy	  in	  1947	  to	  court	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  
3).	  Admittedly,	  however,	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  was	  not	  Tubman’s	  brainchild,	  as	  his	  
predecessor	   Barclay	   had	   left	   the	   door	   to	   Liberia’s	   economy	   ‘ajar’	   by	   containing	  
                                                
207	  In	   1976,	   a	   completely	   overhauled	   Agreement	   forced	   Firestone	   to	   pay	   all	   taxes	   of	   general	  
application	   and	   provide	   basic	   services	   such	   as	   housing,	   healthcare,	   and	   education	   facilities	   to	  





hinterland	   rebellion;	   signing	   concession	   agreements	   in	   the	   1930s	   with	   Dutch,	  
German,	  Danish	  and	  Polish	  investors;	  making	  the	  US	  dollar	  the	  sole	  legal	  tender	  in	  
the	  country;	  and	  convincing	  the	  US	  government	  to	  construct	  a	  seaport	  in	  Monrovia	  
(Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  41-­‐43).	  Tubman	  knew	  that	  further	  compromises	  would	  have	  
to	   be	   made	   with	   hinterland	   inhabitants	   to	   ensure	   the	   success	   of	   his	   economic	  
agenda,	  thus	  his	  simultaneous	  introduction	  of	  the	  Unification	  and	  Integration	  Policy	  
expanding	   citizenship	   to	  propertied	   indigenes	   and	   settler	  women	   (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  
1983:	   3;	   6).	   Although	   the	   Unification	   Policy	   expanded	   citizenship	   rights	   and	  
obligations	  to	  a	  larger	  percentage	  of	  Liberians,	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  of	  1947-­‐1971	  
placed	  profit	  and	  corporate	  interests	  above	  citizenship	  claims.	  	  	  
	  
Tubman	  did	  not	  merely	  open	  the	  door	  of	  Liberia’s	  economy	  to	  global	  capital	  flows;	  
he	  unhinged	  it.	  The	  government	  granted	  to	  European	  and	  American	  concessionaires	  
extended	   tax	   holidays,	   prolonged	   periods	   of	   exemption	   on	   import/export	   duties,	  
special	  tax	  tariffs,	  and	  large	  tax	  deductible	  items	  in	  instances	  where	  investors	  were	  
required	   to	  pay	   taxes	   (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  xvii).	  Nevertheless,	   similar	   incentives	  
were	   not	   accorded	   black	   African	   investors	   for	   fear	   that	   they	   would	   legitimately	  
pursue	   legal	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  and	  unsettle	  the	  economic	  power	  base	  of	  settler	  
elites	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  45).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  corporate	  incentives,	  Firestone’s	  
profits	  after	  taxes	  in	  1951	  “amounted	  to	  three	  times	  the	  total	  income	  of	  the	  Liberian	  
treasury	   for	   the	   same	   year”	   and	   revenues	   from	   the	   Liberia	   Mining	   Company,	  
Liberia’s	   first	   iron	   ore	   mine,	   “surpassed	   the	   total	   revenues	   of	   the	   Liberian	  
government	  until	  1960”	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  xvii).	  Trade	  came	  with	  other	  major	  
allowances.	  For	  instance,	  Liberia	  revised	  its	  Investment	  Code	  of	  1966	  to	  grant	  duty	  
free	   privileges	   on	   the	   importation	   of	   machinery	   and	   equipment	   and	   granted	   tax	  
holidays	  for	  a	  period	  of	  five	  years,	  amongst	  other	  perks	  to	  investors	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  50).	  
American	   and	   European	   multi-­‐nationals	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   inexperience	   of	  
Liberian	   government	   administrators	   and	   lax	   regulatory	   controls	  by	   evading	   taxes,	  
illegally	  exploiting	  and	  exporting	  natural	  resources,	  and	  erecting	  complicated	  legal	  
red	  tape	  with	  adverse	  results	  for	  the	  Liberian	  state	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  xvii).	  For	  
example,	   the	   Liberian	   American	   and	   Swedish	   Mineral	   Corporation	   (LAMCO),	   the	  
largest	  multinational	  in	  the	  mining	  sector	  at	  the	  time,	  earned	  profits	  of	  over	  US$500	  




paid	   the	   Liberian	   government	   US$100	   million	   in	   royalties	   (Kieh,	   2012b:	   8;	   96).	  
Companies	  were	  also	  granted	  “the	  freedom	  to	  repatriate	  profits”	  and	  “the	  freedom	  
to	  suppress	  workers”	  while	  Liberian	  citizens	  were	  denied	  the	  right	   to	   form	  labour	  
unions	   thereby	   undermining	   the	   freedom	   of	   association	   enshrined	   in	   the	  
Constitution	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  77;	  82).	  	  
	  
Akin	  to	  the	  Firestone	  agreement,	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  constrained	  the	  capacity	  of	  
the	  Liberian	   state	   to	   take	   full	   responsibility	   for	   its	   citizens,	   thereby	  eroding	   state-­‐
citizen	   relations.	   Between	   1950	   and	   1960	   investors	   developed	   roads,	   railroads,	  
ports,	  power	  and	   communications	  primarily	   for	   concession	  operations	  and	  export	  
(Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  137-­‐143).	  Concessionnaires	  also	  provided	  workers	  with	   low-­‐
cost	   and	   low-­‐quality	   housing,	   schools	   and	  medical	   facilities	   (Clower,	   et.	   al,	   1966:	  
136-­‐137).	   Liberia	   became	   increasingly	   dependent	   on	   foreign	   aid	   to	   fund	   public	  
sector	  projects	  and	  programmes,	  and	  spent	  much	  of	  its	  income	  on	  debt	  servicing.	  At	  
the	  end	  of	  1961,	  Liberia	  had	  an	  external	  debt	  of	  US$100	  million,	  and	  committed	  to	  
paying	   US$14	  million	   a	   year	   between	   1963	   and	   1969	   (Clower,	   et.	   al,	   1966:	   280).	  
Foreign	   aid	   essentially	   served	   as	   a	   conduit	   for	  multinational	   expansion,	  with	   new	  
overseas	  markets	  developed	  for	  exploitation	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  118-­‐119).	  Between	  1951	  
and	  1961	  alone,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  gave	  US$146	  million	  to	  Liberia	  in	  aid	  
(Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  39).	  From	  1950	  to	  1962,	  the	  UN	  also	  provided	  US$3	  million	  in	  
technical	  assistance	  (Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  374).	  In	  1962,	  American	  aid	  to	  Liberia	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  loans	  and	  grants	  was	  the	  equivalent	  of	  one-­‐third	  of	  Liberian	  government	  
revenues,	   with	   aid	   programmes	   conditioned	   on	   the	   acceptance	   of	   foreign	  
expatriates	  as	  technical	  assistants	  (Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  361).	  	  
	  
Despite	  Liberia’s	  deficient	  gains	  from	  its	  abundant	  natural	  resource	  wealth	  and	  the	  
attendant	  erosion	  of	   state-­‐citizen	   relations,	   it	  would	  be	  misleading	   to	  assume	   that	  
the	   country	  hardly	  benefitted	   from	   incorporation	   into	   the	   global	   capitalist	   system	  
during	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy.	  Between	  1955	  and	  1975,	  Liberia	  recorded	  an	  average	  
growth	  rate	  of	  7	  percent	  annually,	  bringing	  the	  country	  very	  close	  to	  middle-­‐income	  
status	   primarily	   because	   iron	   ore	   accounted	   for	   over	   half	   of	   the	   country’s	   export	  
earnings	  with	  rubber	  and	  other	  cash	  crops	  accounting	  for	  15	  percent	  (Government	  




rubber	   and	   timber	   without	   value	   addition,	   accounted	   for	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   the	  
economy	  than	  imports,	  before	  leveling	  off	  in	  1960	  (Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  29).	  In	  1971,	  
the	   year	   of	   Tubman’s	   death,	   iron	   ore	   export	   earning	   was	   US$160.6	   million,	  
accounting	   for	  65	  percent	   of	   Liberia’s	   total	   exports.	  Another	  major	   export	   earner,	  
rubber,	   was	   equally	   as	   lucrative;	   in	   1950,	   rubber	   accounted	   for	   91	   percent	   of	  
exports,	  dropping	  to	  45	  percent	  in	  1960	  (Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  146).	  	  In	  1971,	  rubber	  
exports	  were	  valued	  at	  US$32.5	  million,	  representing	  13	  percent	  of	  total	  exports.	  	  
	  
Although	   Liberia	   experienced	   growth	   rivaling	   that	   of	   Japan,	   its	   shining	   economic	  
outlook	  appeared	  less	  than	  impressive	  for	  some	  economists,	  primarily	  because	  the	  
state	  did	  not	   fulfill	   its	  primary	  responsibility	   to	   its	  citizens.	  Clower,	  et	  al	   famously	  
coined	   the	   term	   ‘growth	   without	   development’	   to	   describe	   Liberia’s	   economy,	  
arguing	   that	   “rapid	   growth	   in	   production	   between	   1950	   and	   1960	   has	   had	   little	  
developmental	   impact	   on	   Liberia	   or	   Liberians”	   (Clower,	   et.	   al,	   1966:	   vi).	   Indicting	  
Liberia’s	  concession	  driven	  growth	  further,	  they	  concluded	  that:	  
	  
…enormous	   growth	   in	   primary	   commodities	   produced	   by	   foreign	  
concessions	   for	  export	  has	  been	  unaccompanied	  either	  by	  structural	  
changes	  to	  induce	  complementary	  growth	  or	  by	  institutional	  changes	  
to	  diffuse	  gains	  in	  real	  income	  among	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  population…It	  
has	  increased	  the	  wage	  bill	  for	  unskilled	  labour	  and	  has	  expanded	  tax	  
revenues	  received	  by	  the	  government.	  But	  the	  enlarged	  wage	  bill	  has	  
not	   induced	   expansion	   of	   domestic	   production	   of	   goods	   bought	   by	  
wage	   workers;	   it	   has	   merely	   raised	   imports.	   And	   increased	   tax	  
revenues	   have	   been	   spent	   for	   the	   most	   part	   in	   ways	   that	   do	   not	  
appreciably	  increase	  the	  productive	  capacity	  of	  the	  nation	  (Clower,	  et.	  
al,	  1966:	  vi).	  	  
	  
Moreover,	   Liberia’s	   initial	   growth	   spurt	   spelled	   economic	   doom	   for	   the	   vast	  
majority	  of	  citizens	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Tubman’s	  reign:	  
	  
In	  1970,	  less	  than	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  labour	  force	  was	  employed	  in	  the	  
formal	   modern	   sector,	   while	   74	   percent	   was	   employed	   in	   low-­‐
productivity	   agriculture.	   Concessions	   employed	   only	   7	   percent	   of	  
workers,	   despite	   their	   large	   share	   in	   GDP	   and	   exports.	   Wage	  
inequalities	  across	  the	  sectors	  were	  stark:	  in	  1974,	  per	  capita	  GDP	  in	  
the	  agricultural	  economy	  was	  less	  than	  US$120	  per	  year,	  compared	  to	  
almost	  US$900	  in	  the	  cash-­‐crop	  economy	  and	  an	  estimated	  US$2,500	  




controlled	  more	   than	  60	  percent	  of	   income,	  and	  a	   large	  share	  of	   the	  
benefits	   from	   enclave	   sectors	   was	   repatriated	   by	   foreign	   investors.	  
Human	  capital	  levels	  were	  extremely	  low,	  with	  only	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  
labour	  force	  (above	  age	  15)	  literate.	  The	  average	  level	  of	  educational	  
achievement	   in	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole	   was	   only	   1.3	   years	  
(Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  2).	  	  
	  
With	   global	   declines	   in	   commodity	   prices	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   Liberia’s	   inability	   to	  
capture	   revenues	   from	   natural	   resources,	   the	   country’s	   citizens	   began	   to	   feel	   the	  
pinch	   of	   economic	   decline	   thereby	   leading	   to	   mass	   civil	   unrest,	   as	   discussed	   in	  
Chapter	  V.	  In	  response	  to	  harsh	  labour	  practices,	  poor	  working	  conditions	  and	  low	  
salaries,	   workers	   at	   Firestone	   launched	   strikes	   in	   1961,	   1964	   and	   1975,	   LAMCO	  
workers	  launched	  a	  strike	  in	  1978,	  and	  Bong	  Mining	  Company	  workers	  launched	  a	  
strike	  in	  1979	  to	  protest	  the	  Liberian	  government’s	  complicity	  in	  their	  plight	  (Kieh,	  
2012b:	  82).	  	  
	  
Contrary	  to	  claims	  made	  by	  free	  market	  and	  pro-­‐globalisation	  proponents,	  Liberia’s	  
Open	  Door	  Policy	   did	   not	   reap	   the	   kinds	   of	   benefits	   that	   it	   should	  have	   given	   the	  
magnitude	  of	  resource	  extraction,	  particularly	   in	   iron	  ore	  and	  rubber.	  Because	   the	  
export	  of	  iron	  ore	  and	  rubber	  was	  based	  on	  capitalist	  demands,	  Western	  countries	  
often	  set	  the	  price	  of	  exports	  thereby	  making	  Liberia	  vulnerable	  to	  price	  fluctuations	  
(Kieh,	   2012b:	   77).	   Furthermore	   companies	   like	   LAMCO	   and	   the	   Bong	   Mining	  
Company	   held	   a	   monopoly	   in	   iron	   ore	   while	   Firestone,	   the	   Liberia	   Agricultural	  
Corporation	   and	   B.F.	   Goodrich	   dominated	   rubber	   (Kieh,	   2012b:	   77).	   Most	  
importantly,	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   earnings	   did	   not	   fundamentally	   transform	   the	  
material	   conditions	   of	  most	   Liberians,	   leaving	   behind	   a	   legacy	   of	   ‘growth	  without	  
development’	  (Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966),	  as	  well	  as	  tense	  relations	  between	  Liberia	  and	  
its	  citizens.	  According	  to	  Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  can	  be	  
attributed	   to	   settler	   elites	   who	   voluntary	   entered	   into	   economic	   alliances	   with	  
American	   and	   European	   foreign	   investors	   rather	   than	   genuinely	   cooperating	   and	  
integrating	  with	  hinterland	  inhabitants	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  xvii).	  	  
	  
Despite	  its	  major	  fault-­‐lines,	  the	  Open	  Door	  Policy’s	  legacy	  has	  endured,	  particularly	  




After	  steady	  increases	  in	  subsequent	  years,	  followed	  by	  a	  decline	  in	  1977	  because	  of	  
the	  oil	   crisis,	   Liberia’s	   iron	   export	   earning	   in	  1980,	   the	   year	   of	   the	  April	   12	   coup,	  
reached	  an	  all	  time	  high	  of	  US$310.2	  million	  (Kieh,	  1992:42-­‐43).	  In	  the	  1980s,	  iron	  
ore	  accounted	  for	  27	  percent	  of	  GDP	  and	  represented	  58	  percent	  of	  total	  exports	  in	  
1988	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  130).	  Rubber	  exports	  tripled	  to	  US$102.2	  million	  in	  1980,	  at	  17	  
percent	   of	   the	   total,	   and	   accounted	   for	   29	   percent	   of	   total	   exports	   in	   1988	   (Kieh,	  
1992:	  42-­‐46;	  Kieh,	  2012b:	  130).	  Liberia	  exported	   iron	  ore	  and	  rubber	   rather	   than	  
manufacturing	  raw	  materials,	  with	  iron	  ore	  and	  rubber	  accounting	  for	  88	  percent	  of	  
Liberia’s	  total	  exports	  by	  1989	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  76).	  Nevertheless,	  continued	  increases	  
in	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  did	  not	  benefit	   labour.	   In	  the	  1980s,	  unemployment	  
was	  rampant,	  with	  Firestone	  reducing	  its	  workforce	  from	  22,000	  in	  1960	  to	  5,000	  in	  
1985	  and	   the	  mining	   sector	   experiencing	   similar	   labour	   force	   retrenchment,	   from	  
14,200	  employees	  in	  1975	  to	  less	  than	  5,000	  in	  1985	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  134).	  	  
Similarly,	  increases	  in	  aid	  accompanied	  major	  debt	  servicing	  that	  effectively	  limited	  
government’s	   social	   spending.	   Liberia’s	   total	   foreign	   aid	   expanded	   from	   US$11.3	  
million	  in	  1971	  to	  US$16.0	  million	  in	  1975;	  between	  1975	  and	  1980,	  aid	  had	  surged	  
to	   US$24.5	  million	   and	   from	   1980	   to	   1985	   aid	   increased	   from	  US$210	  million	   to	  
US$290	  million	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  49;	  Kieh,	  2012b:	  90).	  Between	  fiscal	  years	  1975/1976	  
to	  1979/1980,	  Liberia’s	  debt	   servicing	   increased	   from	  US$22.1	  million	   to	  US$49.1	  
million,	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	   invest	   in	   basic	   social	   services	   such	   as	   health	   and	  
education	   and	   relegating	   the	   country	   to	   a	   vicious	   circle	   of	   debt	   bondage	   thus	  
reducing	  its	  autonomy	  in	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policy	  making	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  52;	  56).	  
By	  1980,	  Liberia	  had	  accrued	  a	  foreign	  debt	  of	  US$594.7	  million,	  excluding	  interest,	  
and	  the	  country	  spent	  most	  of	  its	  national	  budget	  on	  debt	  servicing	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  52).	  
In	   1980	   and	   1984,	   Liberia	   was	   forced	   to	   accept	   structural	   adjustment	  
conditionalities	   such	  as	   reducing	   the	  wages	  of	   employees	   in	   the	  public	   sector	   and	  
slashing	  public	  investments	  in	  education	  and	  health	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  94).	  As	  part	  of	  the	  
IMF’s	   “Economic	   Recovery	   Programme,”	   the	   Liberian	   government	   reduced	   the	  
salaries	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  by	  17	  percent	  and	  25	  percent	  in	  1981	  and	  1985,	  
respectively	   (Kieh,	   2012b:	   133).	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   V,	   increased	   foreign	   aid	  
and	   its	   attendant	   debt	   servicing	   created	   increasingly	   politicised	   citizens	   who	  




Liberia’s	  armed	  conflicts	  represented	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  depravity	  of	  Open	  Door,	  
during	   which	   a	   policy	   of	   plunder	   was	   adopted	   that	   severely	   eroded	   state-­‐citizen	  
relations.	   State	   resources	   were	   bartered	   off	   to	   the	   highest	   bidder	   with	   GDP	   per	  
capita	  falling	  by	  90	  percent	  between	  1987	  and	  1994	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2008a:	  
15;	   Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011a:	   57).	   Between	   1990	   and	   1994	   alone,	   it	   is	  
estimated	   that	   more	   than	   US$500	   million	   was	   accumulated	   yearly	   by	   leaders	   of	  
armed	   factions	   and	   their	   associates	   from	   exports	   in	   rubber,	   diamonds	   and	   other	  
natural	   resources;	   Charles	   Taylor	   reportedly	   accrued	   US$75	   million	   annually	  
(Sawyer,	   2005:	   38).	   His	   regime	   beginning	   1997	   reflected	   a	   further	   perversion	   of	  
Open	  Door.	  The	  presumed	  gains	  in	  foreign	  exchange	  earnings	  from	  exports	  in	  iron	  
ore	   and	   rubber	   were	   compromised	   by	   the	   high	   importation	   costs	   of	   most	   of	  
Liberia’s	   food	  products,	   including	  the	  staple	  crop	  rice,	  as	  well	  as	  mineral	   fuels	  and	  
other	  petroleum	  products	  (Kieh,	  1992:	  46).	  	  
	  
Like	  some	  of	  his	  predecessors,	  Taylor	  proved	  early	  on	  that	  he	  was	  more	  interested	  
in	   capital	   accumulation	   than	   strengthening	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   For	   example,	  
when	  Firestone	  workers	  demonstrated	  against	  the	  company’s	  arbitrary	  decision	  in	  
1997	  to	  deduct	  38	  percent	  of	  their	  monthly	  salaries	  to	  replace	  money	  that	  had	  been	  
allegedly	  stolen	   in	   the	  company’s	   safe	  deposit	  box	  during	   the	   first	  Liberian	  armed	  
conflict,	   President	   Taylor	   unleashed	   his	   security	   personnel	   to	   indiscriminately	  
attack	  7000	  unarmed	  demonstrators	  thereby	  muzzling	  dissent	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  206).	  	  
In	  1999,	  he	  signed	  a	  deal	  with	  an	   Indonesian	  owned	  corporation,	  Oriental	  Timber	  
Company	  (OTC),	  which	  had	  a	  dismal	  environmental	   record,	  and	  granted	   it	   logging	  
rights	  to	  close	  to	  half	  of	  Liberia’s	  rain	  forest	  (Sawyer,	  2005:	  38).	  	  
	  
Taylor	  operated	  a	  post-­‐war	  economy	  of	  seismic	  proportions;	  while	  smuggling	  Sierra	  
Leonean	  diamonds	  to	  fuel	  that	  country’s	  armed	  conflict,	  he	  was	  reportedly	  wheeling	  
and	  dealing	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  South	  African	  diamond	  producer	  DeBeers,	  Al-­‐Qaida,	  the	  
American	  evangelist	  Pat	  Robertson	  and	  lesser	  known	  but	  equally	  pernicious	  Dutch,	  
Ukrainian,	   and	   Italian	   businessmen	   (Sawyer,	   2005:	   38-­‐39).	   This	   prompted	   the	  
United	  Nations	   to	   impose	   sanctions	   on	   Liberia’s	   diamonds	   in	   2001	   and	   timber	   in	  
2003,	   respectively,	   precipitated	   by	   investigations	   by	   Liberian	   environmental	  




with	  the	  UK-­‐based	  natural	  resources	  watchdog	  Global	  Witness	  (Global	  Witness	  and	  
the	  International	  Transport	  Workers	  Federation,	  2001).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  analysis	  thus	  far	  that	  Tubman’s	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  had	  continued	  
relevance	   beyond	  his	   27-­‐year	   term.	   It	   facilitated	   flows	   of	   capital	   in	   trade	   and	   aid,	  
thus	   fully	   incorporating	   Liberia	   into	   the	   global	   capitalist	   system.	   Yet,	   economic	  
growth	  was	   largely	   based	   on	   extraction	  without	   value	   addition.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
Open	  Door	   Policy	   positioned	   foreign	   corporate	   interests	   above	   the	   Liberian	   state,	  
shifted	   domestic	   expenditure	   from	   social	   spending	   to	   debt	   servicing,	   undermined	  
labour	   rights,	   all	   the	   while	   eroding	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	  
examine	  how	  Liberia’s	  21st	  century	  post-­‐war	  regime	  has	  expanded	  Open	  Door	  with	  
some	  measured	   reforms	   affecting	   Liberians	   home	   and	   abroad,	   thereby	   facilitating	  
claims	  for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	  citizenship.	  	  
	  
Post-­‐War	  Economic	  Development	  Re-­‐Opens	  the	  Floodgates	  of	  Global	  Capital	  
Flows	  	  
Ellen	   Johnson	   Sirleaf,	   Liberia’s	   current	   president,	   has	   extended	   Tubman’s	   Open	  
Door	  Policy	   by	  maintaining	   a	   neo-­‐liberal	   economic	   agenda	   largely	   dictated	  by	   the	  
World	  Bank	   and	   the	   IMF.	  Through	   “increased	  privatisation	  of	   the	  major	  means	  of	  
production	   and	   the	   minimalist	   state	   as	   the	   compass	   for	   guiding	   economic	  
development”	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  229),	  Liberia	  has	  facilitated	  the	  globalisation	  of	  capital	  
through	   increased	   flows	   of	   trade	   and	   investments,	   aid,	   and	   remittances	   under	  
Sirleaf’s	   tutelage.	  Unlike	  Tubman,	   however,	   she	  has	   instituted	   reforms	   to	  mitigate	  
the	  negative	   impact	  of	   economic	  globalisation	  on	  Liberia’s	   citizens,	   and	  embarked	  
on	  a	   ‘Look	  South’	  policy	  courting	  investors	  from	  China,	  Indonesia,	  Malaysia,	  Brazil,	  
and	   Nigeria,	   as	   much	   as	   the	   US	   and	   Europe	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2014:	   24).	  
Nevertheless,	  Liberia’s	  current	  participation	  in	  the	  global	  capitalist	  system	  severely	  
undermines	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  because	   it	  places	  profits	  above	  people	  and	  GDP	  
growth	  above	  human	  development.	  Citing	  the	  initial	  protectionist	  measures	  adopted	  
by	  countries	  such	  as	  China	  and	   India,	  Held	  contends	   that	   “for	  a	  country	   to	  benefit	  
from	  sustained	  development,	  its	  priority	  should	  be	  internal	  economic	  integration—
the	  development	  of	   its	  human	  capital,	  of	   its	  economic	   infrastructure	  and	  of	  robust	  




production	  where	  feasible”	  not	  “the	  single-­‐minded	  pursuit	  of	  integration	  into	  world	  
markets”	   (Held,	   2005:	   13).	   Granted,	   Liberia’s	   ‘single-­‐minded	   pursuit’	   of	   global	  
capitalist	   re-­‐integration	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   need	   to	   bounce	   back	   from	  
devastating	  economic	  stagnation;	  yet	  the	  path	  it	  has	  taken	  remains	  contested.	  	  
	  
Though	  efforts	  are	  laudable	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  post-­‐war	  economic	  recovery—steady	  
growth	  rates	  of	  5.3	  percent,	  6.1	  percent,	  7.9	  percent	  and	  8.3	  percent	  in	  2009,	  2010,	  
2011,	   and	  2012,	   respectively;	  US$1.3	  billion	   in	   foreign	  direct	   investment	  between	  
2006	   and	   2010	   in	   traditional	   sectors	   such	   as	   forestry,	   rubber,	   and	   mining;	   and	  
increases	   in	   export	   revenue	   from	   US$175	  million	   in	   2006	   to	   US$295.2	  million	   in	  
2011	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2008b:	   17;	   Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011a:	   4;	   26;	  
Hettinger	   and	   James,	   2014)—these	  developments	  have	  not	   rendered	   fundamental	  
changes	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   Liberians,	   64	   percent	   of	   whom	   still	   live	   in	   abject	   poverty	  
(Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2008a:	   16).	   For	   example,	   when	   in	   2008	   the	   government	  
devised	  a	   three-­‐year	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy	  as	  a	   conditionality	   for	  debt	   relief	  
under	  the	  Heavily	  Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	  (HIPC)	  initiative,	  many	  Liberians	  dubbed	  
the	  PRS	  the	  ‘Poverty	  Enhancement	  Strategy.’	  
	  
Table	  15:	  Liberia’s	  Post-­‐War	  Real	  GDP	  Growth	  Rates	  (2004-­‐2015)	  
Year	   Real	  GDP	  Growth	  (%)	  
2004	   4.1	  
2005	   5.9	  
2006	   8.9	  
2007	   13.2	  
2008	   6.2	  
2009	   5.3	  
2010	   6.1	  
2011	   7.9	  
2012	   8.3	  
2013	   8.1	  (estimated)	  
2014	   6.8	  (projected)	  
2015	   8.2	  (projected)	  
Sources:	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  African	  Economic	  Outlook	  
	  
Despite	   Liberia’s	   consistent	   post-­‐war	   growth,	   as	   Table	   15	   demonstrates,	  
development	  is	  elusive	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  its	  citizens.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  Liberia	  
ranked	   174th	   among	   186	   countries	   in	   the	   2013	   Human	   Development	   Index—




(United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  2011:	  130;	  United	  Nations	  Development	  
Programme,	   2013:	   146).	   Most	   citizens	   lack	   access	   to	   electricity,	   health	   facilities,	  
feeder	   roads,	   quality	   education,	   finance,	   and	   secure	   land	   tenure,	   amongst	   other	  
development	  challenges.	  According	  to	  the	  2010	  Labour	  Force	  Survey,	  78	  percent	  of	  
Liberia’s	   work	   force	   is	   engaged	   in	   “vulnerable	   employment”	   without	   a	   steady	  
income,	  and	  68	  percent	  are	  employed	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  
2011b:	   xiii).	  More	   than	   half	   of	   formal	   sector	  workers	   are	   employed	   by	   the	   public	  
sector,	   with	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   non-­‐political	   appointees	   earning	   uncompetitive	  
salaries	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2014:	  27).	  Furthermore,	  Liberia’s	  economy	  is	  still	  
reliant	  on	  donor	  aid—which	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  overall	  spending	  
on	  education	  and	  health—and	  exports	  of	  unprocessed	  raw	  materials	  and	  minerals,	  
prices	  of	  which	  fluctuate	  according	  to	  global	  demands	  thereby	  adversely	  impacting	  
the	  local	  economy	  and	  government	  revenues	  (Hettinger	  and	  James,	  2014:	  4;	  11-­‐12).	  
The	  country’s	  staple	  food,	  rice,	  is	  still	  widely	  imported	  (Hettinger	  and	  James,	  2014:	  
4).	   Effectively,	   economic	   globalisation	  has	   constrained	   the	   government’s	   ability	   to	  
respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  its	  homeland	  citizens,	  thereby	  causing	  backlash	  against	  the	  
presumed	   privileges	   of	   would-­‐be	   dual	   citizens.	   The	   sections	   that	   follow	   examine	  
how	  global	  flows	  of	  trade	  and	  investments,	  aid	  and	  remittances	  have	  simultaneously	  
improved	  and	  weakened	  state-­‐citizen	  relations.	  	  
	  
Measured	  Reforms	  in	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Still	  Harken	  Back	  to	  Open	  Door	  
When	   Sirleaf	   assumed	   office	   in	   2006,	   she	   committed	   her	   administration	   to	  
reviewing208 	  all	   concession	   agreements	   in	   keeping	   with	   a	   mandate	   from	   the	  
internationally	   supported	   and	   financed	   Governance	   and	   Economic	   Management	  
Assistance	   Program	   (GEMAP)	   instituted	   in	   2005	   under	   the	   National	   Transitional	  
Government	  of	  Liberia	  (NTGL)	  (National	  Resource	  Governance	  Institute,	  2008).	  The	  
new	   administration	   began	   with	   renegotiations	   of	   the	   Mittal	   Steel	   and	   Firestone	  
agreements,	  respectively,	  signed	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Transitional	  Government,	  
largely	   because	   the	   NTGL	   had	   been	   accused	   of	   gross	   mismanagement	   of	   public	  
finances	  during	  its	  tenure	  (UN	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  on	  Liberia,	  2005;	  Natural	  Resources	  
Governance	  Institute,	  2008).	  	  
                                                





Mittal	  Steel:	  The	  government	  in	  2006	  revised	  the	  Mineral	  Development	  Agreement	  
(MDA)	  of	  2005	  with	  Mittal	  Steel	  Liberia	  Limited,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  ArcelorMittal	  (the	  
world’s	  largest	  steel	  company),	  thereby	  increasing	  investment	  from	  US$1	  billion	  to	  
US$1.5	  billion	   for	   a	   period	  of	   25	   years.	   The	   amended	   agreement	  has	   a	  number	  of	  
positive	  outcomes,	  detailed	   in	  Table	  16,	   such	  as	   the	  requirement	   that	  Mittal	  pay	  a	  
reduced	  withholding	  tax,	   inspection	  and	  ECOWAS	  fees	  (Government	  of	  Liberia	  and	  
Mittal	  Steel	  Liberia	  Limited,	  2006).	  Although	  the	  Mittal	  Agreement	  is	  generally	  more	  
favourable	   than	   its	   Firestone	   counterpart,	   UK-­‐based	   governance	  watchdog	   Global	  
Witness	   flagged	   its	   negative	   outcomes,	   also	   detailed	   in	   the	   table	   (Global	  Witness,	  
2007).	  	  
	  
Table	  16:	  Positive	  and	  Negative	  Outcomes	  of	  Mittal	  Amended	  MDA	  	  
Positive	  Outcomes	  	   Negative	  Outcomes	  
The	   Buchanan	   port	   and	   Yekepa-­‐
Buchanan	   railway	   remain	   the	   sole	  
property	  of	  the	  government	  of	  Liberia	  
The	   government	   of	   Liberia	   cannot	  
inspect	  Mittal’s	  operations	  without	  prior	  
notice,	  severely	  limiting	  oversight	  
Mittal	   must	   rehabilitate	   the	   Buchanan	  
port	   and	   Yekepa-­‐Buchanan	   railroad	   in	  
three	  and	  four	  years,	  respectively	  
Mittal	   has	   limited	   environmental	  
obligations,	   beyond	   a	   vague	   stipulation	  
that	   it	   must	   comply	   with	   the	  
Environmental	   Protection	   and	  
Management	  Law	  of	  Liberia	  
Mittal	  must	  hire	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  to	   fill	  
the	  role	  of	  one	  of	  three	  senior	  managers,	  
with	  25	  percent	  and	  50	  percent	  of	  senior	  
management	   positions	   to	   be	   filled	   by	  
Liberians	   within	   5	   and	   10	   years,	  
respectively	  
Mittal	   has	   unlimited	   rights	   to	   remove,	  
extract,	   and	   use	   timber	   free	   of	   charge,	  
except	   protected	   species,	   thereby	  
severely	   compromising	   Liberia’s	   timber	  
reserves	  
Mittal	   must	   cover	   US$200,000	   per	   year	  
for	   overseas	   scholarships	   for	   Liberians	  
to	   study	   abroad	   in	   mining	   related	  
disciplines	  
N/A	  
Sources:	  Government	  of	  Liberia,	  Mittal	  Steel	  Liberia	  Limited,	  and	  Global	  Witness	  	  
	  
Firestone:	   After	   extended	   negotiations,	   the	   government	   in	   2008	   revised	   the	  
Firestone	   agreement	   of	   2005,	   with	   Firestone	   committing	   a	   total	   post-­‐war	   capital	  
investment	   of	   US$135.3	   million	   through	   2041.	   The	   amended	   agreement,	   which	  
included	  a	  number	  of	  positive	  outcomes	  detailed	  in	  Table	  17,	  increased	  the	  income	  
tax	   rate	   of	   Firestone	   from	   25	   to	   30	   percent	   and	   limited	   the	   concession	   area	   to	  
118,990	   acres	   (Government	   of	   Liberia	   and	   Firestone	   Liberia,	   2008).	   Despite	   the	  




based	  Save	  My	  Future	  Foundation	  (SMFF)	  and	  Global	  Witness	  highlighted	  a	  number	  
of	  negative	  outcomes,	  also	  detailed	  in	  the	  table	  (SMFF	  and	  Global	  Witness,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Table	  17:	  Positive	  and	  Negative	  Outcomes	  of	  Firestone	  Amended	  Agreement	  	  
Positive	  Outcomes	  	   Negative	  Outcomes	  
Firestone	  must	  invest	  US$10	  million	  in	  a	  
rubber	   wood	   factory	   to	   produce	   sawn	  
timber	   and	   other	   wood	   products	   for	  
export	  and	  domestic	  use	  
The	  US	  based	  parent	  company,	  Firestone	  
Tire	   and	  Company,	   is	  not	   a	  party	   to	   the	  
contract,	   and	   therefore	   is	   not	   liable	   for	  
breaches	  in	  the	  agreement	  
Firestone	  must	  pay	  US$2.00	  per	  acre	  per	  
year	  for	  leased	  land	  (up	  from	  US$.50	  per	  
acre	  in	  the	  previous	  agreement),	   limited	  
import	   duties	   on	   rice	   and	   fuel,	   the	  
ECOWAS	   trade	   levy,	   and	   real	   property	  
taxes	  
The	   agreement	   was	   subject	   to	   very	  
limited	   public	   scrutiny,	   with	   only	   two	  
days	  carved	  out	  for	  public	  consultations	  
Firestone	   must	   maintain	   a	   workforce	  
that	   comprises	   at	   least	   50	   percent	  
Liberian	   citizens,	   and	   hire	   at	   least	   30	  
percent	   Liberian	   citizens	   for	   senior	  
management	  positions	  
Liberian	   workers	   cannot	   challenge	  
Firestone	   if	   it	   reneges	  on	   its	  promise	  of	  
social	   benefits	   such	   as	   housing,	  
education	  and	  health	  
Firestone	   must	   replant	   at	   least	   50,000	  
acres	   of	   rubber	   trees	   from	   2017	   and	  
thereafter	  at	  least	  65,000	  acres	  
The	   agreement	   does	   not	   hold	   Firestone	  
to	   best	   practices	   elsewhere,	   such	   as	   in	  
environmental	   standards	   and	   water	  
cleanliness	  
Firestone	   must	   procure	   goods	   and	  
services	   produced	   by	   Liberians	   in-­‐
country	   and	   provide	   smallholder	  
Liberian	   rubber	   farmers	   with	   700,000	  
rubber	   stumps	   per	   year	   free	   of	   charge	  
and	  of	  the	  same	  quality	  as	  Firestone’s	  
The	   force	   majeure	   clause	   enables	  
Firestone	   to	  withdraw	   from	   contractual	  
obligations	   in	   the	   case	   of	   industrial	  
strikes	  or	  employee-­‐employer	  disputes	  
Firestone	  must	   build	   new	   housing	   with	  
basic	   amenities	   of	   running	   water,	  
electricity	   and	   indoor	   latrines,	   and	  
continue	   to	   provide	   health	   care	   and	  
education	   through	   Firestone-­‐managed	  
clinics	   and	   schools	   for	   its	   over	   7500	  
employees	  
The	   agreement	   severely	   stifles	   the	  
labour	   rights	   of	   Liberian	   workers,	  
limiting	  their	  ability	  to	  form	  unions	  
Sources:	  Government	  of	  Liberia,	  Firestone	  Liberia,	  Save	  My	  Future	  Foundation	  and	  
Global	  Witness	  	  
	  
A	   comprehensive	   assessment	   of	   each	   amended	   agreement	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	  
this	  thesis,	  but	  suffice	   it	   to	  say	  that	  each	  has	  its	  merits	  and	  demerits.	  For	   instance,	  
while	   the	   Mittal	   Agreement	   is	   more	   favourable	   to	   labour	   rights,	   the	   Firestone	  
agreement	   mandates	   more	   value	   addition.	   Although	   there	   is	   continuous	   debate	  




it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  amended	  agreements	  reconciled	  asymmetries	  of	  power	  between	  
the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   its	   two	   initial	   post-­‐war	   investors,	   thereby	   invariably	  
improving	  state-­‐citizen	  relations.	  Under	  the	  renegotiated	  agreements,	  Firestone	  and	  
Mittal	   became	   subject	   to	   all	   Liberian	   laws	   of	   general	   application,	   including	  
environmental	   regulations,	   therefore	   symbolically	   placing	   corporate	   citizenship	  
‘below’	   the	   Liberian	   state	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   country’s	   history.	   Although	   the	  
amended	  agreements	  represented	  conditionalities	  set	  by	  external	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  
IMF,	   they	  set	  a	  precedent	   for	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	   trade	  and	   investment	  portfolio	  by	  
highlighting	   the	   need	   to	   match	   pro-­‐capitalist	   economic	   growth	   with	   pro-­‐citizen	  
holistic	  development.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  investment	  reforms	  that	  followed	  the	  amended	  agreements,	  Liberia’s	  
concession	  related	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  increased	  from	  US$153	  million	  in	  2010	  
to	  US$431	  million	  in	  2011	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2014:	  24).	  	  Concessionnaires	  are	  
now	   required	   to	   make	   contributions	   to	   Social	   Development	   Funds	   that	   support	  
basic	   social	   services	   and	   infrastructure	   within	   concession	   areas.	   As	   of	   2012,	   the	  
largest	   contribution,	   US$3	   million,	   was	   made	   by	   Mittal	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	  
2012b:	  18).	  Yet,	  all	  the	  reforms	  are	  not	  pro-­‐Liberia	  or	  pro-­‐Liberians.	  The	  country’s	  
revised	   Investment	   Incentive	   and	   Revenue	   codes	   of	   2010,	   for	   instance,	   exempt	  
concessionaires	  who	  invest	  up	  to	  US$20	  million	  from	  import	  duties	  on	  machinery,	  
equipment,	   spare	   parts,	   and	   raw	   materials	   for	   concession-­‐related	   projects,	   thus	  
depriving	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   local	   entrepreneurs	   of	   essential	   revenue	  
(Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2010c;	   Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2010d).	   Although	  
concessionaires	   are	   now	   required	   to	   pay	   an	  ECOWAS	   tax	   levy,	   they	   can	   claim	   tax	  
deductions	   of	   up	   to	   30	   percent	   on	   machinery	   and	   equipment	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	   2010c;	   Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2010d).	   Furthermore,	   under	   the	   IMF’s	  
tutelage	  Liberia	  was	  compelled	  to	  decrease	  its	  minimum	  corporate	  income	  tax	  from	  
35	  percent	   in	   2010/2011	   to	  25	  percent	   in	   2011/2012	   (IMF,	   2011:	   44).	   It	   is	   clear	  
from	  these	  examples	  and	  others	   that	   follow	  that	  Liberia	  has	  repeated	  many	  of	   the	  
mistakes	  of	  the	  past	  in	  its	  ‘single-­‐minded	  pursuit’	  of	  global	  capitalist	  re-­‐integration,	  





Although	  Liberia	  has	  attempted	  to	  diversify	  its	  post-­‐war	  exports	  by	  producing	  cocoa	  
bean,	   coffee,	   round	   logs	   and	   sawn	   timber,	   it	   still	   largely	   depends	   on	   extractive	  
industries	   for	   its	   foreign	   direct	   investment,	   particularly	   in	   iron	   ore	   and	   rubber.	  
Together,	  iron	  ore	  and	  rubber	  accounted	  for	  total	  export	  earnings	  of	  68	  percent,	  66	  
percent,	   and	   82	   percent	   in	   2011,	   2012,	   and	   2012,	   respectively	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	   2013:	   31-­‐32).	   Rubber	   exports	   have	   recently	   declined	   steadily,	   accounting	  
for	   62	   percent	   (US$226.1	  million),	   40	   percent	   (US$176.8	  million)	   and	   22	   percent	  
(US$120.5	  million)	  of	  exports	  in	  2011,	  2012,	  and	  2013,	  respectively	  (Government	  of	  
Liberia,	  2013:	  31-­‐32).	  There	  has	  been	  an	  inverse	  trend	  in	  iron	  ore	  production	  which	  
has	   increased	   steadily	   since	   the	   first	   post-­‐war	   exports	   in	   2011	   by	   Mittal	   Steel,	  
accounting	   for	  6	  percent	   (US$22.2	  million),	   26	  percent	   (US$117.1	  million)	   and	  60	  
percent	   (US$312.2	  million)	   in	  2011,	  2012,	   and	  2013,	   respectively	   (Government	  of	  
Liberia,	  2013:	  31-­‐32).	  Liberia’s	  growth	  rate	  of	  8.1	  percent	  in	  2013	  was	  due	  in	  large	  
part	  to	  increases	  in	  iron	  ore	  exports	  which	  outpaced	  rubber	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  
the	  cessation	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  2003	  and	  has	  expanded	  to	  markets	  in	  Asia	  and	  the	  
US	   (Hettinger	   and	   James,	   2014:	   2;	   7;	   13).	   In	   2013,	   iron	   ore,	   rubber	   and	   timber	  
accounted	  for	  more	  than	  80	  percent	  of	  exports	  and	  an	  estimated	  22	  percent	  of	  GDP	  
(Hettinger	  and	  James,	  2014:	  13).	   In	  the	  same	  year,	  however,	  Liberia’s	   trade	  deficit	  
widened	  because	  of	  its	  continued	  reliance	  on:	  i)	  imports	  in	  primarily	  minerals,	  fuels,	  
and	  lubricants;	  machinery	  and	  transport	  equipment;	  petroleum	  products;	  and	  food	  
&	   live	   animals	   for	   domestic	   consumption;	   and	   ii)	   exports	   of	   iron	   ore	   and	   rubber,	  
prices	  of	  which	  remain	  volatile	  on	  the	  international	  market	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  
2013:	  32-­‐34).	  According	  to	  data	  in	  Table	  18,	  Liberia	  imports	  three	  times	  as	  much	  as	  
it	   exports,	   resulting	   in	   severe	   trade	   imbalances	   (Government	  of	   Liberia,	   2011a:	  2;	  
65).	  
	  
Table	  18:	  Liberia’s	  Foreign	  Trade	  Statistics	  (Millions	  in	  US	  Dollars)	  (2004-­‐2012)	  
Year	   Export	  Earnings	   Import	  Payments	   Trade	  Balance	  
2004	   103.8	   336.8	   -­‐233.0	  
2005	   131.3	   309.9	   -­‐178.6	  
2006	   157.8	   466.7	   -­‐308.9	  
2007	   200.2	   501.4	   -­‐301.2	  
2008	   242.4	   813.5	   -­‐571.1	  
2009	   148.8	   551.6	   -­‐402.8	  
2010	   222.0	   709.8	   -­‐487.8	  




2012	   444.4	   1,076.4	   -­‐632.0	  
Source:	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Liberia	  
	  
Similarly,	   Liberia’s	   heavy	   reliance	   on	   international	   commodity	   pricing	   adversely	  
affected	  the	  country	  during	  the	  2008-­‐2009	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  GDP	  declined	  from	  
7.1	  percent	   in	  2008	   to	  4.6	  percent	   in	  2009,	  with	   total	   exports	  also	  declining	   from	  
US$242	  million	  in	  2008	  to	  US$152	  million	  in	  2009;	  of	  that	  total,	  exports	   in	  rubber	  
declined	   from	   US$207	  million	   in	   2008	   to	   US$95	  million	   in	   2009	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	   2011c:	   21;	   Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2012b:	   13).	   Production	   in	   rubber	  
declined	  further	  by	  13	  percent	  in	  2013	  due	  to	  decreases	  in	  world	  market	  prices,	  and	  
timber	  production—which	  restarted	  in	  2009	  with	  a	  shipment	  to	  France	  of	  the	  very	  
first	   consignment	   of	   1917	   commercial	   logs	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011c:	   31)—
decreased	  by	  51	  percent	  because	  of	   a	  moratorium	  enacted	  by	   the	   government	  on	  
exports	   from	   Private	   Use	   Permits	   (PUPs).	   PUPs	   enabled	   logging	   companies	   to	  
bypass	  forestry	  regulations	  in	  order	  to	  access	  24	  percent	  of	  Liberia’s	  land	  mass	  (UN	  
Panel	   of	   Experts	   on	   Liberia,	   2012:	   33-­‐45;	   Sirleaf,	   2014:	   12;	   Hettinger	   and	   James,	  
2014:	  2;	  13).	  Post-­‐war	  FDI	  projections	  of	  US$16	  billion	  in	  palm	  oil,	  rubber,	  iron	  ore,	  
oil	   and	   timber	   are	   also	   elusive,	   with	   natural	   resources	   governance	   in	   land	  
administration	   posing	   serious	   impediments	   to	   those	   investments	   (Hettinger	   and	  
James,	  2014:	  2-­‐3).	  As	  a	  case	   in	  point,	  Liberian	  rural	  dwellers	  have	  virtually	  halted	  
large-­‐scale	  palm	  oil	  production	  in	  its	  tracks	  because	  the	  government	  did	  not	  consult	  
them	  before	   leasing	   thousands	  of	  hectares	  of	   communal	   land	   to	   investors	   such	  as	  
Equatorial	  Palm	  Oil	   in	  Grand	  Bassa	  County,	  Golden	  Veroleum	  in	  Sinoe	  County,	  and	  
Sime	  Darby	  in	  Gbarpolu	  and	  Grand	  Cape	  Mount	  counties	  	  (Siakor,	  2012;	  UN	  Panel	  of	  
Experts	   on	   Liberia,	   2012:	   45-­‐47;	   UN	   Panel	   of	   Experts	   on	   Liberia,	   2013:	   34-­‐35).	  
Effectively,	   Liberian	   citizens	   have	   responded	   to	   dubious	   concession	   agreements	  
shrouded	  in	  secrecy	  by	  attempting	  to	  hold	  the	  state	  accountable.	  	  
	  
As	  my	  analysis	  shows,	  trade	  and	  investment	  have	  not	  fundamentally	  improved	  the	  
lives	   of	   Liberian	   citizens	  who	   reside	  within	   the	   territorial	   confines	   of	   the	   nation-­‐
state,	  thereby	  undermining	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  and	  invalidating	  the	  need	  for	  dual	  
citizenship.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   section	   that	   follows,	   aid	   and	   remittances	   pose	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For	  all	  the	  celebration	  about	  trade	  and	  investment	  flows	  to	  Liberia,	  data	  shows	  that	  
overseas	  development	  assistance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  grants	  and	  loans	  far	  exceeds	  foreign	  
direct	   investment	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2014:	   25).	   Liberia	   has	   been	   slow	   to	  
access	  loans	  since	  reaching	  HIPC	  Completion	  Point	  in	  2010,	  yet	  public	  external	  debt	  
was	   estimated	   at	   11	   percent	   of	   GDP	   in	   2013	   and	   could	   increase	   gradually	   if	  
anticipated	  investments	  do	  not	  come	  to	  fruition	  (Hettinger	  and	  James,	  2014:	  7-­‐8).	  As	  
Table	   19	   indicates,	   donor	   aid	   disbursed	   to	   Liberia	   in	   fiscal	   years	   2009/2010	   and	  
2010/2011,	  respectively,	  surpassed	  the	  national,	  cash-­‐based	  budget.	  In	  fiscal	  years	  
2011/2012	  and	  2012/2013,	   respectively,	   aid	  disbursed	   represented	   two	   thirds	  of	  
the	   national	   budget.	   Liberia’s	   donors	   typically	   disburse	   grants	   and	   loans	   through	  
budget	  support,	  pooled	   funds,	   trust	   funds,	  and	  project	  support	  (for	  government	  of	  
Liberia	  executed	  projects	  and	  non-­‐government	  of	  Liberia	  executed	  projects).	  More	  
than	  50	  percent	  of	  aid	  reported	   in	  Table	  19	  was	  disbursed	   for	  non-­‐government	  of	  
Liberia	   executed	  projects	   financially	  managed	   and	   executed	   by	   donors	   or	   a	   third-­‐
party	  contractor,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  major	  infrastructure	  projects.	  	  
	  
Table	  19:	  National	  Budget	  and	  Post-­‐War	  Aid	  Disbursal209	  Statistics	  for	  Liberia	  (2005-­‐
2013)	  












2005-­‐2006	   85	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
2006-­‐2007	   129	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
2007-­‐2008	   199	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
2008-­‐2009	   298	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
2009-­‐2010	   347	   355	   10	   World	  Bank,	  
US,	  UN	  
2010-­‐2011	   369	   426	   11	   US,	  EU,	  World	  
Bank	  
2011-­‐2012	   516	   340	   10	   World	  Bank,	  
UN,	  US	  
2012-­‐2013	   649	   423	   18	   US,	  EU,	  World	  
Bank	  
Source:	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  Republic	  of	  Liberia	  
	  
                                                
209	  Aid	  captured	  in	  this	  table	  does	  not	  account	  for	  non-­‐government	  of	  Liberia	  donor	  contributions	  to	  
NGOs	  or	  private	  entities.	  	  




As	  one	  of	  Liberia’s	  most	  consistent	  donors,	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  invested	  heavily	  in	  
the	  development	  of	   roads,	  ports,	   and	  bridges,	   often	  hiring	  Chinese	   contractors	   for	  
these	   capital-­‐intensive	   ventures.	   While	   the	   Bank	   has	   focused	   on	   tangible	  
investments	   in	   infrastructure,	   the	  US,	   Liberia’s	   second	  most	   consistent	   donor,	   has	  
invested	   in	   security	   sector	   reform	   and	   governance.	   Harkening	   back	   to	   Tubman’s	  
administration,	  Sirleaf	  has	  followed	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  relying	  on	  donor	  dollars	  to	  
fund	   Liberia’s	   development.	   Because	  much	   of	   the	   national	   budget	   is	   absorbed	   by	  
recurring	   expenditures,	   such	   as	   government	   salaries	   and	   operations,	   donors	   have	  
effectively	   filled	   a	   void	   in	   social	   spending	   on	   health,	   sanitation	   and	   education,	   as	  
well	  as	  on	  major	   infrastructure	  such	  as	  public	  buildings,	  roads,	  and	  electricity.	  For	  
the	  purposes	  of	  my	  analysis,	  Liberia’s	  reliance	  on	  aid	  is	  problematic	  for	  two	  major	  
reasons.	   First,	   it	   places	   donors	   ‘above’	   the	   state,	   and	   subjects	   Liberia	   to	  
conditionalities	   that	   undermine	   its	   sovereignty.	   Second,	   aid	   erodes	   state-­‐citizen	  
relations	  by	  making	  Liberia	  more	  accountable	  to	  donors	  than	  to	  its	  citizens.	  	  
	  
Remittance	   flows	   to	   Liberia	   have	   impacted	   citizenship	   in	   similarly	   contradictory	  
ways.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   at	   the	   outset	   that	   remittances	   recorded	   in	   Table	   20	  
capture	   World	   Bank	   data,	   which	   is	   lower	   than	   Central	   Bank	   of	   Liberia	   data	  
referenced	   later.	   Despite	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   data,	   however,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  
remittances	   remain	   consequential	   for	   both	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   its	   citizens.	   As	  
Table	   20	   indicates,	   remittances	   nearly	   equaled	   aid	   disbursals	   referenced	   in	   the	  
previous	  table	  in	  2011,	  2012,	  and	  2013,	  respectively,	  thereby	  having	  a	  direct	  impact	  
on	  how	  the	  Liberian	  state	  invariably	  relates	  to	  its	  domestically	  rooted	  citizens	  and	  
nationals	  abroad.	  	  
	  
Table	  20:	  World	  Bank	  Remittances	  Data	  for	  Liberia	  (2004-­‐2013)	  
Year/Remittance	  Flows	   Inflows	   (millions	   in	  
USD)	  
Outflows	   (millions	   in	  
USD)	  
2004	   58	   0	  
2005	   32	   0	  
2006	   79	   0	  
2007	   62	   0	  
2008	   58	   0	  
2009	   25	   1	  
2010	   31	   1	  




2012	   360	   N/A	  
2013	   (estimated)	  383	  	   N/A	  
Source:	  World	  Bank	  2011,	  2014	  
	  
While	   the	   ‘remitter’	   abroad	   may	   be	   practicing	   active	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   by	  
transferring	  money	  to	  build	  a	  home	  in	  Liberia,	  sponsor	  children	  in	  school,	  or	  invest	  
in	  a	  business—as	  Liberian	  social	  actors	  in	  this	  study	  admitted	  doing—the	  ‘receiver’	  
in	  Liberia	  is	  constrained	  in	  his/her	  ability	  to	  practice	  citizenship	  because	  of	  limited	  
economic	   opportunities	   and	   the	   government’s	   inability	   to	   provide	   basic	   social	  
services.	   Thus,	   the	   ‘receiver’	   becomes	  more	   obligated	   to	   the	   remitter	   than	   to	   the	  
state	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  state	  is	  more	  accountable	  to	  donors	  for	  aid.	  Because	  
the	   remitter	   also	   fills	   gaps	   in	   poverty	   alleviation	   at	   the	   household	   level	   that	   the	  
government	   cannot,	   the	   state	   becomes	   equally	   beholden	   to	   the	   remitter,	   thereby	  
placing	   the	   remitter	   ‘above’	   the	   state.	   Liberia’s	   Foreign	  Affairs	  Minister	  Augustine	  
Ngafuan	   admitted	   that	   remittances	   helped	   to	   stave	   off	   citizen	   demands	   on	  
government,	  thereby	  easing	  the	  pressure	  on	  public	  spending:	  	  
	  
There	   are	   a	   lot	   of	   Liberians	  who	   almost	   every	  month	   remit	   through	  
Western	   Union,	   keeping	   their	   people	   to	   survive,	   whether	   it's	   in	   the	  
urban	  areas	   like	  Monrovia	  and	  others,	  whether	   it's	   in	  Zwedru.	  Some	  
poor	   families	   live	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   work	   of	   a	   brother	   or	   sister	  
somewhere	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  and	  then	  there	  is	  this	  flow	  that	  is	  coming,	  
it	   has	   helped	   us	   [government]	   because	   it	   has	   helped	   to	   keep	   the	  
country	   stable,	   because	   all	   those	   expectations	   would	   have	   been	  
directed	  to	  government…211	  
	  
As	   evidenced	   by	   Minister	   Ngafuan’s	   admission,	   economic	   globalisation	   and	   the	  
remittances	   discourse	   have	   inadvertently	   transformed	   African	   migrants	   from	  
‘traitors’	   to	   ‘development	   partners’	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   their	   governments,	   thereby	  
inserting	   them	   in	   home-­‐country	   debates	   about	   national	   development	   and	  
citizenship	   (Iheduru,	   2011:	   181).	   Apart	   from	   enacting	   dual	   citizenship,	   some	  
countries	   in	   Africa—namely,	   Algeria,	   Benin,	   Burkina	   Faso,	   Cape	   Verde,	   Ethiopia,	  
Kenya,	  Mali,	  Morocco,	  Nigeria,	  Senegal,	  Tunisia	  and	  Zambia—have	  also	  established	  
particular	  government	  agencies	  responsible	  for	  managing	  diaspora	  affairs	  (Ratha,	  et.	  
al,	  2011:	  177-­‐179).	  Moreover,	  it	   is	  often	  presumed	  that	  dual	  citizens	  have	  a	  higher	  
propensity	   to	   send	   remittances	   for	   investment	  purposes	   and	  partner	  with	   foreign	  
                                                




investors	  in	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  (Siaplay,	  2014:	  8).	  Echoing	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  
Whitaker	  (2011),	  Iheduru	  argues,	  however,	  that	  recent	  policies	  adopted	  by	  African	  
governments	  to	  extend	  dual	  citizenship	  and	  voting	  rights	  to	  nationals	  abroad	  is	  less	  
about	   enhancing	   national	   development	   and	   embracing	   pluralistic	   forms	   of	  
citizenship,	   and	   more	   about	   co-­‐optation	   and	   strategically	   harnessing	   emigrant	  
resources	   to	   compensate	   for	   weak	   state	   fiscal	   capacities	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   donor	  
fatigue	  (Iheduru,	  2011:	  182).	  Whereas	  lowering	  tariffs	  on	  exports	  in	  raw	  materials	  
and	  extending	  tax	  holidays	  to	  multinationals	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  generate	  revenue	  for	  
the	  state,	   the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  
placate	  diasporas	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion.	  
	  
This	  is	  precisely	  why	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill	  was	  introduced	  in	  Liberia;	  a	  
core	  group	  of	  legislative	  and	  executive	  branch	  officials	  acknowledged	  the	  important	  
role	   Liberian	  diasporas	   have	  played	   in	   remitting	   to	   their	   families	   during	   the	   slow	  
pace	   of	   post-­‐war	   development,	   and	   sought	   to	   provide	   incentives	   for	   continued	  
remittance	  flows.	  Nevertheless,	  remittances	  have	  enabled	  the	  state	  to	  abdicate	  from	  
its	  responsibility	  to	  citizens,	  undermined	  citizen	  agency,	  and	  created	  a	  syndrome	  of	  
dependency,	  said	  this	  43-­‐year-­‐old	  male	  homelander:	  	  
	  
Our	  remittances	  have	  also	  fuelled	  the	  need	  for	  the	  blatant	  corruption	  
that	  we	  have	  and	  created	  an	  ambience	  for	  the	  government	  to	  neglect	  
its	  primary	  responsibilities	  to	   its	  people.	  So,	   for	  example,	  by	  sending	  
money	   we	   have	   also	   reduced	   the	   chances	   for	   people’s	   political	  
consciousness,	   you	   know,	   to	   hold	   their	   government	   and	   their	   duty	  
bearers	   accountable...So,	   you	   have	   families	   here,	   people	  who	   are	   fit,	  
who	   can	   do	   things	   for	   themselves,	   but	   they	   are	   sitting	   every	  month	  
waiting	  for	  the	  50,	  or	  100	  or	  200	  [United	  States]	  dollars	  to	  come.212	  
	  
The	  discord	  between	  Liberia’s	   foreign	  minister	  and	   the	  homeland	  respondent	  was	  
not	  only	  prevalent	   in	  my	   interviews;	   it	   is	  also	  reflected	   in	   the	  academic	   literature.	  
Critics	   and	   supporters	   of	   remittance-­‐generated	   development	   agree	   that	   migrant	  
transfers	   represent	   a	   significant	   share	   of	   external	   financing	   and	   capital	   for	  
developing	   countries,	   particularly	   post-­‐war	   nations	   like	   Liberia	   (Lucas	   and	   Stark,	  
1985;	  Kapur,	  2003;	  de	  Haas,	  2005;	  World	  Bank,	  2006;	  Pieke,	  Van	  Hear,	  and	  Lindley,	  
                                                




2007;	   IFAD,	   2009).	   Yet,	   debate	   is	   widespread	   about	   their	   actual	   developmental	  
impact.	   While	   remittances	   help	   to	   augment	   private	   consumption	   and	   alleviate	  
transient	   poverty,	   their	   impact	   on	   structural	   poverty	   and	   long-­‐term	   sustainable	  
economic	  development	  are	  less	  quantifiable	  (Kapur,	  2003:	  355-­‐356).	  Because	  most	  
migrants	  are	  not	  drawn	  from	  the	  poorest	  households	  in	  a	  sending	  nation,	  the	  effects	  
of	   remittances	  on	   the	  poorest	  of	   the	  poor	  will	   remain	   limited	   (Kapur,	  2003:	  346).	  
Furthermore,	  remittances	  alone	  are	  not	  the	  panacea	  to	  homeland	  development,	  and	  
nation	  states	  must	  adopt	  measures	  to	  ensure	  fiscal	  responsibility,	  such	  as	  improving	  
their	   overall	   investment	   climate,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   becoming	   heavily	   reliant	   on	  
migrant	  transfers	  (World	  Bank,	  2006:	  xvi).	  	  
	  
Yet,	  when	  the	  state	  effectively	  ceases	  to	  function,	  remittances	  often	  fill	  an	  important	  
void.	   Echoing	   the	   sentiments	   of	   many	   respondents	   in	   this	   study,	   a	   23-­‐year-­‐old	  
Monrovia-­‐based	   female	   homelander	   stated	   that	   remittances	   during	   periods	   of	  
armed	  conflict	  and	   immediately	  afterwards	  meant	   the	  difference	  between	  survival	  
and	  demise	  for	  many	  Liberians:	  
	  
After	   the	  war,	  most	   people	   started	   from	   zero	   so	   they	  were	   actually	  
depending	  on	   foreign	  aid	   [remittances]	   as	   a	   source	  of	   livelihood.	   So,	  
people	   sending	   in	  money,	   it	   helped	   to	   stir	   up	   the	   economic	   activity	  
around	  here	  [Liberia]	  since	  there	  were	  no	  jobs,	  no	  companies,	  and	  no	  
elected	   government	   at	   that	   time.	  Basically,	   almost	  more	   than	  half	   of	  
the	  population	  was	  living	  on	  aid	  [remittances].213	  	  
	  
There	  appears	  to	  be	  dissent,	  however,	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  remittances	  in	  Liberia’s	  
post-­‐war	  milieu.	   Dismissing	   remittances	   altogether	   as	   inconsequential,	   a	   54-­‐year-­‐
old	  male	  homelander	  argued	  that	  they	  have	  not	  fundamentally	  tipped	  the	  scales	  in	  
favour	  of	  meaningful	  development:	  	  
	  
Remittance	  is	  not	  enough	  because	  remittances	  are	  to	  family	  members.	  
So,	   when	   they	   [Liberian	   diasporas]	   say,	   “Oh,	   we	   are	   sending	   plenty	  
money	  home,”	  yeah,	   to	  whom	  are	  you	  sending	   it?	   If	  you	  are	  sending	  
money	  to	  your	  blood	  relative,	  that	  is	  not	  a	  contribution	  because	  with	  
or	  without	  the	  government,	  you	  will	  not	  allow	  your	  relative	  to	  die.214	  
	  
                                                
213	  [HL37]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  June	  21,	  2013.	  	  




Similarly,	   one	   65-­‐year-­‐old	   female	   permanent	   returnee	   in	   Monrovia	   argued	   that	  
remittances	  to	  Liberia	  pale	   in	  comparison	  with	  migrant	   transfers	   to	  other	  parts	  of	  
West	  Africa,	  particularly	  Ghana:	  	  
	  
What	   you	   see	   in	   Accra,	   not	   to	   mention	   Kumasi,	   Cape	   Coast,	   are	  
Ghanaians	   in	   the	  United	   States	   of	   America	  working	   in	   the	   hospitals,	  
the	  janitors,	  the	  teachers,	  the	  professors:	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  remit	  
money	   to	   build	   their	   homes,	   to	   start	   their	   businesses.	   We	   got	  
Liberians	   in	   the	  United	   States	   of	   America.	  How	  many	   of	   them	   remit	  
money?	  They	  might	  remit	  allowances	  to	  family	  members	  which	  goes	  
into	   the	   pot	   or	   keeps	   them	   well,	   but	   how	  many	   Liberians	   have	   sat	  
down	   in	  America	   to	   send	  home	  money	   regularly	   to	   say,	   “Build	  me	  a	  
house,”	   or	   even,	   “I	  want	   to	   start	   a	   business,”	   and	  have	   been	  here	   to	  
check?215	  
	  
This	   respondent’s	   view	   is	   corroborated	   by	  World	   Bank	   data	   showing	   that	   annual	  
migrant	   transfers	   to	   Ghana	   exceeded	   that	   of	   Liberia	   from	   2004	   through	   2009,	  
although	   Liberia	   surpassed	   Ghana	   in	   2010	   and	   2011	   (World	   Bank,	   2011;	   World	  
Bank,	   2014).	   Those	   who	   question	   the	   impact	   of	   remittances	   on	   Liberia’s	  
development,	   like	   the	   previous	   homeland	   and	   permanent	   returnee	   respondents,	  
often	   interrogate	   the	  necessity	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  as	  a	  policy	  prescription	  because	  
they	   fundamentally	   believe	   that	   diasporas	   and	   transnational	   Liberians	   do	   not	  
warrant	  such	  a	  privilege.	  	  
	  
While	   the	   discourse	   on	   remittances	   remains	   rife	   with	   disagreement,	   there	   is	   a	  
parallel	  discourse	  on	  capital	  flight	  that	  also	  interrogates	  the	  developmental	   impact	  
of	  remittances.	  Relatively	  augmented,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Liberia	  (CBL)	  figures	  for	  
remittances	   are	   different	   from	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   because	   the	   CBL	   captures	   all	  
inflows	   and	   outflows	   received	   and	   sent	   by	   embassies,	   service	   providers,	   the	   UN,	  
NGOs	   and	   individuals	   through	   banks	   and	   private	   firms	   in	   Liberia	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	  2008b:	  28).	  What	  is	  particularly	  instructive	  and	  relevant	  for	  my	  study	  is	  the	  
CBL	   data	   on	   remittance	   outflows	   in	   Table	   21,	   as	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   who	  
contested	  the	  developmental	  impact	  of	  remittances	  often	  referenced	  capital	  flight	  as	  
detrimental	  to	  Liberia’s	  growth	  and	  development.	  As	  Table	  21	  indicates,	  remittance	  
                                                




flows	  entering	  Liberia	  are	  nearly	  the	  same	  as	  flows	  leaving	  the	  country	  on	  a	  yearly	  
basis.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  21:	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Liberia	  Remittances	  Data	  for	  Liberia216(2005-­‐2011)	  
Year/Remittance	  Flows	   Inflows	   (millions	   in	  
USD)	  
Outflows	   (millions	   in	  
USD)	  
2005	   630	  	   598	  
2006	   685	   622	  
2007	   753	   710	  
2008	   959	   922	  
2009	   760	   787	  
2010	   981	   995	  
2011	   1261	   1362	  
Source:	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Liberia	  
	  
The	   issue	   of	   capital	   flight	  was	   a	   recurring	  motif	   in	  my	   interviews	  with	   homeland	  
Liberians	   based	   in	  Monrovia,	  who	   argued	   that	   Liberian	   returnees	   transfer	  money	  
out	   of	   Liberia	   to	   maintain	   transnational	   lives	   almost	   at	   the	   speed	   at	   which	  
remittances	   enter	   the	   post-­‐war	   economy.	  According	   to	   one	   43-­‐year-­‐old	   homeland	  
man,	  dual	  citizenship	  would	  facilitate	  excessive	  capital	  flight:	  	  
	  
You	   see	   Ghanaians,	   Nigerians,	   Sierra	   Leoneans	   who	   have	   dual	  
citizenship,	   but	   they	   have	   only	   used	   the	   second	   country	   for	  
expediency.	   They	   all	   come	   back	   home	   and	   invest.	   Liberia	   is	   the	  
reverse.	  So,	  by	  even	  allowing	  them	  [diasporas],	  giving	  them	  approval	  
now	  [for	  dual	  citizenship],	  you’re	  going	   to	  have	  a	  huge	  capital	   flight.	  
You’re	  going	  to	  legitimise	  what	  is	  already	  happening.217	  
	  
These	   claims	   were	   corroborated	   by	   my	   interviews	   with	   returnees	   who,	   when	  
queried	   about	   receiving	   remittances	   from	   relatives	   abroad,	   often	   scoffed	   in	  
response,	  saying,	  “I’m	  the	  remitter!”	  Speaking	  hypothetically	  yet	  referencing	  actual	  
cases	   of	   returnee	   public	   sector	   officials,	   this	   30-­‐year-­‐old	   homeland	   male	   talked	  
about	   how	   capital	   flight	   has	   stripped	   the	   Liberian	   economy	   of	   essential	   foreign	  
exchange:	  
	  
If	  I’m	  working	  as	  a	  minister	  and	  my	  family	  lives	  abroad,	  my	  wife	  and	  
everything	  [are]	  there,	  and	  I	  only	  come	  [to	  Liberia]	  to	  work,	  if,	  for	  any	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  2011	  is	  the	  last	  year	  for	  which	  remittances	  data	  is	  available	  from	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Liberia.	  	  




reason,	  I	  happen	  to	  earn	  maybe	  20/25,000	  [United	  States]	  dollars,	  I’ll	  
ship	   it	   abroad.	   Cash	   will	   flow	   there	   [abroad]	   and	   the	   economy	   [in	  
Liberia]	   will	   not	   boom.	   The	   economy	   will	   not	   boom.	   You	   ship	   the	  
money	   to	  your	   family	  because	  your	   family	  needs	   to	   survive,	   and	   the	  
money	  that	  you	  shipping	  abroad,	  that	  money	  will	  be	  circulated	  within	  
the	  economy	  of	  that	  particular	  country.218	  
	  
It	  is	  apparent	  from	  my	  analysis	  on	  aid	  and	  remittances	  that	  they	  represent	  two	  sides	  
of	   the	   same	   coin	   in	   the	   Liberia	   case.	   While	   they	   have	   hoisted	   up	   citizens	   who	  
otherwise	  would	   not	   have	   been	   able	   to	  withstand	   the	   excruciatingly	   slow	  pace	   of	  
post-­‐war	  development,	  they	  have	  also	  eroded	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  by	  relieving	  the	  
Liberian	  state	  of	   its	   responsibility	   to	   its	   citizens	  and	  obligated	  Liberian	  citizens	   to	  
benefactors—donors	  and	  diaspora	  remitters	  alike—who	  operate	  ‘above’	  the	  state.	  	  
	  
Following	   this	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   globalisation	   of	   capital	   has	   configured	   and	  
reconfigured	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   thereby	   influencing	   the	   introduction	   and	  
postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation,	   I	   shift	   focus	   in	   the	   next	  
section	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  globalisation	  of	   ideas—embedded	  in	  the	  human	  rights	  
discourse	   and	   transnational	   citizenship	   trends	   throughout	   Africa—has	   facilitated	  
claims	  for	  dual	  citizenship	  in	  Liberia.	  	  
	  
How	  Human	  Rights	  Rhetoric	  Influences	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Claims	  for	  Liberia	  	  
Citizenship	  and	  human	  rights	  are	  often	  contradictorily	  applied.	  While	  human	  rights	  
is	   embedded	   in	   the	  politics	  of	   inclusion,	   citizenship	   is	   embedded	   in	   the	  politics	  of	  
exclusion,	  where	  people	  are	  often	  barred	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  social	  qualifiers	  such	  
as	  race	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Liberia),	  ethnic	   identity,	  gender,	  and	  birth-­‐place	  nationality.	  
Yet,	  there	  is	  a	  new	  discourse	  on	  human	  rights	  that	  frames	  citizenship	  and	  the	  right	  
to	   a	   nationality	   as	   a	   human	   right	   among	   other	   rights.	   According	   to	   the	   Universal	  
Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  adopted	  in	  1948,	  “everyone	  has	  a	  right	  to	  a	  nationality”	  
and	  “no	  one	  shall	  be	  arbitrarily	  deprived	  of	  his	  [or	  her]	  nationality”	  (Manby,	  2010:	  
19).	  Therefore,	  any	  state	  that	  ratified	  the	  Declaration,	  regardless	  of	  its	  national	  laws,	  
is	  required	  to	  uphold	  it	  thereby	  guaranteeing	  the	  right	  to	  citizenship.	  Similarly,	  the	  
Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Discrimination	   against	   Women	  
(CEDAW)	  stipulates	  that	  women	  should	  be	  granted	  equal	  rights	  to	  citizenship	  under	  
                                                




the	   law	   (Manby,	   2010:	   19).	   And	   the	   1961	   Convention	   on	   the	   Reduction	   of	  
Statelessness,	  which	  only	  nine	  African	   states	  have	   ratified,	   requires	   a	   “contracting	  
state”	  to	  “grant	  its	  nationality	  to	  a	  person	  born	  in	  its	  territory	  who	  would	  otherwise	  
be	  stateless”	  (Manby,	  2010:	  9;	  23).	  The	  diffusion	  of	  ideas	  about	  rights	  that	  should	  be	  
accorded	   every	   human	   being	   has	   spread	   to	   every	   corner	   of	   the	  world—including	  
Africa,	  generally,	  and	  Liberia,	  specifically.	  
	  
In	  advocating	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  citizenship	  rights	  in	  Africa	  to	  groups	  previously	  
marginalised,	  Manby	  also	  invokes	  the	  human	  rights	  frame:	  	  
	  
African	   states	   should	   address	   the	   problems	   of	   citizenship	   that	   the	  
continent’s	   history	   of	   colonialism	   and	   migration	   has	   created	   and	  
should	  bring	  their	  citizenship	  laws	  into	  line	  with	  international	  human	  
rights	  norms.	  They	  should	  adopt	  a	  protocol	  to	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  
Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights	   on	   the	   right	   to	   nationality.	   The	   African	  
Union	  and	  its	  Regional	  Economic	  Communities	  should	  lead	  a	  process	  
to	  harmonise	  national	   laws	  and	   to	  ensure	   their	   compliance	  with	   the	  
basic	   principles	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	   due	   process	   already	  
enshrined	   in	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights.	  The	  
laws,	   and	   preferably	   the	   constitutions,	   of	   African	   states	   should	  
provide	   for	   an	   explicit	   right	   to	   a	   nationality	   from	   birth.	   In	   general,	  
laws	   should	   provide	   for	   citizenship	   (whether	   from	   birth	   or	   by	  
naturalisation)	  to	  be	  granted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  strong	  connection	  to	  
the	  country,	  including	  birth	  on	  its	  territory,	  having	  a	  mother	  or	  father	  	  
(including	  adoptive	   father	  or	  mother)	  who	  is	  a	  citizen,	  marriage	  to	  a	  
citizen,	   and	   long-­‐term	   residence.	   The	   laws	   regulating	   citizenship	  
should	  not	  refer	  to	  membership	  of	  any	  particular	  race	  or	  ethnic	  group	  
as	   the	   basis	   for	   inclusion	   in	   or	   exclusion	   from	   citizenship	   rights.	  
Citizenship	  rights	  should	  be	  based	  on	  gender	  equality	  in	  all	  respects,	  
including	   the	   right	   of	   a	   woman	   to	   pass	   her	   citizenship	   on	   to	   her	  
children	   and	   spouse.	   African	   states	   should	   take	   legal	   and	   other	  
measures	   to	   ensure	   that	   members	   of	   all	   ethnic	   groups	   resident	   in	  
their	   territory	   are	   given	   equal	   rights	   to	   citizenship…Obtaining	  
citizenship	   by	   naturalisation	   should	   be	   possible	   for	   anyone	   able	   to	  
prove	   legal	   residence	   in	   a	   country	   for	   a	   reasonable	   period	   (Manby,	  
2010:	  1-­‐2).	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  African	  treaties—such	  as	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  
Rights,	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  the	  Rights	  and	  Welfare	  of	  the	  Child,	  and	  the	  Protocol	  
to	   the	   African	   Charter	   on	  Human	   and	   People’s	   Rights	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  Women	   in	  
Africa—are	   relatively	   silent	   on	   the	   issues	   of	   nationality	   and	   citizenship	   (Manby,	  




human	   rights	   discourse	   has	   emboldened	   claims	   for	   dual	   citizenship	   in	   Liberia,	   in	  
which	  proponents	  argue	  that	  revocation	  of	  citizenship	  without	  due	  process	  severely	  
impinges	  on	  one’s	  human	  rights.	  	  
	  
Globalised	  notions	  of	  citizenship	  as	  a	  human	  right	  has	  engendered	  a	   transnational	  
conversation	   about	   Liberia’s	   citizenship	   architecture,	   with	   non-­‐Liberians	   also	  
weighing	   in	  on	   the	   issue	  of	  dual	   citizenship.	  The	  American	  Bar	  Association	   (ABA),	  
for	   example,	   argues	   that	   the	   provision	   that	   one	   must	   renounce	   one’s	   previous	  
citizenship	   at	   the	   time	   of	   naturalisation	   is	   a	   deterrent	   for	   diasporas	   and	   other	  
African	   citizens	  who	  wish	   to	   become	   Liberian	   citizens	   (ABA,	   2009:	   5;	   15;	   17-­‐18).	  
Furthermore,	   the	   revocation	   of	   naturalisation—in	   which	   a	   naturalised	   citizen	  
revokes	  his/her	  legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  if	  s/he	  travels	  to	  his/her	  country	  of	  first	  
nationality	  and	  resides	  there	  for	  up	  to	  two	  years	  or	  any	  other	  foreign	  country	  for	  up	  
to	  five	  years—creates	  classes	  of	  citizenship	  and	  denies	  a	  naturalised	  citizen	  the	  right	  
to	  travel	  or	  seek	  employment	  abroad	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  1973).	  Equally	  harsh	  
is	   Section	   21.58	   of	   the	   Liberian	  Aliens	   and	  Nationality	   Law	  which	   states	   that	   any	  
naturalised	   citizen	   of	   Liberia	   whose	   citizenship	   is	   revoked	   automatically	   loses	  
his/her	  claim	  on	  property	  owned,	  which	  shall	  go	  to	  the	  state	  uncompensated,	  if	  s/he	  
does	  not	  have	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  spouse	  or	  child	  to	  inherit	  said	  property	  (ABA,	  2009:	  
16).	  The	  ABA	  asserts	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  should	  be	  seriously	  considered	  for	  Liberia,	  
as	   it	   would	   enable	   Liberians	  who	   naturalised	   elsewhere	   during	   armed	   conflict	   to	  
retain	   their	   legal	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   status,	   thereby	   fully	   contributing	   to	   the	  
country’s	   recovery	   process.	   The	   assumption	   herein	   is	   that	   dual	   citizenship	   will	  
enhance	   the	   state-­‐building	   agenda	   and	   further	   entrench	   economic	   renewal.	   The	  
converse	   argument	   could	   be	   applied,	   however,	   that	   there	   is	   no	   direct	   correlation	  
between	  retention	  of	  citizenship	  and	  involvement	  in	  national	  reconstruction	  efforts	  
although	   migration	   enthusiasts	   who	   view	   citizenship	   as	   unbounded	   would	   likely	  
disagree.	  	  
	  
Feminist	   discourses	   about	   the	   rights	   of	   women	   have	   also	   influenced	   advocacy	   to	  
expand	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  as	  defined	  by	  gender.	  According	  to	  the	  ABA,	  assigning	  
citizenship	   at	   birth	   based	   on	   the	   father’s	   nationality	   is	   inherently	   discriminatory	  




inconsistent	  with	  CEDAW	  and	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  (ABA,	  2009:	  
14).	  The	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  clearly	  stipulates	  that	  Liberian	  citizen	  
women	  should	  be	  able	  to	  pass	  on	  citizenship	  to	  their	  children,	  thereby	  opening	  the	  
scope	   for	   citizenship	   to	   be	   granted	   to	   a	   larger	   number	   of	   jus	   sanguinis	   Liberians	  
beyond	  the	  age	  of	  majority.	  The	  ABA	  also	  contends	  that	  denying	  a	  person	  citizenship	  
because	   his/her	   father	   did	   not	   reside	   in	   Liberia	   prior	   to	   their	   birth	   discriminates	  
against	   children	   whose	   fathers	   fled	   Liberia	   during	   intermittent	   armed	   conflict,	   a	  
major	   point	   of	   contention	   for	   Liberians	   abroad	  who	   advocate	   for	   dual	   citizenship	  
(ABA,	   2009:	   14).	   Denying	   a	   person	   citizenship	   because	   s/he,	   having	   been	   born	  
outside	  of	  Liberia	  to	  a	  Liberian	  citizen	  father,	  is	  not	  resident	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	  age	  of	  
majority	  discriminates	  against	  children	  who	  were	  exiled	  during	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  
did	  not	  return	  to	  Liberia	  before	  reaching	  the	  age	  of	  majority	  (ABA,	  2009:	  14).	  The	  
ABA	   suggests	   that	   these	  provisions	   be	   eliminated	   from	   the	  Aliens	   and	  Nationality	  
Law	  because	  parents	  whose	  children	  fall	  within	  the	  abovementioned	  categories	  will	  
be	  disinclined	  to	  repatriate	  capital	  to	  Liberia	  or	  invest	  in	  Liberia	  if	  their	  children	  are	  
considered	  “stateless”	  (ABA,	  2009:	  14).	  	  
	  
The	  rights	  rhetoric	  has	  further	  legitimated	  an	  interrogation	  of	  citizenship	  based	  on	  
race,	   although	   Liberia’s	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill	   maintains	   the	   race-­‐based	  
proviso.	  The	  ABA	  argues	  that	  citizenship	  based	  on	  race	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  Article	  5	  
of	   the	   Liberian	   Constitution,	  which	   prohibits	   ethnic	   discrimination,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
Convention	  on	  All	  Forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  (CERD),	  which	  Liberia	  ratified	  in	  
1978	   (ABA,	   2009:	   13).	   According	   to	   the	   ABA,	   although	   Liberia’s	   citizenship	  
provision	  based	  on	  race	  was	  enacted	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  pan-­‐Africanist	  verve,	   it	   is	  out-­‐
dated	   given	   the	   contributions	   of	   non-­‐African	   residents	   of	   Liberia—namely,	  
Lebanese,	   Indians,	   Europeans	   and	   Americans—in	   the	   service,	   retail,	   trading,	  
agriculture,	   and	   mining	   sectors	   (ABA,	   2009:	   14).	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   IV,	  
precluding	   these	   residents	   from	   citizenship	   also	   translates	   into	   economic	  
deprivation	   for	   Liberia,	   as	   the	   aforementioned	   nationals	   more	   than	   likely	   export	  
capital	  and	  investment	  returns	  out	  of	  Liberia	  because	  they	  cannot	  own	  land	  or	  fully	  
participate	   in	   the	   political	   process.	   The	   ABA	   advocates	   for	   either	   abrogating	   the	  




defining	   the	   terms	   Negroes	   and	   Negro	   descent	   in	   a	   way	   that	   accounts	   for	  
international	  norms	  (ABA,	  2009:	  14).	  	  
	  
I	   have	   argued	   herein	   that	   the	   framing	   of	   citizenship	   as	   a	   human	   right	   has	  
strengthened	   appeals	   to	   expand	   Liberia’s	   legal	   definition	   of	   citizenship	   to	   include	  
groups	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  disenfranchised,	  particularly	  jus	  soli	  Liberians	  who	  
naturalised	   abroad.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   discuss	   how	   the	   race	   to	   harmonise	  
citizenship	   laws	   across	   Africa	   has	   also	   emboldened	   claims	   for	   dual	   citizenship	   in	  
Liberia.	  	  
	  
Dual	  Citizenship	  Bill	  Influenced	  by	  Continental	  Citizenship	  Reconfigurations	  
African	   governments	   have	   increasingly	   factored	   diasporas	   into	   domestic	  
development	   and	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   efforts.	   This	   explicit	   acknowledgment	   of	  
transnationals	   as	   ‘partners	   in	   progress’	   has	   manifested	   in	   legal	   instruments	   and	  
frameworks	  such	  as	  dual	  citizenship.	  Within	  the	  last	  decade	  alone,	  African	  countries	  
have	   expanded	   constitutional	   reforms	   to	   grant	  dual	   citizenship	   to	   their	  diasporas,	  
including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to:	   Angola,	   Botswana,	   Burundi,	   Ghana,	   Kenya,	   Nigeria,	  
Rwanda,	   Sao	   Tome	   &	   Principe,	   Senegal,	   Sierra	   Leone,	   South	   Africa	   and	   Uganda	  
(Manby,	   2009).	   Although,	   admittedly,	   this	   trend	   appears	   to	   be	   global	   in	   scale	   and	  
scope	   and	   does	   not	   represent	   African	   exceptionalism,	   Africa	   is	   a	   particularly	  
relevant	   region	   of	   analysis	   given	   that	   most	   of	   the	   continent’s	   post-­‐independence	  
citizenship	  laws	  represented	  colonial	  artefacts	  that	  excluded	  rather	  than	  embraced	  
multiple	   forms	   of	   national	   identity	   (Mamdani,	   1996).	   There	   has	   been	   mounting	  
pressure	   on	   Liberia	   to	   harmonise	   its	   citizenship	   laws	  with	   the	   African	  Union,	   the	  
Economic	  Community	   of	  West	  Africa	   States	   (ECOWAS)	   and	   the	  Mano	  River	  Union	  
(MRU),	  given	  the	  country’s	  renewed	  prominence	  in	  these	  regional	  bodies.	  	  
	  
Within	   the	   African	   Union,	   over	   half	   (57	   percent)	   of	   the	   54	   countries	   have	   dual	  
citizenship	  provisions	   embedded	   in	   law,	  with	   some	  more	   limited	   than	  others.	   For	  
instance,	  while	  Egypt,	  South	  Africa,	  Cape	  Verde,	  and	  Rwanda	  enable	  carte	  blanche	  




for	   jus	  soli	  citizens	  (Manby,	  2010).	  The	  scale	  also	   tips	   in	   favour	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  
within	  the	  ECOWAS	  sub-­‐region.	  Of	  the	  15	  members	  of	  ECOWAS,	  12	  have	  legislated	  
dual	  citizenship	  in	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  as	  Table	  22	  shows.	  	  
	  
Table	  22:	  ECOWAS	  Countries’	  Provisions	  on	  Dual	  Citizenship	  	  
Country	   Allows	  Dual	  Citizenship?	  	  
(Yes	  or	  No)	  
Year	   Dual	   Citizenship	  
Granted	  
Benin	   Yes	   1990	  
Burkina	  Faso	   Yes	   1991	  
Togo	   Yes	   1992	  
Mali	   Yes	   1995	  
Nigeria	   Yes	   1997	  
Cape	  Verde	  	   Yes	   1999	  
Ivory	  Coast	   Yes	   2000	  
Ghana	   Yes	   2002	  
Sierra	  Leone	   Yes	   2006	  
Gambia	   Yes	   Unclear	  
Guinea-­‐Bissau	   Yes	   Unclear	  
Senegal	  	   Yes	   Unclear	  
Guinea	   No	   N/A	  
Liberia	   No	  	   N/A	  
Niger	   No	  	   N/A	  
Sources:	  Manby	  (2010),	  Siaplay	  (2014)	  	  
	  
As	   ECOWAS	   attempts	   to	   facilitate	   economic	   integration	   and	   streamline	   the	   free	  
movement	   of	   persons	   protocol	   for	   its	   citizens	   (Ibeanu,	   2007),	   it	   is	   presumed	   that	  
harmonising	  citizenship	  laws	  across	  the	  sub-­‐region	  will	  facilitate	  the	  regionalisation	  
of	   capital	   flows	   of	   trade	   and	   investment.	   At	   the	   moment,	   inter-­‐regional	   trade	  
amongst	   ECOWAS	   nations	   accounts	   for	   only	   10	   percent	   of	   all	   trade	   for	   member	  
countries	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011a:	   27).	   Siaplay	   uses	   a	   random	   effects	  
economic	  model	  to	  argue	  that	  ECOWAS	  countries	  which	  recognise	  dual	  citizenship	  
“have	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   association	   with	   FDI	   net	   inflows,	   gross	  
capital	   formation,	  and	  household	  consumption”	  although	  he	  does	  not	  make	  claims	  
that	  dual	  citizenship	   is	  a	  causal	  effect	  of	   these	  economic	   trends	  (Siaplay,	  2014:	  3).	  
Nevertheless,	  dual	  citizenship	  is	  often	  touted	  as	  having	  definitively	  positive	  results.	  
Liberia’s	  current	  Ambassador	  to	  France,	  speaking	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  immediate	  past	  
Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  Civil	  Service	  Agency	  (CSA),	  argued	  that,	  given	  the	  examples	  
of	  other	  African	  countries,	  one	  of	  the	  presumed	  benefits	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  is	  that	  it	  




…if	  we	   look	   at	   common	  practices	   from	   other	   African	   countries	  with	  
similar	  geopolitical	  demographics	  as	  Liberia,	  you	  would	  see	  that	  they	  
have	   embraced	   dual	   citizenship…They	   have	   embraced	   it	   with	  much	  
positive	  benefits	  coming	  from	  that…I	  was	  boarding	  the	  plane	  in	  Accra	  
a	   couple	  of	  months	  ago	   to	  go	   to	   the	   [United]	  States	  and	   there	  was	  a	  
Ghanaian-­‐American,	  I	  would	  say,	  in	  front	  of	  me	  and	  he	  was	  exiting	  the	  
country	   [Ghana]	   and	   he	   presented	   his	   American	   passport	   to	   the	  
Ghanaian	   immigration	   officer...and	   the	   Ghanaian	   immigration	   officer	  
looked	  at	   it	  and	  he	  said,	  “How	  did	  you	  enter?”,	  because	  he	  didn't	  see	  
the	  immigration	  endorsement	  and	  the	  fellow	  flipped	  out	  his	  Ghanaian	  
passport	  right	   there…And	  boom,	  boom,	  he	  stamped	  it	  and	  he	   left.	  So	  
there	   is	   transparency	   there.	   So,	  you	  can	  now	  put	   into	  your	  database	  
that	   this	   person’s	   Ghanaian	   passport	   number	   is	   X	   and	   the	   other	  
passport	  is	  Y.	  So,	  you	  have	  better	  control	  then	  if	  you	  leave	  it	  open	  and	  
people	  have	  to	  sneak	  and	  do	  different	  things.219	  
	  
Despite	   reputed	   gains,	   the	   enactment	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   across	   the	   continent	   and	  
within	  the	  sub-­‐region	  has	  not	  happened	  at	  lightning	  speed,	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  
same	   backlash	   described	   throughout	   this	   thesis.	   Senator	   Sumo	   Kupee,	   one	   of	   the	  
sponsors	  of	  Liberia’s	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation,	  admitted	  that	  the	  Liberia	  
bill	  was	  inspired	  by	  continental	  trends,	  with	  his	  colleagues	  warning	  him	  that	  there	  
would	  be	  staunch	  opposition	  along	  the	  way:	  	  
	  
I’ve	   spoken	   to	   parliamentarians	   in	   Accra.	   I’ve	   spoken	   to	  
parliamentarians	   in	   Sierra	   Leone.	   And	   they	   shared	   the	   same	  
difficulties	   they	   had…And	   again,	   especially	   my	   colleagues	   in	   Ghana.	  
They	   said	   it	   was	   really	   tough,	   and	   because	   looking	   at	   where	   Ghana	  
was	   coming	   from	  at	   the	   time,	   grossly	  underdeveloped,	   and	   they	  had	  
these	  citizens	  coming	  from	  London,	  there	  was	  this	  same	  apprehension	  
from	  local	  Ghanaians	  and	  their	  counterparts,	  you	  know.220	  	  
	  
	  
During	  my	  interview	  with	  Ansumana	  Jaia	  Kaikai,	  Deputy	  Minority	  Leader	  of	  Sierra	  
Leone’s	   Parliament	   and	   chief	   sponsor	   of	   that	   country’s	   dual	   citizenship	   bill,	   he	  
admitted	   that	   it	   took	   the	   president’s	   full	   endorsement	   to	   finally	   pass	   the	   Dual	  
Citizenship	  Act	  of	  2006	  nine	  years	  after	  it	  was	  introduced	  in	  1997:	  	  
	  
I	  had	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  several	  Sierra	  Leoneans	  that	  were	   living	  
overseas,	   and	   that	   they	  were	  being	  disadvantaged	  because	   they	  had	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taken	   dual	   citizenships	   in	   other	   countries	   other	   than	   Sierra	   Leone.	  
And	   because	   our	   Constitution	   prohibited	   dual	   nationality,	   I	   felt	   that	  
our	   country	   was	   not,	   our	   laws	   were	   not	   favouring,	   we	   were	  
disadvantaging	  our	  citizens	  and	  nationals	  that	  were	  residing	  overseas,	  
and	   who	   had,	   because	   they	   wanted	   to	   make	   their	   stay	   in	   other	  
countries	   liveable,	   so	   they	   had	   taken	   those	   citizenships	   as	   it	   is	  
required	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  those	  countries…Well,	  we	  came	  to	  realise,	  as	  I	  
said	   earlier,	   among	   those	   reasons,	   that	   in	   fact	   there	   were	   Sierra	  
Leoneans	   with	   access	   to	   our	   roots.	   I	   mean,	   there	   were	   people,	  
Americans,	   Jamaicans,	   etcetera,	   Europeans,	   with	   their	   roots	   from	  
Sierra	  Leone,	  either	  by	  way	  of	  parentage,	  who	  wanted	  to	  be	  associated	  
with	  their	  home	  country.	  So,	   I	   thought	   it	   fit	   that	  I	  should	  make	  it	  my	  
point	   of	   duty	   to	   have	   the	   president	   endorse	   it	   [the	   dual	   citizenship	  
bill]...which	  he	  did,	  and	  not	  too	  long	  after	  that	  it	  went	  through	  cabinet	  
and	  then	  it	  came	  here	  [Parliament],	  became	  law…221	  
	  
One	  of	   the	  unique	  aspects	  of	   Sierra	  Leone’s	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Act	   is	   that	   it	   enables	  
African-­‐Americans	   to	   become	   citizens	   through	   mitochondrial	   DNA	   testing,	   as	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  US	  actor	  Isaiah	  Washington	  who	  claimed	  and	  was	  granted	  Sierra	  
Leonean	   citizenship	   in	   2008	   (Washington,	   2011).	   During	   a	   meeting	   with	   a	  
delegation	  representing	  the	  Gullah	   from	  South	  Carolina,	  who	  trace	  their	   lineage	  to	  
Sierra	  Leone,	  Kaikai	  said	  he	  used	  the	  occasion	  to	  apply	  pressure	  on	  then	  President	  
Tejan	  Kabbah	  to	  pass	  the	  Dual	  Citizenship	  Act.	  Kaikai,	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  US	  as	  a	  
permanent	   resident	   for	   23	   years	   before	   relocating	   to	   Freetown,	   claimed	   that	   the	  
nine-­‐year	  limbo	  for	  the	  Act	  was	  well	  worth	  the	  wait	  since	  Sierra	  Leonean	  diasporas	  
have	  become	  more	  engaged	  in	  politics:	  	  
	  
It	   [dual	   citizenship]	   actually	   has	   given	   lots	   of	   chance	   to	   Sierra	  
Leoneans	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   governments	   of	   the	   country.	   The	  
amount	   of	   members	   of	   Parliament	   [who	   have	   dual	   citizenship]	   has	  
increased,	  the	  amount	  of	  cabinet	  members	  [who	  have	  dual	  citizenship]	  
has	   increased…The	   amount	   of	   non-­‐political	   operations	   [by	   diaspora	  
groups]	  had	  increased.222	  	  
	  
There	   have	   been	   other	   spill-­‐over	   effects	   of	   the	   Act	   which	   have	   undoubtedly	  
influenced	  Liberia’s	  introduction	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation,	  and	  its	  engagement	  
with	  diasporas.	  	  For	  instance,	  Ernest	  Bai	  Koroma,	  current	  president	  of	  Sierra	  Leone,	  
announced	   an	   Executive	   Proclamation	   shortly	   after	   assuming	   office	   in	   2007	   that	  
                                                
221	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Freetown	  on	  April	  19,	  2013.	  	  




diasporas	   constituted	   Sierra	   Leone’s	   5th	   Region,	   prompting	   a	   concept	   note	   that	  
established	  an	  Office	  of	  Diaspora	  Affairs	  in	  2008.223	  During	  my	  tenure	  in	  the	  office	  of	  
President	  Ellen	  Johnson	  Sirleaf,	  I	  was	  seconded	  to	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  Office	  of	  Diaspora	  
Affairs	   for	  a	  week-­‐long	  study	   tour	   in	  2010	   to	  examine	   its	   contours	  so	   that	  Liberia	  
could	  establish	  a	  similar	  unit	  that	  would	  be	  incubated	  in	  the	  president’s	  office.	  The	  
Liberian	  president	  also	  began	  referring	  to	  diasporas	  as	  Liberia’s	  “16th	  county.”	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   from	   my	   analysis	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   Liberia’s	   proposed	   dual	  
citizenship	  bill	  was	  prompted	  not	  only	  by	  human	  rights	   claims	  within	  Liberia	  and	  
transnational	   spaces,	   but	   also	   by	   citizenship	   reconfiguration	   processes	   across	   the	  
continent	  of	  Africa.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
As	  Liberia’s	  first	  major	  investor,	  Firestone	  is	  emblematic	  of	  how	  the	  globalisation	  of	  
capital	   (foreign	  direct	   investment	  by	  Firestone)	  and	  the	  globalisation	  of	   ideas	  (the	  
framing	   of	   Firestone	   workers’	   rights	   as	   human	   rights)	   have	   cast	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   as	   a	   set	   of	   state-­‐citizen	   and	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	  
argued	  that	  although	  globalisation	  in	  theory	  and	  practice	  remains	  contested,	   it	  has	  
impacted	  the	  configuration	  of	  citizenship	  across	  the	  globe,	  generally,	  and	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’,	   specifically,	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways.	   While	   economic	   globalisation	  
manifested	  in	  unfair	  trade	  and	  conditional	  aid	  has	  exacerbated	  inequality,	  political	  
globalisation	  manifested	  in	  notions	  of	  social	  justice	  has	  promoted	  equality	  (Koenig-­‐
Archibugi,	   2003:	   3-­‐7).	   This	   is	   fundamentally	   true	   in	   the	   Liberia	   case.	   While	   the	  
globalisation	   of	   capital	   has	   created	   vast	   swathes	   of	   poverty	   in	   Liberia,	   thereby	  
eroding	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   and	   fuelling	   anti-­‐dual	   citizenship	   angst,	   the	  
globalisation	   of	   ideas	   manifested	   in	   notions	   of	   human	   rights	   has	   strengthened	  
citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  and	  engendered	  principles	  of	   inclusion,	   thereby	  advancing	  
pro-­‐dual	   citizenship	   sentiments.	   I	   have	   also	   shown	   that	   Liberia’s	   20th	   century	  
integration	   and	   21st	   century	   re-­‐integration	   into	   the	   global	   capitalist	   system	   has	  
sustained	   Tubman’s	   Open	  Door	   Policy,	  with	   simultaneously	   positive	   and	   negative	  
results	  for	  citizenship	  construction	  and	  practice.	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In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   discuss	   how	  post-­‐war	   recovery	   has	   sparked	  heated	  debates	  
about	   what	   kind	   of	   development	   Liberia	   should	   pursue,	   who	   can	   legitimately	  














































‘Taylor-­‐Corkrum	  Nexus’	  Undermines	  Transnational	  Citizenship	  
	  
In	  1984,	  soon	  to	  be	  warlord-­‐turned-­‐president	  Charles	  Ghankay	  Taylor	  sat	  in	  a	  drab	  
cell	   of	   the	   Plymouth	   Massachusetts	   Correctional	   Facility,	   a	   fugitive	   on	   the	   run	  
(Waugh,	  2011:	  97).	  For	  16	  months,	  he	  awaited	  extradition	   to	  Liberia	   for	  allegedly	  
embezzling	   US$922,382	   from	   the	   country’s	   General	   Services	   Agency	   (GSA),	   the	  
procurement	  arm	  of	  government	  he	  had	  previously	  headed	  before	  absconding	  to	  the	  
US,	   his	   adopted	   home	   (Waugh,	   2011:	   97-­‐104).	   In	   the	   early	   1970s,	   the	   ambitious	  
young	  Taylor	  had	  travelled	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  from	  Liberia	  to	  attend	  Chamberlayne	  
Junior	   College	   in	   Boston,	   Massachusetts,	   although	   he	   subsequently	   enrolled	   at	  
Bentley	   College,	   studying	   economics	   (Waugh,	   2011:	   63;	   65).	   A	   consummate	  
politician,	   he	   became	   involved	   in	   the	   Liberian	   Community	   Association	   in	  
Massachusetts,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Union	   of	   Liberian	   Associations	   in	   the	   Americas	  
(ULAA)—then	  a	  “vehicle	   through	  which	  educated	  but	  politically	  disenfranchised—
mostly	   indigenous—Liberians	   could	   voice	   their	   disapproval”	   of	   settler	   hegemony	  
(Waugh,	   2011:	   67;	   69).	   Travelling	   up	   and	   down	   the	   US	   East	   Coast	   for	   rallies	   and	  
demonstrations,	   Taylor,	   then	   a	   critical	   voice	   for	   change	   in	   his	   native	   Liberia,	  was	  
elected	   head	   of	   the	   Boston	   branch	   of	   ULAA	   (Waugh,	   2011:	   69-­‐70).	  When	   he	   and	  
other	  ULAA	   stalwarts	  were	   invited	   by	   President	  William	  Tolbert	   in	   early	   1980	   to	  
help	   institute	   reforms	   in	   Liberia	   for	   which	   they	   had	   advocated	   in	   the	   US,	   Taylor	  
declined	  until	  a	  more	  lucrative	  offer	  came	  from	  Samuel	  Kanyon	  Doe	  to	  head	  the	  GSA	  
in	  1983	  (Waugh,	  2011:	  86).	  	  
	  
Rumoured	  to	  have	  acquired	  permanent	  US	  residency	  while	  abroad,	  Taylor	  stands	  as	  
a	   shining	   exemplar	   of	   the	   anxieties	   that	   underpin	  backlash	   against	   proposed	  dual	  
citizenship	  legislation.	  His	  1984	  aborted	  extradition	  and	  escape	  from	  Plymouth	  has	  
been	   lodged	   in	   the	   Liberian	   imagination	   as	   indicative	   of	   the	   country’s	   inability	   to	  
deter	   transnationals	   from	   pilfering	   meagre	   state	   resources	   and	   “plunging	   the	  
country	   into	   chaos,”224	  as	   articulated	   by	   one	   homeland	  male	   respondent.	   In	   2013,	  
another	   indictment	  and	   looming	  extradition,	   this	   time	   involving	  a	  Liberia-­‐born	  US	  
                                                




citizen	   army	   pilot,	   Ellen	   Corkrum,	   harkened	   back	   to	   the	   Taylor	   case.	   Appointed	  
managing	   director	   of	   the	   Roberts	   International	   Airport	   (RIA)	   in	   Liberia	   in	   2011,	  
Corkrum	   was	   subsequently	   accused	   in	   2012	   of	   “economic	   sabotage,	   theft	   of	  
property,	   criminal	   conspiracy,	   and	   misapplication	   of	   entrusted	   property” 225	  
(Kanneh,	  2014).	  After	  fleeing	  to	  the	  US,	  she	  and	  her	  Liberia-­‐born	  US	  citizen	  partner,	  
Melvin	   Johnson—the	   first	   black	   judge	   to	   serve	   in	   Lithonia,	   Georgia—released	  
unauthorised	  tapes	  they	  had	  recorded	  implicating	  other	  government	  officials	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  court	  sympathy	  (Kanneh,	  2014).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  government	  of	  Liberia	  
requested	   their	   extradition	   in	   September	   2013,	   prompting	   Sirleaf	   to	   publically	  
lament	  her	  faith	  in	  Corkrum’s	  purported	  ability	  to	  lead	  reforms	  in	  aviation:	  	  
	  
A	   major	   setback	   in	   efforts	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   [Roberts	  
International]	  airport	   resulted	   from	  an	  unscrupulous	  and	  conspiring	  
newly	   recruited	   Managing	   Director	   [Corkrum],	   who	   returned	  
kindness	   and	   deference	  with	   entrapment	   and	   intriguing	   accusations	  
to	  damage	   the	  credibility	  of	  several	   individuals	  and	  the	   image	  of	   the	  
country.	  This	  matter	   is	  under	  review	  by	  counsel	   in	  the	  United	  States	  
for	  legal	  redress,	  including	  extradition	  (Sirleaf,	  2014:	  24).	  
	  
Indeed,	  Sirleaf’s	  unwavering	  faith	  in	  returnee	  recruits	  such	  as	  Corkrum	  has	  in	  many	  
ways	  eroded	  state-­‐citizen	  relations,	  casting	  diaspora	  actors	  as	  post-­‐war	  saboteurs.	  	  	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   argue	   that	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   has	   fundamentally	   reconfigured	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’,	   leading	   to	   heightened	   debates	   about	   who	   can	   legitimately	  
participate	  in	  reconstruction	  efforts.	  I	  employ	  what	  I	  call	  the	  ‘Taylor-­‐Corkrum	  nexus’	  
to	  illustrate	  that	  the	  presumed	  contributions	  of	  Liberians	  abroad	  and	  their	  returnee	  
counterparts	   are	   violently	   contested.	   While	   there	   is	   recognition	   that	   diasporas	  
represent	   a	   ‘third	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   space’	   through	   their	   contributions	   to	  
recovery—thereby	   increasing	   claims	   for	   dual	   citizenship—there	   is	   also	  
acknowledgment	   that	   they	   have	   contributed	   to	   post-­‐war	   profiteering	   through	  
corrupt	   practices—thereby	   influencing	   backlash	   against	   dual	   citizenship.	   The	  
chapter	  is	  organised	  into	  three	  sections:	  First,	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  
on	   war	   to	   peace	   transitions,	   examining	   the	   contestations	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  






Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   trajectory.	   Second,	   I	   catalogue	   Liberia’s	   achievements	  
and	   challenges	   in	   implementing	   its	   first	  major	   post-­‐war	   development	   agenda,	   the	  
Lift	  Liberia	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy,	  and	  examine	  how	  these	  developments	  have	  
impacted	   citizenship	   configuration.	   And	   lastly,	   I	   assess	   how	   Sirleaf’s	   diasporic	  
ethos—manifested	   in	   her	   copious	   appointments	   of	   transnationals	   to	   government	  
positions	  of	  power	  and	  influence—has	  both	  helped	  and	  hindered	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  
thereby	   influencing	   claims	   for	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   against	   dual	   citizenship	   as	   a	  
policy	  prescription.	  	  
	  
The	  Great	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Makeover	  Fantasy226	  and	  War	  to	  Peace	  Alternatives	  	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  refrain	  from	  using	  the	  term	  ‘post-­‐conflict’	  to	  describe	  Liberia	  because	  
it	   is	   a	   misnomer	   given	   the	   country’s	   contemporary	   post-­‐war	   clashes	   over	   land,	  
income	  inequality,	  transitional	  justice	  and	  dual	  citizenship,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  
V.	  Nevertheless,	  ‘post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction’	  is	  a	  term	  often	  used	  in	  policy	  circles	  to	  
describe	   countries	   recovering	   from	  armed	   conflict,	   although	  post-­‐war	  nations	   like	  
Liberia	  are	  rarely	  devoid	  of	  deeply	  entrenched	  historical	  fissures.	  In	  fact,	  one	  of	  the	  
fallacies	   generated	   by	   the	   ‘post-­‐conflict	  moment’	   is	   that	   a	   country	   emerging	   from	  
war	  is	  a	  ‘blank	  slate”	  without	  a	  unique	  historical	  trajectory	  (Cramer,	  2006:	  255).	  The	  
term	   ‘post-­‐conflict	   reconstruction’	   persists,	   however,	   and	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	  
attempt	  by	   the	  US	  and	  other	  nations	   to	  rebuild	  Europe	  after	  World	  War	   II	   (World	  
Bank,	  1998).	  More	  contemporarily,	  the	  term	  has	  been	  used	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  since	  
1995	  to	  describe	   the	  need	   for	   “the	  rebuilding	  of	   the	  socio-­‐economic	   framework	  of	  
society”	   and	   the	   “reconstruction	   of	   the	   enabling	   conditions	   for	   a	   functioning	  
peacetime	  society	   [to	   include]	   the	   framework	   for	  governance	  and	   the	   rule	  of	   law”	  
(World	  Bank,	  1998;	  Orr,	  2004:	  10).	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  $400	  million	  in	  World	  Bank	  
grants	  were	  spent	  on	  reconstruction	  efforts	  between	  1993	  and	  1998,	  with	  the	  Bank	  
establishing	   a	   Post-­‐Conflict	   Unit	   (PCU)	   in	   1997	   to	   address	   economic	   recovery	   in	  
addition	  to	  combating	  corruption,	  improving	  governance,	  social	  cohesion	  and	  social	  
capital	  in	  post-­‐war	  contexts	  (World	  Bank,	  1998:	  vi-­‐vii).	  	  
	  
                                                
226	  “The	  Great	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Makeover	  Fantasy”	   is	   the	   title	  of	  chapter	  seven	   in	  Cramer’s	  2006	  book,	  




Although	   the	  World	  Bank	  argues	   that	   it	   is	  not	   in	   the	  business	  of	   interfering	   in	   the	  
politics	   of	   a	   member	   state,	   its	   laundry	   list	   of	   priorities	   and	   interventions	   have	  
prompted	   researchers	   to	   contend	   that	   ‘post-­‐conflict	   reconstruction’	   is	   a	   decidedly	  
political	   project.	   Scholars	   like	   Cramer	   are	   vehemently	   critical	   of	   the	   post-­‐conflict	  
reconstruction	   paradigm,	   arguing	   that	   “contemporary	   post-­‐conflict	   threats	   to	  
development	  have	  three	  major	  sources:”	   i)	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  and	  peace-­‐
building	   are	   not	   technical	   undertakings,	   but	   fiercely	   political	   in	   nature;	   ii)	   the	  
developmental	  outcomes	  of	  peace	  settlements	  depend	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  economic	  
policy	   is	   based	   on	   ideological	   fantasy	   or	   on	   a	   realistic	   assessment	   of	   particular	  
economies	  and	  of	  historical	  experience;	  and	   iii)	   the	  post-­‐conflict	   “moniker”	  can	  be	  
misleading	   (Cramer,	   2006:	   245).	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   when	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   moment	  
actually	   begins,	   nor	   is	   there	   any	   internationally	   sanctioned	   definition	   of	   what	  
constitutes	  post-­‐conflict	   reconstruction	  aid	   (Cramer,	  2006:	  259).	  Furthermore,	   the	  
diverse	  prescriptions	  for	  the	  ‘post-­‐conflict	  makeover’	  have	  been	  employed	  since	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  increasing	  its	  lending	  to	  post-­‐war	  nations	  
by	  800	  percent	  from	  1980	  to	  1998	  (Cramer,	  2006:	  258).	  Post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  
debates	   are	   often	   driven	   by	   a	   single	   narrative	   with	   an	   expressed	   reluctance	   to	  
accept	   that	   there	   are	   diverse	   ways	   of	   “managing	   the	   challenges	   of	   war	   to	   peace	  
transitions”	  (Cramer,	  2006:	  277).	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  ‘post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction’	  is	  a	  contested	  category	  of	  inquiry,	  war	  to	  peace	  
transitions	   are	   often	   disputed	   political	   processes	   that	   involve	   a	   number	   of	  
competing	   priorities	   of	   states,	   local	   constituents,	   and	   donors.	   They	   represent	   an	  
array	   of	   intersecting	   processes	   which	   include,	   but	   are	   not	   limited	   to:	   i)	   security	  
sector	  reform	  (rebuilding	  the	  army	  and	  other	  security	  institutions,	  demobilising	  ex-­‐
combatants	   and	   introducing	   principles	   of	   ‘good	   governance’	   throughout	   security	  
institutions);	   ii)	   political	   reconstruction	   (legal	   systems,	   electoral	   systems,	   public	  
policy	  reforms);	  iii)	  economic	  reconstruction	  (macro-­‐economic	  policies,	  tax	  reforms,	  
budget	  realignment,	  controlling	   inflation,	  changing	  banking	  and	  commercial	  codes,	  
realigning	  expenditures	  and	  revenue);	  and	  iv)	  social	  reconstruction	  (integrating	  ex-­‐
combatants,	  repatriating	  refugees,	  reigniting	  social	  cohesion,	  identity	  formation	  and	  
consolidation)	   (Ottaway,	   2003;	   del	   Castillo,	   2008;	   Paris	   and	   Sisk,	   2010).	   Another	  




international	   financial	  assistance,	  as	  well	  as	   international	  police	  and	  troops,	  which	  
del	   Castillo	   attributes	   to	   the	   country’s	   regional	   or	   strategic	   importance	   to	   donors	  
and	  nations	  contributing	  troops	  (del	  Castillo,	  2008:	  9).	  	  
	  
Similar	  to	  the	  four-­‐pillar	  structure	  of	  Liberia’s	  first	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy,	  Lift	  
Liberia,	   as	   a	   regional	   example,	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   in	  Africa	   to	   date	   has	   been	  
premised	   on	   four	   textbook	  war	   to	   peace	   principles	   largely	   derived	   and	   driven	   by	  
donors:	   i)	   security	   sector	   reform	   (DDRR,	   security	   agency	   restructuring);	   ii)	   justice	  
and	   reconciliation	   (TRC,	   war	   crimes	   tribunal,	   judicial	   reform);	   iii)	   socio-­‐economic	  
transformation	   (employment,	   restoring	   basic	   services,	   GDP	   growth	   and	   economic	  
development);	   and	   iv)	   political	   restructuring	   (elections,	   rule	   of	   law,	   governance,	  
mass	   political	   participation)	   (Sesay,	   et.	   al,	   2009:	   7).	   Akin	   to	   post-­‐World	   War	   II	  
reconstruction	   in	  Europe,	   there	   is	  often	  an	   “externalisation	  of	  post-­‐war	  efforts”	   in	  
Africa	   where	   “external	   actors	   tend	   to	   dominate	   the	   designing,	   financing,	   and	  
implementation	   of	   reconstruction	   programmes	   in	   countries	   emerging	   from	   civil	  
wars”	   (Sesay,	   et.	   al,	   2009:	   8).	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   Liberia’s	   adoption	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	  
measures	   prompted	   former	   Public	   Works	   Minister	   Kofi	   Woods	   to	   lament	   the	  
country’s	  externalisation	  of	  its	  post-­‐war	  efforts:	  
	  
My	   frustration	   with	   most	   of	   these	   things	   is	   that	   it’s	   [post-­‐war	  
recovery’s]	   captured	   externally	   and	   imposed	   locally.	   And	  when	   you	  
have	   these	   kinds	   of	   things	   happen,	   when	  we	   have	   to	   pander	   to	   the	  
international	   demands	   and	   the	   dictates	   of	   the	   international	  
community	  as	  to	  what	  model	  we	  should	  adapt,	  what	  will	  be	  good	  for	  
our	   country,	   implementation	   becomes	   difficult.	  We	   need	   to	   develop	  
our	  national	  drive,	  our	  domestic	  approaches	  to	  be	  able	  to	  address	  the	  
problems	  of	  Liberia,	  not	  what	  happened	  somewhere	  else,	  or	  not	  what	  
becomes	  the	  most	  romantic	  approach	  to	  development.	  And	  that’s	  part	  
of	  my	   frustration.	   So,	   nothing	   that	   is	   borrowed	  without	   appropriate	  
understanding	  can	  be	  applied	  consistently	  in	  this	  country.	  	  And	  I	  don’t	  
think	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  do	  it.	  We	  want	  to	  be	  a	  darling	  of	  external	  
people,	  probably	  some	  of	  us	  –	  not	  only	  the	  institution	  or	  the	  country	  –	  
but	   as	   individuals,	   we	   also	  want	   to	   be	   a	   darling	   of	   those	   out	   there,	  
hoping	   that	   our	   future	   can	  be	   embedded	   in	   their	   institutions,	   of	   the	  
IMF,	   the	   World	   Bank,	   and	   so	   forth.	   So	   we	   pander	   to	   them	   without	  
understanding	  that	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	  for	  our	  own	  country.227	  
	  
                                                




Despite	   Woods’	   contention,	   other	   policy	   makers	   like	   current	   Foreign	   Affairs	  
Minister/former	  Finance	  Minister	  Augustine	  Ngafuan,	  who	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  
the	   HIPC	   process,	   argued	   that	   Liberia	   has	   demonstrated	  more	   agency	   than	   some	  
care	  to	  admit	  in	  strategically	  accepting	  post-­‐war	  conditionalities:	  
	  
Well,	   because	   [of]	   the	   conditionalities,	  we	   agreed	  upon	   it.	  We	   called	  
them	   triggers.	   One	   was	   to	   maintain	   macro-­‐economic	   stability.	   That	  
was	  good	  for	  the	  Liberian	  people.	  Not	  just	  an	  IMF	  issue.	  We	  agreed	  to	  
institute	  audits	  of	  five	  key	  government	  ministries	  and	  agencies,	  ‘HIPC	  
Audits,’	  including	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  Education,	  Health	  and	  that	  was	  
good	   for	   the	   Liberian	   people	   that	   those	   entities	   were	   audited.	   We	  
agreed	   to	   the	   establishment,	   and	   making	   functional,	   an	   Anti-­‐
Corruption	   Commission.	   That	  was	   good	   for	   the	   Liberian	   people.	  We	  
agreed	  to	  clean	  up…to	  regularise	  the	  Education	  Ministry	  payroll.	  That	  
was	   good	   for	   the	   Liberian	  people.	  We	   agreed	   to	  pass	   an	   Investment	  
Code	   that	   would	   take	   away	   discretion	   and	   that	   was	   good	   for	   the	  
Liberian	   people.	   Of	   all	   the	   triggers	   agreed,	   those	   were	   triggers	   that	  
were	  advancing	  the	  interest	  of	  Liberians…No,	  it	  was	  not	  top-­‐down.	  It	  
was	   negotiated.	   We	   proffered	   most	   of	   these	   things	   and	   we	   had	   a	  
common	  understanding	  with	  our	  partners—the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  IMF	  
and	  others	  in	  the	  HIPC	  process.	  They	  say	  these	  are	  the	  conditionalities	  
because	  they	  sprang	  from	  the	  exigent	  realities	  of	  Liberia.	  Yes,	  in	  other	  
situations	  the	  neo-­‐liberalist	  critiques	  apply	  but	  for	  us	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  
we	  ensured	  that	  those	  triggers	  agreed	  upon	  were	  triggers	  that	  were	  in	  
the	  interest	  of	  Liberia.228	  
	  
As	   highlighted	   by	   former	  minister	  Woods	   and	   current	  minister	   Ngafuan,	   there	   is	  
contestation	   about	   whether	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   has	   been	   externally	  
imposed	   or	   domestically	   driven,	   and	   whether	   it	   has	   strengthened	   or	   weakened	  
state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   Central	   to	   the	   discourses	   surrounding	   war	   to	   peace	  
transitions	   in	   Liberia	   and	   elsewhere	   is	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   state	   to	   negotiate	   the	  
competing	   priorities	   of	   donors	   and	   international	   actors,	   the	   state	   itself,	   and	   local	  
constituents.	  	  
	  
Post-­‐war	  countries	  often	  share	   important	   features—the	   	  “mismatch	  between	  fiscal	  
capacities	  and	  needs	  as	  well	  as	  on-­‐going	  societal	  tensions	  that	  could	  precipitate	  the	  
renewal	   of	   violent	   conflict”—yet	   they	   also	   exhibit	   differences	   which	   must	   be	  
considered	   in	   formulating	   war	   to	   peace	   policies	   (Boyce	   and	   O’Donnell,	   2007:	   2).	  
                                                




Each	  war	  to	  peace	  transition	   is	  distinct	  depending	  on	  the	  “specific	   interplay	  of	   the	  
many	  factors	  that	  influence	  them,”	  including	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  conflict	  
began	  (internal	   strife,	   regional	   conflict,	   the	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity,	  or	  control	  of	  
natural	   resources)	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   were	   resolved	   through	   peaceful	  
negotiations	   or	   through	   military	   intervention	   (del	   Castillo,	   2008:	   9).	   Though	  
knowledge	   and	   experiences	   gained	   from	   other	   post-­‐war	   contexts	   provide	   a	  
heightened	   level	   of	   insight,	   “off-­‐the-­‐shelf	   solutions	   cannot	   be	   imported	   from	   one	  
setting	   and	   simply	   grafted	   into	   another”	   (Boyce	   and	   O’Donnell,	   2007:	   2).	  
Furthermore,	  attempts	  by	  donors	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  create	  a	  blueprint	  for	  
reconstruction	   is	   ill-­‐advised	   because	   creating	   and	   legitimising	   institutional	  
structures	  can	  only	  be	  marginally	  facilitated	  by	  external	  actors	  (Ottaway,	  2003:	  265).	  	  
	  
External	   influence	   in	   post-­‐war	   transitions	   often	   compromises	   their	   success	   rates,	  
with	   del	   Castillo	   and	   others	   arguing	   that	   transitions	   in	   countries	   like	   Iraq	   and	  
Afghanistan	   failed	  because	  they	  did	  not	  address	   fundamental	  problems	  of	  political	  
reconciliation,	  economic	  reconstruction,	  and	  improvements	  in	  the	  living	  conditions	  
of	   citizens	   (del	   Castillo,	   2008:	   2).	   Thus,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   national	   authorities	   to	  
drive	  the	  process	  of	  reconstruction	  because	  “their	  participation	  is	  crucial	  if	  policies	  
and	  aid	  flows	  are	  to	  contribute	  to	  effective	  reconstruction	  and	  peace	  consolidation	  
in	   the	   future”	   (del	  Castillo,	   2008:	  5).	  What	  del	  Castillo	   and	  others	   fail	   to	   factor	   in,	  
however,	   is	   how	   national	   authorities	   are	   legitimated,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   post-­‐war	  
contexts	   like	   Liberia	   where	   diasporas	   are	   strategically	   involved	   in	   the	   rebuilding	  
process,	   how	   diasporic	   claims	   to	   legitimacy	   are	   contested	   or	   reinforced	   through	  
existing	  power	  dynamics,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	   later	   in	   this	  chapter.	  Cramer	  argues	  
convincingly	   that	   for	   economic	   development	   to	   gain	   momentum	   in	   the	   wake	   of	  
violent	  conflict,	  a	  strong	  central	  state	  is	  essential,	  contrary	  to	  popular	  opinion	  that	  
the	   state	  must	   take	   a	  backseat	   to	   the	   “decentralising	   and	  enabling	  bureaucracy	  of	  
the	   post-­‐conflict	   reconstruction	   make-­‐over	   fantasy”	   (Cramer,	   2006:	   277).	   Other	  
scholars	  also	  challenge	  the	  manner	   in	  which	   international	  agencies	  undermine	  the	  
post-­‐war	   state	   in	   war	   to	   peace	   transitions.	   According	   to	   Boyce,	   the	   ‘dual	   public	  
sector’	   architecture	   of	   post-­‐war	   economic	   reconstruction	   efforts—where	   there	  
exists	  an	  ‘internal	  sector’	  funded	  and	  managed	  by	  the	  government	  and	  an	  ‘external	  




tap	  external	  assistance	  to	  build	  the	  state’s	  own	  fiscal	  capacity;	  ii)	  it	  crowds	  out	  the	  
‘external	  public	  sector’	  by	  recruiting	  professionals,	  and	  often	  diaspora	  professionals	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   Liberia	   and	   other	   post-­‐war	   contexts,	   that	   the	   government	   cannot	  
afford;	   iii)	   it	   poses	   coordination	   problems	   for	   an	   external	   public	   sector	   that	   is	  
managed	   by	   competing	   agencies	   with	   their	   own	   priorities;	   and	   iv)	   there	   are	   no	  
mechanisms	  that	  make	  donors	  (and	  sometimes	  states)	  accountable	  to	  local	  citizens	  
(Boyce,	  2010:	  102).	  	  
	  
As	   discussed	   briefly	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   externally	   financed	   and	   driven	  
reconstruction	   efforts	   fundamentally	   erode	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   Donors’	  
obsession	  with	  the	  “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all”	  approach	  undermines	  citizen	  agency,	  strips	  the	  
state	  of	  its	  historical	  context,	  and	  entrenches	  the	  assumption	  that	  “institutions,	  state	  
capacity	   and	   governance	   are	   purely	   technical,	   depoliticised	   entities”	   (Cramer	   and	  
Goodhand,	  2003:	  150).	  Unlike	  Mengisteab	  and	  Daddieh	  (1999)	  who	  view	  the	  state	  
as	  a	  panacea	  for	  democratic	  consolidation	  in	  post-­‐war	  settings,	  Cramer	  posits	  that	  a	  
powerful	   state	   is	   not	   sufficient	   because	   longer	   term	   development	   transformation	  
can	  only	  happen	  by	   identifying	  and	  encouraging	   the	   “conditions	  under	  which	   that	  
state	  is	  dominated	  by	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions”	  (Cramer,	  2006:	  278),	  such	  
as	   authority	   derived	   from	   strong	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   In	   other	   words,	   a	   strong	  
state	  does	  not	  necessarily	  equal	  a	  successful	  post-­‐war	  transition.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
particularities	  of	  causes	  of	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  state	  failures	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’	   approach	   to	   peace-­‐building	   and	   reconstruction	   (Luckham,	   2006:	  
287).	  According	  to	  Luckham,	  reconstruction	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  if	  it	  factors	  in	  
the	  multiple	   layers	  of	  authority	  above	  and	  below	  the	  state,	  such	  as	  citizens,	  rather	  
than	  a	  single-­‐minded	  pursuit	  of	  rebuilding	  states	  through	  central	  governance	  alone	  
(Luckham,	  2006:	  292).	  A	  simultaneous	  pursuit	  of	  state-­‐building	  and	  nation-­‐building	  
objectives	  in	  post-­‐war	  contexts	  is	  the	  only	  means	  of	  strengthening	  state-­‐citizen	  and	  
citizen-­‐citizen	  relations,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  the	  section	  that	  follows.	  	  
	  
The	  Dilemmas	  of	  State-­‐building229	  and	  Nation-­‐building	  
Five	  major	   contributions	   supporting	   the	   need	   to	   strengthen	   state	   institutions	   and	  
                                                




governance	   structures	   in	   war	   to	   peace	   transitions	   were	   proffered	   in	   2004	   by	  
authors	   such	   as	   Francis	   Fukuyama,	   Simon	   Chesterman,	   James	   Fearon	   and	   David	  
Laitin,	  Stephen	  Krasner,	  and	  Roland	  Paris,	  which	  transformed	  state-­‐building	  into	  a	  
growing	  topic	  of	  concern	  in	  peace-­‐building	  scholarship	  (Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2010:	  7-­‐10).	  
Paris	   and	   Sisk	   refer	   to	   “the	   construction	   or	   strengthening	   of	   legitimate	  
governmental	   institutions	   in	   countries	   emerging	   from	   civil	   conflict”	   as	   ‘state-­‐
building,’	   which	   has	   been	   used	   increasingly	   by	   the	   UN	   and	   other	   multilateral	  
agencies	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	   peace-­‐building	   (Paris	   and	   Sisk,	   2010:	   1).	   While	  
institutional	   strengthening	   is	   certainly	   not	   the	   panacea	   to	   sustainable	   peace	   or	  
development,	  sustainable	  peace	  and	  development	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  effective	  state-­‐building	  (Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2010:	  3).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  backlash	  to	  the	  
neo-­‐liberal	   agenda	   in	   post-­‐war	   contexts,	   questions	   about	   “coordination	   and	  
coherence,	   local	   ownership,	   legitimacy,	   capacity-­‐building,	   dependency,	  
accountability,	  and	  exit”	  have	  foregrounded	  official	  discussions	  by	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  
international	  organisations	  (Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2010:	  3).	  A	  closer	  examination	  of	  these	  
issues	   is	   vital	   to	   solving	   the	   daily	   challenges	   of	   externally	   assisted	   state-­‐building	  
efforts,	  particularly	  for	  peace-­‐building	  agents	  in	  the	  field	  (Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2010:	  3).	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Paris	   and	   Sisk,	   however,	   post-­‐war	   peace-­‐building	   and	   state-­‐building	  
remain	  uncertain	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons:	  i)	  the	  record	  of	  peace-­‐building	  and	  state-­‐
building	   enterprises	   have	   seen	   divergent	   outcomes;	   ii)	   state-­‐building,	   for	   some,	  
represents	  a	  new	  form	  of	  colonial	  control	  over	  war-­‐torn	  states	   in	  the	  form	  of	  neo-­‐
imperial	  or	   capitalist	  expansion	  and	   for	  others	   it	   fosters	  a	   ‘culture	  of	  dependency’	  
when	   the	  goal	   should	  be	   self-­‐rule	  and	  domestic	  governance;	   and	   iii)	   the	  post/911	  
period	   has	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	   separate	   discussions	   of	   state-­‐building	   in	   war-­‐torn	  
states	   from	   the	   failed	   attempts	  by	   the	  US	   in	   Iraq	   and	  Afghanistan	   (Paris	   and	  Sisk,	  
2010:	   3).	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	   state-­‐building	   ‘project’	   does	   not	   require	  
reinvestment	   or	   re-­‐organisation,	   but	   rather	   rethinking	   (Paris	   and	   Sisk,	   2010:	   13).	  
Contemporary	   state-­‐building	   exercises	   insist	   entirely	   too	  much	   on	   the	   regulatory	  
role	   of	   international	   institutions	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   locally	   derived	   political	  
solutions	   (Chandler,	   2007:	   71).	   Chandler	   alludes	   to	   Samuel	   Huntington’s	   1960s	  




to	   state	   stability	   is	   the	   building	   of	   a	   domestic	   consensus,	   a	   sense	   of	   political	  
community,	   and	   establishing	   a	   government	   of	   popular	   will	   (Chandler,	   2007:	   71-­‐
72)—essentially	  strong	  state-­‐citizen	  and	  citizen-­‐relations.	  The	  problem	  with	  state-­‐
building	   as	   a	   project	   is	   that	   it	   “does	   not	   require	   a	   process	   of	   popular	   consensus	  
building	  to	  give	  the	  target	  population	  a	  stake	  in	  policy	  making”	  (Chandler,	  2007:	  81).	  	  
	  
One	  of	   the	  problems	  with	  state-­‐building	  as	  a	  war	   to	  peace	   transition	  agenda	   is	   its	  
myopic	   focus	   on	   building	   state	   institutions,	   with	   the	   core	   assumption	   that	   no	  
positive	   institutional	  practices	  existed	  before	   the	   ‘post-­‐conflict	  moment’—a	   fallacy	  
of	  terra	  nullius	  as	  articulated	  by	  Cliffe	  and	  Manning	  (2008:	  165).	  In	  this	  analysis,	  the	  
post-­‐war	  state	  represents	  a	  ‘blank	  slate,’	  a	  tabula	  rasa	  to	  be	  foisted	  by	  donors	  who	  
function	   as	   social	   engineers,	   in	  which	  policy	  makers	   conflate	   the	   ‘state	   idea’—our	  
imaginations	  of	  what	  the	  state	  should	  be—with	  the	  ‘empirical	  state’—how	  the	  state	  
actually	  functions	  in	  practice	  (Abrams,	  1988).	  This	  usually	  occurs	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
recognising	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  building	  national	  cohesion	  and	  has	   the	  propensity	   to	  
delegitimise	  state	  authority.	  Fundamental	  to	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  success	  or	  
failure,	   therefore,	  are	  discussions	  centred	  around	  citizenship,	  property	  ownership,	  
and	  political	  participation.	  This	   is	  why	  the	  Liberia	  Rising	  2030	  focus	  on	  re-­‐defining	  
national	  identity	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  tenets	  of	  citizenship)	  is	  so	  crucial,	  because	  it	  
recognises	   nation-­‐building	   and	   state-­‐building	   as	   necessary	   parallel	   processes	   in	  
Liberia.	   Although	   some	   scholars	   conflate	   the	   terms	   state-­‐building	   and	   nation-­‐
building	   (Jenkins	   and	   Plowden,	   2006:	   1),	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   prevailing	   literature	  
that	   the	   two	  represent	  distinct	  processes	  altogether	   that	  are	  mutually	   reinforcing.	  
Whereas	   state-­‐building	   focuses	   on	   public	   institutions	   of	   the	   state	   (laws,	   courts,	  
legislatures),	  nation-­‐building	  refers	  to	  the	  “strengthening	  of	  a	  national	  population’s	  
collective	   identity,	   including	   its	   sense	  of	  national	  distinctiveness	  and	  unity”	  or	   the	  
“orderly	  exercise	  of	  a	  nation-­‐wide,	  public	  authority”	  (Bendix,	  1996:	  22).	  	  
	  
Scholars	  who	   examine	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   projects	   place	   a	   high	   premium	  on	  
state-­‐building,	   but	   less	   of	   an	   emphasis	   on	   its	   analytical	   twin,	   nation-­‐building.	   It	  
would	   appear	   that	   state-­‐building	   and	   its	   contested	   legitimacy	   stands	   in	   stark	  
contrast	  to	  the	  potentially	  legitimising	  forms	  of	  nation-­‐building.	  Nation	  building—as	  




has	   “political	   re-­‐legitimation”	   as	   its	   hallmark	   (Robinson,	   2007:	   13).	   Robinson’s	  
preoccupation	   with	   the	   social	   contract	   between	   states	   and	   their	   citizens	   is	  
particularly	   relevant	   for	   my	   analysis	   of	   how	   Liberians	   naturalised	   abroad	   who	  
automatically	  revoked	  their	  citizenship	  have	  used	  the	  institution	  of	  citizenship	  as	  a	  
marker	   for	   increased	   claims	   to	   nation-­‐building,	   which	   has	   come	   to	   envelop	  
development	   processes	   in	   the	   context	   of	   post-­‐war	   recovery.	   Nation-­‐building	   has	  
three	  central	  elements	   that	  define	   it	  as	  a	  success:	   “a	  unifying,	  persuasive	   ideology,	  
integration	  of	  society	  and	  a	  functional	  state	  apparatus”	  (Hippler,	  2005:	  7).	  With	  its	  
emphasis	   on	   not	   only	   repairing	   state-­‐citizen	   relations,	   but	   also	   on	   strengthening	  
citizen-­‐citizen	  relations,	  nation-­‐building	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  magic	  bullet.	  Yet,	  it	  should	  
not	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   concept	   that	   provides	   a	   simple	   solution	   to	   fragmented	  
societies	  or	  failing	  states,	  but	  rather	  a	  potentially	  transformative	  tool	  when	  coupled	  
with	  other	  parallel	  processes,	  such	  as	  state-­‐building	  (Hippler,	  2005:	  13).	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  features	  defining	  state-­‐building	  and	  nation-­‐building	  position	  the	  two	  in	  
binary	  trajectories.	  While	  nation-­‐building	  is	  ‘people	  centric’	  and	  domestically	  driven,	  
requiring	   national	   agency,	   ownership	   and	   resources,	   state-­‐building	   is	   ‘institution	  
centric’	  and	  externally	  driven,	  often	  soliciting	  international	  resources	  and	  involving	  
some	   form	   of	   social	   engineering	   through	   a	   ‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’	   approach.	   Although	  
both	   state-­‐building	   and	   nation-­‐building	   have	   their	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages,	  
the	  two	  processes	  cannot	  be	  transformational	  if	  they	  are	  pursued	  in	  isolation.	  Thus,	  
state-­‐building	  and	  nation-­‐building	  in	  Liberia	  cannot	  be	  fully	  operational	  without	  an	  
interrogation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  citizenship.	  Whereas	  the	  focus	  of	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  
recovery	   thus	   far	   has	   been	   building	   state-­‐structures	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   solidifying	  
national	  cohesion,	  current	  debates	  about	  dual	  citizenship	  force	  policy	  makers	  to	  see	  
state-­‐building	   and	   nation-­‐building	   as	   mutually	   constitutive.	   Claims	   for	   dual	  
citizenship	  beg	  the	  question	  fundamental	  to	  Liberia’s	  state	  and	  nation-­‐building:	  how	  
does	  the	  state	  incorporate	  deterritorialised	  nationals	  in	  its	  recovery	  efforts	  without	  
invalidating	   the	   needs	   and	   contributions	   of	   those	  who	   are	   domestically	   rooted?	   I	  
explore	   the	   contours	  of	   this	   question	   in	  detail	   later	   in	   the	   chapter	  when	   I	   discuss	  
how	  diasporas	  have	  simultaneously	  helped	  and	  hindered	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  




achievements	  and	  challenges	  to	  date	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  how	  they	  have	  impacted	  
citizenship	  construction	  and	  practice.	  	  
From	  ‘Lifting	  Liberia’	  to	  ‘Lifting	  Liberians’—Post-­‐War	  Recovery	  and	  
Citizenship	  Configuration	  
Since	  the	  cessation	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  2003,	  Liberia	  has	  pursued	  a	  textbook	  post-­‐
war	   reconstruction	   agenda,	   moving	   from	   humanitarian	   relief	   to	   recovery	   and	  
development.	   Though	   it	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	   provide	   a	  
comprehensive	   overview	   of	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   achievements	   and	   challenges	   to	  
date—particularly	   since	   the	   Liberian	   government	   and	   its	   donors	   have	   already	  
produced	  voluminous	  reports	  to	  that	  end—I	  have	  targeted	  particular	  cases	  of	  post-­‐
war	   efforts	   to	   support	   one	   of	   two	   central	   arguments	   in	   this	   chapter:	   that	   the	  
demands	   of	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   have	   created	   incentives	   and	   opportunities	   for	  
Liberian	  diasporas	  and	  their	  returnee	  counterparts	  to	  practice	  active	  citizenship	  by	  
contributing	  their	  ‘time,	  talent,	  and	  treasure’	  to	  reconstruction,	  thereby	  influencing	  
the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation.	  
	  
According	  to	  Kieh,	  Sirleaf’s	  “regime,	  although	  haphazardly,	  has	  embarked	  upon	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  project,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  efforts	  to,	  among	  others,	  
liberalise	  the	  political	  institutions,	  reform	  the	  security	  sector,	  and	  recommit	  Liberia	  
to	  the	  peripheral	  capitalist	  path	  to	  development”	  (Kieh,	  2012b:	  xix).	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐
war	   recovery	   has	   been	   anchored	   by	   a	   series	   of	   externally	   driven	   and	   financed	  
reconstruction	  agendas	  that	  have	  simultaneously	  strengthened	  and	  undermined	  the	  
tenets	   of	   citizenship—from	   the	   Results	   Focused	   Transitional	   Framework	   (RFTF)	  
(2003-­‐2005)	   of	   the	  National	  Transitional	  Government	   to	   the	  150-­‐Day	  Action	  Plan	  
(2006),	   Interim	   Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy	   (2006-­‐2008),	   Lift	   Liberia	   Poverty	  
Reduction	  Strategy	  (2008-­‐2011),	  and	  Agenda	  for	  Transformation	  (AfT)	  (2012-­‐2016)	  
of	  the	  Sirleaf	  administration.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  analysis,	  I	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  
the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Lift	   Liberia	   Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy,	   which	   was	  
monitored	  and	  evaluated	  more	  consistently	  than	  the	  other	  development	  agendas	  to	  
date.	   Its	   goal	  was	   to	   reduce	  poverty	  by	  4	  percent,	   from	  64	  percent	   in	  2007	   to	  60	  
percent	   in	   2011,	   with	   the	   government	   of	   Liberia	   committing	   a	   meagre	   US$500	  




of	   Liberia,	   2012c:	   9).	   Although	   the	   Lift	   Liberia	   PRS	   was	   dubbed	   the	   ‘Poverty	  
Enhancement	   Strategy’	   by	   citizens	   across	   the	   country,	   a	   second	   Core	   Welfare	  
Indicators	  Questionnaire	  will	  have	  to	  be	  conducted	  to	  validate	  actual	  reductions	  in	  
poverty	  during	  the	  three-­‐year	  period	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011c:	  15).	  	  
	  
Table	   23:	   Summary	   of	   the	   Lift	   Liberia	   PRS	   Four-­‐Pillar	  Deliverables	   and	   Completion	  
Rates	  
Pillar	   Number	  of	  
Deliverables	  
Completion	  Rate	  (%)	  
I.	  Peace	  and	  Security	  	   94	   67	  
II.	  Economic	  Revitalisation	   118	   69	  
III.	  Governance	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	   52	   41	  
IV.	  Infrastructure	  and	  Basic	  Services	   187	   57	  
Source:	  Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2012c	  
	  
According	   to	   government	   of	   Liberia	   reports	   summarised	   in	   Table	   23,	   the	   PRS	  
completion	   rate	   improved	   from	   20	   percent	   in	   2008-­‐2009	   to	   80	   percent	   in	   2009-­‐
2010	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011c:	   7),	   with	   capacity	   constraints	   defined	   as	   the	  
major	   contributor	   to	   low	   levels	   of	   implementation	   in	   the	   initial	   stages	   of	   the	  
Strategy.	  According	  to	  former	  Civil	  Service	  Agency	  Director-­‐General,	  Dr.	  C.	  William	  
Allen,	   Liberia’s	   inability	   to	   implement	   reconstruction	   deliverables	   was	   largely	  
hampered	  by	  a	  low-­‐level	  domestic	  human	  resource	  base:	  	  
	  
The	  challenges,	  the	  challenges,	  first	  of	  all,	  would	  be	  capacity.	  Frankly,	  
both	  human	  capacity	  and	  institutional	  capacity	  and	  I	  guess	  those	  two	  
would	  add	  up	  into	  a	  general	  deficit	  in	  societal	  capacity.	  I	  think	  clearly	  
those	  would	  be	  the	  greatest	  challenges	  because	  one	  may	  have	  all	  the	  
ideas	   but	   if	   you	   don't	   have	   the	   resources	   to	   implement	   those	   ideas	  
then	  the	  challenges	  become	  enormous.230	  
	  
These	   constraints	   facilitated	   emergency	   capacity	   building	   programmes	   such	   as	  
TOKTEN,	   LECBS,	   and	   SES	   discussed	   in	   previous	   chapters,	   thereby	   carving	   out	   a	  
niche	   for	  diaspora	  returnees	  and	  entrenching	  the	   influence	  of	  donors	   in	  the	  entire	  
PRS	  process.	   In	   fact,	   Liberia	   seems	   to	  have	   a	   chequered	  history	  of	   foreign	   agenda	  
setting	   disguised	   as	   capacity	   building	   through	   expatriate	   technical	   assistance,	  
whether	   imposed,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Finance	   Advisor	   within	   the	   Firestone	  
agreement,	   or	   voluntarily	   sought	   (Van	   der	   Kraaij,	   1983).	   For	   example,	   in	   1934	  
                                                




President	  Barclay	  hired	  a	  Polish	  national	  as	  his	  economic	  advisor	   (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  
1983:	   300).	   In	   the	   same	   year,	   Liberia’s	   first	   Three-­‐Year	   Development	   Plan	   was	  
devised,	   and	   six	   American	   specialists	  were	   hired	   although	   their	   relationship	  with	  
the	   government	  was	   shaky,	   so	  much	   so	   that	  when	   the	  Plan	   expired	   in	   1937	   their	  
contracts	  were	  not	  renewed	  (Van	  der	  Kraaij,	  1983:	  300).	  These	  historical	  examples	  
show	   that	   Liberia’s	   heavy	   reliance	   on	   international	   experts—whether	   foreign	  
expatriates	  or	  diaspora	   recruits—for	   the	   implementation	  of	   its	  development	  goals	  
has	  fundamentally	  weakened	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  and	  undermined	  the	  capacity	  of	  
the	   state	   to	   deliver	   with	   autonomy.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   Liberia’s	   entire	   PRS	  
superstructure	   and	   implementation	   were	   primarily	   driven	   by	   a	   ‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’	  
race	  to	  HIPC	  Completion	  Point.	  	  
	  
Under	   the	  peace	   and	   security	  pillar	  of	   the	  Lift	  Liberia	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy,	  
foreign	  agents	   led,	   financed,	  and	   implemented	  most	  deliverables.	  For	  example,	   the	  
deployment	  of	  15,000	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Liberia	  (UNMIL)	  military	  personnel	  
in	  2003	  represented	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  expensive	  operations	  embarked	  upon	  by	  the	  
UN	   since	   1945”	   (Sesay,	   et.	   al,	   2009:	   50).	   Yet,	   there	   was	   a	   small	   measure	   of	   local	  
ownership	   in	   the	   process	   of	   security	   sector	   reform,	   argued	   Defence	   Minister	  
Brownie	  Samukai:	  
	  
Yes,	   the	   US	   government	   provided	   funding	   [to	   the	   Armed	   Forces	   of	  
Liberia	  (AFL)]	  and	  the	  funding	  was	  dictated	  by	  them…They	  determine	  
who	  they	  bring,	  who	  the	  instructors	  will	  be.	  They	  determine	  when	  the	  
instructor	  will	  be	  here,	  how	  long	  they	  gonna	  be	  here,	  the	  kind	  of	  car	  
the	   instructor	  rides,	  where	   the	   instructor	   lives	  and	  everything	  else…	  
we	   were	   building	   the	   Army	   in	   2006,	   they	   [the	   US	   government]	  
provided	  funding	  of	  close	  to	  US$200	  million	  for	  the	  training,	  they	  gave	  
the	   contract	   away	   [to	   DynCorp],	   that’s	   their	   money…The	   training	  
module	   [of	   the	  AFL]	   is	   based	  on	   the	  TRADOC	   [Training	  Doctrine]	   of	  
the	   US,	   that	   is	   the	   training	   doctrine	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   We	   are	  
making	  that	  training	  manual	  to	  become	  what	  you	  call	  interoperability	  
[interoperable]	   with	   other	   African	   countries	   so	   that	   a	   Liberian	   can	  
work	  here	  and	  also	  work	  in	  Ghana,	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Nigeria,	  like	  we	  
have	   Liberians	   in	   Mali,	   there	   is	   no	   problem	   at	   all…The	   weapons	  
system	   that	  we	  used	   is	  not	  an	  American	  M16,	   it’s	  an	  AK47,	  which	   is	  
pretty	   much	   predominant	   around	   [Africa].	   LARS	   [Lower	   Airspace	  
Radar	  Services]	   that	  are	  also	  used,	  we	  can	  use	   those	  weapons.	  RPGs	  
[Rocket	  Propelled	  Grenades],	  we	  can	  also	  use	   those	  weapons.	  Pretty	  




Liberia,	  outside	  Liberia,	  with	  other	  African	  countries	  and	  among	  other	  
countries	  around	  the	  world…231	  
	  
Despite	  the	  minister’s	  assertions,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Liberia’s	  autonomy	  in	  its	  
own	  security	  restructuring	  was	  marginal	  at	  best.	  The	  US	  government	  disbanded	  and	  
reorganised	   the	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   Liberia	   (AFL)	   by	   contracting	   DynCorp,	   an	  
American	  security	   firm,	  with	  minimal	   input	   from	  the	  government	  of	  Liberia	   (Kieh,	  
2012b:	   239).	   Under	  DynCorp’s	   tutelage,	   only	   2000	   Liberian	   soldiers	  were	   trained	  
from	  2006	  to	  2009	  although	  the	  Liberian	  government’s	  initial	  target	  was	  4000	  (Kieh,	  
2012b:	   239).	   From	   its	   inception,	   the	   restructured	   AFL	   was	   led	   by	   a	   Nigerian	  
Command	  Officer-­‐in-­‐Charge,	  Major	  General	  Suraj	  Alao	  Abdurrahman,	  until	  February	  
2014,	  when	  a	  Liberian,	  Brigadier	  General	  Daniel	  D.	  Ziankhan232,	  took	  over	  the	  reigns	  
as	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  (Sirleaf,	  2013:	  18).	  Under	  the	  supervision	  of	  UN	  Police	  (UNPOL),	  an	  
estimated	   US$0.5	   million	   was	   spent	   on	   training	   3500	   members	   of	   the	   Liberia	  
National	   Police	   (LNP)	   from	   2004-­‐2007	   (Kieh,	   2012b:	   239).	   While	   the	   army	   and	  
police	  were	   priorities,	   other	   security	   outfits	   such	   as	   the	  National	   Security	   Agency	  
(NSA),	  Bureau	  of	  Immigration	  and	  Naturalisation	  (BIN),	  and	  the	  Drug	  Enforcement	  
Agency	   (DEA)	  were	   virtually	   neglected	   because	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   donor	   support	   (Kieh,	  
2012b:	  239).	  Nevertheless,	  Minister	  Samukai	  justified	  the	  single-­‐minded	  pursuit	  of	  
restructuring	   the	   AFL,	   arguing	   that	   it	   served	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   increased	   forms	   of	  
human	  security	  in	  Liberia:	  	  
	  
Arising	  out	  of	  the	  civil	  conflict,	  people	  lost	  confidence	  in	  the	  security	  
sector.	  People	  lost	  confidence	  in	  those	  who	  were	  entrusted	  to	  protect	  
them,	  and	  so	  it	  was	  not	  the	  question	  of	  training	  and	  retraining	  but	  it’s	  
how	  do	  you	  build	  that	  confidence	  back	  both	  domestically,	  both	  on	  the	  
regional	   level,	   and	   also	   in	   the	   diaspora	   as	   well.	   So,	   those	   were	   the	  
steps	  we	  began	  to	  take.	  And	  working	  with	  the	  US	  government	  through	  
their	  full	  support	  for	  the	  restructuring	  process	  we	  set	  out	  to	  conduct	  
an	   empirical	   vetting	   process	   on	   the	   order	   of	   merits	   upon	  which	   all	  
new	  entrants	  into	  the	  AFL	  had	  to	  conform	  to	  so	  that	  actually	  helped	  to	  
raise	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  process…And	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  UN	  as	  
observers	   and	   civil	   society	   as	   well	   on	   the	   Joint	   Personnel	   Board	   all	  
successful	  recruits	   into	  the	  AFL	  had	  to	  meet	  those	  standards	  as	  well.	  
So,	   if	   there	   is	  anything	   that	  we	  can	  say	   that	  we	  may	  have	  ever	  done	  
                                                
231	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  July	  12,	  2013.	  
232	  The	  full	  story	  of	  the	  new	  AFL	  chief	  of	  staff	  induction	  was	  covered	  in	  an	  Executive	  Mansion	  press	  





here	   over	   the	   past	   seven	   years	   is	   to	   regain	   the	   confidence	   of	   the	  
Liberian	  people	  into	  the	  military,	  into	  the	  security	  sector,	  so	  that	  they	  




Despite	  Minister	  Samukai’s	  claims	  that	  Liberians	  have	  a	  newfound	  confidence	  in	  the	  
security	   sector,	   he	   admitted	   that	   there	   are	   still	   gaps	   in	   improving	   the	   living	  
conditions	  of	  AFL	  soldiers,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  some	  defection:	  	  
	  
We	  have	   trained	   them,	  we	  have	   equipped	   them,	  we’re	  providing	   for	  
them	  the	  salaries.	  We	  need	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  condition	  in	  which	  they	  
live	   and	   work	   is	   much	   better	   than	   what	   it	   is	   today…Because	   the	  
concentration	   of	   the	   troops	   here	   in	  Monrovia	   at	   the	   Edward	  Binyah	  
Kesselly	  Barracks,	  which	  is	  actually	  constructed	  for	  800	  persons,	  now	  
has	  2000	  persons	  initially…Then	  eventually	  we	  tried	  to	  have	  some	  of	  
them	   relocated	   to	   the	  Coast	  Guard	  Base,	   to	   Camp	  Ware	   and	   then	   as	  
well	  as	  Camp	  Tubman	   in	  Gbarnga.	  And	   then	  we	  encouraged	   them	  to	  
bring	   their	   families,	   so	   you	   had	   200	   families,	   now	   you	   got	   probably	  
about	  2000	  families…And	  then	  we	  have	  over	  500	  kids	  that	  are	  going	  
to	   school,	   so	   all	   of	   these	   challenges	   suggest	   to	   us	   that	   the	   condition	  
under	   which	   they	   live	   and	   work	   has	   been	   and	   continues	   to	   be	   a	  
challenge	  for	  us…234	  
	  
Minister	   Samukai’s	   admission	   about	   the	   lack	   of	   complete	   satisfaction	   within	   the	  
army	   is	   one	   indicator	   among	   many	   that	   Liberia’s	   peace	   is	   still	   very	   fragile.	  
Furthermore,	   increased	   instability	   in	   the	   Mano	   River	   sub-­‐region	   remains	  
unresolved	  and	  there	  are	  concerns	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  Liberia’s	  security	  personnel	  
ahead	  of	  the	  complete	  drawdown	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Liberia	  (UNMIL)	  
after	  the	  up-­‐coming	  presidential	  and	  legislative	  elections	  scheduled	  in	  late	  2017	  (UN	  
Panel	  of	  Experts	  on	  Liberia,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  peace	  and	  security	  is	  still	  tenuous,	  largely	  driven	  by	  external	  agenda-­‐setting,	  
so	   too	   has	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   economic	   revitalisation	   undermined	   state-­‐citizen	  
relations	  by	  following	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF,	  as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  
in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   For	   instance,	   the	   government	   welcomed	   in	   2005	   the	  
Governance	  and	  Economic	  Management	  Assistance	  Programme	  (GEMAP),	  in	  which	  
                                                
233	  Ibid.	  	  




foreign	   experts	   were	   hired	   to	   oversee	   revenue-­‐generating	   agencies	   in	   order	   to	  
ensure	   fiscal	   discipline	   and	   transparent	   management	   (UN	   Panel	   of	   Experts	   on	  
Liberia,	   2005:	   8-­‐9;	   Kieh,	   2012b:	   229).	   This	   was	   undoubtedly	   based	   on	  
recommendations	   from	   a	   UN	   Panel	   of	   Experts	   report	   recommending	   the	  
establishment	   of	   an	   “independent	   economic	   commission	   of	   inquiry”	   to	   “conduct	  
systematic	   investigations	   of	   all	   revenue-­‐producing	   entities	  wishing	   to	   be	   active	   in	  
Liberia”	   (UN	   Panel	   of	   Experts	   on	   Liberia,	   2003:	   8).	   Yet,	   the	   systematic	   review	   of	  
revenue	   generation	   has	   not	   mitigated	   corruption	   beyond	   GEMAP’s	   mandate	   nor	  
followed	   economic	   diversification	   “beyond	   the	   traditional	   natural	   resource-­‐
dependent	   export	   products	   and	   toward	   other	   agricultural	   and	   small-­‐scale	  
manufacturing	   products	   and	   services”	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011a:	   6).	   Despite	  
the	   precariousness	   of	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   development,	   Defence	   Minister	   Samukai	  
praised	  GEMAP	  for	  laying	  the	  foundation	  of	  economic	  growth:	  	  
I	  mean	  there	  was	  nothing	  here	  [in	  Liberia],	  there	  was	  no	  process,	  no	  
procedure,	   no	   system.	   I	   mean	   people	   were	   calling	   Liberia	   [a]	  
completely	   failed	   state.	   All	   of	   the	   institutions	   of	   governance	   were	  
already	   gone.	   The	   issue	   of	   accountability	   was	   not	   there.	   Credibility	  
was	   not	   there.	   Confidence	   was	   also	   gone,	   so	   you	   needed	   [donor]	  
partners	  to	  help	  you	  to	  lay	  the	  basis	  to	  get	  yourself	  going.	  For	  example,	  
we	   had	   the	   GEMAP	   people	   who	   were	   sitting	   in	   every	   aspect	   of	  
government	   co-­‐signing	   every	   document,	   3/4	   years	   later	  we	   felt	   that	  
we	  were	  confident	  enough	  to	  handle	  things	  ourselves…and	  we	  got	  rid	  
of	  them	  and	  we	  continue	  our	  own	  process	  today.235	  
	  
Other	   reforms	   under	   the	   economic	   revitalisation	   pillar	   were	   largely	   brokered	   by	  
collaborations	   between	   the	   Liberian	   government	   and	   its	   donors,	   such	   as	   debt	  
cancellation	  of	  US$4.9	  billion;	  audits	  conducted	  by	  the	  General	  Auditing	  Commission	  
(GAC);	  the	  establishment	  of	  internal	  audit	  systems	  in	  all	  government	  agencies;	  and	  
the	   enactment	   of	   public	   financial	   management	   legislation	   such	   as	   the	   Public	  
Financial	   Management	   Law	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011a).	   These	   measures,	  
including	   budget	   transparency	   mechanisms	   instituted,	   were	   intended	   to	   improve	  
the	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  to	  deliver	  development	  thereby	  increasing	  citizen	  oversight	  
of	  public	  finances.	  According	  to	  former	  Finance	  Minister	  and	  current	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
Minister	  Ngafuan,	   Liberia’s	   adoption	  of	   an	  open	  budget	  process	   represents	   one	  of	  
                                                




the	   hallmarks	   of	   post-­‐war	   economic	   revitalisation,	   in	   which	   Liberia’s	   cash-­‐based	  
budget	  increased	  from	  US$85	  million	  in	  the	  2005-­‐2006	  fiscal	  year	  to	  US$649	  in	  the	  
2012-­‐2013	  fiscal	  year	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a):	  	  
One	  of	  the	  milestones	  was	  to	  have	  this	  sacred,	  sacredness	  around	  the	  
budget	  taken	  off	  and	  to	  make	  it	  a	  public	  instrument	  and	  that	  budgets	  
became	   instruments	   to	   be	   discussed	   on	   radio,	   journalists	   having	  
copies,	  hatai	  shops	  discussing	  it	  and	  then	  lively	  budget	  debate.	  It	  was	  
all	   part	   of	   the	   transition.	   Now,	   it's	   good	   that	   after	   we	   left,	   my	  
successor	  [Amara	  Konneh]	  has	  maintained	  this	  path	  with	  [the]	  "Open	  
Budget	  Initiative."	  But	  one	  of	  the	  key	  milestones	  given	  the	  immediate	  
past	  was,	  one,	  we	  opened	  the	  budget	  process…at	  least	  people	  are	  not	  
as	   detached	   from	   the	   budget	   process	   today	   as	   they	   were	   detached	  
before	  the	  government	  of	  Ellen	  Johnson	  Sirleaf	  came	  in.236	  
	  
Completely	   unprecedented	   in	   Liberia,	   budget	   transparency	   has	   opened	   up	   the	  
democratic	   space	   for	   citizens	   to	   participate	   in	   prioritising	   and	   financing	  
development.	  Although	  the	  establishment	  of	  County	  Development	  Funds	  (CDFs)	   in	  
2008	  was	  also	  intended	  to	  decentralise	  fiscal	  authority	  to	  Liberia’s	  15	  sub-­‐political	  
divisions,	  thereby	  strengthening	  state-­‐citizen	  relations,	  the	  process	  has	  been	  mired	  
by	   mismanagement	   and	   political	   machinations	   between	   executive	   branch	   county	  
authorities	   and	   legislative	   caucuses,	   prompting	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Internal	   Affairs	   to	  
suspend	  disbursements	  to	  the	  Fund	  in	  December	  2013,	  pending	  review237.	  	  
	  
Akin	   to	   the	   first	   two	   pillars	   of	   the	   Lift	   Liberia	   Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy,	  
governance	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Liberia	  improved	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  milieu	  primarily	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  policies	  devised	  and	   institutions	  established	   to	   improve	  state-­‐citizen	  
relations:	  	  
	  
The	   government	   has	   also	   focused	   strong	   efforts	   on	   improving	  
governance,	   strengthening	   justice,	   and	   restoring	   confidence	   in	   the	  
rule	   of	   law.	   During	   the	   PRS	   period,	   it	   created	   the	   Liberia	   Anti-­‐
Corruption	   Commission	   (LACC),	   the	   Public	   Procurement	   and	  
Concession	  Commission	  (PPCC),	  and	  the	  Liberia	  Extractive	  Industries	  
Transparency	   Initiative	   (LEITI).	   To	   make	   government	   institutions	  
more	  transparent,	  capable,	  and	  oriented	  toward	  service	  delivery,	  the	  
government	   created	   a	   comprehensive	   Civil	   Service	   Reform	   Strategy,	  
which	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  civil	  service	  employees,	  and	  rationalised	  
                                                





the	   functions	  and	  mandates	  of	  nine	  ministries	  and	  agencies	   (M&As).	  
The	   delivery	   of	   justice	   improved	   as	   the	   government	   developed	   and	  
implemented	   a	   national	   and	   county-­‐level	   case	  management	   system;	  
deployed	   public	   defenders	   throughout	   the	   country;	   and	   replenished	  
the	  ranks	  of	  trained	  magistrates	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  20	  years.	  Policies	  
that	   increasingly	   put	   power	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   local	   communities	   are	  
taking	   hold	   with	   the	   passing	   of	   the	   Community	   Rights	   Law,	  
endorsement	  of	  a	  National	  Decentralisation	  Policy,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  
county-­‐level	   branches	   for	   government	   service-­‐delivery	   (Government	  
of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  4).	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  state-­‐citizen	  and	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  in	  Liberia	  are	  fundamentally	  
undermined	   by	   Liberia’s	   inability	   to	   reconcile	   formal	   and	   informal	   justice	  
mechanisms.	   Former	   Justice	   Minister	   Christiana	   Tah	   admitted	   that	   rule	   of	   law	  
remains	  a	  challenge	  to	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  41	  percent	  
overall	  completion	  rate	  for	  this	  PRS	  pillar:	  	  
	  
I	  think	  the	  formal	  justice	  system	  has	  always	  had	  a	  challenge	  with	  the	  
informal	   justice	   system.	   But	   I	   think	   there	   was	   better	   control	   in	   the	  
past,	   because	   of	   the	   relative	   peace	   and	   stability	   that	   we	   had.	   But,	   I	  
think,	  with	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  formal	  justice	  system,	  
people	   always	   have	   a	   need	   to	   turn	   to	   someone	   or	   something	   for	  
resolutions.	  And	  when	  you’re	  on	  the	  run,	  and	  the	  formal	  system	  is	  not	  
working,	  and	  the	  informal	  system	  is	  all	  that	  is	  available,	  it	  seems	  like	  it	  
became	   more	   significant,	   more	   important	   to	   people,	   and	   so	   more	  
people	  utilised	  the	  informal	  justice	  system,	  it	  appears	  to	  me,	  from	  my	  
own	  observation,	  during	  the	  war	  years…So,	  now,	  to	  come	  back	  and	  re-­‐
establish	   the	  rule	  of	   law,	  you	  have	   to	  confront	   this.	  So,	  what	  we	  did,	  
we	  actually	  created	  a	  dialogue	  between	  actors	  in	  both	  the	  formal	  and	  
informal	  [justice	  systems].	  We	  thought	  this	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  you	  
fight	   over,	   but	   this	   is	   the	   kind	   of	   thing	   you	   discuss;	   you	   have	   a	  
dialogue.	   So,	   in	   April	   in	   2010,	   we	   had	   a	   national	   conference	   on	  
enhancing	   or	   harmonising	   the	   two	   systems.	   Enhancing	   access	   to	  
justice	   by	   harmonising	   the	   informal	   and	   the	   formal	   systems…So,	  
rather	   than	   looking	   at	   it	   as	   a	   contention	   between	   the	   two,	   we’re	  
dialoguing	   and	   working	   together	   to	   see	   how	   we	   can	   bring	   them	  
together.238	  
	  
As	  highlighted	  by	  former	  Minister	  Tah,	  harmonising	  formal	  and	  informal	  justice	  will	  
be	  crucial	  to	  strengthening	  the	  tenets	  of	  citizenship.	  Furthermore,	  Liberia’s	  perfectly	  
pitched	   post-­‐war	   polices	   must	   resolve	   challenges	   in	   citizenship	   governance,	  
                                                




particularly	   in	   land	   administration	   and	   tenure,	   as	   discussed	   in	   previous	   chapters.	  
Transparency	   and	   accountability	   also	   remain	   major	   impediments	   to	   post-­‐war	  
recovery,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
	  
As	   the	  most	   capital-­‐intensive	   pillar	   of	   the	  Lift	  Liberia	  Poverty	   Reduction	   Strategy,	  
infrastructure	   and	   basic	   services	   have	   been	   the	   most	   sought	   after	   by	   Liberia’s	  
citizens	   yet	   financed	   extensively	   by	   donors	   (Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2012c:	   9).	   In	  
many	   ways	   this	   undermines	   strong	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	   because	   while	   donors	  
heavily	  fund	  social	  spending,	  the	  state	  abdicates	  from	  fulfilling	  its	  responsibility	  to	  
the	   citizenry.	   During	   the	   government’s	   nation-­‐wide	   consultations	   with	   Liberian	  
citizens	   in	   2008,	   they	   listed	   roads,	   health	   and	   education	   as	   their	   top	   three	  
development	  priorities	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2008a).	  The	  government	  responded	  
by	   financing	   these	   citizen	   demands	   with	   donor	   dollars.	   During	   the	   PRS	   process,	  
Liberia	  reconstructed	  or	  rehabilitated	  2500	  kilometres	  of	  laterite	  and	  paved	  roads;	  
increased	  electrical	  generation	  from	  zero	  to	  23	  megawatts;	  renewed	  or	  constructed	  
48	   kilometres	   of	   power	   transmission	   and	   distribution	   lines;	   and	   began	  
implementation	  of	   the	  West	  Africa	  Power	  Pool	   cross-­‐border	  electrification	  project	  
(Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2011a:	   4).	   All	   infrastructure	   developments	   were	   not	  
entirely	   driven	   by	   donor	   directives	   and	   financing,	   however.	   In	   order	   to	   build	   the	  
capacity	   of	   Liberian	   entrepreneurs,	   the	   Public	   Works	   Ministry	   insisted	   that	   for	  
infrastructure	   projects	   undertaken	   by	   concessionnaires	   investing	   more	   than	  
US$25,000,	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  projects	  should	  be	  reserved	  for	  Liberian	  firms239	  thus	  
improving	  state-­‐citizen	  relations.	  According	  to	  former	  Public	  Works	  Minister	  Woods,	  
the	  ministry	  under	  his	  guidance	  began	  to	  “tie	  certain	  kinds	  of	  social	   investment	  to	  
private	   investment	   to	  concessions”	   to	   improve	   the	  material	   conditions	  of	  Liberia’s	  
citizens240:	  
In	  some	  cases,	  we	  had	  MOUs,	  or	  we	  had	  commitment.	  	  In	  other	  cases	  
we	  tied	  it	  to	  concessions.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Putu	  Mining	  Company	  for	  
instance	   in	   the	   Southeast,	   in	   Grand	   Gedeh	   area,	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
concession,	   there	   is	   a	   commitment	   to	   build	   a	   road	   that	   connects	  
Zwedru,	  we	  call	  Grand	  Gedeh,	   to	  Sinoe	  County.	   It’s	  a	  paved	  road,	   it’s	  
no	  longer	  a	  laterite	  road.	  So,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  road	  and	  access	  become	  
very	   important.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  ArcelorMittal,	   from	  Ganta	   to	  Yekepa	  –	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for	  instance	  –	  that	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  concession	  agreement;	  it	  was	  a	  
commitment	  made	   by	  Mr.	   [Lakshmi]	  Mittal	   himself	   to	   the	   president	  
[of	  Liberia],	  that	  the	  road	  will	  be	  paved…In	  the	  case	  of	  Bong	  Mines,	  the	  
China	   Union	   for	   instance	   also	   did	   not	   have	   any	   commitment,	   but	   it	  
was	  an	  MOU.	   Initially	   it	  was	  a	   laterite	  road,	  but	   I	   insisted	  personally	  
that	   we	   are	   not	   going	   to	   accept	   laterite	   roads	   in	   this	   day	   and	   age.	  
We’re	   going	   to	   have	   an	   asphalt	   road.	   So,	   for	   me,	   beyond	   the	  
commitment,	   the	   partnership	   with	   the	   World	   Bank	   to	   build	   major	  
roads,	   infrastructure,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Swedish	   government	   to	   build	  
feeder	   roads,	   it	  was	   important	   to	  begin	   to	   tie	   this	   thing,	  because	   for	  
years,	  Bong	  Mining	  Company	  was	  here,	  they	  didn’t	  build	  a	  road	  to	  the	  
concession	   areas.	   We	   had	   many	   concessions	   –	   LAMCO	   and	   other	  
people	   like	   that.	   So,	   that	   shift	   now	   to	   tie	   this	   kind	   of	   private	  
investment	   to	   these	   social	   investments	   became	   very	   critical	   to	   re-­‐
establish	  faith	  in	  the	  communities,	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  something	  is	  
left	  behind	  that	  will	  benefit	  ordinary	  people,	  especially	  infrastructure.	  
On	  another	  small-­‐scale	   item,	  we	  came	  up	  with	  a	  policy	  to	  make	  sure	  
that	  all	  the	  log	  bridges	  –	  even	  on	  feeder	  roads	  –	  will	  be	  transformed	  to	  
concrete	  bridges.	  So,	  we’re	  not	  going	  to	  accept	  –	  whether	  it’s	  a	  donor,	  
whoever	   wants	   to	   build	   roads	   in	   rural	   Liberia	   –	   farm-­‐to-­‐market	   or	  
rural	  roads	  –	   to	  have	   these	   log	  bridges	  put	   into	  place,	   these	  wooden	  
bridges.	  We’re	   clear	   in	   our	   policy	   that	  we	  want	   concrete	   bridges	   in	  
these	   kinds	   of	   communities.	   Though	   they	   are	   far	   away,	   farm-­‐to-­‐
market	   roads,	   they	  are	   feeder	   roads,	   yet	   they	  deserve	  better.	   So,	  we	  
transformed	   that	   now	   to	   insist	   on	   concrete	   bridges	   instead	   of	   log	  
bridges.241	  
	  
Besides	   infrastructure,	   basic	   social	   services	  were	   also	   a	  major	   priority	   in	   the	   PRS	  
period.	  Although	  there	  is	  contestation	  about	  quality,	  Liberia	  improved	  its	  provision	  
of	   health	   and	   education	   services,	   the	   second	   and	   third	   priorities	   outlined	   during	  
county	  consultations	  in	  2008.	  In	  the	  three-­‐year	  PRS,	  the	  number	  of	  health	  workers	  
increased	  from	  5000	  to	  8000;	  health	  facilities	  nearly	  doubled,	  from	  354	  to	  550;	  439	  
schools	  were	   constructed	  or	   renovated	  across	   the	   country,	  with	   school	   enrolment	  
numbers	   improving;	   teachers	  were	  trained	  with	  commensurate	  salary	   increments;	  
and	  curricula	  were	  harmonised	  with	  ECOWAS	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  4).	  In	  
her	   2014	   Annual	   Message	   to	   the	   Legislature,	   Sirleaf	   touted	   the	   improvements	   in	  
education—from	  primary	  to	  vocational	  and	  tertiary—as	  her	  government’s	  response	  
to	  the	  capacity	  constraints	  of	  citizens	  in	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  milieu:	  	  
	  
                                                




According	  to	  the	  2010	  Census,	  the	  system,	  as	  currently	  exists,	  consists	  
of	  2849	  schools	  –	  2103	  of	  which	  are	  public,	  343	  private,	  226	  religious	  
and	   mission	   schools,	   and	   177	   community	   schools.	   There	   are	   five	  
community	   colleges	   existing	   or	   in	   pre-­‐operational	   status	   –	   Grand	  
Bassa,	   Bomi,	   Bong,	   Grand	   Gedeh,	   Lofa,	   and	   Nimba;	   nine	   four-­‐year	  
degree-­‐granting	   institutions,	   including	   the	   University	   of	   Liberia	   and	  
Tubman	   University	   which	   are	   public;	   two	   vocational	   training	  
institutes	   –	  Booker	  Washington	   Institute,	  which	  plans	   to	  move	   from	  
high	   school	   to	   junior	   college;	   and	   the	  Monrovia	   Vocational	   Training	  
Centre,	   which	   should	   move	   this	   year	   [2014]	   into	   new	   modern	   and	  
well-­‐equipped	  facilities	  (Sirleaf,	  2014:	  27).	  
	  
Despite	   these	   achievements,	   however,	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   development	   has	   been	  
infused	   with	   obsessions	   about	   quantity	   over	   quality,	   which	   has	   ultimately	  
compromised	   state-­‐citizen	   relations.	   Under	   Sirleaf’s	   administration,	   Liberia	   has	  
developed	   a	   single-­‐minded	   pursuit	   of	   infrastructural	   development—roads,	   ports,	  
bridges,	   and	   electricity—at	   the	   expense	   of	   human	  development	  manifested	   in	   the	  
provision	  of	  quality	   education	  and	  health	   services.	  The	  outbreak	  of	  Ebola	   in	  2014	  
and	  the	  crisis	  that	  ensued	  exposed	  the	  appalling	  public	  health	  system	  in	  the	  country,	  
as	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	   conclusion	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Infrastructure	   especially	  
remains	  weak,	  with	  electricity	  confined	  to	  pockets	  of	  Monrovia	  in	  a	  country	  where	  
most	   citizens	   still	   must	   contend	   with	   the	   cost-­‐prohibitive	   nature	   of	   generators	  
(Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  5).	  	  
The	   challenges	   posed	   by	   the	   infrastructure	   and	   basic	   services	   pillar	   mirrored	  
challenges	  throughout	  the	  entire	  three-­‐year	  Lift	  Liberia	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy,	  
in	   which	   capacity	   was	   often	   highlighted	   as	   a	   binding	   constraint	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	  2011a:	  5):	  
A	  recent	  review	  of	  the	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  PRS	  shows	  many	  “fully	  
satisfactory”	   outcomes,	   including	   maintaining	   macroeconomic	  
stability	  with	   low	   inflation;	   a	   balanced	   budget;	   and	   the	   reduction	   of	  
external	   debt.	   Outcomes	  were	   “partly	   satisfactory”	   in	   the	   sectors	   of	  
health,	   water	   and	   sanitation,	   the	   business	   and	   private	   sectors,	   and	  
civil	   service	   reform.	  There	  were	   also	   areas	   in	  which	   outcomes	  were	  
“marginally	  positive,”	   including	   the	   transition	  of	   security	   to	  Liberian	  
agencies;	   delivery	   of	   basic	   education;	   improvement	   of	   roads;	  
environmental	   issues;	   labour	   protection;	   and	   crime	   prevention.	  
Finally,	   in	   a	   few	   areas—electric	   power	   supply,	   prompt	   delivery	   of	  




indicating	   the	   need	   for	   more	   attention	   and	   a	   revised	   strategy	  
(Government	  of	  Liberia	  2011b:	  34).	  	  
	  
It	   is	   assumed	   that	   these	   challenges	   will	   be	   resolved	   in	   the	   five-­‐year	   Agenda	   for	  
Transformation	   (AfT),	   Liberia’s	   PRS	   II	   (2012-­‐2016).	   Primarily	   an	   economic	   policy	  
and	  growth	  strategy,	  the	  AfT	  came	  out	  of	  consultations	  within	  154	  Liberian	  districts	  
in	   2011,	   as	   the	   first	   step	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   Liberia	   Rising	   2030	   vision	   of	   “socio-­‐
economic	   transformation	   and	   development”	   to	   achieve	   the	   lofty	   goals	   of	   middle	  
income	   status	   by	   2030,	   wealth	   creation	   and	   inclusive	   growth	   (Government	   of	  
Liberia,	  2011a:	   ix-­‐x;	  xvi).	   	  Although	   the	  AfT	   is	   touted	  as	  a	  grass-­‐roots	   level,	  home-­‐
grown	  strategy,	  the	  process	  of	   its	  consolidation	  was	  largely	  funded	  and	  steered	  by	  
Liberia’s	   donors	   and	   its	   implementation,	   according	   to	   the	   Liberian	   government,	  
“will	  rely	  heavily	  on	  funding	  from	  development	  partners”	  to	  cover	  estimated	  costs	  of	  
US$3.2	  billion,	  double	  the	  cost	  of	   the	  first	  PRS	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  xvi;	  
152).	   Furthermore,	   the	   AfT’s	   four	   pillars242—Peace,	   Security	   and	   Rule	   of	   Law;	  
Economic	   Transformation;	   Governance	   and	   Public	   Institutions;	   and	   Human	  
Development—represent	   replicas	   of	   the	   five-­‐tiered	   peace-­‐building	   and	   state-­‐
building	  goals	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  for	  Engagement	  in	  Fragile	  States—Legitimate	  Politics;	  
Security;	   Justice;	  Economic	  Foundations;	  and	  Revenue	  and	  Services—a	   framework	  
providing	  financial	  support	  to	  countries	  affected	  by	  conflict	  which	  was	  validated	  at	  
the	  Fourth	  High-­‐Level	  Forum	  on	  Aid	  Effectiveness	  in	  November	  2011	  	  (Government	  
of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  176).	  Thus,	  the	  AfT	  remains	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Paris	  
Declaration,	  Accra	  Agenda	  for	  Action,	  and	  the	  New	  Deal	   for	  Engagement	   in	  Fragile	  
States	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a:	  xvi;	  176).	  	  
According	  to	  former	  Public	  Works	  Minister	  Kofi	  Woods,	  the	  AfT	  represents	  a	  ploy	  to	  
appease	  donors	  and	  an	  invalidation	  of	  what	  Liberian	  citizens	  initially	  advocated	  for	  
in	  the	  2008	  nation-­‐wide	  consultations:	  	  
People	  need	  simple	  things	  that	  we	  make	  complex.	  And	  throughout	  the	  
county	   consultations	   [in	   2008],	   it	  was	   very	   clear	  what	   they	  wanted.	  
We	   made	   it	   quite	   difficult.	   From	   the	   time	   Toga	   McIntosh	   was	   at	  
                                                
242	  The	   four	   pillars	   are	   supported	   by	   eight	   cross-­‐cutting	   issues:	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   child	   protection,	  
disability,	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   empowerment,	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   and	   employment	  




[Ministry	   of]	   Planning	   [from	   2006	   to	   2008],	   the	   people	   were	   very	  
clear	   –	   roads,	   health,	   education,	   they	   were	   very	   clear...Why	   are	   we	  
redefining	  it?	  Why	  are	  we	  not	  focusing	  on	  it	  since	  those	  consultations?	  
Simple	   things	   they	   wanted.	   And	   if	   we’d	   focused	   on	   those	   things	   by	  
now,	  we’d	  be	  far	  gone.	  Why	  are	  we	  reshaping	  it?	  Why	  are	  we	  making	  
it	  complex,	  into	  Liberia	  Rising?...You	  know,	  I	  always	  said	  to	  people	  that	  
[President	  William]	   Tolbert	   made	   it	   so	   simple.	   For	   me,	   the	   poverty	  
alleviation	   plan	   was	   simple:	   from	  mat	   to	   mattress.	   Tell	   me,	   who	   in	  
Liberia	   couldn’t	   identify	  with	  what	   it	  meant,	   from	  mat	   to	  mattress?	  
You	   know?	   Liberia	   Rising,	   this	   other	   one,	   Agenda	   for	   what?	  
Transformation?	   Waste	   of	   time	   with	   that!	   You	   know?	   Who	   are	   we	  
satisfying	  here?	  We	  need	  to	  have	  a	  language	  that	  the	  guy	  in	  the	  village	  
will	  identify	  with.	  That’s	  the	  language	  we	  need!243	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   unlike	  previous	   recovery	  plans	  which	   focused	  almost	   exclusively	  on	  
state-­‐building—‘lifting	   Liberia’,	   the	   state,	   through	   institutional	   capacity—AfT	   is	  
expressly	  anchored	  on	  the	  tenets	  of	  nation-­‐building—‘lifting	  Liberians’,	  the	  citizens,	  
through	  national	  cohesion,	  human	  development	  and	  reconciliation	  	  (Government	  of	  
Liberia,	   2011a:	   38-­‐39).	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   AfT	   will	   fundamentally	  
improve	   state-­‐citizen	   and	   citizen-­‐citizen	   relations,	   thereby	   making	   good	   on	   its	  
promise	  of	  wealth	  creation	  and	  inclusive	  growth.	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Liberia’s	  war	  to	  peace	  transition	  has	  been	  largely	  
derived,	   financed	  and	  driven	  by	   externally	   imposed	  agendas	  with	  minimal	   agency	  
asserted	   by	   the	   Liberian	   state,	   thereby	   simultaneously	   eroding	   and	   strengthening	  
state-­‐citizen	  relations.	  In	  the	  section	  that	  follows,	  I	  examine	  how	  the	  participation	  of	  
transnational	   Liberians	   and	   their	   diaspora	   returnee	   counterparts	   in	   post-­‐war	  
recovery	  has	  impacted	  claims	  for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	  citizenship.	  	  
Post-­‐War	  Transitions,	  Citizenship	  and	  Sirleaf’s	  Diaspocracy	  	  
While	  some	  argue	  that	  war	  to	  peace	  transitions	  are	  primarily	  facilitated	  by	  external	  
actors	   exerting	   a	   ‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’	   neo-­‐liberal	   agenda	   without	   acknowledging	  
differences	   in	   post-­‐war	   contexts,	   other	   scholars	   insist	   that	   these	   processes	   have	  
become	   increasingly	   collaborative,	   due	   in	   part	   to	   local	   actors	   pushing	   their	   own	  
agendas.	  Because	  there	  is	  often	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  ‘international’	  aspirations	  and	  
‘local’	   aspirations,	   rarely	   does	   the	   general	   literature	   on	   war	   to	   peace	   transitions	  
                                                




factor	   in	   diasporas,	   who	   are	   neither	   entirely	   ‘international’	   nor	   ‘local’	   in	   their	  
orientations	  yet	  fall	  somewhere	  in	  between.	  There	  are	  multi-­‐layered	  ways	  in	  which	  
diasporas	   insert	   themselves	   in	  post-­‐war	  development	  processes:	  as	  political	  elites,	  
entrepreneurs,	   development	   workers,	   state	   agents,	   humanitarians,	   and	  
reconstruction	  ‘spoilers.’	  Just	  as	  Foner	  argued	  that	  the	  black	  experience	  was	  central	  
to	   reconstruction	   after	   the	  Civil	  War	   in	   the	  post-­‐bellum	  United	   States	  with	   blacks	  
playing	  an	  active	  role	  (Foner,	  1989),	  I	  argue	  that	  diasporas	  are	  central	  to	  post-­‐war	  
recovery	   processes	   in	   many	   contexts,	   particularly	   Liberia.	   Post-­‐war	   countries	  
systematically	  target	  their	  diasporas,	  with	  some	  proposing	  policy	  measures	  such	  as	  
dual	  citizenship	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Liberia	  to	  attract	   transnational	  engagement.	   In	   Iraq,	  
Afghanistan,	   and	   Liberia,	   for	   instance,	   diaspora	   returnees	   have	   served	   as	   the	  
conduits	  for	  post-­‐war	  state-­‐building,	  with	  often	  contested	  claims	  to	  nation-­‐building.	  	  
	  
Liberia	  is	  a	  particularly	  important	  case	  study	  of	  the	  role	  of	  diasporas	  in	  war	  to	  peace	  
transitions	   because	   of	   the	   country’s	   pre-­‐war	   migratory	   history	   and	   the	   observed	  
diasporic	   dialectic	   of	   contestation-­‐migration-­‐exile-­‐return.	   During	   her	   many	   trips	  
abroad,	  President	  Ellen	  Johnson	  Sirleaf	  has	  held	  meetings	  with	  diasporas	  from	  Accra,	  
Ghana,	  to	  Freetown,	  Sierra	  Leone;	  from	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  to	  Minneapolis,	  Minnesota;	  
from	   Oslo,	   Norway,	   to	   London,	   England,	   imploring	   Liberians	   in	   these	   population	  
centres	  to	  re-­‐engage	  with	  the	  country.	  Furthermore,	  a	  Liberia	  Rising	  2030	  Steering	  
Committee	  appointed	  in	  February	  2012	  consulted	  Liberians	  in	  the	  country’s	  15	  sub-­‐
political	   divisions,	   with	   five	   consultations	   held	   with	   diasporas	   in	   West	   Africa,	  
Europe,	   and	   North	   America.	   This	   is	   a	   clear	   indication	   that	   Liberian	   diasporas	  
represent	   not	   only	   a	   ‘third	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   space,’	   but	   also	   the	   country’s	  
deterritorialised	   ‘16th	   county.’	   Given	   Liberia’s	   goals	   of	   reaching	   middle-­‐income	  
status	   by	   2030,	   a	   renewal	   of	   discussions	   about	   the	   role	   of	   diasporas	   in	   post-­‐war	  
recovery	  and	  development	  has	  been	  infused	  by	  heightened	  debates	  about	  the	  tenets	  
of	  citizenship	  and	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill	  introduced	  in	  2008.	  In	  2012,	  the	  
president	   established	   a	   Constitution	   Review	   Committee	   to	   examine	   the	   country’s	  
citizenship	   laws,	  among	  other	  provisions	   in	  the	  Constitution244.	  During	  her	  Annual	  
Message	   to	   the	   Legislature	   in	   January	   2014,	   Sirleaf	   explicitly	   acknowledged	   her	  





diasporic	   ethos,	   thereby	   endorsing	   dual	   citizenship	   as	   a	   worthwhile	   policy	  
prescription:	  
	  
Honorable	   ladies	  and	  gentlemen:	  A	  great	  human	  capital	  resource	   for	  
the	  development	  of	  this	  country	  lies	  in	  the	  Liberian	  diaspora.	  We	  trust	  
that	   as	   you	   move	   forward	   during	   this	   session,	   and	   in	   your	  
deliberations,	  you	  will	  give	  adequate	  consideration	  to	  the	  recognition	  
of	  citizens’	  rights	  for	  those	  persons	  born	  as	  Liberians,	  and	  those	  born	  
of	  Liberian	  parentage	  who	  wish	  to	  contribute	  fully	  to	  the	  development	  
of	   this	   country	   as	   citizens.	   The	   grant[ing]	   of	   [legal]	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	   would	   enable	   us	   to	   draw	   on	   the	   wealth	   of	   financial,	  
technical	   and	   other	   resources	   available	   to	   that	   category	   of	   persons	  
that	  could	  be	  deployed	  nationally	  (Sirleaf,	  2014:	  31).	  
	  
Under	   Sirleaf’s	   administration,	   Liberia’s	   executive	   branch	   of	   government	   can	   be	  
labelled	   a	   diaspocracy,	   a	   term	   I	   coined	   to	   describe	   the	   systematic	   rule	   and	  
dominance	   of	   expatriate	   nationals	   in	   government	   policy	   and	   practice.	   It	   is	   worth	  
noting	  that	  during	  Sirleaf’s	  two	  terms	  in	  office,	  the	  primary	  custodians	  of	  post-­‐war	  
recovery	  have	  been	  diaspora	  recruits,	  some	  of	  whom	  with	  strong	  political	  loyalties	  
to	   the	   president.	   These	   appointed	   officials	   have	   hoisted	   up	   the	   four	   pillars	   of	  
Liberia’s	   externally	   financed	   reconstruction	   agenda:	   peace	   and	   security,	   economic	  
revitalisation,	  governance	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  infrastructure	  and	  basic	  services.	  
As	   one	   of	   Sirleaf’s	   longest	   serving	   cabinet	   officials,	   Minister	   of	   National	   Defence	  
Brownie	  Samukai	  has	  managed	  the	  restructuring	  of	  Liberia’s	  security	  sector	  under	  
the	   auspices	   of	   the	  UN	  and	  US.	   Former	  Finance	  Minister	  Antoinette	   Sayeh	   led	   the	  
country’s	   preparation	   for	   HIPC	   status	   and	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Lift	   Liberia	  
Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy;	  the	  current	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  Amara	  Konneh,	  is	  also	  
a	   diaspora	   recruit,	   though	   he	   had	   no	   prior	   experience	   in	   economics	   or	   financial	  
management.	  Sirleaf	  seems	  to	  have	  entrusted	  Liberia’s	  economy	  almost	  exclusively	  
to	   returnees.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   all	   of	   Liberia’s	   major	   revenue	   generating	   semi-­‐
autonomous	   agencies,	   referred	   to	   locally	   as	   the	   country’s	   ‘cash	   cows,’	   have	   been	  
headed	  by	  Liberian	  returnees	  appointed	  during	  Sirleaf’s	   first	  and/or	  second	  terms	  
in	   office—Roberts	   International	   Airport	   (Ellen	   Corkrum);	   Liberia	   Petroleum	   and	  
Refining	  Corporation	  (Harry	  Greaves	  and	  T.	  Nelson	  Williams,	  respectively);	  National	  
Port	   Authority	   (Matilda	   Parker);	   Liberia	   Maritime	   Authority	   (Binyah	   Kesselly);	  




On	  the	   international	  affairs	   front,	   former	  Foreign	  Affairs	  ministers	  Olubanke	  King-­‐
Akerele	   and	  Toga	  Gayewea	  McIntosh	   courted	  multi-­‐lateral	   and	  bilateral	   economic	  
and	   political	   arrangements	   that	   transformed	   Liberia	   from	   a	   ‘pariah	   nation’	   to	   a	  
donor	   darling.	   Previously	   a	   sociology	   professor	   at	   Morgan	   State	   University	   in	  
Maryland	   (USA),	   former	   Justice	   Minister	   Christiana	   Tah,	   led	   the	   judicial	   reform	  
agenda;	  her	  predecessor	  and	  current	  associate	  justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  Philip	  
Banks,	   also	   spent	   considerable	   amounts	   of	   time	   abroad.	   Although	   her	   immediate	  
predecessor,	  Kofi	  Woods,	  was	  not	  a	  diaspora	  recruit,	  returnee	  engineer	  Antoinette	  
Weeks	  is	  now	  overseeing	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  basic	  infrastructure	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Public	  Works.	  In	  Sirleaf’s	  first	  term,	  Public	  Works	  was	  managed	  by	  returnee	  Luseni	  
Dunzo,	   before	   he	   was	   dismissed	   for	   alleged	   financial	   impropriety	   and	   later	  
appointed	   as	   the	   president’s	   Infrastructure	   Advisor245.	   There	   are	   rumours	   that	  
many	   of	   these	   high-­‐level	   political	   appointees	   carry	   foreign	   passports,	   though	  
Liberia’s	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law	   is	   very	   clear	   about	   the	   revocation	   of	   legal	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  upon	  naturalisation	  abroad.	  	  
	  
Sirleaf’s	  brand	  of	  diasporacy	  has	  effectively	  undermined	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  homeland	  
citizen	   contributions	   to	   recovery	   and	   created	   a	   polarised	   discourse	   on	   dual	  
citizenship.	  According	  to	  chief	  sponsor	  of	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill,	  Senator	  
Cletus	  Wotorson,	  contestations	  around	  returnee	  contributions	  to	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  
have	  effectively	  compromised	  claims	  for	  dual	  citizenship:	  	  
	  
What	   didn’t	   help	  much	  was	   that	  when	  Ellen	   [Johnson	   Sirleaf]	   got	   in	  
power	  most	  of	   the	  people	   that	  were	  coming	  were	   from	  the	  diaspora	  
and	  which	  was	  not	  to	  the	  liking	  of	  those	  that	  were	  here	  at	  home.	  And	  
their	   jobs	   were	   being	   given	   to	   only	   diasporans,	   diasporans	   were	  
preferred,	  and	  that	  didn’t	  work	  too	  well	  and	  the	  results	  have	  not	  been	  
too	  good…246	  
	  
As	   Sirleaf’s	   diaspocracy	   shows,	   diasporas	   can	   often	   transform	   into	   the	   vectors	   of	  
internationally	   sponsored	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   processes	   because	   of	   their	  
transnational	  ethos.	  On	  one	  hand	  they	  are	  more	  legitimate	  than	  international	  actors	  
by	  virtue	  of	  being	  ‘children	  of	  the	  soil,’	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  they	  carry	  the	  same	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experiences	   and	   contexts	   as	   international	   actors	   because	   of	   their	   experiences	  
abroad.	   According	   to	   former	   minister	   Woods,	   Liberia’s	   diaspora	   recruits	   have	  
perpetuated	   an	   international	   agenda	   for	   recovery,	   rather	   than	   adopting	   home-­‐
grown	  solutions	  to	  post-­‐war	  development:	  	  
I	  think	  most	  of	  the	  time	  we	  perpetuate	  the	  international	  aspirations	  –	  
most	   of	   the	   time.	   They	   [Donors]	   set	   the	   conditionalities;	   they	   have	  
what	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  resources.	  Most	  of	  us	  are	  trained	  and	  educated	  
outside,	   come	   home	  with	   a	   sense	   of	   that	   aspiration.	  We	   are	   trained	  
with	   that	   aspiration,	   in	   schools	   abroad	   and	   our	   associations.	   So,	  we	  
pander	   to	   it	   even	  more.	   More	   and	  more,	   we	   get	   detached	   from	   the	  
local	  realities,	  and	  that’s	  the	  challenge	  –	  especially	  for	  those	  of	  us	  who	  
are	  the	  educated	  elites	  –	  we	  go	  to	  school	  abroad	  and	  come	  back.	  We	  
find	   ourselves	  more	   and	  more	   detached	   from	   the	   local	   realities.	   So,	  
I’m	  clear	  that	  none	  of	  us,	  in	  many	  ways	  –	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  time	  –	  look	  
at	  the	  local	  aspirations.	  We	  seek	  legitimacy	  internationally	  rather	  than	  
locally.	  We’re	  proud	  of	  our	  friendships,	  we’re	  proud	  of	  the	  photo	  ops	  
that	   legitimises	   us	   at	   international	   conferences	   without	   even	  
understanding	   what	   they	   mean,	   and	   I	   think	   that’s	   part	   of	   our	  
challenges.	  So,	  sometimes,	  you	  read	  the	  newspapers	  and	  most	  of	   the	  
time	  we	  want	   to	  shake	  hands	  and	   take	  pictures	  and	  put	   them	   in	   the	  
newspapers.	  How	  many	  of	   us	   go	   in	   rural	   Liberia,	   take	   pictures	  with	  
ordinary	  people,	   and	   get	   that	   publicised?	  How	  many	  of	   us	   celebrate	  
the	  national	  efforts	  in	  Lofa	  or	  in	  River	  Gee?247	  
	  
Furthermore,	  returnees	  tend	  to	  be	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  domestic	  realities	  and	  are	  not	  
fully	  equipped	  to	  drive	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  argued	  Woods:	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  challenges	  will	  be	  the	  difficulty	  of	  articulating	  or	  ensuring	  
that	   the	   real	   views	   from	  people	   on	   the	   ground	   are	   translated	   in	   the	  
national	  agenda.	  Because	  there’s	  a	  gap	  in	  real	  communication	  with	  the	  
majority	   of	   those	   who	   are	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   positions	   of	  
government.	   [The]	  majority	   have	   been	   out	   for	   long,	   came	   in,	   and	   so	  
there’s	  that	  gap…But	  connecting	  with	  the	  people	   is	  a	  whole	  different	  
process;	  it’s	  a	  whole	  different	  conviction	  and	  passion	  that	  is	  built	  out	  
of	  an	  experience	  on	  the	  ground,	  throughout	  the	  war…I	  think	  that	  lack	  
of	   coordination,	   that	   lack	   of	   a	   consistent,	   organised,	   national	  
framework	  to	  drive	  policy	  creates	  a	  level	  of	  disorder,	  inflates	  ego,	  and	  
personalises	   what	   often	   should	   be	   a	   national	   venture	   or	   collective	  
vision.248	  
	  
Although	   former	  minister	  Woods	   remains	   convinced	   that	   Liberian	   returnees	  have	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been	   co-­‐opted	   by	   international	   agents,	   diasporas	   have	   the	   propensity	   to	   both	  
reinforce	  and	  challenge	  ‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’/‘cut	  and	  paste’	  reconstruction	  planning	  by	  
powerful	   nations	   too	   often	   imposed	   on	   weaker	   ones.	   Diasporas	   develop	   hybrid	  
identities	  that	  conflate	  values	  of	  the	  homeland	  with	  values	  acquired	  or	  enhanced	  by	  
host	  nations	  (Brinkerhoff,	  2007:	  187),	  yet	  this	  does	  not	  always	  yield	  positive	  results.	  
Informal	   ‘contracts’	   entered	   into	   between	   local	   elites,	   such	   as	   returnees,	   and	  
international	   actors	   actually	   lead	   to	   the	   enforcement	  of	  weak	   states	  because	   their	  
interests	   in	   creating	   a	   facade	   of	   change	   often	   leave	   existing	   state-­‐citizen	   relations	  
unchanged	  (Barnett	  and	  Zurcher,	  2010:	  23-­‐52).	  As	  argued	  by	  some	  respondents	  in	  
this	   study,	   for	   example,	   dual	   citizenship	   could	   inadvertently	   reinforce	   elite	   power	  
structures	   that	   fuelled	   Liberia’s	   armed	   conflicts	   in	   the	   first	   place	   by	   privileging	  
returnees	   over	   those	   who	   are	   domestically	   rooted.	   This	   argument	   is	   particularly	  
prolific	  amongst	  homelanders	  who	  claim	  that	  dual	  citizenship	  has	  the	  propensity	  to	  
replicate	  pre-­‐war	  fissures	  in	  social	  relations.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  
the	   contributions	   of	   diasporas	   and	   returnee	   recruits	   to	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   are	  
widely	   contested,	   thereby	   influencing	   claims	   for	   and	   counter-­‐claims	   against	   dual	  
citizenship.	  	  
How	  Diasporas	  Have	  Simultaneously	  Helped	  and	  Hindered	  Post-­‐War	  Recovery	  	  
Heightened	  interest	   in	  the	   impact	  of	  Liberian	  diasporas	  has	  been	  facilitated	  by	  the	  
current	   government’s	   diasporic	   ethos.	   Coupled	   with	   emerging	   empirical	   studies,	  
anecdotal	   evidence	   shows	   that	   Liberians	   abroad	   have	   been	   actively	   engaged	  with	  
the	  ‘homeland’	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  armed	  conflict	  in	  1989,	  with	  both	  positive	  and	  
negative	  outcomes.	  Although	  many	  homeland	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  negated	  the	  
active	  citizenship	  of	  Liberian	   transnationals,	   some,	   like	   this	  53-­‐year-­‐old	  man,	   fully	  
acknowledged	  their	  positive	  contributions	  to	  reconstruction	  as	  citizens	  ‘by	  heart’:	  
	  
Well,	   some	  of	   them	  come	  with	  certain	   skill	   sets	   that	  are	  desperately	  
needed,	   especially	   in	   those	   sectors—health,	   education,	   the	   private	  
sector—not	   necessarily	   governmental…I	   think	   sometimes	   they	   just	  
try	   to	   change	   the	   attitudes	   of	   Liberians	   that	   haven’t	   had	   that	  
exposure…249	  
	  
                                                




A	   54-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homelander	   echoed	   these	   sentiments,	   arguing	   that	   Liberians	  
from	  abroad	  have	  advanced	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  with	  their	  ‘time	  and	  talent’:	  
	  
They	  [diasporas]	  have	  helped	  in	  trying	  to	  advocate	  for	  change,	  helped	  
to	  express	  their	  desire.	  They	  have	  come	  with	  technical	  expertise	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  contribute	  towards	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  our	  broken	  nation.	  So,	   in	  
that	  respect,	  they	  have	  helped.250	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Dr.	  C.	  William	  Allen,	  a	  returnee	  who	  was	  initially	  recruited	  as	  minister	  
of	  information	  during	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  National	  Transitional	  Government	  of	  Liberia	  
(NTGL)	  from	  2003	  to	  2005,	  diasporas	  and	  their	  returnee	  counterparts	  contributed	  
their	   ‘time,	   talent,	   and	   treasure’	   to	   humanitarian	   and	   recovery	   efforts	   before	   the	  
introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  in	  2008	  and	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  in	  spite	  of	  
the	  bill’s	  postponement:	  	  	  
	  
Let's	  look	  at	  what	  they	  [Liberians	  abroad]	  have	  already	  done.	  During	  
the	  war,	   and	  even	  now,	   there	  was	   a	  huge	  percentage	  of	   remittances	  
from	   Liberians	   in	   the	   diaspora	   to	   their	   relatives	   and	   friends	   here	  
[Liberia].	  The	  numbers	   are	   there	  with	  Western	  Union.	  We’re	   talking	  
about	   tens	   of	   millions	   of	   dollars.	   There	   were	   families	   here	   who	  
survived	   almost	   wholly	   and	   solely	   on	   remittances.	   When	   they	  
[homeland	  Liberians]	  were	  cashing	  in	  the	  Western	  Union	  remittances,	  
they	  didn't	  say…	  “those	  people	  sending	  me	  money	  are	  not	  Liberians.”	  
They	  were	  happy	   to	   receive	   it.	   So,	  why	  now?	  And	   those	  people	  who	  
were	  sending	   those	  remittances	  are	  adding	  something	   to	   the	  GDP	  of	  
Liberia.	   If	   you	   look	   along	   the	   Robertsfield	   Highway	   and	   towards	  
Virginia	   and	   Brewerville	   [outside	   of	   Monrovia],	   you	   see	   a	   lot	   of	  
construction	   going	   on	   there,	   and	   a	   sizeable	   number	   of	   these	  
constructions	   are	   homes	   I	   know	   personally	   are	   being	   done	   by	  
Liberians	   in	   the	  diaspora.	   That's	   contributing	   to	   the	  development	   of	  
Liberia.	  There	  are	  businesses	  in	  Ganta	  and	  Gbarnga	  and	  other	  places	  
that	   are	   owned	   by	   Liberians	   in	   the	   diaspora	   through	   their	   relatives	  
here.	   It	   is	   because	   they	   are	  making	   the	  money	   in	   the	   diaspora	   that	  
they	   are	   able	   to	   send	   that	   kind	   of	   money	   here	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  Liberia.	  There’s	  also	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  intellectual	  capital	  I	  
think	  that	  Liberians	  in	  the	  diaspora	  bring	  to	  the	  table.	  When	  you	  talk	  
about	   the	   reversal	   of	   the	   brain	   drain,	   that's	   what	   it	   is,	   you	   know.	  
Liberians	   in	   the	  diaspora	   are	  bringing	   their	   talent	  here.	   Liberians	   in	  
the	   diaspora	   are	   conducting	   research	   that	   can	   better	   inform	   the	  
governance	  process	   in	   Liberia.	   They	   are	   acquiring	   skills,	   knowledge,	  
and	   abilities	   that	   they	   would	   eventually	   bring	   home	   either	  
permanently	  or	  sporadically.	  Liberians	  in	  the	  diaspora	  had	  a	  very	  key	  
                                                




role	  of	  advocacy	   in	  calling	   international	  attention	   to	   the	  atrocities	  of	  
the	  war.	  I	  mean,	  I	  attended	  demonstrations	  at	  the	  UN	  headquarters	  in	  
the	   late	  80s	  and	  early	  90s	  where	  prominent	  Liberians	  were	  present.	  
They	  didn't	  just	  remain	  silent	  when	  these	  things	  were	  going	  on.	  Many	  
Liberians	   in	   the	   diaspora	   have	   been	   there	   to	   receive	   their	   relatives	  
who	   went	   as	   refugees,	   you	   know.	   I	   think	   Liberians	   in	   the	   diaspora	  
have	   also	   been	   vocal	   and	   eloquent	   critics	   of	   public	   policy	   on	   the	  
ground	   and	   to	   some	   extent	   have	   led	   to	   positive	   changes	   in	   those	  
policies	  as	  a	  result	  of	  what	  they've	  said.	  I'm	  sure	  there	  are	  others	  but	  
the	  key	  point	  I	  think	  is	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  hard	  we	  try,	  we	  as	  a	  nation	  
cannot	  disconnect	  ourselves	  from	  Liberians	  in	  the	  diaspora.	  They	  are	  
there	  whether	  we	  like	  it	  or	  not	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  reform	  achievements	  
that	  happened	  after	  the	  war	  can	  be	  traced	  directly	  to	  the	  participation	  
of	  Liberians	  in	  the	  diaspora.251	  
	  
As	   evidenced	   by	   Dr.	   Allen’s	   anecdotal	   menu	   of	   diaspora-­‐led	   initiatives	   and	  
interviewee	  responses	  in	  this	  study,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Liberians	  abroad	  have	  practiced	  
active	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   from	   afar,	   regardless	   of	   their	   legal	   citizenship	  
status/identity,	  by:	  i)	  providing	  humanitarian	  and	  monetary	  assistance	  to	  maintain	  
livelihoods	   in	  Liberia,	  as	  well	  as	  within	   the	  West	  African	  sub-­‐region	  during	  armed	  
conflicts;	   ii)	   lobbying	  in	  Washington	  and	  other	  urban	  centres	  of	  power	  to	  bring	  an	  
end	  to	  conflict;	  iii)	  investing	  in	  post-­‐war	  small	  to	  medium	  sized	  joint	  ventures	  with	  
relatives;	   iv)	   constructing	  homes	   for	   commercial	   and	   residential	  use	   in	  Liberia;	   v)	  
infusing	   the	   post-­‐war	   emergency	   capacity	   building	   drive	   by	   returning	   to	   Liberia	  
with	   programmes	   such	   as	   the	   UNDP	   Transfer	   of	   Knowledge	   through	   Expatriate	  
Nationals	   (TOKTEN),	   Senior	   Executive	   Service	   (SES),	   and	   the	   Liberia	   Emergency	  
Capacity	   Building	   Support	   (LECBS);	   and	   vi)	   aligning	   themselves	   with	   the	  
government’s	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   deliverables	   by	   participating	   in	   transnational	  
networks,	  hometown	  associations	  and	  regional	  organisations	  such	  as	   the	  Union	  of	  
Liberian	   Associations	   in	   the	   Americas	   (ULAA)	   and	   the	   European	   Federation	   of	  
Liberian	  Associations	  (EFLA).	  	  
	  
The	  catalogue	  of	  contributions	  during	  and	  after	  armed	  conflict	   show	  that	  Liberian	  
diasporas	   and	   their	   returnee	   counterparts	   represent	   a	   key	   node	   in	   development	  
efforts,	  yet	  they	  are	  not	  the	  panacea	  to	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  According	  to	  this	  45-­‐year-­‐
old	  Washington-­‐based	  male	  respondent,	  diaspora	  returnees	  are	  not	   fundamentally	  
                                                




committed	   to	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	   development;	   this	   is	   evidenced	   by	   their	  
maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo:	  	  	  
	  
Right	  now,	  we	  all	  know	  90	  to	  95	  percent	  of	  Ellen’s	  [Johnson	  Sirleaf’s]	  
cabinet	   hold	   one	   form	   of	   foreign	   status,	   either	   they	   are	   residents,	  
mostly	  in	  the	  US,	  not	  even	  counting	  Europe…Either	  they	  are	  residents	  
or	  they	  are	  citizens	  [abroad],	  but	  if	  you	  look	  at	  their	  output	  you	  have	  
scepticism	   as	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   [proposed]	   dual	   citizenship	  
[legislation].	   Right	   now,	   they	   are	   doing	   things	   as	   they	   are.	   They	   are	  
not	   promoting	   the	   country’s	   interest.	   They	   are	   not	   promoting	  
development.	  They	  are	  not	  wanting	  to	  be	  creative	  in	  their	  output	  for	  
the	  country.	  They	  are	  contented	  with	  where	  the	  country	  is,	  literally,	  so	  
to	  speak.	  If	  you	  give	  them	  dual	  citizenship	  just	  like	  that,	  in	  effect,	  what	  
you	  are	  telling	  them,	  the	  ball-­‐field	  is	  open	  for	  everybody	  to	  play.252	  
	  
Despite	   public	   relations	   campaigns	   to	   the	   contrary	   and	   the	   forecasts	   of	  
transformation,	   most	   of	   Sirleaf’s	   first-­‐term	   development	   milestones	   have	   been	  
mired	  by	  challenges.	  Lack	  of	  administrative,	  financial,	  and	  technical	  capacity	  as	  well	  
as	  rampant	  corruption	  have	  been	  listed	  as	  impediments	  to	  sustainable	  growth	  with	  
development	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011a).	  Diaspora	  returnees	  have	  been	  at	  the	  
centre	   of	   these	   debates,	   often	   perceived	   by	   the	   government	   and	   international	  
donors	   as	   the	   panacea	   to	   capacity	   deficiencies	   while	   simultaneously	   viewed	   by	  
homeland	   Liberians	   as	   the	   incubators	   of	   corruption	   with	   impunity.	   According	   to	  
homeland	   cabinet	   official	   and	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Minister	   Ngafuan,	   returnees	   have	  
consistently	  undermined	   the	  positive	   contributions	  of	   their	   diaspora	   counterparts	  
by	  succumbing	  to	  corruption:	  
	  
…if	  you	  track	  the	  number	  of	  persons,	  whether	  public	  official	  or	  so,	  that	  
have	  been	  engaged	  in	  fraud,	  persons	  that	  come	  from	  the	  diaspora	  take	  
a	   disproportionate	   portion.	   So,	   it	   makes	   the	   locals	   to	   get	   more	   and	  
more	   [afraid]...that,	   well,	   these	   people	   come	   to	   loot;	   that	   they	   come	  
with	   all	   their	   sophisticated	   degrees	   and	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day	   they	  
come	   and	   loot	   our	   funds.	   So,	   that	   hasn’t	   helped	   the	   diaspora	   cause,	  
especially	   people	   from	   the	   diaspora	   recruited	   in	   the	   public	   service	  
engaging	   in	   fraudulent	  activities	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   they	  disgrace	  and	  
make	   it	  more	  difficult	   for	   acceptability	   for	  Liberians	   that	   come	   from	  
the	  diaspora.253	  
	  
                                                
252	  [DL36]	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Washington	  on	  October	  20,	  2012.	  	  




Although	   Liberia	   established	   a	   number	   of	   autonomous	   agencies	   responsible	   for	  
curbing	  public	  sector	  graft—the	  General	  Auditing	  Commission	  (GAC)	  (established	  in	  
2005);	   the	   Anti-­‐Corruption	   Commission	   (established	   in	   2008);	   the	   Liberia	  
Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative	  (LEITI)	  (established	  in	  2009);	  and	  the	  
Public	   Procurement	   and	   Concessions	   Commission	   (established	   in	   2010)—
corruption	  persists	  without	  the	  political	  will	  to	  tackle	  it.	  According	  to	  Transparency	  
International’s	  2013	  Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index,	  Liberia	  scored	  38	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  
to	   100,	  with	   0	   denoting	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   perceived	   corruption	   (Transparency	  
International,	  2013).	  This	  represents	  a	  decline	  from	  a	  2012	  score	  of	  41	  and	  unmasks	  
the	  endemic	  nature	  of	  corruption	  in	  Liberia	  (Transparency	  International,	  2012).	  In	  
her	   2006	   inaugural	   address,	   Sirleaf	   promised	   Liberian	   citizens	   that	   corruption	  
would	   be	   ‘public	   enemy	   number	   one’	   (Sirleaf,	   2006:	   9),	   yet	   her	   diaspora	   recruits	  
have	   been	   implicated	   in	   some	   of	   the	   most	   high	   profile	   graft	   cases.	   For	   example,	  
Global	  Witness	  in	  2010	  investigated	  allegations	  that	  a	  UK	  citizen	  had	  been	  dubiously	  
awarded	   400,000	   hectares	   of	   Liberia’s	   forest	   to	   harvest	   carbon	   credits	   (Global	  
Witness,	   2010;	   Global	   Witness,	   2011:	   9).	   In	   response,	   Sirleaf	   instituted	   a	   special	  
presidential	   committee	   headed	   by	   respected	   lawyer	   and	   homeland	   civil	   society	  
activist	  Negbalee	  Warner	  to	  probe	  the	  allegations.	  Based	  on	  the	  committee’s	  report,	  
the	  president,	  among	  other	  actions:	  referred	  former	  PPCC	  executive	  director	  Peggy	  
Varfley	  Meres	  (a	  diaspora	  recruit)	  and	  former	  Minister	  of	  Internal	  Affairs,	  Ambulai	  
Johnson	   (Sirleaf’s	   cousin,	   also	   a	   diaspora	   recruit)	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   for	  
further	   investigation	   and	   possible	   prosecution;	   and	   publically	   reprimanded	   then	  
Minister	   of	   Planning	   and	  Economic	  Affairs	  Amara	  Konneh	   (a	  diaspora	   recruit)	   for	  
not	  following	  regulations	  on	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  concession	  contract	  covering	  Liberia’s	  
forests	   (UN	   Panel	   of	   Experts	   on	   Liberia,	   2010:	   69).	   Neither	   Varfley	   Meres	   nor	  
Johnson	  were	  ever	  pursued	  in	  court,	  and	  the	  reprimand	  of	  Konneh	  was	  considered	  a	  
slap	   on	   the	   wrist.	   Moreover,	   the	   carbon	   corruption	   case	   eroded	   state-­‐citizen	  
relations	   and	   cast	   Sirleaf	   as	   weak	   in	   tackling	   corruption,	   particularly	   involving	  
returnees.	  	  
	  
Other	   public	   sector	   corruption	   cases	   implicating	   returnees	   have	   followed	   in	  
succession,	  calling	  into	  question	  their	  expressed	  commitment	  to	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  




Telecommunications	  Authority	  (LTA),	  was	  declared	  guilty	  of	  economic	  sabotage	  in	  
2012	  for	  defrauding	  the	  government	  of	  close	  to	  US$20,000	  and	  mismanaging	  nearly	  
US$300,000;	  he	   is	   awaiting	  an	  appeal	  decision	   from	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Liberia	  
(Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2011d:	  10;	  Government	  of	  Liberia,	  2012d:	  11).	  In	  2012,	  the	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	   Commission	   successfully	   prosecuted	   former	   Police	   Inspector	  
General	   Beatrice	   Munah-­‐Sieh	   Brown	   for	   misappropriating	   US$198,000	   in	   donor	  
funds	  intended	  to	  purchase	  uniforms	  for	  the	  Emergency	  Response	  Unit	  (ERU);	  she	  
has	  since	  appealed	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Liberian	  Supreme	  Court	  (Government	  of	  Liberia,	  
2011c:	   21-­‐22;	  Government	   of	   Liberia,	   2012d:	   14).	  And	   in	  2013,	   Liberia’s	  Auditor-­‐
General,	   Robert	   Kilby,	   and	   GSA	   Director-­‐General,	   Pearine	   Davis-­‐Parkinson,	   were	  
both	   dismissed	   by	   the	   president	   for	   alleged	   conflict	   of	   interest:	   the	   Auditor-­‐
General’s	   private	   company	   had	   been	   contracted	   by	   the	   GSA	   thereby	   violating	  
procurement	   laws	   (Sirleaf,	   2013).	  Although	   implicated	   in	   corruption	  allegations,	   a	  
slew	  of	  returnee	  heads	  of	  government	  agencies	  have	  been	  dismissed	  by	  Sirleaf	  with	  
no	  legal	  action	  taken	  against	  them—namely,	  Chris	  Toe	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture;	  
Joseph	  Korto	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education;	  Eugene	  Shannon	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands,	  
Mines	   and	   Energy;	   Richard	   Tolbert	   at	   the	   National	   Investment	   Commission;	   and	  
Harry	  Greaves	  at	  the	  Liberia	  Petroleum	  and	  Refining	  Company.254	  
	  
Sirleaf’s	   brand	   of	   diaspocracy	   has	   often	   been	   dubbed	   a	   kleptocracy,	   prompting	  
former	  Auditor-­‐General	   John	  Morlu,	   a	  diaspora	   recruit	  himself,	   to	  declare	   in	  2007	  
that	   her	   administration	   was	   “three	   times	   more	   corrupt”	   than	   the	   National	  
Transitional	  Government	  of	  Liberia	  (NTGL)255	  although	  he	  did	  not	  substantiate	  this	  
comparison	   with	   evidence.	   Nonetheless,	   post-­‐war	   profiteering	   by	   some	   diaspora	  
returnees	   fundamentally	   underpins	   claims	   against	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation,	   prompting	   one	   30-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homeland	   respondent	   to	   contend:	   “I	  
don’t	   think	   they’ve	   helped.	   I	   believe	   they	   have	   created	   so	   much	   problems…they	  
don’t	  come	  back	  to	  Liberia	  to	  help	  to	  rebuild…They	  came	  back	  to	  accumulate	  wealth	  
for	   themselves.”256	  Echoing	   his	   contempt	   for	   the	   theft	   apparently	   so	   prevalent	   in	  
                                                
254	  This	  information	  was	  corroborated	  on	  July	  29,	  2014	  in	  an	  e-­‐mail	  exchange	  with	  Thomas	  Doe	  Nah,	  
head	  of	  the	  Centre	  for	  Transparency	  and	  Accountability	  in	  Liberia	  (CENTAL).	  	  	  
255	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6225422.stm	  




Sirleaf’s	   administration,	   a	   54-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homelander	   quipped	   that	   returnees	  
“become	  loose	  like	  mad	  dogs”	  when	  they	  assume	  public	  office:	  
	  
How	  have	  they	  harmed	  [post-­‐war	  recovery]?	  They	  have	  not	  set	  a	  very	  
good	  example;	  they	  are	  very	  corrupt…as	  soon	  as	  they	  come	  here	  and	  
get	   into	   [a]	   government	   job,	   they	   get	   blind	   or	   greed	   takes	   over	  
them...The	   [good]	   practices	   that	   they	   do	   in	   America,	   they	   will	   not	  
transmit	  them	  here.	  257	  
	  
According	   to	   this	   45-­‐year-­‐old	   male	   homeland	   respondent,	   returnee	   government	  
recruits	  often	  claim	  to	  be	  Liberian	  citizens	  ‘by	  heart’	  but	  they	  are	  neither	  equipped	  
for	   the	   positions	   they	   occupy	   nor	   committed	   to	   post-­‐war	   recovery,	   and	   this	   is	  
indicative	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  merit-­‐based	  appointments	  made	  by	  Sirleaf:	  	  
	  
I	  think	  most	  of	  the	  people	  who	  were	  brought	  in	  to	  do	  X,	  Y,	  Z,	  a	   lot	  of	  
them	  have	  really	  failed	  the	  president…Most	  of	  them	  are	  not	  qualified	  
and	  most	  of	  them	  have	  shown	  that	  they	  are	  not	  just	  up	  to	  the	  task.	  In	  
fact,	   they	  are	  more	  corrupt	   than	  even	  people	  who	  are	  here	  and	  they	  
bring	  a	  new	  dynamism	  to	  corruption	  in	  our	  country.	  They	  bring	  a	  new	  
order	  of	  corruption	   in	  our	  country	  because,	  mind	  you,	  most	  of	   these	  
people,	   they	  will	   not	   get	   the	   kind	   of	   job	   they	   are	   doing	   here	   in	   the	  
[United]	  States…258	  
	  
Referencing	   Charles	   Taylor’s	   botched	   1984	   extradition	   from	   the	  US	   to	   Liberia	   for	  
allegedly	  pilfering	  close	  to	  US$1	  million	  from	  the	  GSA	  (Waugh,	  2011:	  97-­‐104),	  one	  
47-­‐year-­‐old	   homeland	   man	   argued	   that	   transnationals	   who	   violate	   Liberian	   laws	  
with	  impunity	  are	  far	  from	  citizens	  ‘by	  heart’:	  	  
	  
…most	  often	  when	  people	  kind	  of	  steal	  public	  money…the	  most	  likely	  
country	  they	  go	  to	  is	  America	  where	  they	  live	  freely	  and	  we	  can’t	  have	  
them	  come	  back,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Taylor,	  for	  trial,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  several	  
public	   officials	   now	  who	  Auditing	   Commission,	   I	  mean,	   GAC	   audited	  
and	  they	  found	  that	  they	  were	  liable.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  they’re	  not	  guilty	  
yet,	   but,	   they	   [have]	   gone	   back	   to	   live	   in	   America.	   With	   allegations	  
now,	  and	  it’s	  going	  to	  take	  us	  [a]	  long	  time,	  you	  know,	  to	  kind	  of	  have	  
them	  to	  come	  back,	  and	  under	  what	  law	  are	  we	  bringing	  them	  back?	  
I’m	   asking.	   Under	   the	   Doe	   government,	   for	   corruption	   charges,	   the	  
government	   asked	   for	   [Charles]	   Taylor	   to	   come	   back.	   The	   US	  
government	  refused	  because	   they	  were	  not	  pleased	  with	   the	   judicial	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system	  [in	  Liberia]…And	  then,	  later	  on	  we	  saw	  the	  aftermath,	  how	  he	  
[Taylor]	   came	   back	   and	   what	   happened	   to	   the	   country,	   a	   terrible	  
event	   that	   we	   don’t	   want	   to	   talk	   about…They	   [the	   US	   government]	  
said	  he	  [Taylor]	  would	  have	  been	  executed,	   this,	   that.	   Instead	  of	  one	  
man	  being	   executed,	  we	  had	  300,000	   lives	   in	   the	   country	  destroyed	  
simply	   because	   he	   had	   some	  paper	   [Green	   Card]	   to	   stay	   in	  America	  
without	   being	   troubled…So,	   Liberians	   who	   take	   citizenship	   of	   the	  
United	  States	  or	  Europe	  have	  the	  chance	  of	  plunging	  the	  country	  into	  
chaos.	  They	  come	  and	  take	  public	  funds	  and	  run.259	  
	  
Taylor’s	  late	  20th	  century	  incomplete	  extradition	  to	  Liberia	  has	  been	  evoked	  by	  the	  
21st	  century	  alleged	  theft	  of	   funds	  from	  the	  Roberts	  International	  Airport	  (RIA)	  by	  
Corkrum,	   the	   Liberia-­‐born	   US	   citizen	  who	  was	   indicted	   on	   three	   counts	   of	   fraud.	  
According	   to	   American	   attorney	   Steven	   M.	  Schneebaum,	   who	   was	   hired	   by	   the	  
Liberian	  government	   to	  expedite	   the	  extradition	   request	   in	   the	  US,	   the	  allegations	  
against	  Corkrum	  and	  her	  partner	  Johnson	  are	  particularly	  damning:	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  count,	  it	  is	  alleged	  that	  Ms.	  Corkrum	  retained	  a	  consulting	  
firm	   owned	   and	   run	   by	   a	   friend	   of	   hers	   to	   do	   emergency	   work	   at	  
Roberts	   International	  Airport.	  The	   firm	  –	  Diaspora	  Consulting	  LLP	  –	  
was	   retained	   without	   following	   any	   of	   the	   proper	   procedures	   for	  
public	   procurements	   in	   Liberia,	   and	   without	   disclosure	   even	   to	   the	  
Board	   of	   the	   LAA	   [Liberia	   Airport	   Authority]	   itself.	   And	  
Ms.	  Corkrum	  apparently,	   and	   again	   without	   authority,	   made	   a	  
commitment	   to	   pay	  Diaspora	   [Consulting	   LLP]	   many	  hundreds	   of	  
thousands	  of	  dollars.	  There	   is	  no	  evidence	   that	  Diaspora	   [Consulting	  
LLP]	   ever	   made	   any	   constructive	   contribution	   to	   the	   desperately	  
needed	   repairs	   to	   Robertsfield.	   Indeed,	   the	   necessary	   work	   was	  
ultimately	  done	  by	  NACO,	  a	  Dutch	  company,	  at	  a	  price	   far	  below	  the	  
one	   apparently	   agreed	   between	  Ms.	   Corkrum	  and	   her	   friend.	   In	   the	  
second	  count,	  the	  grand	  jury	  alleges	  that	  Ms.	  Corkrum	  and	  Mr.	  [Melvin]	  
Johnson	  together	  arranged	  for	  LAA	  funds	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  him	  for	  
work	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   security	   system	   at	   RIA.	   There	   is	   no	  
evidence	   that	  Mr.	   Johnson	  was	   qualified	   to	   do	   that	   kind	   of	  work,	   or	  
that	  he	  ever	  actually	  performed	  it.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  again	  no	  paper	  
trail,	   and	   no	   record	   of	   compliance	  with	   the	   laws	   and	   regulations	   in	  
Liberia	   that	   are	   in	   place	   to	   deter	   corruption	   and	   the	   unaccountable	  
misuse	  of	  public	   funds.	  Finally,	   the	   third	  count	  outlines	  a	  scheme	  by	  
which	   Ms.	  Corkrum	  received	   cash	   from	   the	   LAA	   Board	   to	   purchase	  
electronic	   equipment	   that	   she	   ultimately	   did	   not	   deliver	   to	   its	  
intended	  (and	  approved)	  recipients260	  (Kanneh,	  2014).	  	  
                                                






In	  a	  strange	  twist	  of	  irony,	  Jewel	  Howard	  Taylor,	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  ex-­‐wife	  and	  now	  
co-­‐sponsor	   of	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   bill,	   referenced	   the	   Corkrum	   case	   to	  
explain	  why	  she	  now	  has	  reservations	  about	  dual	  citizenship:	  	  	  
Half	  of	   the	  people	   in	  government	  are	  US	  citizens.	  Really!	  And	  what’s	  
happening	   now,	  when	   you	   catch	   them	   for	   corruption	   they	   all	   leave.	  
The	  woman	  at	  the	  airport	  [Ellen	  Corkrum]…is	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  
what	  I’m	  talking	  about.	  She	  got	  in	  the	  big	  helluva	  trouble;	  she	  just	  got	  
in	  the	  plane	  and	  went	  back	  [to	  the	  US].261	  
	  
Akin	  to	  Senator	  Taylor	  and	  the	  previous	  homeland	  respondent,	  many	  interviewees	  
in	  this	  study	  alluded	  to	  Ellen	  Corkrum	  and/or	  Charles	  Taylor	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  
potential	   fault-­‐lines	   in	   enacting	  dual	   citizenship,	   prompting	  me	   to	   label	   these	   two	  
tactile	  experiences	  of	  transnational	  fraud	  the	  ‘Taylor-­‐Corkrum	  nexus.’	  Nevertheless,	  
former	  Justice	  Minister	  Tah	  cautioned	  that	  high-­‐level	  cases	  of	  corruption	  involving	  
returnees	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  all	  returnees,	  but	  rather	  indicative	  of	  an	  endemic	  
system	  of	  dishonesty	  coupled	  with	  impunity:	  	  
I’m	  trying	  to	  convince	  people	  that	  everybody	  is	  not	  Ellen	  [Corkrum]…I	  
know	  that	  is	  obvious,	  but	  everybody	  is	  not	  Ellen	  Corkrum,	  you	  know,	  
yeah.	   I	   mean,	   they	   were	   already	   looking	   for	   some	   reason	   to	   reject	  
people	  who	  come	  from	  outside…It	  makes	  whatever	  else	  they	  already	  
felt,	   this	   now	  makes	   it	   easy.	   They	   know	   in	   their	  minds	   that	   it’s	   not	  
true,	   and	   she	   doesn’t	   represent	   the	   diaspora.	   But	   if	   you’re	   already	  
looking	  for	  a	  way	  to	  reject	  a	  group	  of	  people,	  she	  makes	  it	  easy.	  And	  
that’s	  what	  hurts	  me	  about	  what	   she	  did…We	  are	   indicting	  her,	   and	  
we’re	   filing,	   applying	   for	   extradition.	   They’re	   working	   on	   the	  
indictment	  now.262	  
	  
Contrary	   to	   contemporary	   discourses	   about	   the	   lack	   of	   accountability	   in	   Liberia,	  
Sirleaf’s	  diaspocracy	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  genesis	  of	  corruption.	  Akin	  to	  settler	  polities	  
such	  as	  Australia,	  Canada	  and	  the	  US,	  Liberia	  was	  founded	  on	  principles	  of	  intrusion	  
and	   exclusion,	   dispossession	   and	   theft	   (Pailey,	   2013b).	   The	  bedrock	  of	   corruption	  
was	   formed	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   when	   ACS	   agents	   seized	   their	   first	   parcel	   of	  
indigenous	   land	   from	   King	   Peter	   through	   the	   use	   of	   force	   (Levitt,	   2005:	   40-­‐41).	  
                                                
261	  Semi-­‐structured	  interview	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  March	  6,	  2013.	  




According	  to	  Clower,	  et	  al,	  corruption	  became	  further	  entrenched	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  
during	  Tubman’s	  reign:	  	  	  
	  	  
The	   governing	   authorities	   award	   loyalty	   and	   conformity	   with	   jobs,	  
many	  of	  which	  are	  sinecures	  requiring	  only	  occasional	  attendance.	  To	  
each	   level	  of	  government	  employment	  there	   is	  attached	  a	  special	  set	  
of	  fringe	  benefits.	  The	  highest	  echelons	  and	  their	  kin	  obtain	  the	  most	  
lucrative	  material	   prerogatives:	   purchases	   of	   shares	   of	   stock	   in	   iron	  
ore	   concessions	  at	  bargain	   rates;	  purchases	  of	   tribal	   land	  along	  new	  
roads;	   sales	   of	   phantom	   services	   (public	   relations,	   advertising)	   to	  
foreign	   concessions;	   sales	   of	   real	   economic	   services	   to	   concessions	  
(e.g.	   trucking),	   but	   at	   higher	   cost	   than	   the	   buyers	   would	   incur	   in	  
providing	   their	   own	   services;	   acquiring	   compulsory	   labour	   for	   their	  
rubber	   farms;	   the	   right	   to	   impose	   private	   levies	   in	   rice	   on	   tribal	  
groups;	   the	   use	   of	   government	   vehicles	   and	   other	   equipment	   for	  
private	  gain;	  extraordinarily	  large	  expense	  accounts;	  free	  housing	  and	  
trips	  abroad;	  and	  government	  scholarships	  for	  training	  and	  education	  
abroad	  regardless	  of	  merit	  (Clower,	  et.	  al,	  1966:	  10).	  	  
	  
Following	   this	   trajectory,	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   corruption	   in	   Liberia	   has	   become	  
“enmeshed	  in	  daily	  human	  interaction;	  it	  is	  a	  function	  of	  both	  poverty	  and	  greed”263	  
(Pailey,	   2013b)	   involving	   not	   only	   diaspora	   government	   recruits	   but	   also	   all	   of	  
Liberian	   society.	   Given	   its	   historical	   antecedents,	   corruption	   has	   now	   become	  
central	  to	  the	  discourse	  on	  citizenship	  in	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  There	  is	  a	  recognition	  
in	   Liberia	   that	   building	   state	   institutions—state-­‐building—is	   not	   a	   sufficient	  
deterrent	   to	   curbing	  corruption;	   rather,	   a	  parallel	  process	  of	  nation-­‐building	  must	  
be	  anchored	  by	  the	  tenets	  of	  active	  citizenship.	  Because	  contemporary	  constructions	  
of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  are	  more	  practice-­‐based,	  largely	  because	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  
post-­‐war	  recovery,	  those	  engaged	  in	  corruption	  are	  rarely	  considered	  Liberians	  ‘by	  
heart,’	  regardless	  of	  their	  legal	  citizenship	  status/identity.	  	  	  
	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   Liberia’s	   diasporas	   and	   their	   returnee	  
counterparts	  have	  both	  helped	  and	  hindered	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  thereby	  influencing	  
claims	  for	  and	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  dual	  citizenship.	  On	  one	  hand,	  they	  have	  lifted	  
Liberia	  and	  Liberians	  by	  contributing	  their	  ‘time,	  talent,	  and	  treasure’,	  while	  on	  the	  






other	  hand	  eroded	  state-­‐citizen	  and	  citizen-­‐citizen	  relations	  by	  engaging	  in	  corrupt	  
forms	  of	  post-­‐war	  profiteering.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
When	  Charles	  Taylor	  sat	  in	  Plymouth	  awaiting	  extradition	  to	  Liberia	  in	  1984,	  little	  
did	  he	  know	  that	  he	  would	  end	  up	  in	  a	  British	  prison	  30	  years	  later	  for	  war	  crimes	  
committed	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   (Bowcott	   and	   Mark,	   2012).	   His	   alleged	   pilfering	   of	  
Liberia’s	   state	   resources	   in	   the	   20th	   century	   has	   been	   conjured	   up	   by	   allegations	  
against	   Ellen	   Corkrum	   in	   the	   21st	   century,	   with	   both	   serving	   as	   models	   of	  
transnational	   citizenship	  gone	  wrong.	  Based	  on	   the	  experiences	  of	   respondents	   in	  
Liberia,	   many	   of	   whom	   referred	   to	   Liberians	   abroad	   as	   Janus-­‐faced,	   this	   chapter	  
explored	   what	   I	   refer	   to	   as	   the	   ‘Taylor-­‐Corkrum	   nexus,’	   evaluating	   how	   Liberia’s	  
diasporas	  have	  served	  as	  both	  war-­‐mongers/post-­‐war	  recovery	  saboteurs	  as	  well	  as	  
development	   enablers	   thereby	   influencing	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	  
passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation.	   Cataloguing	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Liberians	  
abroad	  and	  their	  returnee	  counterparts	  have	  contributed	  to	  post-­‐war	  recovery,	  the	  
chapter	   illustrated	   that	   Liberia’s	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   was	  
introduced	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   incentivising	   Liberian	   transnationals	   to	   commit	  
what	  Dr.	  C.	  William	  Allen	  refers	  to	  as	  their	  “time,	  talent,	  and	  treasure.”264	  Although	  
recovery	  in	  Liberia	  may	  require	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  all	  Liberians	  in	  order	  to	  
build	  state	  institutions	  and	  achieve	  national	  cohesion,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  
political	  will	   or	   a	   strong	  enough	   legal	   regime	   to	   safeguard	   the	   country	   from	  post-­‐
war	  profiteering	  by	  those	  returning	  from	  abroad.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  also	  examined	  how	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	  as	  a	  political	  project	  has	  
configured	  and	  reconfigured	  the	  conception	  and	  practice	  of	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’.	   I	  
assessed	   the	   differences	   between	   international	   state-­‐building	   interventions	   and	  
domestic	   nation-­‐building	   initiatives	   in	   Liberia,	   thereby	   illustrating	   the	   tensions	  
between	  international	  aspirations	  for	  Liberia,	  and	  a	  domestic	  agenda	  for	  the	  country.	  
In	  my	  analysis,	  Liberia’s	  diasporas	   inhabit	   a	   ‘third	  post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   space,’	  
constantly	   brokering	   and	   mediating	   between	   local	   aspirations	   and	   international	  
agendas.	  	  
                                                




By	  way	  of	  conclusion	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  assert	  that	  citizenship	  remains	  a	  peace-­‐
building	   imperative	   for	   Liberia	   by	   examining	  how	   the	   state’s	   response	   in	   2014	   to	  



































2014	  ‘War	  on	  Ebola’	  in	  Liberia	  Reveals	  a	  ‘Crisis	  of	  Citizenship’265	  
“We	  dodged	  bullets	  during	  the	  war,	  now	  Ebola	  is	  going	  to	  kill	  us?”	  my	  aunt	  asked	  me	  
in	  distress	  one	  evening	  in	  mid-­‐July	  2014,	  as	  we	  sat	  commiserating	  at	  my	  house	  on	  
the	  outskirts	  of	  Monrovia.	  At	  the	  time,	  Ebola	  seemed	  like	  a	  looming	  threat	  to	  Liberia	  
in	  the	  way	  that	  armed	  conflict	  had	  15	  years	  earlier.	  But	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month,	  the	  
Liberian	  government	  had	  declared	  a	   ‘state	  of	  emergency’	  and	  days	  later,	  the	  World	  
Health	   Organisation	   (WHO)	   designated	   the	   Ebola	   outbreak	   in	   West	   Africa	   an	  
‘international	   health	   emergency.’	   Major	   airlines	   such	   as	   British	   Airways,	   ASKY,	  
Kenya	  Airways,	  Emirates	  and	  Delta	  suspended	  services	  to	  the	  affected	  areas.	  WHO	  
reported	  on	  August	  28	  that	  at	  least	  1500	  people	  had	  died	  and	  more	  than	  3069	  had	  
been	  infected	  in	  the	  region,	  with	  the	  number	  of	  deaths	  in	  Liberia	  surpassing	  those	  in	  
Sierra	  Leone,	  Guinea,	  and	  Nigeria,	  Africa’s	   largest	  economy.266	  Yet,	  even	  before	  the	  
highly	  infectious	  disease	  permeated	  Liberia’s	  borders	  from	  neighbouring	  Guinea	  in	  
March	  2014,	   the	  country	  was	  already	  plagued	  by	  a	   ‘crisis	  of	  citizenship.’	  As	   I	  have	  
shown	  throughout	   this	   thesis,	   the	  Liberian	  state	  has	  repeatedly	  abdicated	   from	  its	  
responsibility	  of	  shielding	  citizens	  from	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  upheaval.	  The	  
lack	  of	  a	  robust	  healthcare	  system	  to	  respond	  to	  an	  infectious	  disease	  such	  as	  Ebola	  
revealed	  the	  volatile	  nature	  of	  Liberia’s	  state-­‐citizen	  relations.	  	  
In	  July	  2014	  before	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  hit	  crisis	  point,	  a	  group	  of	  disaffected	  citizens	  
clashed	  with	  riot	  police	  at	  the	  Mittal	  Steel	  concession	  area	  in	  Nimba,	  north-­‐central	  
Liberia.	   They	   were	   protesting	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   iron	   ore	   mineral	   development	  
agreement	  had	  not	  benefitted	  locals.	  The	  government	  branded	  the	  assailants	  ‘thugs’	  
and	   ‘unlawful’,	   making	   appeals	   to	   the	   parent	   company	   ArcelorMittal	   even	   before	  
launching	  a	  formal	  investigation	  into	  the	  grievances.	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
bubbling	  cauldron.	  The	  Ebola	  outbreak	  simply	  tipped	  the	  pot	  over,	  and	  contributed	  
to	  a	  succession	  of	  further	  crises.	  Lacking	  proper	  training	  and	  protective	  gear,	  more	  
                                                
265	  Excerpts	   of	   this	   introduction	   were	   culled	   from	   an	   August	   22,	   2014	   article	   I	   published	   in	   The	  
Guardian	   (UK)	   entitled:	   “Ebola	   Has	   Caused	   Liberia’s	   Cauldron	   of	   Dissatisfaction	   to	   Boil	   Over”:	  
http://www.theguardian.com/global-­‐development/poverty-­‐matters/2014/aug/22/ebola-­‐liberia-­‐






than	  50	  Liberian	  healthcare	  workers,	   including	  doctors	   and	  nurses,	   succumbed	   to	  
the	  Ebola	  virus	  one	  by	  one.	  Their	  colleagues	  refused	  to	  go	  to	  work	  fearing	  that	  they	  
too	   would	   become	   infected.	   That	   the	   Liberian	   state	   had	   not	   invested	   heavily	   in	  
strengthening	   the	   crumbling	  health	   system	  was	  not	   lost	   on	   those	  who	  battled	   the	  
silent	   killer	   without	   a	   cure.	   Entire	   communities	   barricaded	   themselves	   in	   their	  
homes	   for	   fear	   of	   contracting	   Ebola,	   rather	   than	   visiting	   the	   limited	   number	   of	  
resource-­‐strapped	  health	  facilities	  across	  the	  country.	  	  
On	  August	  17,	  looters	  carrying	  clubs	  raided	  a	  makeshift	  Ebola	  holding	  centre	  in	  the	  
overcrowded	  West	  Point	   slum	  of	   central	  Monrovia,	  declaring	   that	   the	  disease	  was	  
not	  real	  and	  that	  the	  government	  was	  using	  it	  as	  a	  ruse	  to	  shore	  up	  donor	  funding.	  
They	  made	  away	  with	  bloodstained	  mattresses	  and	  other	   supplies.	  Of	   the	   twenty-­‐
nine	   confirmed	   and	   suspected	   Ebola	   patients	   who	   escaped,	   17	   were	   found	   three	  
days	  later	  and	  taken	  to	  a	  treatment	  centre.	  President	  Ellen	  Johnson	  Sirleaf	  declared	  
on	  August	   19	   that	   effective	   the	  next	   day	   a	   national	   curfew	  would	  be	   instituted	   to	  
restrict	  movement	   from	  9	  p.m.	  until	   6	   a.m.—an	  attempt	   to	  quell	   growing	  hysteria	  
and	  anxiety—and	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens	  would	  be	  limited	  severely.	  Quarantines	  
were	  executed	  without	  warning	   in	  two	  communities,	  Dolo’s	  Town	  and	  West	  Point,	  
with	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Liberia	  (AFL)	  deployed	  to	  restrict	  movement.267	  In	  West	  
Point,	   the	   sprawling	  mass	  of	   sardined	  packed	   shacks	  on	   the	   sandy	  beaches	  of	   the	  
Atlantic	  Ocean,	  a	  teenage	  boy	  was	  shot	  in	  both	  legs	  by	  security	  forces	  during	  a	  riot	  
and	   bled	   to	   death	   on	   the	   first	   day	   of	   the	   quarantine. 268 	  Ten	   days	   later,	   the	  
government	   lifted	   restrictions	   on	   movement	   in	   West	   Point	   amidst	   domestic	   and	  
international	   censure	   about	   the	   use	   of	   lethal	   force	   during	   the	   army	   scuffle	   with	  
civilians269.	   A	   proverbial	   ‘War	   on	   Ebola’	   had	   effectively	   commenced,	   as	   homeland	  
citizens	  condemned	  the	  government	  for	  failing	  them	  in	  the	  most	  profound	  ways.	  	  
The	  Ebola	  outbreak	  in	  Liberia	  has	  underscored	  how	  strained	  relations	  between	  the	  
Liberian	  state	  and	  its	  citizens	  severely	  threatens	  the	  peace-­‐building	  process	  and	  has	  
the	  propensity	   to	  destabilise	   the	   country	  once	  more.	  Therefore,	   citizenship	   in	   this	  
context	  is	  an	  important	  frame	  for	  discussing	  future	  policy	  prescriptions	  for	  Liberia	  








and	   other	   post-­‐war	   countries.	   In	   this	   concluding	   chapter,	   I	   argue	   that	   Liberia’s	  
proposed	  dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   is	  unlikely	   to	  be	   enacted	  without	   reconciling	  
contestations	  over	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship.’	  I	  also	  contend	  
that	   my	   conceptualisation	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   identity	   (passive),	   practice	  
(active),	   and	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   (interactive)	   can	  be	  used	   as	   a	  model	   for	   theorising	  
citizenship	   generally,	   given	   its	  multi-­‐layered	  meanings	   in	   the	   academic	   literature.	  
And	   last,	   but	   not	   least,	   I	   propose	   areas	   of	   possible	   future	   research,	   such	   as	   a	  
comprehensive	  study	  of	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause’	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  Liberia’s	  development.	  	  
Why	  Citizenship	  Matters	  for	  Policy	  and	  Practice	  in	  Post-­‐War	  Liberia	  	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   has	   been	   configured	   and	  
reconfigured	  since	   the	   founding	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state	   in	  1847.	  These	  processes	  have	  
been	   largely	  brokered	  by	  conflict,	  migration,	   globalisation,	   and	  post-­‐war	   recovery.	  
Therefore,	   the	   introduction	   and	   postponement	   in	   passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	   serves	   as	   a	   contemporary	  manifestation	   of	   that	   reconfiguration	   across	  
space	  and	  time.	  While	  conflict	  interfaces	  between	  indigenes	  and	  settlers	  in	  the	  19th	  
century	  produced	  a	  hegemonic	  form	  of	  citizenship,	  contestation	  and	  conciliation	  in	  
the	   20th	   and	   21st	   centuries	   facilitated	   more	   expansive,	   multi-­‐layered	   citizenships.	  
Similarly,	  migration	  redefined	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	   in	   that	   it	   created	  categories	  of	  
Liberians	  who	   defy	   the	   legal	   definition	   of	   citizenship	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Aliens	   and	  
Nationality	   Law.	   Nevertheless,	   there	   is	   contestation	   amongst	   Liberians	   across	  
spatial	  landscapes	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  naturalisation	  brokered	  through	  migration	  
represents	   choice	   or	   compulsion.	   Though	   integration	   and	   reintegration	   into	   the	  
global	  capitalist	  system	  strained	  relations	  between	  the	  Liberian	  state	  and	  its	  citizens,	  
thereby	   creating	   backlash	   against	   dual	   citizenship,	   globalised	   notions	   of	   human	  
rights	  and	  deterritorialised	   forms	  of	   citizenship	  have	  emboldened	  dual	   citizenship	  
claims.	  Furthermore,	  the	  challenges	  of	  post-­‐war	  recovery	  have	  effectively	  carved	  out	  
a	  niche	  for	  transnational	  citizenship	  contributions	  by	  diasporas	  and	  returnees	  alike,	  
thereby	  increasing	  claims	  for	  dual	  citizenship.	  Despite	  these	  contributions,	  however,	  
high-­‐profile	   cases	   of	   post-­‐war	   profiteering	   by	   returnees	   have	   undermined	   dual	  





I	  have	  shown	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  that	  citizenship	  mattered	  in	  19th	  century	  Liberia	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  it	  carries	  significant	  policy	  and	  practical	  importance	  today.	  It	  
signifies	   how	   Liberians	   across	   various	   spatial	   landscapes	   conceive	   of	   themselves,	  
express	   their	   identity	   through	   practice,	   and	   engage	   with	   the	   state	   and	   with	   each	  
other.	   Furthermore,	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   is	   inextricably	   tied	   to	   the	   trajectory	   of	  
post-­‐war	   recovery.	   Questions	   abound	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   amendments	   to	  
Liberia’s	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law	  will	  actually	  harness	  state-­‐	  and	  nation-­‐building	  
processes.	   While	   some	   argue	   that	   dual	   citizenship	   would	   facilitate	   development,	  
reconciliation,	   sustainable	   peace	   and	   unity,	   others	   believe	   it	   would	   exacerbate	  
unresolved	  societal	  fissures,	  thereby	  compromising	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  For	  instance,	  
this	  study	  has	  shown	  that	  citizenship-­‐derived	  conflicts	  over	  land	  ownership,	  income	  
inequality	  and	  transitional	  justice	  must	  be	  resolved	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  to	  deter	  future	  
outbreaks	   of	   violence.	   Measured	   changes	   in	   policy	   and	   practice	   would	   mean	  
implementing	   fully	   the	   Land	   Rights	   Policy	   of	   2013;	   adjudicating	   land	   disputes	   in	  
court;	  placing	  a	  moratorium	  on	  concession	   land	  acquisition;	  collecting	   taxes	  on	  all	  
privately	   and	   commercially	   owned	   land;	   and	   instituting	   eminent	   domain	   where	  
taxes	   are	   not	   collected.	   The	   Liberian	   government	   can	   take	   the	   lead	   in	   mitigating	  
income	   inequality	   by	   placing	   a	   ceiling	   on	   the	   salaries	   of	   political	   appointees	   and	  
enforcing	   a	   pay	   grade	   system	   commensurate	   with	   professional	   experience	   and	  
academic	   qualifications.	   And	   last,	   but	   not	   least,	   members	   of	   the	   Independent	  
National	   Human	   Rights	   Commission	   established	   to	   implement	   the	   TRC	  
recommendations	  must	  be	  elected	  by	  an	  independent	  body	  comprising	  civil	  society,	  
government,	  and	  the	  private	  sector,	  rather	  than	  appointed	  by	  the	  Liberian	  head	  of	  
state.	  This	  will	  enable	  the	  body	  to	  maintain	  a	  semblance	  of	  autonomy.	  	  
	  
As	  evidenced	  by	  the	  three	  post-­‐war	  conflict-­‐generating	  issues	  described	  above,	  it	  is	  
clear	   that	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   remains	   a	   space	   of	   contestation.	   Therefore,	   dual	  
citizenship	   should	   not	   be	   pursued	   as	   a	   policy	   prescription	   until	   disputes	   over	  
citizenship	   are	   fundamentally	   resolved.	   Moreover,	   the	   focus	   of	   policy	   should	   be	  
amending	   the	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law	   of	   Liberia	   to	   reflect	   how	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’	  is	  currently	  conceived	  of	  and	  practiced	  domestically	  and	  transnationally,	  
as	   exemplified	   by	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   in	   this	   thesis.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   that	  




‘crisis	  of	  citizenship’,	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation	  should	  also	  be	  subject	  to	  
public	   debates,	   national/transnational	   consultations	   and	   policy	   discussions,	  
followed	   by	   a	   referendum	   in	   the	   future.	   Based	   on	   previous	   discussions	   with	  
Liberia’s	   constitutional	   review	   committee	   pre-­‐Ebola,	   it	   was	   speculated	   that	   a	  
national	  referendum	  on	  the	  Constitution	  would	  be	  held	  in	  2015.	  Though	  it	  remains	  
unclear	   whether	   or	   not	   dual	   citizenship	   will	   be	   included	   on	   a	   ballot	   that	   is	   now	  
unlikely	   given	   the	   challenges	   of	   the	   Ebola	   outbreak,	   it	   would	   be	   unwise	   to	   do	   so	  
because	   of	   the	   highly	   polarised	   nature	   of	   debates	   on	   deterritorialising	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship.’	  Because	  dual	  citizenship	  is	  so	  emotionally	  charged,	  and	  especially	  given	  
that	   opposition	   to	   it	   is	   strongest	   in	   Liberia,	   passage	   of	   the	   proposed	   bill	   may	  
ultimately	   damage	   already	   fragile	   relations	   between	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   its	  
domestic	   citizens	   even	   as	   it	   strengthens	   relations	  with	   those	  who	  would	   become	  
dual	   citizens.	  Moreover,	   the	  historical	   and	   contemporary	   crises	   of	   citizenship	   that	  
culminated	  in	  the	  Ebola	  outbreak	  have	  underscored	  the	  need	  for	  the	  state	  to	  fortify	  
domestic	  state-­‐citizen	  relations—by,	   for	  example,	   investing	   in	  basic	  social	  services	  
such	   as	   quality	   healthcare	   regardless	   of	   donor	   support	   and	   protecting	   the	   labour	  
rights	  of	  homeland	  Liberians	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  capitalist	  re-­‐integration—before	  it	  can	  
focus	   on	   extending	   citizenship	   rights	   transnationally.	   Therefore,	   legislation	  
introduced	  in	  Liberia	  and	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  to	  extend	  citizenship	  
to	  nationals	  abroad	  is	  a	  trend	  that	  has	  far	  reaching	  implications,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  
rushed	  for	  political	  expediency.	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	   section	   that	   follows,	   I	   proffer	   a	  model	   of	   citizenship	   that	   can	   be	   generally	  
applied	   as	   a	   means	   of	   resolving	   conflicts	   over	   what	   the	   term	   signifies	   in	   theory,	  
policy	  and	  practice.	  	  	  
	  
	  ‘Liberian	  Citizenship’	  Triad	  As	  a	  Model	  for	  Constructing	  Citizenship	  Generally	  
In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Galtung	  (1996)	  formulated	  his	  conflict	  triangle,	  I	  conceptualise	  
‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   a	   set	   of	   three	   axes	   that	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   model	   for	  






















As	   Figure	   4	   illustrates,	   my	   conceptualisation	   of	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	   as	   identity	  
(passive),	  practice	  (active),	  and	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  (interactive)	  encompasses	  political,	  
legal,	   sociological	  and	  cultural	   constructions	  of	   citizenship,	   thereby	  representing	  a	  
holistic	  realisation	  of	  the	  term.	  It	  is	  specific	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  concrete	  examples	  of	  
how	  citizenship	   is	  defined	   in	   the	   literature,	   but	   conceptually	  broad	  enough	   that	   it	  
can	   be	   applied	   in	   all	   contexts.	   The	   model	   includes	   multiple	   levels	   of	  
conceptualisation—moving	  from	  the	  individual	  to	  how	  the	  individual	  interacts	  with	  
his/her	   society.	   It	   reconciles	   contestations	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   citizenship	   is	  
bounded	   or	   unbounded	   because	   it	   does	   not	   include	   spatial	   categories	   of	  
differentiation.	  Furthermore,	  my	  citizenship	  triad	  is	  informed	  by	  empirical	  research	  
about	   a	   country	   of	   emigration,	   Liberia;	   therefore	   it	   provides	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	  
overly	   theoretical	   and	   Eurocentric	   foundation	   of	   citizenship	   studies	   to	   date.	   As	   a	  
case	   in	  point,	   the	   seminal	   academic	   journal	  Citizenship	  Studies	   has	   few	  articles	   on	  
North	   Africa,	   and	   only	   a	   handful	   of	   articles	   on	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa—Zimbabwe;	  
South	  Africa;	   Chad;	  Nigeria;	   Sudan;	   northern	   Cameroon;	   Central	   African	  Republic;	  
Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	   Congo;	   Nigeria;	   Ghana;	   Benin;	   Cape	   Verde;	   Uganda;	  
Kenya.	   Although	   Citizenship	   Studies	   showcases	   empirical	   studies	   from	   across	   the	  
globe,	  it	  is	  still	  heavily	  dominated	  by	  articles	  from	  and	  about	  the	  Global	  North.	  	  
	  
My	  thesis	  is	  one	  in	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  that	  challenges	  the	  spatial	  imbalance	  
of	   citizenship	   studies.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   abstract	   and	   Eurocentric	   discourses	   on	  
identity	  (passive)	  





citizenship	  in	  the	  academic	  literature,	  the	  project	  Citizenship	  after	  Orientalism	  was	  
introduced	   as	   a	   post-­‐colonial	   critique	   (http://www.oecumene.eu/).	   Moving	  
citizenship	   from	   the	   abstract	   and	  Eurocentric	   to	   the	   concrete	   and	  Afrocentric,	  my	  
thesis	   also	   addresses	   severe	   gaps	   in	   the	   citizenship	   literature	   by	   dissecting	   how	  
citizenship	  is	  conceived	  of	  and	  practiced	  in	  a	  post-­‐war	  African	  context.	  Because	  the	  
continent	  of	  Africa	  has	  seen	  some	  of	  the	  most	  violent	  manifestations	  of	  citizenship	  
contestation	   misguidedly	   portrayed	   as	   identity-­‐based	   conflicts,	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	  
adopt	  a	   theoretical	  model	  of	   citizenship	   that	   takes	   this	   context	   into	  consideration.	  
My	   citizenship	   triad	   does	   that	   and	   more.	   Furthermore,	   employing	   the	   ‘crisis	   of	  
citizenship’	  paradigm	  as	  I	  have	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  particularly	  instructive	  for	  post-­‐war	  
countries	   like	  Rwanda,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  Angola	  as	  well	  as	  conflict-­‐ridden	  nations	  
such	  as	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic	  and	  South	  Sudan	  because	  it	  debunks	  the	  overly	  
simplistic,	   primordial	   paradigms	   often	   attributed	   to	   African	   wars.	   The	   ‘crisis	   of	  
citizenship’	  paradigm	  would	  also	  be	  useful	   for	  non-­‐African	  post-­‐war	  contexts	  such	  
as	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Northern	  Ireland,	  and	  Bosnia	  because	  it	  generally	  examines	  citizenship	  
as	   identity,	   practice,	   and	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	  
times	  of	  war	  and	  peace.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  discuss	  strands	  of	  possible	  future	  research.	  	  
	  
Interrogating	  the	  ‘Negro	  Clause’	  and	  Other	  Areas	  of	  Future	  Research	  
Liberia	  is	  one	  of	  two	  countries	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  that	  defines	  citizenship	  explicitly	  along	  
racial	   lines,	   and	   this	   represents	   one	   of	   the	   most	   controversial	   elements	   of	   the	  
country’s	   Constitution	   and	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law.	   Although	   I	   refrained	   from	  
providing	  a	  full	  evaluation	  of	  the	  ‘Negro	  clause’	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  remains	  a	  contested	  
space	  of	  intellectual	  inquiry	  that	  I	  plan	  to	  pursue	  in	  future	  research.	  Because	  Liberia	  
hosts	   growing	   populations	   of	   Lebanese,	   Indian	   and	   Chinese	   expatriates	   who	  
dominate	   the	   commercial	   sector,	   further	   analysis	   is	   needed	   to	   understand	   how	  
these	   and	   other	   non-­‐black	   foreign	   nationals	   conceive	   of	   and	   practice	   citizenship	  
given	  that	  they	  are	  barred	  from	  formal	  recognition	  as	  Liberian	  citizens.	  I	  also	  intend	  
to	   examine	   what	   impact	   this	   form	   of	   exclusion	   has	   had	   on	   Liberia’s	   political	  
economy.	  During	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   for	   this	   thesis,	   I	   probed	  a	  number	  of	  




elicits	   passionate	   views	   across	   the	   spectrum.	   Similar	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  
need	   to	   be	   conducted	  with	   those	  who	   identify	   as	   ‘non-­‐Negroes’	   in	   Liberia,	   as	   this	  
would	   open	   the	   space	   for	   a	   critical	   examination	   of	   how	   they	   practice	   what	   Glick	  
Schiller	   (2005:	   31)	   calls	   ‘social	   citizenship’—claiming	   citizenship	   rights	   “through	  
social	  practice	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  law”—and	  what	  impact	  this	  has	  had	  on	  post-­‐
war	  recovery.	  Although	  there	  have	  been	  studies	  conducted	  on	  Lebanese	  diasporas	  
across	   space	   and	   time	   (Humphrey,	   1998;	   Nahas	   and	   Tabar	   2010;	   Arsan,	   2013),	  
focused	  analysis	  on	  how	  generations	  of	  Lebanese	  in	  Liberia,	  for	  instance,	  construct	  
and	  practice	  citizenship	   in	  a	  country	  that	  does	  not	  recognise	  their	   formal	  rights	  to	  
jus	  soli	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  would	  introduce	  a	  new	  strand	  to	  this	  growing	  body	  of	  
empirical	  research.	  	  
	  
Another	   area	   of	   analysis	   that	   is	   worth	   pursuing	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   citizenship	  
governance	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   weak	   enforcement	   in	   Liberia	   and	   abroad.	   The	   lack	   of	  
citizenship	   governance	   regimes	   was	   particularly	   stark	   in	   the	   ‘Taylor-­‐Corkrum	  
nexus’	  analysis,	  although	  a	  broader	  study	  needs	  to	  be	  conducted	  to	  assess	  how	  the	  
Liberian	  state	  administers	  citizenship	  law	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,	  what	  gaps	  there	  are	  
in	  enforcement,	  and	  how	  this	  impacts	  how	  citizenship	  is	  conceived	  of	  and	  practiced	  
domestically	  and	  transnationally.	  It	  was	  clear	  from	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  
some	   anonymised	   respondents	   in	   the	   field	   that	   they	   practice	   de	   facto	   dual	  
citizenship	  by	  carrying	  two	  passports—Liberian	  and	  one	  other—even	  though	  this	  is	  
prohibited	  by	  law.	  Given	  that	  the	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  was	  established	  in	  2009	  
followed	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Review	  Committee	  in	  2012	  to	  review	  and	  harmonise	  
Liberia’s	  general	  laws	  of	  application	  with	  the	  Constitution,	  and	  vice	  versa,	  it	  will	  be	  
worth	  evaluating	  what	  recommendations	  these	  bodies	  have	  proffered	  related	  to	  the	  
enforcement	   of	   citizenship	   regulations.	   An	   investigation	   of	   Liberia’s	   citizenship	  
governance	   mechanisms	   is	   important	   because	   it	   has	   implications	   for	   how	  
citizenship	  entitlements,	  such	  as	  voting	  eligibility	  as	  well	  as	  the	  eligibility	  to	  run	  for	  
elected	  office,	  will	  be	  managed	  and	  enforced	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	  
A	  third	  and	  final	  area	  of	  research	  inquiry	  is	  the	  need	  to	  synthesise	  migration	  data	  for	  
Liberia.	   My	   study	   on	   citizenship	   construction	   and	   practice	   has	   proven	   that	   the	  




evidence-­‐based	  policy-­‐making	   related	   to	  diaspora	   engagement.	   It	   could	  be	   argued	  
that	  the	  lack	  of	  data	  has	  not	  impeded	  the	  introduction	  of	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  
legislation.	  Yet,	  data	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  proposed	  bill’s	  passage.	  
For	   instance,	   one	   of	   the	   assumptions	   underpinning	   dual	   citizenship	   claims	   is	   that	  
large	   numbers	   of	   Liberians	   either	   naturalised	   abroad,	   or	   have	   had	   jus	   sanguinis	  
foreign-­‐born	  offspring	  who	  want	  to	  qualify	   for	   legal	   ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  after	   the	  
age	   of	   majority.	   The	   absence	   of	   data	   to	   support	   this	   argument	   fundamentally	  
weakens	   claims	   for	   instituting	   dual	   citizenship.	   Although	   I	   am	   not	   equipped	   to	  
produce	  quantitative	  data,	  statistics	  on	  the	  sample	  size	  of	  Liberians	  abroad	  is	  crucial	  
for	  both	  instituting	  empirically	  driven	  policies	  that	  impact	  diasporas	  and	  conducting	  
empirical	  research	  on	  this	  demographic.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Although	   Liberia	   celebrated	   10	   years	   of	   uninterrupted	   peace	   in	   2013,	   the	   2014	  
Ebola	   outbreak	   revealed	   how	   fragile	   relations	   between	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   its	  
domestic	   citizens	   remains	   a	   peace-­‐building	   conundrum.	   Furthermore,	   it	  
underscored	  that	  Liberia	  has	  maintained	  a	  tenuous	  ‘negative	  peace’—characterised	  
by	   the	   absence	   of	   direct	   physical	   violence	   in	   the	   form	  of	   armed	   conflict—when	   it	  
should	  be	  striving	  for	  a	  robust	  ‘positive	  peace’—the	  absence	  of	  ‘structural	  violence’	  
such	   as	   norms,	   rules,	   and	   regulations	   that	   fuel	   inequality	   and	   injustice	   (Galtung,	  
1996:	   31-­‐34;	   221).	   Like	   most	   citizenship	   laws	   across	   the	   globe,	   Liberia’s	   current	  
Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law	   is	   fundamentally	   exclusionary	   because	   it	   bars	   jus	   soli	  
citizens	  who	  naturalised	  abroad	  and	   their	  offspring	  as	  well	   as	  non-­‐blacks	  who,	  by	  
law,	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  citizenship	  at	  all.	  Moreover,	  for	  those	  who	  qualify	  as	  citizens	  
by	  law,	  citizenship	  is	   largely	  differentiated	  and	  ‘multi-­‐layered’	  (Yuval	  Davis,	  2000),	  
based	   on	   structural	   forces	   that	   privilege	   some	   citizens	   above	   others.	   Therefore,	  
interrogating	  the	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  contemporary	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’	  is	  one	  
of	  the	  ways	  of	  bringing	  it	  closer	  to	  the	  aspirations	  of	  those	  who	  claim	  to	  be	  Liberians	  
‘by	  heart’,	  regardless	  of	  their	  legal	  citizenship	  status.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Falk	  (2000:	  6),	  the	  struggle	  for	  citizenship	  is	  an	  unfinished	  one,	  and	  the	  
Liberia	  case	  study	  is	  a	  stark	  example	  of	  that	  unfinished	  narrative.	  Given	  the	  nature	  




short-­‐term	   abandon	   the	   homeland	   regardless	   of	   their	   legal	   citizenship	   ties	   to	   the	  
country.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   while	   relations	   between	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   its	  
domestic	   citizens	   has	   been	   severely	   undermined	   by	   the	   Ebola	   outbreak,	   citizen-­‐
citizen	   relations	   between	   diasporas	   and	   homelanders	   have	   strengthened	   as	  
evidenced	   by	   the	   outpouring	   of	   remittances	   to	   family	  members	   and	   shipments	   of	  
medical	   relief	   supplies	   from	   abroad.	   Given	   the	   increasing	   demands	   by	   Liberians	  
abroad	  for	  formal	  citizenship	  recognition,	  however,	  it	  will	  be	  imperative	  in	  the	  long-­‐
term	  that	  domestic	  state-­‐citizen	  relations	  are	  strengthened	   in	  order	  to	  carve	  out	  a	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Appendix	   1:	   A	   PROPOSED	   ACT	   TO	   ESTABLISH	   DUAL	   CITIZENSHIP	   FOR	  
LIBERIANS	  BY	  BIRTH	  AND	  BACKGROUND	  
	  
The	   Liberian	  Constitution	  provides,	   at	   article	   22(a),	   that	   “every	   person	   shall	   have	  
the	  right	  to	  own	  property	  alone	  as	  well	  as	  in	  association	  with	  others;	  provided	  only	  
Liberian	  citizens	  shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  own	  real	  property	  within	  the	  Republic”.	  This	  
sacred	   instrument	   provides	   also,	   at	   article	   27(a)	   that	   “	   all	   persons	   who,	   on	   the	  
coming	   into	   force	   of	   this	   Constitution,	   were	   lawfully	   citizens	   of	   Liberia	   shall	  
continue	  to	  be	  Liberian	  citizens”,	  and	  further,	  at	  article	  28,	  that	  “	  any	  person	  at	  least	  
one	   of	   whose	   parents	  was	   a	   Liberian	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   person’s	   birth	   shall	   be	   a	  
citizen	   of	   Liberia;	   provided	   that	   any	   such	   person	   shall	   upon	   reaching	   maturity	  
renounce	  any	  other	  citizenship	  acquired	  by	  virtue	  of	  one	  parent	  being	  a	  citizen	  of	  
another	  country….”	  
	  
We,	  the	  drafters	  of	  this	  proposed	  Law	  are	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  framers	  
of	  the	  provisions	  quoted	  above	  was	  to	  protect	  the	  Liberian	  heritage	  and	  the	  Liberian	  
interest,	  and	  we	  most	  heartily	  subscribe	  to	  that	   intent.	  Consistent	  with	  that	   intent,	  
we	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Constitution	  contemplated	  at	  the	  
time	  that	  our	  country	  would	  have	  degenerated	  into	  the	  unfortunate	  political	  turmoil,	  
civil	  strife	  and	  devastation	  that	  claimed	  the	  lives	  of	  over	  250,000	  of	  our	  citizens	  	  and	  
caused	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  	  of	  others	  to	  seek	  refuge	  and	  sanctuary	  in	  other	  lands,	  
to	   preserve	   and	   safeguard	   their	   lives	   and	   security,	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   very	  
Constitution,	  and	  thereby	  avoid	  the	  grave	  carnage	  taking	  place	  in	  their	  country.	  
	  
It	   is	   further	  our	  sense	   that	   the	  drafters	  of	   the	  Constitution	  did	  not	  contemplate	  or	  
intend	  that,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  events	  surrounding	  our	  civil	  conflict,	  our	  people	  
should	   endure	   the	   perpetual	   hardships	   of	   refugees	   and	   the	   attending	   economic	  
destitutions;	   as	   at	   the	   time	   there	  was	   no	   foreseeable	   end	   to	   the	   carnage	   and	   the	  
hardships	   of	   the	  war	   in	   Liberia.	   	   Yet	   it	  was	   under	   these	   conditions	   and	   for	   these	  
reasons	  that	  many	  of	  our	  fathers,	  mothers,	  brothers,	  sisters	  and	  children,	  still	  loving	  
their	   country,	   faced	   the	   ultimate	   dilemma	   and	   imperative	   of	   taking	   on	   the	  
citizenship	   of	   the	   nations	   that	   offered	   them	   sanctuary,	   security	   and	   livelihood	   for	  
survival.	   In	   a	   number	   of	   cases,	   their	   actions	   were	   driven	   by	   the	   events	   of	   the	  
necessity	   for	   life,	   preservation	   and	   survival	   and/or	   the	   results	   of	   natural	  
occurrences	   over	  which	  majority	   of	   them	  had	  no	   control.	  Most	   of	   them	   could	   not	  
fully	   enjoy	   the	   social	   and	   civic	   benefits	   of	   their	   host	   country,	   which	   included	  
securing	  decent	  well-­‐paying	  jobs	  commensurate	  with	  their	  educational	  background,	  
or	  acquire	  proper	  education,	  which	  is	  very	  expensive	  and	  often	  priced	  much	  higher	  
for	  immigrants	  not	  having	  citizenship	  of	  the	  host	  countries.	  
	  
Under	  the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Laws	  of	  Liberia,	   their	   involuntary	  actions	  for	   life,	  
security,	   safety,	   and	   survival	   deprived	   them	   of	   their	   Liberian	   citizenship	   and	  
consequently	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  attending	  benefits	  of	  such	  citizenship,	  including	  
the	  right	   to	  ownership	  of	  real	  property.	  Many	  of	   these	  Liberians	  have	  earned	  very	  
good	  education	  and	  have	  accumulated	  resources	  which	  they	  believe	  they	  owe	  a	  duty	  
to	  their	  native	  land	  to	  share,	  impart	  and	  invest,	  but	  have	  difficulty	  doing	  so	  because	  




forgotten	   their	   country	   and	   they	   continue	   to	   positively	   impact	   the	   economy	   of	  
Liberia	   by	   their	   remittances	   to	   the	   tune	   of	   over	   $50m	   USD	   a	   year	   to	   assist	   their	  
kinship	  cope	  with	  the	  difficulties	  and	  experiences	  of	  livelihood	  in	  Liberia	  during	  and	  
long	  after	  the	  war;	  and	  they	  continue	  these	  remittances	  up	  to	  the	  present.	  We	  are	  of	  
the	  strong	  belief	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  fourteen	  years	  of	  civil	  war	  in	  
Liberia,	  the	  Liberian	  people	  are	  prepared	  to	  take	  a	  fresh	  look	  at	  the	  true	  intent	  of	  the	  
framers	  of	   the	  Liberian	  Constitution,	  which	   is	   to	  preserve	  to	  Liberians	  the	  right	   to	  
retain	   their	   citizenship,	   consistent	   with	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   Liberian	   heritage	  
referenced	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  
	  
Against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  several	  requests	  and	  petitions	  we	  have	  received	  and	  
continue	  to	  receive	   from	  citizens	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,	  we	  the	  undersigned	  hereby	  
submit	   to	   the	   Liberian	   Legislature	   this	   proposal	   to	   grant	   DUAL	   CITIZENSHIP	   to	  
Liberians	  who	  are	  citizens	  by	  birth,	  but	  who	  have	  acquired	  	  the	  citizenship	  of	  other	  
lands	   under	   the	   conditions	   mentioned	   above	   are	   allowed	   to	   retain,	   reacquire	   or	  
preserve	   their	   Liberian	   citizenship,	   preserve	   their	   lives	   and	   security	   and	   enable	  
them	   to	   obtain	   economic	   and	   professional	   development	   which	   they	   are	   eager	   to	  
transfer	   to	   their	  country	  of	  birth.	  The	  Republics	  of	  Ghana	  and	  Nigeria	  are	   thriving	  
from	   the	   economic	   and	   social	   contributions	   from	   their	   willingness	   to	   grant	  
citizenship	  to	  their	  fellow	  countrymen	  and	  women	  who	  had	  secured	  new	  nationality	  
and/or	  citizenship	  in	  other	  countries.	  This	  proposal	  therefore	  is	  not	  only	  unique	  to	  
Liberia.	  
	  
While	   we	   do	   not	   subscribe	   to	   the	   continued	   and	   persistent	   creation	   of	   non-­‐
contributory	  laws,	  we	  are	  of	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  below	  suggested	  proposition	  is	  
so	  critical	  to	  the	  experiences	  we	  have	  had	  since	  the	  promulgation	  of	  that	  instrument,	  
and	   we	   feel	   that	   the	   intent	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   our	   constitution	   deserve	   the	  
reconsideration	   of	   the	   Liberian	   people.	   And	   so	   we	   most	   humbly	   appeal	   to	   the	  
consciences	  of	   the	  Liberian	  people	   through	   their	  Legislators	   to	   see	   reason	   for	  our	  
submission	  consistent	  with	  current	  national	  realities.	  We	  are	  seeking	  the	  repeal	  of	  
the	   Aliens	   and	  Nationality	   Law	   to	   provide	   dual	   citizenship	   for	   Liberians	   by	   birth,	  
who	  lost	  their	  citizenship	  due	  to	  the	  necessities	  of	  life	  and	  survival.	  
	  
	  
AN	  ACT	  TO	  AMEND	  CERTAIN	  SECTIONS	  
OF	  THE	  	  
	  ALIEN	  AND	  NATIONALITY	  LAWS	  OF	  LIBERIA	  
	  
WHEREAS,	  Article	   11	   (b)	   of	   the	   Liberian	   Constitution	   provides	   that	   “	   All	   Persons,	  
irrespective	   of	   ethnic	   background,	   race,	   sex,	   creed,	   place	   of	   origin	   or	   political	  
opinion,	   are	   entitled	   to	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   freedom	   of	   the	   individual,	  
subject	  to	  such	  qualifications	  as	  provided	  for	  in	  our	  constitution”;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	   Article	   11(c)	   of	   the	   said	   Constitution	   guarantees	   that	   “All	   Persons	   are	  
equal	  before	  the	  Law	  and	  are	  therefore	  entitled	  to	  the	  equal	  protection	  of	  the	  Law”,	  
and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	  Article	  28	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Constitution	  provides	  that	  “Any	  person,	  at	  least	  




of	   Liberia;	   provided	   that	   any	   such	   person	   shall	   upon	   reaching	  maturity	   renounce	  
any	  other	  citizenship	  acquired	  by	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  parent	  being	  a	  citizen	  of	  another	  
country.	  No	  citizen	  of	  Liberia	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	  citizenship	  or	  nationality	  except	  as	  
provided	  by	   law;	   and	   no	   person	   shall	   be	   denied	   the	   right	   to	   change	   citizenship	   or	  
nationality”;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	  Article	  34(h)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  also	  gives	  the	  Legislature	  the	  authority	  
to	   “establish	   laws	   for	   citizenship,	   naturalization	   and	   residence”	   not	   inconsistent	  
with	  the	  Constitution;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	   believing	   that	   the	   intent	   of	   the	   quoted	   provision	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	  
Liberians	  who	  are	  citizens	  of	  Liberia	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Constitution	  
are	   not	   deprived	   of	   their	   citizenship	   on	   account	   of	   events	   of	   necessity	   for	   life,	  
preservation	  and	   survival	  which	  are	   largely	  out	  of	   their	   control	   and/or	  which	  are	  
the	  results	  of	  natural	  occurrences	  over	  which	  they	  have	  no	  control;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	  Article	  13(a)	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Constitution	  also	  provides	  that	  “All	  Persons	  
lawfully	   within	   the	   Republic	   of	   Liberia	   shall	   have	   the	   right	   to	   move	   freely	  
throughout	   Liberia,	   to	   reside	   in	   any	   part	   thereof	   and	   to	   leave	   therefrom,	   subject	  
however	  to	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  Public	  Security;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS	  the	  circumstances	  stated	  herein,	  i.e.	  the	  departure	  of	  our	  citizens	  to	  other	  
lands	  for	  their	  safety	  and	  security,	  and	  their	  lives	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  their	  families	  and	  
relations	  do	  not	  present	  any	   interference	  or	   imposition	   to	   the	   safeguarding	  of	   the	  
Public	  Security	  to	  the	  nation;	  
	  
WHEREAS	   the	   Liberian	   Constitution,	   at	   article	   2,	   states	   “This	   Constitution	   is	   the	  
supreme	  and	  fundamental	  law	  of	  Liberia	  and	  its	  provisions	  shall	  have	  binding	  force	  
and	  effect	  on	  all	  authorities	  and	  persons	  throughout	  the	  Republic”,	  and	  further	  “Any	  
laws,	   treaties,	   statutes,	   decrees,	   customs	   and	   regulations	   found	   to	   be	   inconsistent	  
with	  is	  shall,	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  inconsistency,	  be	  void	  and	  of	  no	  effect….”;	  and	  	  
	  
WHEREAS,	   certain	   sections	   of	   the	   Aliens	   and	   Nationality	   Law	   of	   Liberia,	   enacted	  
prior	   to	   the	   coming	   into	   effect	   of	   the	   new	   (1986)	   Liberian	   Constitution,	   stand	   in	  
contrast	   to	   provisions	   and	   intent	   of	   the	   Liberian	   Constitution,	   referenced	   above,	  
thus	   defeating	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Constitution	   and	   the	   equal	  
protection	  of	  the	  Law;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	  it	  has	  become	  imperative	  to	  amend	  certain	  Sections	  of	  the	  existing	  Aliens	  
and	   Nationality	   Law	   of	   Liberia,	   consistent	   with	   current	   national	   realities	   and	  
international	   best	   practices,	   to	   have	   them	   conform	   to	   the	   present	   Liberian	  
Constitution,	   and	   as	   would	   grant	   to	   all	   Liberians	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   right	   of	  
citizenship	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Constitution;	  and	  
	  
WHEREAS,	  free	  movement	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  environment	  free	  
of	  intimidation	  and	  harassment	  are	  important	  conditions	  for	  long-­‐term	  national	  and	  






NOW,	   THEREFORE,	   THE	   Liberian	   Senate	   and	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   in	  
legislature	  assembled	  hereby	  amend	  certain	  Sections	  of	   the	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  
Law	  of	  Liberia	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Part	  lll	  –	  NATIONALITY	  AND	  NATURALIZATION	  
	  
Section	  1:	  Chapter	  20:	  Nationality	  at	  Birth,	  and	  specifically	  Section	  20.1,	  Citizen	  of	  
Liberia	  at	  Birth,	  which	  reads:	  
	  
“The	  following	  shall	  be	  citizen	  of	  Liberia	  at	  birth:	  
A	   person	   who	   is	   a	   Negro,	   or	   of	   Negro	   descent,	   born	   in	   Liberia	   subject	   to	   the	  
Jurisdiction	  thereof:	  
	  
A	  person	  born	  outside	  Liberia	  whose	  father	  
(i)	  Was	  born	  a	  Citizen	  of	  Liberia;	  
(ii)	  Was	  a	  Citizen	  of	  Liberia	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  such	  child,	  and	  
(iii)	  Had	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  prior	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  such	  child,	  	  
	  
Is	  hereby	  amended	  to	  read	  as	  follows:	  
	  
“The	  following	  shall	  be	  a	  citizen	  of	  Liberia	  at	  birth:	  
A	   person	   who	   is	   Negro,	   or	   of	   Negro	   descent,	   born	   in	   Liberia	   and	   subject	   to	   the	  
Jurisdiction	  thereof:	  
	  
A	  person	  born	  outside	  Liberia	  whose	  father	  or	  mother	  
	  	  	  	  (i)	  Was	  born	  a	  citizen	  of	  Liberia;	  
	  	  	  	  (ii)	  Was	  a	  citizen	  of	  Liberia	  at	  the	  time	  of	  birth	  of	  such	  child;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  (iii)	  Had	  resided	  in	  Liberia	  prior	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  such	  child.	  
	  
Section	  2:	  CHAPTER	  22:	   	   LOSS	  OF	   CITIZENSHIP,	   and	   specifically	   Section	   22.1,	  
Acts	  Causing	  Loss	  of	  Citizenship,	  which	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
	  
“From	  and	  after	   the	  effective	  date	  of	   this	   title,	  a	  person	  who	   is	  a	  citizen	  of	  Liberia	  
whether	  by	  birth	  or	  naturalization	  shall	  lose	  his	  citizenship	  by:	  
	  
(a) Obtaining	   naturalization	   in	   a	   foreign	   state	   upon	   his	   own	   application;	  
upon	   the	   application	   of	   a	   duly	   authorized	   agent,	   or	   through	   the	  
naturalization	  of	  a	  parent	  having	  legal	  custody	  of	  such	  person,	  provided	  
citizenship	  shall	  not	  be	  lost	  by	  any	  person	  under	  this	  section	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  naturalization	  of	  a	  parent	  or	  parents	  while	  such	  person	  is	  under	  the	  
age	  of	  21	  years,	  unless	  such	  person	  shall	  fail	  to	  enter	  Liberia	  to	  establish	  
a	  permanent	  residence	  prior	  to	  his	  twenty	  –	  third	  birthday;	  or	  	  
	  
(b) Taking	  an	  oath	  or	  making	  an	  affirmation	  or	  other	  formal	  declaration	  of	  
allegiance	  to	  a	  foreign	  state	  or	  a	  political	  subdivision	  thereof;	  or	  
	  
(c) Exercising	   a	   free	   choice	   to	   enter	   services	   in	   the	   armed	   forces	   for	   a	  
foreign	   sate	   unless,	   prior	   to	   such	   entry	   or	   services,	   such	   entry	   or	  





(d) Voting	  in	  a	  political	  election	  in	  a	  foreign	  state	  or	  voting	  in	  an	  election	  or	  
plebiscite	   to	   determine	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   a	   foreign	   state	   over	   foreign	  
territory;	  or	  
	  
(e) Making	   a	   formal	   renunciation	   of	   Liberian	   Nationality	   in	   a	   court	   in	  
Liberia	  or	  before	  a	  diplomatic	  or	  consular	  officer	  of	  Liberia	  in	  a	  foreign	  
state	   in	   such	   form	   as	   may	   be	   prescribed	   by	   the	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	  
Affairs	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Liberia	  
	  
Is	  hereby	  amended	  to	  read	  as	  follows:	  
	  
22. LOSS	  OF	  CITIZENSHIP	  
	  
22.1 Acts	  causing	  Loss	  of	  Citizenship	  
	  
	  
(a) From	  and	  after	  the	  effective	  date	  of	  this	  title,	  no	  person	  who	  is	  a	  
citizen	  of	  Liberia	  at	  birth	  shall	  lose	  his	  /her	  citizenship	  for	  reasons	  
of	   marriage	   to	   a	   citizen	   of	   a	   foreign	   state;	   naturalization	   in	   a	  
foreign	   state	   or	   naturalization	   of	   a	   parent	   or	   parents	   in	   another	  
state;	  entering	  or	  serving	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  for	  a	  foreign	  state	  or	  
voting	  in	  a	  political	  election	  in	  a	  foreign	  state;	  
	  
(b) From	  and	  after	  the	  effective	  date	  of	  this	  title,	  Liberian	  Citizenship	  
by	   Birth	   is	   hereby	   restored	   to	   all	   persons	  who	  were	   citizens	   by	  
birth	  and	  who	  lost	  citizenship	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  conditions	  laid	  out	  
in	  the	  previous	  Aliens	  and	  Nationality	  Law;	  
	  
(c) A	  person	  who	  is	  a	  citizen	  of	  Liberia	  at	  birth	  but	  who	  makes	  a	  free	  
choice	   of	   a	   formal	   renunciation	   of	   Liberian	   nationality	   before	   a	  
court	   in	   Liberia	   or	   before	   a	   diplomatic	   or	   consular	   officer	   of	  
Liberia	  in	  a	  foreign	  state,	  in	  such	  manner	  as	  may	  be	  prescribed	  by	  
the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Liberia,	  and	  not	  growing	  out	  of	  
circumstances	   over	   which	   he	   or	   she	   has	   no	   control	   or	   is	   not	   in	  
control	  of,	  shall	  lose	  his/her	  citizenship;	  
	  
(d) 	  By	  the	  passage	  of	  this	  Act,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Liberia	  shall,	  within	  the	  
limits	   prescribed	   herein	   and	   under	   the	   conditions	   stated	  
hereinbefore,	   RECOGNIZE	   “Dual	   Citizenship”	   in	  which	   a	   citizen	  
of	  Liberia	  at	  birth	  may	  become	  a	  citizen	  of	  another	  state	  without	  
losing	  HIS/HER	  Liberian	  citizenship;	  and	  
	  









ANY	  LAW	  TO	  THE	  CONTRARY	  IS	  NOTWITHSTANDING	  
	  
SUBMITTED	   TO	   THE	   SENATE	   AND	   HOUSE	   OF	   REPRESENTATIVES	   IN	  
LEGISLATURE	  ASSEMBLED	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Appendix	  2:	  Fieldwork	  Consent	  Form	  	  
	  
I,	  	   	   	   	   	   ,	   agree	   to	   be	   interviewed	   by	   Ms.	   Robtel	   Neajai	  
Pailey,	  a	  second	  year	  PhD	  student	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Development	  Studies	  at	  the	  
University	   of	   London’s	   School	   of	   Oriental	   and	   African	   Studies	  
(http://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff71766.php),	  who	   is	   conducting	   research	  on	   	   the	  
current	   and	   historical	   factors	   that	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation	   in	   Liberia	   and	   how	   these	   factors	   have	   affected	   on-­‐going	   debates	   about	  
the	  role	  of	  diasporas	  in	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction.	  	  
	  
Given	   that	   dual	   citizenship	   is	   the	   first	   comprehensive	   policy	   mechanism	   that	   the	  
Government	   of	   Liberia	   has	   ever	   introduced	   specifically	   to	   respond	   to	   diasporic	  
claims,	  I	  understand	  that	  this	  study	  analyses	  the	  proposed	  legislation	  as	  a	  symbolic	  
manifestation	  of	   Liberia’s	   long-­‐standing	   struggle	   to	   formalise	   its	   relationship	  with	  
its	  diasporas.	   I	  understand	  that	   the	  contents	  of	  my	  interview	  will	  appear	   in	  a	   final	  
thesis,	  and	  may	  be	  published	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  	  
	  
I	  understand	  that	  by	  participating	  in	  this	  study,	  I	  will	  be	  contributing	  to	  the	  growing	  
body	  of	  empirical	  research	  on	  Liberia’s	  diasporas.	  I	  also	  understand	  that	  Ms.	  Pailey’s	  
Ph.D.	  research	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  study	  on	  diasporas	  as	  ‘neglected	  agents	  of	  change’	  
funded	  by	   the	   International	  Development	  Research	  Centre	   (IDRC)	   in	  collaboration	  
with	   the	   George	  Washington	   University	   and	   the	   Liberia	   Diaspora	   Policy	  Working	  
Group,	   a	   collaborative	   of	   Liberian	   researchers	   institutionally	   affiliated	   with	   the	  
University	  of	  Liberia	  IBB	  School	  of	  International	  Affairs.	  	  
	  
I	  understand	  that	  I	  was	  selected	  through	  either	  Ms.	  Pailey’s	  personal	  or	  institutional	  
networks	   because	   I	   fit	   the	   criteria	   stipulated	   in	   the	   study.	   I	   understand	   that	   the	  
interview	  will	   last	  up	   to	  one-­‐hour	   in	  duration,	  and	   that	   I	  may	  be	  contacted	  by	  Ms.	  
Pailey	   after	   the	   interview	   for	   follow-­‐up	   clarification.	   I	   understand	   that	   I	   may	  
withdraw	  at	  any	  time	  from	  the	  study	  by	  informing	  Ms.	  Pailey	  of	  my	  decision	  to	  do	  so.	  
I	  also	  understand	  that	  I	  have	  the	  right	  to	  refrain	  from	  answering	  any	  questions	  that	  
make	  me	  feel	  uncomfortable.	  	  	  
	  
I	  have	  been	   informed	   that	  all	   interviews	  will	  be	  audio	  recorded,	  and	   I	  agree	   to	  be	  
audio	  taped	  during	  the	  course	  of	  this	  interview.	  I	  understand	  that	  Ms.	  Pailey	  will	  be	  
working	   with	   Liberian	   research	   assistants	   who	  will	   help	   to	   transcribe	   the	   audio-­‐
recorded	   interviews.	   I	   have	   been	   informed	   that	   Ms.	   Pailey	   and	   her	   research	  
assistants	   will	   be	   the	   only	   ones	   with	   access	   to	   a	   password-­‐protected	   electronic	  
database	  of	  qualitative	  interviews	  as	  they	  are	  conducted	  in	  West	  Africa,	  Europe,	  and	  
North	  America	  in	  “real-­‐time.”	  I	  understand	  that	  recorded	  interviews	  and	  transcripts	  
will	   be	   stored	   in	   Ms.	   Pailey’s	   electronic	   database	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   SOAS	   secure	  
database	   for	   up	   to	   five	   years.	   I	   also	  understand	   that	  with	   the	   exception	  of	   policy-­‐
makers/government	   officials	   and	   the	   heads	   of	   Liberian	   diaspora	   regional	  
organisations,	  all	  respondents	  will	  be	  anonymised.	  
	  
I	   understand	   that	   I	   may	   contact	   Ms.	   Pailey	   at	   robtelneajai@gmail.com	   or	  






Signed:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Date:	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  





















































Interviewee	  Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  




1.	  Why	  did	  you	  sponsor	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  bill?	  
	  
2.	  What	  impact	  will	  the	  proposed	  bill	  have	  on	  Liberia’s	  development?	  What	  impact	  
will	  it	  have	  on	  Liberia’s	  diasporas?	  
	  
3.	  How	  difficult	  or	  easy	  has	  it	  been	  to	  convince	  legislative	  colleagues	  to	  support	  the	  
proposed	  bill?	  
	  
4.	  Who	  are	  your	  allies/opponents	  (with	  respect	  to	  this	  bill)	  at	  ‘home’	  and	  abroad?	  
	  
5.	  Which	  diaspora	  groups	  have	  been	  the	  largest	  lobbying	  force?	  How	  have	  they	  been	  
involved?	  Where	  are	  they	  located?	  	  
	  
6.	  How	  have	  you	  educated	  the	  public	  about	  the	  proposed	  legislation?	  
	  
7.	   Have	   you	   consulted	   counterparts	   in	   other	   countries	   about	   the	   proposed	   bill	   or	  
about	  their	  experiences	  with	  similar	  legislation?	  What	  lessons	  can	  be	  learned	  from	  
other	  contexts?	  
	  
8.	  How	  do	  you	  define	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  	  
	  
9.	  In	  what	  ways	  are	  Liberia’s	  diasporas	  involved	  in	  the	  country’s	  development?	  How	  





















Interviewee	  Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  




1.	  What	  have	  been	  the	  major	  development	  milestones	  in	  your	  sector	  in	  Liberia	  since	  
2003?	  What	  has	  been	  the	  role	  of	  diasporas	  in	  these	  milestones,	  if	  any	  at	  all?	  
	  
2.	   What	   have	   been	   some	   of	   the	   major	   challenges	   in	   Liberia’s	   post-­‐war	  
reconstruction	   drive?	   Have	   returnees/diasporas/homeland	   Liberians	   mitigated	  
these	  challenges	  or	  compounded	  them?	  How?	  
	  
3.	   How	   has	   the	   government	   of	   Liberia	   engaged	   diasporas	   in	   its	   reconstruction	  
efforts?	  
	  
4.	  Why	  did	  the	  government	  hold	  townhall	  meetings	  in	  key	  population	  centres	  in	  the	  
US,	  Europe	  and	  West	  Africa,	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Liberia	  Rising	  2030	  initiative?	  
	  
5.	  What	  are	  the	  challenges	  of	  being	  a	  returnee/homeland	  Liberian	  in	  government?	  
	  
6.	  What	   is	   the	  percentage	  of	  returnee	  Liberians	  currently	  holding	  key	  government	  
positions	  in	  your	  sector?	  What	  are	  the	  advantages/disadvantages	  of	  this	  trend?	  
	  
7.	  Who	  do	  you	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  
	  
8.	  What	   do	   you	   know	   about	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   for	   Liberia?	  	  
How	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  it?	  
	  
9.	  Do	  you	  support	  dual	  citizenship	  for	  Liberia?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  
	  
10.	  Is	  there	  a	  role	  for	  diasporas	  in	  Liberia’s	  development?	  If	  so,	  what	  is	  that	  role?	  If	  
















Interviewee	  Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  




1.	  What	  is	  the	  population	  of	  Liberians	  in	  your	  country/regional	  jurisdiction	  and	  how	  
did	  most	   of	   them	   get	   there?	  When	   did	   they	   get	   there?	   Does	   the	   embassy	   keep	   a	  
database	  of	  Liberians	  within	  your	  jurisdiction?	  If	  so,	  how	  does	  one	  register	  with	  the	  
database?	  
	  
2.	  How	  does	  your	  mission	  engage	  with	  diaspora	  Liberians	  within	  your	  jurisdiction?	  	  
	  
3.	  What	   are	   the	  major	   challenges/concerns	   of	   Liberians	  within	   your	   jurisdiction?	  
How	  does	  the	  embassy	  assist	  in	  mitigating	  these	  challenges/concerns?	  	  
	  
4.	   What	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   Liberia’s	   diplomatic	   relationship	   with	   the	   host	   country?	  
Have	  Liberians	  residing	  in	  the	  host	  country	  affected	  this	  relationship	  (negatively	  or	  
positively)?	  How?	  
	  
5.	   How	   does	   your	  mission	   verify	   ‘Liberian	   citizenship’	  within	   your	   jurisdiction	   or	  
when	  issuing	  travel	  documents?	  How	  does	  your	  mission	  define	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  
	  
6.	  What	  are	  the	  various	  legal	  residence	  options	  for	  Liberians	  in	  your	  jurisdiction?	  
	  
7.	  What	   is	   the	   percentage	   of	   Liberians	   in	   your	   jurisdiction	  who	   have	   naturalised?	  
Why	  do	  you	  think	  they	  have?	  
	  
8.	  What	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  Liberians	  in	  your	  jurisdiction	  who	  have	  retained	  their	  
legal	  ‘Liberian	  citizenship’?	  Why	  do	  you	  think	  they	  have?	  
	  
9.	  What	  are	  the	  immigration	  challenges	  in	  your	  jurisdiction	  for	  Liberians	  who	  do	  not	  
or	  cannot	  naturalise?	  
	  
10.	   Do	   you	   believe	   dual	   citizenship	   will	   help	   or	   hinder	   Liberia’s	   reconstruction	  
process?	   Why	   or	   why	   not?	   Do	   you	   believe	   dual	   citizenship	   will	   improve	   the	  












Interviewee	  Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  




1.	  In	  what	  ways	  is	  your	  regional	  organisation	  active	  in	  Liberia?	  
	  
2.	  In	  what	  ways	  is	  your	  organisation	  active	  in	  the	  host	  nation?	  
	  
3.	   How	   has	   the	   government	   of	   Liberia	   (or	   the	   Liberian	   embassy	   in	   your	   region)	  
engaged	  your	  organisation’s	  support	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  process?	  
	  
4.	   How	   has	   your	   organisation	   engaged	   the	   Liberian	   government	   (or	   the	   Liberian	  
embassy	  in	  your	  region)	  in	  your	  projects	  in	  Liberia	  and	  abroad?	  
	  
5.	  How	  many	  members	  does	  your	  organisation	  have?	  Do	  they	  all	  live	  locally?	  
	  
6.	  How	  many	  Liberians	   reside	   in	  your	  city/region?	  How	   involved	  are	   they	   in	  your	  
organisation/or	  in	  other	  Liberian	  organisations?	  
	  
7.	   What	   are	   the	   major	   challenges	   of	   Liberians	   in	   your	   city/region/or	   in	   your	  
organisation?	  
	  
8.	  What	  is	  the	  citizenship	  status	  of	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  your	  members?	  
	  
9.	  Who	  do	  you	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  How	  does	  your	  organisation	  define	  
a	  “Liberian	  citizen’?	  
	  
10.	  What	  do	  you	  know	  about	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	   legislation	  for	  Liberia?	  	  
How	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  it?	  
	  
11.	  What	  is	  your	  position	  on	  the	  proposed	  dual	  citizenship	  legislation?	  Why	  do	  you	  














Interviewee	  File	  #:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  
Age:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Gender:	  	   M	  	   	   F	  	   	  
	  
Educational	  level:	   	   	   	   	   Profession:	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Annual	  Income:	   	   	   	   	   Citizenship	  status:	  	   	   	   	  
	  
Place	  of	  Birth:	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  





1.	  Have	  you	  ever	  resided	  outside	  of	  Liberia	  for	  longer	  than	  one	  year	  since	  1997?	  For	  
how	  long?	  Where?	  Why?	  
	  
2.	  What	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  engagement	  with	  Liberia	  when	  you	  resided	  abroad?	  
	  
3.	  How	  have	  you	  contributed	  to	  Liberia’s	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	  efforts?	  
	  
4.	  Do	  you	  have	  Liberian	   relatives	   abroad?	  What	   is	   the	  nature	  of	   your	   relationship	  
with	  them?	  	  
	  
5.	  How	  often	  have	  you	  benefited	   from	  remittances	  sent	  by	  relatives	  abroad	  within	  
the	  past	  year?	  What	  is	  the	  total	  amount	  you	  received	  (in	  USD)	  within	  the	  past	  year?	  
	  
6.	   Generally,	   do	   you	   believe	   Liberians	   abroad	   have	   helped	   or	   hindered	   the	  
reconstruction	  process?	  How?	  Please	  provide	  examples.	  
	  
7.	   Does	   the	   government	   of	   Liberia	   treat	   Liberians	   abroad	   (or	   Liberian	   returnees)	  
differently	  from	  Liberians	  at	  home?	  	  What	  evidence	  do	  you	  have	  of	  this?	  
	  
8.	  Who	  would	  you	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  
	  
9.	  What	   do	   you	   know	   about	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   for	   Liberia?	  	  
How	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  it?	  
	  




11.	  Is	  there	  a	  role	  for	  diasporas	  in	  Liberia’s	  development?	  If	  so,	  what	  is	  that	  role?	  If	  























































Interviewee	  File	  #:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  
Age:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Gender:	  	   M	  	   	   F	  	   	  
	  
Educational	  level:	   	   	   	   	   Profession:	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Annual	  Income:	   	   	   	   	   Citizenship	  status:	  	   	   	   	  
	  
Place	  of	  Birth:	   	   	   	   	   Residence	  Abroad:	   	   	   	  
	  





1.	  Is	  this	  a	  temporary	  or	  permanent	  move	  back	  to	  Liberia?	  Why?	  	  
	  
2.	  Did	  you	  secure	   immigration	  status	   in	  your	  country	  of	  settlement	  before	  moving	  
back	  to	  Liberia?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  What	  status	  do	  you	  have	  abroad,	  if	  any	  at	  all?	  
	  
3.	   What	   were	   the	   circumstances	   that	   brought	   about	   your	   permanent/temporary	  
return	  to	  Liberia?	  When	  did	  you	  move	  back?	  From	  where?	  When	  do	  you	  intend	  to	  
return	  to	  your	  country	  of	  settlement,	  if	  at	  all?	  
	  
4.	   What	   were	   you	   doing	   before	   moving	   back	   to	   Liberia?	  What	   are	   you	   currently	  
doing	  in	  Liberia?	  
	  
5.	  How	  did	  you	  (do	  you)	  remain	  engaged	  with	  Liberia	  while	  abroad?	  
	  
6.	  What	  kind	  of	  support	  do	  you	  receive	  from	  Liberian	  relatives	  abroad,	  if	  any?	  
	  
7.	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  investments	  in	  the	  country	  in	  which	  you	  settled	  abroad,	  
if	  any?	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  investments	  in	  Liberia,	  if	  any?	  
	  
8.	  How	  do	  you	  define	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  
	  
9.	  What	   do	   you	   know	   about	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   for	   Liberia?	  	  
How	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  it?	  
	  





11.	  Would	  you	  seek	  dual	  citizenship	  if	  the	  bill	  were	  passed?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  
	  
12.	  Is	  there	  a	  role	  for	  diasporas	  in	  Liberia’s	  development?	  If	  so,	  what	  is	  that	  role?	  If	  





















































Interviewee	  File	  #:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  
Age:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Gender:	  	   M	  	   	   F	  	   	  
	  
Educational	  level:	   	   	   	   	   Employed?	  	   	  Y	   	   	  N	  
	  
Profession:	   	   	   	   	   	   Annual	  Income:	   	   	  
	   	  
Country	  of	  Citizenship:	  	   	   	   	   Immigration	  Status:	   	   	  
	  
Place	  of	  Birth:	   	   	   	   	  
	  





1.	  Are	  you	  involved	  at	  all	  in	  Liberia’s	  reconstruction	  process?	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  
	  
2.	   Has	   the	   government	   of	   Liberia	   engaged	   your	   support	   in	   the	   reconstruction	  
process?	  If	  so,	  who	  and	  how?	  	  
	  
3.	  How	  involved	  are	  you	  in	  Liberian	  organisations	  where	  you	  reside?	  What	  do	  these	  
organisations	   do	   (community	   development	   in	   the	   host	   country?	   engagement	  with	  
Liberia?	  etc.)?	  
	  
4.	  How	  engaged	  are	  you	  with	  the	  host	  nation?	  	  
	  
5.	  How	  do	  you	  define	  a	  ‘Liberian	  citizen’?	  
	  
6.	   Why	   did	   you	   naturalise	   elsewhere/or	   why	   did	   you	   retain	   your	   legal	   ‘Liberian	  
citizenship’?	  
	  
7.	  What	  have	  been	  the	  major	  challenges	  of	  naturalisation/or	  of	  retaining	  your	  legal	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  if	  any?	  
	  
8.	  What	   have	   been	   the	  major	   benefits	   of	   naturalisation/or	   of	   retaining	   your	   legal	  
‘Liberian	  citizenship’,	  if	  any?	  
	  
9.	  What	   do	   you	   know	   about	   the	   proposed	   dual	   citizenship	   legislation	   for	   Liberia?	  	  




10.	  Do	  you	  support	  dual	  citizenship	  for	  Liberia?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  
	  
11.	  Would	  you	  seek	  dual	  citizenship	  if	  the	  bill	  were	  passed?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  What	  
if	  the	  proposed	  bill	  is	  rejected?	  
	  
12.	  Is	  there	  a	  role	  for	  diasporas	  in	  Liberia’s	  development?	  If	  so,	  what	  is	  that	  role?	  If	  


















































Interviewee	  Name:	  	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  Date:	   	   	   	  
	  
Interview	  Time:	   	   	   	   	   Interview	  City:	   	   	   	  
	  
E-­‐mail	  Contact:	   	   	   	   	   Telephone	  Contact:	   	   	   	  
	  




1.	  What	  were	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  your	  country’s	  introduction	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  
legislation?	   What	   were	   the	   factors	   that	   led	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   dual	   citizenship	  
legislation?	  
	  
2.	  How	  involved	  were	  you	  in	  dual	  citizenship	  advocacy,	  if	  at	  all?	  	  
	  
3.	  How	  long	  did	  it	  take	  to	  enact	  dual	  citizenship?	  
	  
4.	  Who	  were	  the	  major	  supporters/opponents	  of	  dual	  citizenship?	  Why	  did	  people	  
support	  or	  oppose	  the	  bill?	  
	  
5.	  How	  has	  your	  government	  instituted/implemented	  dual	  citizenship?	  
	  
6.	  How	  has	  your	  government	  engaged	  with	  Sierra	  Leonean	  diasporas	  before,	  during	  
and	  after	  the	  war?	  
	  
7.	  What	  have	  been	  some	  of	  the	  outcomes	  (negative	  and	  positive)	  of	  that	  engagement?	  
	  
8.	   How	   does	   your	   government	   define	   a	   ‘Sierra	   Leonean	   citizen’?	   Who	   do	   you	  
consider	  to	  be	  a	  ‘Sierra	  Leonean	  citizen’?	  
	  
9.	  Has	  dual	  citizenship	  helped	  or	  hindered	  your	  country’s	  post-­‐war	  development?	  
How?	  
	  
